File 019477

Images

Text

Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 1
9/29/16 5:51 PM
also by edward jay epstein
The Annals of Unsolved Crime
Three Days in May: Sex, Surveillance, and DSK
The Hollywood Economist: The Hidden Financial Reality Behind the Movies
The Big Picture: The New Logic of Money and Power in Hollywood
Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer
Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA
The Rise and Fall of Diamonds: The Shattering of a Brilliant Illusion
Cartel
Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald
Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America
Between Fact and Fiction: The Problem of Journalism
News from Nowhere: Television and the News
Counterplot
Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 2
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOW AMERICA
LOST ITS SECRETS
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 1
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 2
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOW AMERICA
LOST ITS SECRETS
Edward Snowden, the Man and the Theft
Edward Jay Epstein
alfred a. knopf | new york | 2017
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 3
9/29/16 5:51 PM
this is a borzoi book
published by alfred a. knopf
Copyright © 2017 by E. J. E. Publications, Ltd.
All rights reserved. Published in the United States by Alfred A. Knopf,
a division of Penguin Random House LLC, New York,
and distributed in Canada by Random House of Canada,
a division of Penguin Random House Canada Limited, Toronto.
www.aaknopf.com
Knopf, Borzoi Books, and the colophon
are registered trademarks of Penguin Random House LLC.
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data [to come]
Jacket photograph by TK
Jacket design by TK
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Edition
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 4
9/29/16 5:51 PM
This book is dedicated to the memory of a wise teacher,
James Q. Wilson (1931–2012)
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 5
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 6
9/29/16 5:51 PM
There are certain persons who . . . have a perfect right
to commit breaches of morality and crimes, and . . .
the law is not for them.
—fyodor dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 7
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 8
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Contents
Prologue Snowden’s Trail: Hong Kong, 2014 000
part one SNOWDEN’S ARC
chapter 1 Tinker 15
chapter 2 Secret Agent 22
chapter 3 Contractor 28
chapter 4 Thief 38
chapter 5 Crossing the Rubicon 44
chapter 6 Hacktivist 49
chapter 7 String Puller 59
chapter 8 Raider of the Inner Sanctum 73
chapter 9 Escape Artist 80
chapter 10 Whistle- blower 88
chapter 11 Enter Assange 98
chapter 12 Fugitive 104
part two THE INTELLIGENCE CRISIS
chapter 13 The Great Divide 113
chapter 14 The Crime Scene Investigation 133
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 9
9/29/16 5:51 PM
x | Contents
chapter 15 Did Snowden Act Alone? 146
chapter 16 The Question of When 156
chapter 17 The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing 168
chapter 18 The Unheeded Warning 185
part three THE GAME OF NATIONS
chapter 19 The Rise of the NSA 195
chapter 20 The NSA’s Back Door 207
chapter 21 The Russians Are Coming 217
chapter 22 The Chinese Puzzle 231
chapter 23 A Single Point of Failure 238
part four MOSCOW CALLING
chapter 24 Off to Moscow 247
chapter 25 Through the Looking Glass 254
chapter 26 The Handler 261
part five CONCLUSIONS: WALKING THE CAT BACK
chapter 27 Snowden’s Choices 271
chapter 28 The Espionage Source 281
chapter 29 The “War on Terror” After Snowden 287
Epilogue The Snowden Effect 295
Acknowledgments 301
Notes 303
Selected Bibliography 325
Index 329
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 10
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOW AMERICA
LOST ITS SECRETS
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 1
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 2
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Prologue
Snowden’s Trail: Hong Kong, 2014
The national security agency, or, as it is now commonly
called, the NSA, was created on October 24, 1952, in such a tight
cocoon of secrecy that even the presidential order creating it was
classified top secret. When journalists asked questions about this
new agency, Washington officials jokingly told them that the initials
NSA stood for “No Such Agency.” The reason for this extraordinary
stealth is that the NSA is involved in a very sensitive enterprise.
Its job is to intercept, decode, and analyze foreign electronic communications
transmitted around the globe over copper wires, fiberoptic
cable, satellite, microwave relays, cell phone towers, wireless
transmissions, and the Internet for specified intelligence purposes. In
intelligence jargon, its product is called COMINT, which stands for
communications intelligence. Because this form of intelligence gathering
is most effective when the NSA’s targets are unaware of the
state- of- the- art tools the NSA uses to break into their computers
and telecommunications channels to first intercept and then decrypt
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 3
9/29/16 5:51 PM
4 | how america lost its secrets
their secret messages, the NSA goes to extraordinary lengths to keep
them secret. Draconian laws protect this secrecy.
In the first week of June 2013, the NSA learned that there had
been a massive breach. Thousands of secret files bearing on communications
intelligence had been stolen from a heavily guarded
regional base in Oahu, Hawaii.
The suspect was Edward Snowden, a twenty- nine- year- old civilian
analyst at that base, who had fled to Hong Kong before the
breach was discovered. According to a three- count criminal complaint
filed by federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia,
Snowden had stolen government property and violated the
Espionage Act by the unauthorized and willful communication of
national defense information to an unauthorized person. He also
likely violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by entering computer
systems illicitly.
This was not a whodunit mystery. On June 9, 2013, in an extraordinary
twelve- minute video made in a cramped hotel room in Hong
Kong, Snowden identified himself as the person who had taken the
NSA documents. Watching the video, the world saw a shy, awkward,
and sympathetic- looking man wearing a rumpled shirt, rimless
glasses, and a computer- geek haircut, passionately speaking out
against what he termed the NSA’s violations of the law and, in a
shaky voice, expressing his willingness to suffer the consequences
for exposing them.
Snowden had an innocent, idealistic, principled look about him,
and the world was ready to congratulate him for revealing the NSA’s
alleged illegal collection of data inside the United States. But in fact,
Snowden had stolen a great deal more than documents relating to
domestic surveillance. He had also stolen secret documents from the
NSA, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the British cipher
service revealing the sources and methods they employed in their
monitoring of adversaries, which was their job.
By the time the theft had been discovered, in the first week of
June 2013, it was impossible for the FBI, a grand jury, or any other
U.S. agency to question him because he had fled the country. His
first stop, Hong Kong, the economically autonomous city of 7.2 million,
is a special administrative region of mainland China. Under the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 4
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Prologue | 5
terms of the 1997 transfer of sovereignty from Great Britain, China
is responsible for Hong Kong’s defense and foreign policy, including
intelligence services. He then proceeded to Russia, which has no
extradition treaty with the United States. Russia granted him asylum,
making it unlikely that U.S. authorities would ever have the
opportunity to question him.
Snowden’s escape left in its wake an incredibly important unsolved
mystery: How had a young analyst in training at the NSA succeeded
in penetrating all the layers of NSA security to pull off the largest
theft of secret documents in the history of American intelligence?
Did he act alone? What happened to the documents? Was his arrival
in Russia part of the plan?
Because I had written several books on the vulnerability of intelligence
services, this was a mystery— a “howdunit,” if you like— that
immediately intrigued me. Even if Snowden had acted for the most
salutary of reasons, the unauthorized transfer of state secrets from
the United States to an adversary country is, by almost any definition,
a form of espionage.
I decided to begin my investigation of this case in Hong Kong,
because it was the place to which Snowden first fled after leaving
Hawaii. Snowden had planned the trip for at least four weeks,
according to the mandatory travel plan he had filed at the NSA.
When I spoke to my sources in the intelligence community, they
could not explain Snowden’s choice. It would not necessarily protect
him from the reach of U.S. law, because Hong Kong had an active
extradition treaty with the United States. Just a few months earlier,
Hong Kong had made headlines by honoring America’s request to
extradite Trent Martin, a fugitive wanted for insider trading.
Nor was Hong Kong particularly convenient to Hawaii. There
were no nonstop flights there from Honolulu in May 2013. Snowden
flew eight hours to Narita International Airport in Japan, where he
waited almost three hours. He then flew five hours to Hong Kong.
Snowden could have flown to countries that do not have extradition
treaties with America in far less time.
Adding to this mystery, at the time he departed Honolulu,
Snowden had not yet arranged for any journalists to meet him in
Hong Kong, and as far as U.S. intelligence could determine, he had
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 5
9/29/16 5:51 PM
6 | how america lost its secrets
no known appointments there. Even so, Snowden carried to Hong
Kong digital copies he had made of the top secret NSA documents.
As General Michael Hayden, who served as the head of both the
NSA and the CIA, told me, “It’s very mysterious why Snowden
chose Hong Kong.” We can assume he had a compelling enough reason
for him to take the risk that he would be arrested there by Hong
Kong police after U.S. authorities invoked the detention provision
of its extradition treaty. It was of course possible that Snowden had
traveled there to see someone he believed could protect him.
I arrived in Hong Kong on May 20, 2014— exactly one year after
Snowden had arrived there aboard a Japan Airlines flight. I checked
in to the Mira hotel in the Tsim Sha Tsui shopping district of Kowloon,
a ten- minute ferry ride away from Hong Kong Island, where
most of the foreign consulates are located.
I chose the Mira because it was the five- star hotel in which
Snowden had stayed and where he had made the celebrated video
admitting his role in taking the NSA documents. I asked at the front
desk for room 1014, the same one that Snowden had occupied in
2013, because I wanted easy access to the hotel’s service and security
personnel responsible for the room who might have had contact
with Snowden a year earlier. Unfortunately, that room was occupied,
but I was given a nearby room that served my purpose.
Snowden had told Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the
Guardian reporters he met in Hong Kong, that he had hidden out
at the Mira hotel since his arrival in Hong Kong because he feared
that the CIA might capture him. My first surprise was that Snowden
had not arrived at the Mira until eleven days after he arrived in
Hong Kong. As I learned from the hotel staff, Snowden had registered
there under his real name and used his own passport and credit
card to secure the room, an odd choice if he was hiding out. He had
checked in to the hotel not on May 20, as he had told the reporters,
but on June 1, 2013. He checked out on June 10.
Wherever Snowden stayed from May 20 to June 1, he apparently
considered it a safe enough place from which to send Greenwald a
“welcome package,” as he called it, of twenty top secret NSA docu-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 6
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Prologue | 7
ments on May 25. He had now not only downloaded documents but
also violated the oath he had signed when he took his job by providing
them to an unauthorized party. During this period, Snowden
also contacted Barton Gellman, on behalf of The Washington Post,
via e- mail. Indeed, while he was staying someplace other than the
place he claimed to be staying, he made almost all the arrangements
for his journalistic coming- out. He was in contact with at least one
foreign mission during this period, according to what he wrote to
Gellman on May 24. In that e- mail, concerning when and how his
story was to be published by The Washington Post, Snowden asked
Gellman to include some text that would help Snowden with his
dealings with this mission. But which country was he approaching?
In an effort to establish Snowden’s whereabouts during these “missing”
eleven days, which, among other things, could shed light on
why he first came to Hong Kong, I called Keith Bradsher, a prizewinning
journalist who had been the New York Times bureau chief in
Hong Kong in 2013. He had written a well- researched report about
Snowden’s arrival there. He proposed we meet at the Foreign Correspondents’
Club.
Bradsher told me that he had known Albert Ho, who had been
retained as Snowden’s lawyer, for more than a decade. He had interviewed
him many times, because he was a leader of a political movement
in Hong Kong. Bradsher said that a few days after Snowden
had revealed himself on June 9, he met with Ho and questioned him
about Snowden’s unknown whereabouts.
Ho told Bradsher that all of Snowden’s logistics had been arranged
for him by an intermediary, whom Ho called a “carer.” Ho said that
Snowden had been in contact with the “carer” prior to his arrival in
Hong Kong on May 20. According to Ho, it was this person who had
arranged accommodations for Snowden on his arrival and afterward.
If so, it seemed to me that this person might be able to shed light
on whom, if anyone, Snowden saw in his first eleven days in Hong
Kong. Even if this person might have been unaware of the reasons
for Snowden’s trip to Hong Kong when he made the arrangements
for him, he was still the best lead I had to learning why Snowden
had come to Hong Kong. Bradsher told me that he pressed Ho for
details about this mystery person over the course of several meet-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 7
9/29/16 5:51 PM
8 | how america lost its secrets
ings but Ho would not identify him beyond saying that he was a
“well- connected resident” of Hong Kong.
I called Ho’s law office in Hong Kong. He politely declined to be
interviewed by me, saying he had said all he was going to say about
the Snowden case. I was able, though, to make an appointment with
Robert Tibbo, a Canadian- born barrister specializing in civil liberties
cases. Tibbo had worked closely with Ho on the Snowden case.
I met Tibbo in the tearoom at the Mandarin Oriental hotel on
Hong Kong Island. Tibbo, in his early fifties, was tall, with a round
face and thinning hair. He talked freely about his remarkable career.
After earning a degree in chemical engineering from McGill University
and working in Asia as an engineer for a decade, he went to law
school in New Zealand and became a barrister in Hong Kong specializing
in cases involving the legal status of refugees.
Over a leisurely tea, Tibbo made it clear that he had played a far
more active role than Ho in the Snowden case. He had even personally
escorted Snowden from the Mira hotel to a safe house on
June 10. He did not dispute what Ho had told Bradsher. When I asked
him if he could give me the name of the “carer,” he said that he was
bound by a lawyer- client privilege that prevented him from providing
me with any details that might reveal the identity of the person
who had made arrangements for Snowden. When I asked the date
that he was officially retained by Snowden, he said that Snowden
had signed an agreement hiring him and Ho’s law firm as his legal
adviser on June 10, 2013 (which was a matter of public record).
“I understand that,” I said, “but I am inquiring about something
that had happened before you became his legal adviser.” He shook
his head, as if getting rid of a pesky fly, and said that his oath precluded
him from saying anything at all that might do damage to
the credibility of his client. “Not even where he was staying in May
in Hong Kong?” I persisted. He leaned forward and, after a brief
hesitation, said, jokingly I assumed, that he would not divulge that
information, “even if you held a gun to my head.” We met two more
times, but true to his word Tibbo would not say if he even knew the
identity of the “carer.”
Meanwhile, Joyce Xu, a very resourceful Chinese journalist who
was assisting me in Hong Kong, had filed the equivalent of a Freedom
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 8
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Prologue | 9
of Information request with the Hong Kong Security Bureau asking
for information about Snowden’s movements in May. Thomas
Ng, the secretary for security, turned down the request, adding that
Hong Kong authorities do not keep records of hotel registrations. I
had run into a dead end with the Hong Kong authorities on the issue
of Snowden’s “carer” and Snowden’s whereabouts for those eleven
crucial days.
At this point, I got some much- needed help from an old friend on
the Obama White House staff. Before I had left New York, I asked
him if he could find someone at the consulate in Hong Kong who
might brief me on the Snowden case. I didn’t hear from him until
just a few days before I was due to return to New York. He put me
in touch with a former employee of the Hong Kong consulate, who
he said was “fully informed” about the efforts of the U.S. mission to
locate Snowden in Hong Kong. This person was still living in Hong
Kong, and he agreed to meet with me on condition that I did not
mention either his name or his specific job in the U.S. mission in
Hong Kong. The venue was the terrace lounge of the American Club
in Exchange Square in central Hong Kong, a posh club mainly for
expatriate Americans. It was on the forty- eighth floor, with a spectacular
view of Victoria Harbor. Once there, I had no problem finding
my source, identifying him by the description he had given me.
He was sitting alone at a discreet table in the corner.
After we ordered drinks, he told me in a soft voice about the American
reaction to Snowden’s revelations in Hong Kong. “All hell broke
loose,” he said, describing the atmosphere at the U.S. mission after
Snowden’s video was posted on The Guardian’s website on June 9.
I asked about an assertion that Snowden had made concerning the
U.S. consulate in that extraordinary video. Snowden had said that he
could be seized at any moment by a CIA rendition team based at the
U.S. consulate “just down the road” from the Mira hotel.
“Was that true?” I asked.
He rolled his eyes and said, “Snowden has a pretty wild imagination.
For one thing, the U.S. consulate is not down the road from the
Mira in Kowloon; it is here on Hong Kong Island. And there was no
CIA rendition team in Hong Kong.”
My next question concerned a second period during which
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 9
9/29/16 5:51 PM
10 | how america lost its secrets
Snowden’s whereabouts are clouded— the period between the time
he left the Mira hotel on June 10 and the day he left Hong Kong for
Russia on June 23. When I asked my consulate source whether the
U.S. mission took any action to track Snowden during these thirteen
days, he explained that the FBI had long maintained a contingent
of “legal attachés” based at the consulate to pursue many possible
violations of U.S. law including video piracy. In addition, the CIA
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had retained a handful of
“China watchers” under diplomatic cover in Hong Kong. This group
constituted the “intelligence mission,” as he referred to it. It had
developed informal relations with the Hong Kong police that, along
with the NSA’s electronic capabilities abroad, allowed it to track
Snowden’s movements after he had outed himself on the video.
Because Snowden, his lawyers, and the journalists in his entourage
frequently used their cell phones to text one another, it was fairly
easy for the U.S. intelligence mission to follow Snowden’s trail after
he left the Mira hotel. He said that the Hong Kong police also knew
where he was during this period. My source further suggested that
the massive Chinese intelligence contingent in Hong Kong also
knew, because it had close relations with the Hong Kong police.
“So everyone knew Snowden’s whereabouts as he moved every
few days from apartment to apartment,” I interjected. He answered
that it was no secret to anyone except the media and the public. “Of
course we knew,” he said, adding that there were also photographs
of Snowden entering the office building that housed the Russian
consulate. I mentioned that there was a report in a Russian newspaper
that Snowden had visited the Russian consulate in late June in
connection with the flight he later took to Moscow. “All we know is
he entered the building,” he answered, with a shrug.
That Russian consulate visit did not come as a complete surprise
to U.S. intelligence. After Snowden left the Mira, his interactions
with the Russian and Chinese intelligence services in Hong Kong
had been closely monitored by “secret means,” a term that in that
context likely indicated electronic surveillance. A former top intelligence
executive in Washington, D.C., subsequently confirmed this
monitoring to me. All of Snowden’s stealth in exiting from the Mira
hotel, which included wearing a baseball cap and dark glasses, thus
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 10
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Prologue | 11
proved ineffective in hiding him from U.S. intelligence and presumably
other intelligence services seeking the treasure trove of documents
he had taken from the NSA.
As for his next destination, I could find no evidence that Snowden
had made any arrangements during his monthlong stay in Hong
Kong to go to any Latin American country. Before he went public
on June 9, he could have easily gotten a visa in Hong Kong with his
still- valid passport to go to almost any country in the world, including
Cuba (for which a U.S. passport was not necessary), Bolivia, and
Ecuador. Yet he did not apply for visas during this time period. Even
as late as June 8, after meetings with Greenwald and Poitras, his
name had still not been revealed, no criminal complaint had been
issued against him, and there was no Interpol red alert for his detention.
He could have walked out of the Mira hotel, caught a taxi to
the Hong Kong airport, and gone on Swiss International Air Lines
via Zurich to any country in South America or to Iceland. But, as
in the oft- cited Sherlock Holmes clue of the dog that did not bark,
Snowden’s inaction in not obtaining visas during this thirty- day
period suggests that he had no plans to go anyplace but where he
went: Moscow.
However, the mystery that most concerned me was not where
Snowden was housed in the interim between when he went public
and when he went to Moscow. It was where, and in whose care,
Snowden had been before he checked into the Mira on June 1. When
I asked my source about this period, he said that as far as he knew,
neither the FBI nor the Hong Kong police could find a trace of him
during the period between May 20, when he passed through Hong
Kong customs, and June 1, when he first used his credit card and
passport to check into the Mira hotel. Other than those transactions,
they could not find any credit card charges, ATM withdrawals,
telephone calls, hotel registrations, subway pass purchases, or other
clues to Snowden’s activities. As far as a paper trail was concerned,
Snowden was a ghost during this period.
“Could an American just vanish in Hong Kong for eleven days?”
I asked.
“Apparently, he did just that,” my source replied.
Snowden’s whereabouts during these eleven days was not a mys-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 11
9/29/16 5:51 PM
12 | how america lost its secrets
tery I was going to solve on this first trip to Hong Kong. I needed to
know more about his activities before he got there. After all, Snowden
was not, as he himself pointed out from Moscow, an “angel descending
from the heavens.” He had been working for the U.S. government
for the previous seven years. During that period, he had been
part of America’s secret intelligence regime and held a clearance for
sensitive compartmented information, or SCI. Such SCI material is
considered so sensitive that it must be handled within formal access
control systems established by the director of national intelligence.
Nor did Snowden’s breach begin with his handing over classified
documents to the Guardian reporters in Hong Kong in June 2013 or,
for that matter, in the eleven days prior to his meeting with journalists.
He had, as the NSA quickly determined, begun illicitly copying
documents in the summer of 2012. Such a dangerous enterprise is
not born of a sudden impulse. It was, as his actions suggested, nurtured
over many months. Even if he had managed to elude American
intelligence from late May to early June 2013, he could not hide all
the history that led to his decision to come to Hong Kong. There
had to be an envelope of circumstances surrounding it, including
Snowden’s motivation, associates, movements, finances, and activities
prior to his fleeing to Hong Kong. What was missing was not
just Snowden’s first eleven days in Hong Kong but the context of
the alleged crime.
I first needed to find out who Edward Snowden was.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 12
9/29/16 5:51 PM
part one
SNOWDEN’S ARC
I woke this morning with a new name. I had had a vision.
A dream vision. A vision righteous and true. Before me I saw
Gamers, Gamers shrouded in the glory of their true names.
Step forth, and assume your name in the pantheon. It’s
always been there, your avatar’s true name. It slips through
your subconscious, reveals itself under your posts, and
flashed visibly in that moment of unrestrained spite; in the
indulgent teabag. You’ve felt it, known it, recognized it.
Now realize it.
I woke this morning with a new name. That name is
Wolfking.
Wolfking Awesomefox.
—edward snowden, Geneva, June 12, 2008
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 13
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 14
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 1
Tinker
It’s like the boiling frog. You get exposed to a little bit of evil,
a little bit of rule- breaking, a little bit of dishonesty . . . you can
come to justify it.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
Edward joseph snowden was born on June 21, 1983, in Elizabeth
City, North Carolina. His parents were Lon Snowden and
Elizabeth “Wendy” Barrett. According to their marriage records,
they wed when they were both eighteen in 1979. The following year
they had a daughter, Jessica.
Lon Snowden, like his father before him, served in the U.S. Coast
Guard. He was stationed at its main aviation base, where his fatherin-
law, Edward Joseph Barrett, was an officer and rising star of the
Coast Guard. While Edward Snowden was still a child, his maternal
grandfather would become not only an admiral but also head of the
Coast Guard’s entire aviation service.
When Lon was transferred to a Coast Guard base near Baltimore
in 1992, he bought a two- story house in Crofton, Maryland, a residential
community very close to the NSA’s headquarters building
at Fort Meade. Edward, who was nine, and Jessica, who was twelve,
were enrolled in local public schools in Crofton.
Jessica was a top student. After she obtained her degree at the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 15
9/29/16 5:51 PM
16 | how america lost its secrets
University of Maryland, she went on to law school, graduating with
honors. Unlike his sister, Edward Snowden experienced a string of
failures in his education. In 1998, after only one year of classes, he
dropped out of Arundel High School; according to school records,
he stopped attending classes at the age of fifteen. He later attributed
his absence from school to a medical problem, mononucleosis, but
according to Robert Mosier, a spokesman for Anne Arundel County
public schools, there is no record of any illness. Brad Gunson, who
knew Snowden before he dropped out of high school, recalled in an
interview with The Washington Post only that he had a high- pitched
voice, liked magic cards, and played fantasy video games.
Instead of completing a formal education, Snowden went his own
way. Still in his teens, he became the product of a broken home. His
parents were entangled in messy divorce proceedings until he was
seventeen. By this time, Jessica had her own apartment. When his
parents separated, Snowden’s mother bought a two- bedroom condominium
in Ellicott City, Maryland. She moved Edward, along with
his two cats, into the condominium, while she remained in the family
house awaiting its sale. According to a condominium neighbor,
Joyce Kinsey, Snowden stayed home alone almost all the time. From
what she could observe, he spent long hours in front of a computer
screen.
At the age of eighteen, while other teens his age went to college,
Snowden was still living by himself, now devoting a large part of his
time to playing fantasy games on the Internet. Posting under the
alias TheTrueHooHa on a website called Ars Technica, he showed
himself to be a passionate gamer. He was especially drawn to anime,
a graphically violent style of Japanese animation. These anime
games had by 2002 achieved a fanatic following in both Japan and
the United States. He claimed special skills at Tekken, a martial arts
fighting game. He even went to anime conventions in the Washington,
D.C., area. When he became a webmaster for Ryuhana Press,
a website running these anime- based games, he described himself
somewhat fancifully as a thirty- seven- year- old father of two children.
The only truth in his description was that he was born on “the
longest day of the year” (June 21).
He wrote Internet posts under his TrueHooHa alias about how he
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 16
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Tinker | 17
used weight lifting and intensive training to precision shape his body.
He bragged to his online followers that he had reduced his “body fat
percentage to between 9.5% and 10.5%” (which was less than half
of the average for his age). He wrote that he wore “cool” purple sunglasses,
practiced martial arts, and was a fan of Japanese cuisine. He
described himself at one point, as if advertising his virtues, as having
a “head of vibrant, shimmering blond hair (with volume).”
He appeared somewhat restless with his solitary life in his almost
daily postings. He expressed a longing to go to Japan. “I’ve always
dreamed of being able to ‘make it’ in Japan. I’ve taken Japanese for
a year and a half,” he wrote in 2002. Despite his claim of learning
Japanese, there is no record of his taking any courses in Japanese.
But it was perhaps part of his yearning. In pursuit of an employment
opportunity in Japan, he posted, “I’d love a cushy gov job over
there.” Eventually, he gave up on the idea of relocating himself to
Japan because, as he explained in a post, he would have to put his cats
in quarantine for six months.
Snowden’s father meanwhile moved to Pennsylvania with his
new wife- to- be. This left Snowden with only one male family member
in the area, his maternal grandfather, Admiral Barrett, who was
now in the top echelon of U.S. intelligence working at the Pentagon.
Barrett was there when a plane piloted by terrorists crashed into it
on 9/11. He emerged unscathed.
Snowden sought to join the Special Forces through the 18X program,
a U.S. Army Reserve program created in 2003 that allowed
individuals who had not served in the military or completed their
education to train to be a Special Forces recruit. He listed his religion
on the application as Buddhist because, as he explained in a sardonic
post on Ars Technica, “agnostic is strangely absent” from the form.
He enlisted in the army reserves on May 7, 2004, according to
U.S. Army records. He reported for a ten- week basic training at Fort
Benning, Georgia, which was standard for all enlistees in the infantry.
In August, he began a three- week course in parachute jumping
but did not complete that training. As Snowden put it in his Internet
postings, he “washed out.” He was discharged on September 29,
2004, ending his nineteen- week military career. Snowden would
later claim on the Internet that he returned to civilian life because
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 17
9/29/16 5:51 PM
18 | how america lost its secrets
he had broken both legs. An army spokesman could not confirm that
Snowden injured his legs or that he was in fact dropped from the
program for medical reasons.
Under his TrueHooHa alias, Snowden wrote that “they [the army]
held on to me until the doctors cleared me to be discharged, and then
after being cleared they held onto me for another month just for
shits and giggles.” He attributed this treatment in the army, as he
would later attribute his problems in the CIA and the NSA, to the
inferior intelligence of his superiors. He wrote in his post, “Psych
problems = dishonorable discharge depending on how much they
hate you. Lots of alleged homos were in the hold unit, too, but they
only got a general discharge at best.”
If he had broken his legs, it was not evident to Joyce Kinsey, his
next- door neighbor, who told me that she never saw Snowden on
crutches when he returned to his mother’s condominium in September
2004. Army records show that he did not receive a medical
discharge. He received an “administrative discharge.” Unlike a medical
discharge, which is given because a soldier has sustained injuries
that prevent him from performing his duties, an administrative discharge
is a “morally neutral” form of separation given to a soldier
when he or she is deemed for nonmedical reasons inappropriate for
military service. Snowden preferred to cite a medical explanation for
his severance, just as he had claimed a medical reason for dropping
out of high school (and would later claim he needed medical treatment
for epilepsy at the NSA).
When he returned home from Fort Benning, Georgia, he was
twenty- one. He remained unemployed for several months before
taking a job as a security guard at the University of Maryland’s Center
for Advanced Study of Language, where he was given his first
security clearance. Snowden had to take a polygraph exam to get
the job. According to his Ars Technica postings, he worked the night
shift from six in the evening to six in the morning. He had higher
ambitions than being a campus security guard.
He wanted to become a male model. He did not seem overly concerned
about his privacy, posting pictures of himself on the Internet
“mooning” for the camera. He also posted provocative modeling pictures
of himself on the Ars Technica website. He commented on his
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 18
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Tinker | 19
own beefcake- style pictures, “So sexxxy it hurts” and “I like my girlish
figure that attracts girls.” He approached a model agency called
Model Mayhem, which recommended a photographer. He had some
concern about that photographer because he, as Snowden wrote in
a post, “shoots mostly guys.” Snowden said he was “a little worried
he might, you know, try to pull my pants off and choke me to death
with them, but he turned out to be legit and is a pretty damn good
model photographer.” He posted the photographs on the Internet.
The lack of any paid job offers dashed Snowden’s hopes for a modeling
career.
Around this time, he began dating Lindsay Mills, an extremely
attractive nineteen- year- old art student at the Maryland Institute
College of Art. Jonathan Mills, Lindsay’s father, was an applications
developer at the Oracle Corporation. According to him, Snowden
met his daughter on an Internet dating site. Snowden and Mills had
much in common. They both had divorced parents who gave them a
great deal of latitude in conducting their personal lives. Both of them
were keenly interested in perfecting their bodies through exercise
and diet regimes. Mills’s only paid employment over the next eight
years would be as a fitness and yoga instructor in Maryland. When
they first met, they both had ambitions to be models, and neither of
them had inhibitions about posing provocatively for photographers.
They both also had a desire to travel to exotic places, including cities
in Asia. Mills had spent four month in Guilin, China, before meeting
Snowden.
As bleak as his prospects as a high-school dropout might have
seemed, Snowden had an unexpected stroke of good fortune in the
spring of 2006. The CIA offered him a $66,000- a- year job as a CIA
communications officer. “I don’t have a degree of ANY type. In fact,
I don’t even have a high school diploma,” Snowden boasted in May
2006 on the website Ars Technica under his alias. He added, with
only a slight exaggeration, “I make 70K.”
How did Snowden get the job? The CIA’s minimum requirements
in 2006 for a job in its clandestine division included a bachelor’s or
master’s degree and a strong academic record, with a preferred GPA
of 3.0 or better.
The CIA needed technical workers in 2006. But even if Snowden
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 19
9/29/16 5:51 PM
20 | how america lost its secrets
applied only in this capacity, which entailed a five- year employment
agreement, the minimum requirement for an intelligence technology
job was an associate’s degree awarded by a two- year community
college in electronics and communications, engineering technology,
computer network systems, or electronics engineering technology.
Candidates had to have had a final GPA of at least 3.0 on a 4.0 scale
from a fully accredited technical school or university. Snowden, as
we’ve seen, did not meet these standards. If a candidate lacks these
qualifications, the CIA can make an exception only if he or she has
at least two years’ civilian or military work experience in the telecommunications
and/or automated information systems field that is
comparable to one of the requisite degree fields. Snowden in no way
qualified in this way either.
Under extraordinary circumstances, even the minimum requirements
might be waived if the applicant had a distinguished military
career and an honorable discharge. Snowden, however, did not
complete his military training at Fort Benning and received only an
administrative discharge.
The CIA, to be sure, had needed computer- savvy recruits to service
its expanding array of computer systems since 1990. By 2006,
however, there was no shortage of fully qualified applicants for IT
jobs who met the CIA’s minimum standards. Most of them had university
course records, work experience at IT companies, computer
science training certificates from technical schools, and other such
credentials. The CIA, like the NSA, also obtained technicians with
special skills for IT jobs from outside contractors. So it had no need
for employing a twenty- two- year- old dropout who did not meet its
requisites. According to Tyler Drumheller, a former CIA station chief
in Europe, the only plausible way that Snowden, with no qualifications,
was allowed to jump the queue was that “he had some pull.”
In 2006, Snowden’s grandfather, who had attained the rank of
rear admiral, was certainly well connected in the intelligence world.
After twenty years’ service in the Coast Guard, Barrett had joined
an interagency task force in 1998, which included top executives
from the CIA, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
It had been set up to monitor any gaps in the U.S. embargo on Cuba,
and Barrett, as one of its leaders, was in constant liaison with the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 20
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Tinker | 21
CIA. By 2004, he had joined the FBI as the section head of its aviation
and special operations. In this capacity, he supervised the joint
CIA- FBI interrogation of the prisoners in the Guantánamo base in
Cuba, which involved him in the rendition program for terrorists.
Barrett could certainly have played a role in furthering his only
grandson’s employment. The CIA, however, has not disclosed any
information about who, if anyone, recommended Snowden. All that
is known is that in 2006 the CIA waived its minimum requirements
for him.
Later Snowden pointed out from Moscow that in 2006 the federal
government employed his entire family. His father was serving
in the Coast Guard; his mother was an administrative clerk for the
federal court in Maryland; his sister was a research director at the
Federal Judicial Center; and Admiral Barrett was still a top executive
at the FBI. In a sense, Snowden had entered the family business.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 21
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 2
Secret Agent
Sure, a whistleblower could use these [NSA computer vulnerabilities],
but so could a spy.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
The sudden transformation of Snowden in 2006 from a
night watchman on a university campus to an employee for
the CIA provided him with a powerful new identity and one much
closer to the avatars he adopted for his fantasy games. It was burnished
so deeply in his self- image that he cited it eight years later,
in exaggerated fashion, in Moscow. When Brian Williams, then an
NBC anchorman, began an hour- long television interview with
Snowden in 2014 by saying, “It seems to me spies probably look a
lot more like Ed Snowden and a lot less like James Bond these days,”
Snowden approvingly smiled and told him, “I was trained as a spy
in sort of the traditional sense of the word.” Snowden further confirmed
his interviewer’s point, stating, “I lived and worked undercover
overseas— pretending to work in a job that I’m not [in]— and
even being assigned a name that was not mine.”
In reality, Snowden’s employment at the CIA was far more prosaic.
When he joined the CIA, he did not have the required experience
in maintaining secret communication systems, so the CIA sent
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 22
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Secret Agent | 23
him to its information technology school for six months to train as
a communications officer, not a spy. After completing his training,
he was dispatched to the CIA station in Geneva. He worked there
for the next two years as one of dozens of information technologists
servicing the CIA’s communication channels in Switzerland. He was
stationed there, according to Swiss registry records, under his own
name from March 2007 to February 2009. He was identified as a U.S.
State Department employee in Geneva because Switzerland does
not allow any intelligence officers to operate in its country. Officially,
he was attached to the permanent U.S. mission to the United
Nations, which employed hundreds of U.S. government functionaries
in Switzerland. It was a thin cover; the Swiss government was
aware that the CIA maintained its base in Geneva and posted its
employees at the U.S. mission.
Although Snowden would claim in a video he made in Hong
Kong that he had served as a “senior adviser for the Central Intelligence
Agency,” he was merely a telecommunications support officer,
or TSO in CIA parlance, which was a junior- level job at the CIA.
He worked as part of a team of information technologists under the
supervision of senior CIA officers, according to a former CIA officer
in Geneva. The job of these TSOs was to protect the security of the
CIA’s computer systems through which the CIA station in Geneva
sent and received its secret communications.
As far as is known, Snowden made very few friends at the eighthundred-
person mission. The only person to have publicly reported
knowing him in Geneva during this period is Mavanee Anderson, a
young and attractive summer intern at the U.S. mission from May
to August 2007. She described befriending Snowden, who, according
to her, said that he was in the CIA and also demonstrated to her his
martial arts skills. She later recalled in interviews that he was “a bit”
prone to brooding and voiced growing dissatisfaction with the CIA.
The job in Geneva did have its benefits, however. It provided him
with a generous housing and travel allowance. In many ways, it was
the “cushy government job” he had said he was seeking in his Internet
posts. He rented a four- room apartment and had his girlfriend,
Lindsay Mills, now twenty- one, join him there.
According to his posts on the Ars Technica website, he took full
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 23
9/29/16 5:51 PM
24 | how america lost its secrets
advantage of his compensation to live the high life. He gambled on
financial developments by buying and selling options, which are
contracts that allow speculators to bet on the directions of the market
without buying the actual stocks, bonds, or commodities. He also
bought a BMW sports car on which, he wrote, he disabled the speed
control so he could exceed the legal limit. He described in his posts
racing motorcycles in Italy and traveling around Germany with an
Estonian rock star (whom he did not further identify). He also continued
his avatar life in Internet gaming; the alias he chose for that
was Wolfking Awesomefox. He also indulged in a fantasy gun sport
called Airsoft, a variation of paintball, in which participants used
realistic- looking pistols to splatter each other with paint.
Snowden’s good fortune came to an abrupt end in 2008. He suffered
a massive loss in his options speculations. He wrote in a post
that he had “lost $20,000 in October [2008] alone,” a sum that represented
almost a third of his annual salary. He blamed the U.S. financial
system, posting on Ars Technica that Ben Bernanke, the Federal
Reserve chairman, was a “cockbag.” He also bet against any further
rise in the stock market index, asking a user with whom he was chatting
on the Internet in December 2008 to “pray” for a collapse of
stock prices. When his correspondent asked him why he wanted him
to pray for a decline, Snowden responded, “Because then I’ll be filthy
fucking rich.” But Snowden lost this bet.
Snowden lashed out at others on the Internet over these setbacks.
He termed those who questioned his financial judgment “fucking
retards.” As with other setbacks, he blamed them on government officials
in Ars Technica posts. Because the CIA was engaged in 2008 in
highly sensitive operations to gather banking data in Switzerland—
one of which Snowden later disclosed to The Guardian— any Internet
discussion by a CIA employee of financial losses could serve as a
beacon to an adversary intelligence service on the prowl for a source.
If any party was looking for disgruntled U.S. employees, Snowden’s
Internet chatter about bad choices in gambling could have aroused
its interest.
That Snowden used his TrueHooHa alias for these Internet postings
would not prevent a sophisticated espionage organization from
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 24
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Secret Agent | 25
quickly uncovering his true identity. He was listed by his true name
on the roster of the U.S. mission to the UN. By consulting personnel
records, one would further discover that he did not actually work for
the State Department. Because it was no secret that the U.S. mission
in Geneva housed the CIA station for all of Switzerland, any outsider
would think it probable that this brittle gambler who played
the options market worked for the CIA.
Even though it cannot be precluded that Snowden was spotted
in Geneva by another intelligence service, there is no evidence, at
least that I know of, to suggest that he was approached by one. Nor
is there reason to believe that if he had been contacted by a foreign
service in 2008, he would have responded positively. Despite
his indiscreet posting about his outside activities, he apparently still
respected the boundaries of secrecy that had been clearly defined in
the oath he had taken at the CIA. For example, after The New York
Times published an article revealing secret American intelligence
activities in Iran on January 11, 2009, Snowden railed against the
newspaper on the Internet under his TrueHooHa alias. He wrote,
“This shit is classified for a reason. . . . It’s because this shit won’t
work if Iran knows what we are doing.” He clearly recognized that
revealing intelligence sources was extremely damaging. As for the
Times, he said, “Hopefully they’ll finally go bankrupt this year.”
When another Internet user asked him if it was unethical to release
national security secrets, he answered, “YEEEEEEEEEES.”
As with every CIA officer, Snowden had to undergo a two- year
evaluation and take a routine polygraph test. It was then, in December
2008, that his superior at the CIA placed a “derog” in his file, the
CIA’s shorthand for a derogatory comment, in an unfavorable evaluation.
The reason remains somewhat murky. According to a New
York Times story by the veteran intelligence reporter Eric Schmitt,
Snowden’s superior had suspected that Snowden “was trying to
break into classified computer files to which he was not authorized
to have access.” Schmitt evidently had well- placed sources in the
CIA. He said that he interviewed two senior American officials who
were familiar with the case. According to what they told Schmitt, the
CIA superior had decided to “send Snowden home.” Officially, how-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 25
9/29/16 5:51 PM
26 | how america lost its secrets
ever, according to a reply by a CIA public affairs officer to the Times,
Snowden had not been fired or accused of attempting to “break into
classified computer files to which he did not have authorized access.”
A former CIA officer who had also been at the U.S. mission
in Geneva explained the discrepancy to me. He said that the spin
the CIA put on the story was “necessary containment.” After the
Snowden breach occurred in June 2013, the CIA had a problem that
could, as he put it, “blow up in its face.” If Snowden had been fired
but allowed to keep his security clearance in 2009, the CIA’s incompetence
could be partly blamed for the NSA’s subsequent employment
of him. If he had broken into a computer to which he was not
authorized, he should have been fired if not arrested.
What this spin glossed over, according to this former CIA officer,
is the part about Snowden’s behavior that concerned his superior.
Technically, Snowden, as a CIA communications officer, was authorized
to use the computer system. The problem was that Snowden
had deliberately misused it by adding code to it. This code could have
compromised the security of the CIA’s “live system.” So while what
the CIA public affairs officer quoted in the Times story said was correct,
it clouded the issue.
During his time in Geneva, Snowden had received no promotions
or commendations for his work. He was threatened with a punitive
investigation unless he agreed to quietly resign from the CIA. “It
was not a stellar career,” Drumheller, the former CIA station chief,
told me in 2014.
Snowden blamed his career- ending “derog” on an “e- mail spat”
with a superior. From Moscow, he wrote to James Risen of the Times
that his superior officer ordered him not “to rock the boat.” Further,
he complained that the technical team at the CIA station in Geneva
had “brushed him off,” even though he had a legitimate grievance.
When he complained about a flaw in the computer system, he said
that his superior took vengeance on him. He said he added the code
to the system to prove he was right. He attributed the “derog” in
his file to the incompetence, blindness, and errors of his superiors.
According to Snowden, he was a victim. This would not be the last
time he faulted superiors for their supposed incompetence. He would
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 26
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Secret Agent | 27
later say that the NSA experts who examined the documents that he
had stolen were “totally incapable.”
In any case, in February 2009, Snowden not only had a careerdamaging
“derog” in his file but faced an internal investigation of
his suspicious computer activities. According to Drumheller, such an
internal investigation would not be undertaken lightly or because of
an “e- mail spat.” He said that such an investigation was “a big deal”
involving the CIA Office of Security in Washington and possibly the
FBI. It would also result in the temporary suspension of Snowden’s
security clearance. This left Snowden with little real choice. If he
wanted to avoid that investigation, he had to resign from the CIA,
which he did in February 2009. That was the end of the security
investigation.
He was clearly bitter, posting on Ars Technica on January 10,
2009, “Obama just appointed a fucking POLITICIAN to run the
CIA!” (He was referring to Leon Panetta, President Clinton’s former
chief of staff.) Snowden attributed the origins of his antipathy to
U.S. intelligence to his 2007– 9 experiences in the CIA. He later told
Vanity Fair that the 2009 incident in the CIA convinced him that
working “through the system would lead only to reprisals.”
Snowden, if not yet a ticking time bomb, was certainly a disgruntled
intelligence worker before he ever got to the NSA.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 27
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 3
Contractor
Private contractors don’t clear employees. The government does.
— admiral michael mcconnell,
former vice- chairman, Booz Allen Hamilton
Snowden, aged twenty- five, returned from Europe and moved
into his mother’s condo. Not only was he unemployed now, having
resigned from the CIA, but his financial state had been hurt
by the huge losses he had suffered playing the options market in
Geneva and by the fact that he did not qualify for any CIA benefits.
His vision of himself as a secret agent, the unstoppable Wolfking
Awesomefox, might have also suffered. According to the narrative
he later supplied to The Guardian, he had become deeply concerned
about the immoral way in which the CIA conducted its intelligence
operations in Switzerland.
“Much of what I saw in Geneva really disillusioned me about how
my government functions and what its impact is in the world. I realized
that I was part of something that was doing far more harm than
good,” Snowden told The Guardian. By way of example, he said he
learned that the CIA had gotten a Swiss banker drunk enough to be
arrested when he drove so the CIA could compromise him. Snowden,
who did not drink himself, was appalled at this ploy. Despite his
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 28
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Contractor | 29
growing antagonism toward the U.S. government, he had not given
up on, if not becoming a secret agent, working in the netherworld of
secret intelligence.
There was still a back door through which he could reenter the
spy world. Private corporations hired civilian technicians to work
for spy agencies as independent contractors. By 2009, the CIA, the
NSA, and other U.S. intelligence services had outsourced much of
the job of maintaining and upgrading their computer systems to
these private companies. They supplied the NSA with most of its
system administrators and other information technology workers.
This arrangement allowed the NSA to effectively bypass budget
limits and other restrictions limiting how many NSA technicians
it could recruit. Instead of being on the NSA’s own payroll, these
people nominally worked for, and received their paychecks from,
private employers. In fact, many of these outside contractors worked
full- time for the NSA.
Snowden applied in April 2009 to one of these private companies,
a subsidiary of the Dell computer company. To diversify out of
manufacturing computers, Dell had recently gone into the business
of managing government computer systems for the NSA and other
intelligence services. As a leading specialist in the field of corporate
cyber security, Dell had no problem obtaining sizable contracts from
the NSA’s Technology Directorate. In 2008, the NSA had in effect
outsourced to Dell the task of reorganizing the backup systems at its
regional bases. Dell had to find thousands of independent contractors
to work at these bases. In 2009, it was seeking to fill positions
at the NSA’s regional base in Japan, and Snowden applied. Relocating
would be no issue for him because he had a longtime interest in
going to Japan.
He had little problem obtaining the job. He had a single compelling
qualification: like all other CIA officers, he had been given a
top secret clearance. For an outside contractor such as Dell, such a
security clearance was pure gold. If a potential recruit lacked it, Dell
needed to wait for a time- consuming background check that would
have to be conducted before it could deploy him or her at the NSA.
If a recruit already had the clearance, as Snowden did, he could begin
working immediately.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 29
9/29/16 5:51 PM
30 | how america lost its secrets
Snowden still had his security clearance, despite his highly problematic
exit from the CIA, because the agency had instituted a policy
a few years earlier that allowed voluntarily retiring CIA officers to
keep their clearance for two years after they left. This “free pass,” as
one former CIA officer called the two- year grace period, had been
intended to make it easier for retiring officers to find jobs in parts of
the defense industry. This accommodation, in turn, made it easier for
the CIA to downsize to meet its budget.
Not only did Snowden retain his clearance, but unlike when he
had applied for his job at the CIA in 2006, he could now list on his
résumé two years of experience in information technology and
cyber security at the CIA. Dell could check only a single fact: that
Snowden was employed at the CIA between 2006 and 2009. His CIA
file, which contained the “derog,” was not available to Dell or any
other private company because of government privacy regulations.
Even though the CIA had “security concerns” about Snowden, it
could not convey them to either Dell or the NSA without violating
the privacy rules. “So the guy with whom the CIA had concerns left
the Agency and joined the ranks of the many contractors working
in the intelligence community [IC] before CIA could inform the rest
of the IC about its worries,” Michael Morell, then CIA deputy director,
explained. “He even got a pay raise.”
Obviously, this was a glitch in the security system. As a result of
it, though, Snowden entered the secret world of the NSA only five
months after being forced out of the CIA.
For the next forty- five months, Dell assigned him various IT tasks
at the NSA. In June 2009, he was sent to Japan to work in the NSA
complex at the U.S. Yokota Air Base, which is about two hours by car
from downtown Tokyo. He moved into a small one- bedroom apartment
in Fussa, just outside the sprawling base.
His initial job for Dell was teaching cyber security to army and air
force personnel. In this capacity, he instructed U.S. military officers
stationed at the base in how to shield their computers from hackers.
Such security training had been required for military personnel
dealing with classified material after several successful break- ins
to U.S. military networks by China, Russia, and other adversary
nations. It was not a challenging or interesting job.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 30
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Contractor | 31
But Snowden found diversions in Japan. In July 2009, Lindsay
Mills joined him there. She had become an amateur photographer,
specializing in arty self- portraits. She also saw herself as a global
tourist, writing in her blog after arriving in Japan that she had traveled
to seventeen countries. Like Snowden, she also deemed herself,
tongue in cheek, a “super hero.” In this sense, her Internet avatar
was a match for Snowden’s Wolfking Awesomefox.
In Japan, Mills and Snowden spent time with another American
couple, Jennie and Joseph Chamberlin, who also worked at the
Yokota base. Jennie, a sergeant in the public affairs section of the U.S.
Air Force, had been at art college with Mills and called herself in her
blog the Little Red Ninja. Joseph Chamberlin was a decorated U.S.
Navy pilot who now flew highly sensitive intelligence- gathering
missions from the Yokota base. Jennie described Lindsay in her blog
as her “super- model friend.” The two couples also went on expeditions
in Japan together. As far as is known, the Chamberlins were
the only Americans at the base with whom Snowden socialized. On
August 17, 2009, the foursome attempted to walk up Mount Fuji,
but they got lost en route and wound up in the Mount Fuji gift
shop. Jennie described the misadventure in her blog: “Our adventure
started off a little rocky with our attempts to find the interstate.
Alas, our iconic mountain was obscured by cloud. A short stop at
the Mt. Fuji combination soba noodle stand/gift shop was enough to
whet our appetite for the further exploration that is to come.” Photographs
taken that day show Snowden wearing Hawaiian shorts
and a black tank top emblazoned with an eagle and the letters USA.
They also show Mills wearing safari shorts, a brown sweater, and
what appears to be an engagement ring. “Ed was looking rather rednecky,”
Lindsay commented on one photograph. Snowden described
her, in turn, as “nerdy.” They never made it to the top of Mount Fuji.
Snowden also sought to advance himself by getting credit toward
a college certificate by enrolling in a summer online course at the
University of Maryland’s Asia program, which had a regional campus
on the Yokota base. Known as UMUC, it had a contract with
the government to provide military personnel with such educational
opportunities. Snowden would later claim that he was taking
courses for a graduate degree in computer sciences, but William
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 31
9/29/16 5:51 PM
32 | how america lost its secrets
Stevens, the assistant registrar of UMUC, who I spoke to at the base
in 2016, told me that the program in 2009 did not provide graduate
courses in computer sciences. According to the program’s record,
while Snowden had enrolled as a student in the summer of 2009, he
received neither any credits nor a certificate.
In October 2009, Dell assigned Snowden a job in which he had
direct access to the NSA’s computers. He was now a system administrator,
which is essentially a tech- savvy repairman. Dell was working
on a backup system code- named EPICSHELTER. For this contract,
Dell was transferring large chunks of data from the NSA’s main
computers in Maryland to backup drives in Japan so that the system
could be quickly restored if there was a communications interruption.
Because most of the classified data was in its encrypted form, it
had little value to any outside party. Snowden’s job was to maintain
the proper functioning of computers, but as a system administrator
he also had privileges to call up unencrypted files. He sat in front of a
computer screen all day looking for any problems in the transferring
of files to backup servers.
The work was highly repetitive and exceedingly dull. Snowden
found time to search for anomalies in the system, and he claimed
to have spotted a major flaw in the security system in late 2009. He
discovered that a rogue system administrator in Japan could steal
secret data without anyone else’s realizing that it had been stolen.
Snowden brought that to the attention of his superiors, as he later
said.
The emergence of a rogue system administrator was not that farfetched
in 2009. Hacktivists such as Julian Assange had adopted the
battle cry “Sysadmins of the world, unite.” Instead of asking them
to “throw off their chains,” as Marx did, he asked them to send classified
documents about secret government activity to the WikiLeaks
site. Snowden, as a “sys admin,” was aware he had the power to do
so. He recalled in Moscow in 2014, “I actually recommended they
[the NSA] move to two- man control for administrative access back
in 2009.” To make his point even clearer, he added, “A whistleblower
could use these things, but so could a spy.” Not without irony,
Snowden became that rogue system administrator some three years
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 32
9/30/16 11:09 AM
Contractor | 33
later. In fact, he later used the very vulnerability he pointed out to
steal NSA documents at Dell.
In September 2009, still on the Dell payroll, Snowden made a tenday
trip to India. He later said he was on an official visit “working
at the US embassy.” Hotel records show that he arrived at the Hyatt
Regency in New Delhi on September 2 from Japan and at 3:30 p.m.
on September 3 checked into the Koenig Inn, an annex to Koenig
Solutions, a school that gave crash courses on programming and
computer hacking. According to Rohit Aggarwal, head of the school,
Snowden stayed there until September 10 while taking classes
with a private instructor. It cost $2,000 in tuition and fees, which
Snowden prepaid from Japan with his personal credit card. Even
though Snowden later said he only took courses in “programming,”
the school’s records show that during that week he took intensive
courses in sophisticated hacking techniques. The course was titled
“Ethical Hacking,” but that was a euphemism for teaching the techniques
of illicit hacking. The course provided tutoring on hackers’
tools such as SpyEye and Zeus, which are used to circumvent security
procedures. It also demonstrated how these hacking tools could
be customized by criminals and spies to break into files, plant surveillance
programs, impersonate system administrators, assume the
privileges of system administrators in a network, and capture the
passwords of others. On September 11, Snowden, according to hotel
records, left India for Japan. While the stated purpose of the hacking
training was to allow security consultants to detect intruders, it also
prepared Snowden to be, if he chose to be, an intruder in the NSA
system.
One problem with working as a contractor is that the standard
two- year contracts are not necessarily renewed. Nor is there much
possibility for advancement for IT workers. As one contractor
told me, “It is a dead- end job with great pay.” In the fall of 2010,
Snowden’s contract in Japan with Dell was nearing an end.
Dell offered Snowden, and he accepted, a new position in the
United States. He rented a modest suburban house shaded by a
sakura cherry tree in a suburb of Annapolis, Maryland. Lindsay
Mills meanwhile was attending a two- week fitness training course at
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 33
9/29/16 5:51 PM
34 | how america lost its secrets
a retreat that qualified her to be a yoga instructor. She had been living
on and off with Snowden during the previous two years abroad,
including while he worked at the CIA in Switzerland and the NSA in
Japan, and now she moved in with Snowden again. The twenty- fiveyear-
old Mills posted on Instagram, “Finally in our first US place
together.” She also put pictures online of him in bed with her, affectionately
referring to him in her posts as a “computer crusader.”
He worked on problem solving for corporate clients at Dell headquarters
in Annapolis. In preparation for his new corporate role,
Snowden shaved off his facial hair and, with Lindsay’s help, bought a
Ralph Lauren suit. His corporate clients were assisting the NSA, the
CIA, and the DIA. Consequently, Snowden dealt with a wide range of
intelligence officers and gave presentations on the vulnerabilities in
computer security at the DIA- sponsored Joint Counterintelligence
seminar. In February 2011, he attended a black tie Valentine’s Day
gala sponsored by corporate members of the Armed Forces Communication
and Electronics Association. The guest speaker was Michael
Hayden, who had headed the CIA when Snowden was abruptly
forced out two years earlier. Nevertheless, Snowden joined the cue
to have his photo taken with the former director, a perk of the charity
event.
These dealings in no way mitigated his resentment of the intelligence
establishment. What began at the CIA in 2009 as objections
to what he saw as the incompetence of his superiors grew into wellarticulated
disapproval of the way the U.S. government conducted
its intelligence. He found NSA surveillance particularly worrisome,
later telling The Guardian, “They [the NSA] are intent on making
every conversation and every form of behavior in the world known
to them.” He claimed after defecting to Moscow that he had voiced
his concerns about what he considered illicit surveillance to ten NSA
officials, “none of whom took any action to address them.” The NSA
can find no record of these complaints, but if Snowden had indeed
complained to these officials while working for Dell, his superiors
at Dell either didn’t notice or didn’t care that they had a very disgruntled
employee on their hands.
Snowden also made no secret on the Internet of his anger at the
U.S. government and the corporations that served it. He railed on
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 34
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Contractor | 35
the Ars Technica site against the complicity of private corporations,
such as Dell, that assisted the NSA. In his online posts in 2010,
Snowden expressed loathing for the assistance that corporate America
was providing the intelligence community. “It really concerns
me how little this sort of corporate behavior bothers those outside of
technology circles,” he wrote under his TrueHooHa alias. He said he
feared that America was already on “a slippery slope,” and he suggested,
perhaps adumbrating his own later actions, that this corporate
assistance to U.S. intelligence “was entirely within our control
to stop.”
What the “computer crusader” expressed in these angry Internet
postings was an almost obsessive concern over individuals’ freely
submitting to government authority. “Society really seems to have
developed an unquestioning obedience towards spooky types,” he
wrote on Ars Technica without mentioning that he himself worked
for a corporation that assisted spy agencies. He asked rhetorically
on this public forum whether the sinister slide toward a surveillance
state “sneaked in undetected because of pervasive government
secrecy.”
The outright contempt he expressed toward this “government
secrecy” did not prevent him from seeking even more secret work
at Dell for the intelligence services. In February 2011, after his CIA
security clearance ran out, he applied to renew it. The new clearance
now required a new background check and filling out the government’s
127- page Standard Form 86.
Since 1996, background investigations for the NSA, like much of
the computer work at the NSA, had been outsourced to a private
company. It had proceeded from the effort of the Clinton administration
to cut the size of government by privatizing tasks that could
be more efficiently done by for- profit companies. U.S. Investigations
Services, or USIS, as it is now called, which won the contract
for background checks, was initially owned by the private equity
fund Carlyle Group, which later sold it to another financial group,
Providence Equity Partners. For the private equity and hedge funds,
profits were the measure of success. To increase its profits from the
contract with the NSA, USIS had to move more quickly in concluding
background checks because it did not get paid more for extensive
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 35
9/29/16 5:51 PM
36 | how america lost its secrets
investigation. In 2006, the government learned these background
checks were often prematurely ended. In Snowden’s case, because
the CIA did not share its files with a private concern, USIS did not
have access to Snowden’s CIA files, and it therefore did not learn
about the threatened security investigation. Nor did it learn from
the Internet, where he always employed an alias, that he was a disgruntled
employee. So Snowden’s new clearance was approved in
the summer of 2011, allowing him to continue working for Dell on
secret intelligence projects.
Meanwhile, in August 2011, Mills began her own blog titled
L’s Journey. In it, she described herself as “a world- traveling poledancing
super hero.” Many of her posted pictures were provocative
poses of herself in her underwear and various states of undress. She
wrote, “I’ve always wanted to be splashed on the cover of magazines,
with my best air- brushed look.” Her wish would be gratified two
years later in a way she likely did not anticipate.
For his part, Snowden seemed happy to encourage her fantasy
about being a superhero. He even gave her a Star Trek– inspired head
visor. Despite all the concerns he voiced about privacy, he did not
seem to mind her provocative posts. On the contrary, he took photographs
of her, telling her at one point that her photographs were
not “sexy” enough.
Snowden was soon offered a new position by Dell at the NSA’s
Kunia regional base in Hawaii. Dell, which was in the process of
expanding its government consulting business, wanted him to be a
system administrator on the NSA’s backup system. The NSA needed
this system before it could upgrade new security protocols that
would audit suspicious activity in real time. In Hawaii, as in Japan,
system administrators still worked alone. Snowden knew from his
experience in Japan that this solo work in an unaudited workplace
provided an opportunity for a system administrator to steal documents.
So he might also have realized that as a solo system administrator
in Hawaii, he would have this opportunity. Whether this
was on his mind or not, on March 15, 2012, he accepted this offer.
Dell agreed to pay all his relocation expenses and provide him with
a housing allowance.
He found a 1,559- square- foot house in Oahu, located at 94- 1044
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 36
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Contractor | 37
Eleu Street in the middle- class suburb of Waipahu. It was part of
the Royal Kunia development, which contained three hundred
similar- looking homes. According to Albi Matco, the manager of the
community association for the development, many of the residents
worked at military facilities in the area. The corner house Snowden
rented was comfortable enough, with three bedrooms, a walk- in
closet, a living room with a high ceiling, and a single- car garage, but
in no way lavish. It did not even have a backyard. He moved in on
April 2, 2012, which entailed a brief separation from his girlfriend,
Mills, who had committed herself to attending a girlfriend’s wedding
the following month. After he left for his new assignment, she wrote
on Instagram, “Sex toy party and then saying goodbye to my man—
well not goodbye so much as see you in two months.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 37
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 4
Thief
We begin by coveting what we see every day.
— hannibal lecter, The Silence of the Lambs
In hawaii in 2012, Snowden was living a very comfortable life.
He was earning just over $120,000 a year from Dell. His housing
allowance covered the rent and the lease on his car. He worked
five days a week at the NSA base. The commute, as I timed it, took
only ten minutes. Driving past a sign marked “Restricted Area: Keep
Out,” and the security booth where NSA guards checked his credentials,
he left his car in the outdoor lot for the Kunia Regional
Security Operations Center. (When I drove into the base in 2016,
I was detained nearly two hours at the security booth before being
turned back.)
Snowden worked in a three-story reinforced concrete building
called “the tunnel,” even though it was above the ground. It had
been built during World War II to serve as an aircraft assembly
plant. During the war, it was entirely covered with earth and shrubbery
to proof it against Japanese bomber attacks. In 1980, the NSA
converted it to its regional base in Hawaii for its intelligence gather-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 38
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Thief | 39
ing. Its lack of windows and the dirt covering gave it the appearance,
when I viewed it in 2016, of an oblong-shaped anthill. Workers, both
military and civilian, entered through an exterior staircase in the
center of the mound. Even though it is above the ground, it is known
as the tunnel. Snowden said in describing the atmosphere, “You’re in
a vaulted space. Everybody has sort of similar clearances, everybody
knows everybody. It’s a small world.” He said that to relieve the
tediousness of the work, every two months or so his fellow workers
would circulate a picture of a naked person that showed up on
their screens as part of the NSA’s surveillance of foreign suspects. He
explained, “You’ve got young enlisted guys, 18 to 22 years old [who
have] suddenly been thrust into a position of extraordinary responsibility
where they now have access to all of your private records. In
the course of their daily work they stumble across . . . an intimate
nude photo of someone in a sexually compromising position.”
He knew that copying any files, including photographs, was a violation
of NSA rules. But he did not report this illicit activity to the
NSA, even though he later claimed that it occurred regularly. He
joked in his Moscow interview with The Guardian that some of the
nudes were “extremely attractive” and that viewing them was, as he
put it, “the fringe benefits of surveillance positions.”
Snowden identified with the Libertarian Party, and at the NSA
he made no effort to conceal his political support of its causes. He
became an active partisan of Congressman Ron Paul, the leading figure
in the party in 2012. “He’s so dreamy,” Snowden posted on the
Ars Technica site in March 2009 (just after he registered to vote in
North Carolina, though he no longer lived there). Paul was running
in the 2012 Republican presidential primaries, and Snowden made
a contribution of $500 to his election committee. Snowden’s attraction
to Paul’s libertarian ideology was not that surprising. At the
core of Paul’s worldview was a deep hostility to the intrusion of the
government into private lives. Snowden shared this hostility, as was
clear from his Internet postings. Like other Libertarians, Snowden
believed that citizens should not be “shackled” by federal law. He
later addressed from Moscow via an Internet hookup a libertarian
gathering at which Ron Paul also spoke. “Law is a lot like medi-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 39
9/29/16 5:51 PM
40 | how america lost its secrets
cine,” he said. “When you have too much it can be fatal.” Like Paul,
Snowden ardently opposed any form of gun control, as did Lindsay
Mills in her online postings.
Like other Libertarians, Snowden, a contractor for the government,
saw the government as an adversary. “The [American] government,”
he later said, “assumed upon itself, in secret, new executive powers
without any public awareness or any public consent and used them
against the citizenry of its own country to increase its own power,
to increase its own awareness.” Most relevant to his future activities
at the NSA, Snowden wholeheartedly agreed with Paul’s position
on the dangers inherent in government surveillance of U.S. citizens.
Paul described the CIA, the organization that had forced Snowden
out, as nothing short of a “secret government” and said that “in a
true Republic, there is no place for an organization like the CIA.” He
also railed against NSA surveillance.
As is clear from Snowden’s Internet postings, he, like Ron Paul,
had doubts about the competence of the intelligence agencies of the
U.S. government. Snowden’s own disillusionment about the government
might have begun with his rejection and perceived mistreatment
by the Special Forces of the U.S. Army. It was almost certainly
reinforced by his ouster from the CIA. He later told The Guardian
that he was disillusioned as early as 2007 when he learned about the
CIA’s methods in compromising Swiss citizens. His critical view of
the U.S. government only hardened during the years he worked at
the NSA. He described his NSA superiors as “grossly incompetent,”
as he later explained to a journalist from Wired magazine in Moscow.
At the NSA, he said employees were kept in line by “fear and
a false image of patriotism.” He said that he saw his fellow workers
cowed into “obedience to authority” and his superiors induced to
break the law. He became particularly concerned with what he called
the “secret powers” of the NSA. He saw them as “tremendously
dangerous.” By this time, Snowden was fully aware that the NSA
conducted domestic surveillance because he had used his privileges
as a system administrator in 2012 to read the NSA inspector general’s
report on a 2009 surveillance program.
Nevertheless, Snowden continued to work at the NSA, where he
was, as he put it, “making a ton of money.” Mills joined him in his
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 40
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Thief | 41
“paradise” in June 2012, shortly before his twenty- ninth birthday.
Just before leaving Annapolis for Hawaii, Mills posted a seminude
picture of herself on her blog, L’s Journey. In it, her face was covered
with a blanket. The caption under it read, “Trying to avoid the
changes coming my way.” In Honolulu, she found “E.,” as she called
Snowden in her blog, “elusive.” She found that he preferred to stay
at home and avoided meeting other people to the point that her
friends “were not quite sure that E. existed.” Lindsay’s fellow performers
in the Waikiki Acrobatic Troupe told me in 2016 that they
rarely, if ever, saw Snowden at the practice sessions. Andrew Towl,
a juggler with the group, did briefly meet Snowden once. It was on
a hike with Lindsay in Oahu. Towl said he asked Snowden what he
was doing in Hawaii and Snowden answered tersely, “I work with
computers,” and continued walking. Even though Mills had dated
Snowden for eight years, most of her other friends, except for Jennie
and Joe Chamberlin in Japan, had not met him. Next door neighbors
I spoke to caught brief glimpses of him entering or leaving his
house but did not engage him in a conversation as Snowden tended
to avoid eye contact. If he had other social interactions in Hawaii, no
one he met came forward and spoke of meeting him, even after he
became world famous.
Two days after his twenty- ninth birthday dinner on June 21, Mills
described him playfully as a “goof.” She wrote in her blog, “The
universe is telling me something and I’m pretty sure it’s saying get
out, Fuck you Hawaii.” In early July, she summed up her shaky situation
with Snowden in another blog, writing, “I moved to Hawaii
to continue my relationship with E. [but] it has been an emotional
roller coaster since I stepped off the plane.” She diverted herself by
organizing a pole- dancing studio in the four- hundred- square- foot
garage of the house. She also found her own friends in physical fitness
and dance groups. She joined a New Age yoga studio called
Physical Phatness, as well as a local acrobatic performance group,
and, on Friday nights, pole danced at the Mercury lounge in downtown
Honolulu. Unlike Snowden, she enjoyed socializing, writing in
her blog, “We lovingly crammed a large group into a small corner
of a delicious Japanese restaurant and filled our bellies with sushi,
tempura, and good conversation.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 41
9/29/16 5:51 PM
42 | how america lost its secrets
That same July, Snowden had other things on his mind, including
an attempt to advance himself. Although his position at Dell as
a system administrator was a well- compensated one, especially for
a twenty- nine- year- old with no formal education, it carried little
prestige. He sat from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in a windowless room
watching a bank of monitors in the so- called tunnel. Many of those
who worked with him were, as he described them, “eighteen year old
soldiers.” Presumably, they had little interest in discussing with him
the weightier issues of the world. Working as an outside contractor
was also a dead- end job that hardly matched the vision he had of
himself in his Internet postings. In real life, in a cubicle in the NSA,
he was decidedly not the Wolfking Awesomefox heroic image he had
of himself in his dream vision.
Snowden now decided to apply for a position in the NSA itself.
He apparently believed that if he scored high enough on its entrance
exam, the NSA would invite him to join it as a Senior Executive
Service officer, or SES, which was the civilian equivalent in rank and
pay to a flag officer in the U.S. armed forces. “I’m still amazed that
a twenty-eight-year-old thought he could get an SES position,” a
civilian contractor working for the NSA during the same period told
me, “Snowden had a very overinflated view of his self-worth.” To
enhance his chances of getting the SES job, Snowden in the summer
of 2012 illicitly hacked into the NSA’s administrative files and stole
the answers to the NSA exam. As the NSA’s subsequent postmortem
would determine, it was the first known document that Snowden
took without authorization at the NSA.
It was not the first time, however, that he had used his hacking
skills to attempt to advance himself. At the CIA in 2009, as he later
said in Moscow, he had added text to his annual CIA evaluation in
what he termed “a non- malicious way” to prove a point. His CIA
superior took a much darker view of that incident when the hack
was detected, calling for an investigation. It was the threat of that
investigation that, it will be recalled, in effect ended Snowden’s CIA
career. At the NSA, his intrusion was not detected for almost a year.
“He stole the [NSA] test with the answers, and he took the test and
he aced it,” the former NSA director Michael McConnell recounted
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 42
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Thief | 43
in a 2013 interview. “He then walked into the NSA and said you
should hire me because I am this good on the test.”
The reason why he attempted to gain entry into the upper ranks
of the NSA in the late summer of 2012 is less clear. If his Internet
posting and libertarian riffs are an indication of his state of mind
then, he was hostile to the surveillance activities of the NSA. If so, it
made little sense that he would seek a permanent career there. If this
is considered in light of the career move he made six months later
(in March 2013), which, as he himself admits, was for the express
purpose of getting at tightly held documents stored on computers
that were not available to him in his job at Dell, then he might have
been seeking wider access in 2012 for a more nefarious purpose than
an NSA job.
In any case, despite the near- perfect scores, the NSA did not offer
him a Senior Executive Service job. “It was totally unrealistic for
Snowden to expect to get an SES position,” a former senior NSA
officer told me. Snowden’s ambitions might have been disappointed
in this instance, but it did not prevent him from later claiming that
he had been a senior adviser to the CIA and also a senior adviser to
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Instead of an SES position, the NSA offered him a lowly G- 13 job
as an information technology worker, which was not an improvement
on his job at Dell. He took this slight as evidence of the NSA’s
incompetence, subsequently joking to a reporter in Moscow that his
ability to steal the test answers should have been seen as a qualification
for the NSA job. In September 2012, he turned down the NSA
offer. If he was to advance himself now, he had to find a new way.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 43
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 5
Crossing the Rubicon
What I came to feel is that a regime that is described as a national
security agency has stopped representing the public interest and
has instead begun to protect and promote state security interests.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
Soon after Snowden failed to get an SES job at the NSA in September
2012, he intensified his rogue activities. As we’ve seen,
part of Snowden’s job as a system administrator under contract to
Dell was transferring files held at Fort Meade to backup computers
in Hawaii. He “was moving copies of that data there for them,” said
Deputy Director Ledgett, “which was perfect cover for stealing the
[NSA] data” through the fall and winter of 2012. The security measures
at the Hawaii base presented no obstacles to him because, as
a system administrator, he had privileges that allowed him to copy
documents that had not been encrypted. Indeed, it was part of the
process of building the backup system. The flaw he had pointed to
in Japan, in which system administrators working solo could safely
steal files, also existed in Hawaii, as we know. This time, however,
instead of bringing it to the attention of the NSA, he used it to steal
files.
Snowden could be confident that his thefts of documents would
go undetected. Real- time auditing of the movement of documents,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 44
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Crossing the Rubicon | 45
which was done at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade and most of the
NSA’s regional facilities, had not yet been installed at the Hawaii
base, because a lack of bandwidth prevented the safe upgrading of
the software. This auditing software was scheduled to be installed
after the backup system was completed in 2013. The Kunia base was
one of the last NSA bases that did not monitor suspicious transfers
of files on a real- time basis. Snowden was aware of this deficiency;
he later pointed out in his interview in Wired that the NSA base
where he worked did not have an “audit” mechanism. This security
gap allowed Snowden, using his system administrator’s credentials,
to copy classified data to a thumb drive without anyone’s being able
to trace the copied data back to him. According to the NSA’s subsequent
damage assessment, he stole many thousands of pages while
working for Dell in 2012 before he contacted journalists. Ledgett
subsequently reported that the NSA analysis of the fifty- eight thousand
documents that were given by Snowden to journalists in June
2013 showed that most of them were taken while he was still working
at Dell.
This theft was made even more serious by the interconnection
of NSA computers with those of other intelligence agencies. Prior
to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, “stovepiping” had protected NSA data
on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services.
After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason U.S.
intelligence agencies were unable to “connect the dots” in advance of
the attack was related to this practice, the NSA stripped away a large
part of its stovepiping. As a result, the NSANet, which Snowden
had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network with “common
access points,” as the former NSA director Michael Hayden
described them to me, which made them the equivalent of “reading
rooms” in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to
exchange ideas about the problems they were encountering on various
projects for the intelligence community. In maintaining them,
system administrators, or “system admins,” like Snowden, acted as
the “librarians.” If a system administrator copied data from this network,
no one knew.
For Snowden, the NSANet, which included CIA and Defense
Department documents, provided a rich hunting ground in the fall
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 45
9/29/16 5:51 PM
46 | how america lost its secrets
and winter of 2012. Many of the documents he took off the NSANet
revealed operations not only of the NSA but also of the CIA and the
Pentagon. By taking them, he had come to a Rubicon from which
there would be no return. He later explained in an e- mail to Vanity
Fair from Moscow, “I crossed that line.”
As far as is known, Snowden was not sharing documents with any
other party prior to May 2013. He was not even yet in contact with
Poitras, Greenwald, or any other journalists. Presumably, Snowden
was collecting them on drives— despite the risks that possessing
such a collection of secrets might entail— for some future use.
Why would Snowden jeopardize his career and, if caught, his freedom
by undertaking this illicit enterprise? He might by now have
had strong ideological objections to the NSA’s global surveillance. As
he said later in Moscow, “We’re subverting our security standards
for the sake of surveillance.” Ordinarily, though, even ideologically
opposed employees don’t steal state secrets and risk imprisonment.
If they are disgruntled, they seek employment elsewhere. Certainly,
Snowden, with his three years’ experience working for Dell, would
have little problem finding a job as an IT worker in the booming
civilian sector of computer technology. Instead, he sought to widen
his access to NSA documents. This behavior suggests that he might
have had another agenda. One possible clue to it is the first document
he took: the NSA exam. The answers to the questions in it
represented to him a form of tactical power. Those answers could
empower him to obtain a more important job in the NSA itself that
would allow him to burrow deeper into the executive structure of
the agency. Holding such a job would unlock the door to documents
containing the NSA’s sources stored in areas not available to Dell
contractors like himself.
His later actions demonstrated that he equated the possession of
such secrets with personal power. For example, after he arrived in
Moscow in 2013, he bragged to James Risen of the Times that he
had access to secrets that gave him great leverage over the NSA. He
told him specifically his access to “full lists” of the NSA’s agents and
operations in adversary countries could, if revealed, close down the
NSA’s capabilities to gather information in them.
Such a fascination with the power of government- held secrets
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 46
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Crossing the Rubicon | 47
has always been a core concern of radical Libertarians. In his 1956
book, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of
American Security Policies, the sociologist Edward Shils brilliantly
dissects the fascination with secrecy among individuals who fear that
government agencies will use covert machinations against them. In
Shils’s concept, this counterculture is “tormented” by the government’s
possession of knowledge unavailable to them. Members of
this culture tend to believe that the agencies that hold these secrets,
such as the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA, can control their lives; they
also believe that obtaining such secrets will give individuals power
over government.
Snowden himself was concerned with a coming “dark future,”
which he later described as follows: “[The elites] know everything
about us and we know nothing about them— because they are secret,
they are privileged, and they are a separate class . . . the elite class,
the political class, the resource class— we don’t know where they
live, we don’t know what they do, we don’t know who their friends
are. They have the ability to know all that about us. This is the direction
of the future but I think there are changing possibilities in this.”
To change the “dark future,” someone would have to know the
secrets of the “elites.” Snowden saw himself as one of the few individuals
in a position to seize state secrets from those elites. He had
a SCI (sensitive compartmented information) clearance, a pass into
an NSA regional base, and the privileges of a system administrator.
This position allowed him to steal state secrets and whatever power
that went with them. And if he moved to a position that gave him
greater access, he would, in this view, amass even greater power.
Whatever his actual agenda in 2012, we know that he tested possible
reactions to a leak exposing NSA surveillance in the United
States. He asked fellow workers at the NSA base in 2012, according
to his own account, “What do you think the public would do if this
[secret data] was on the front page?” He asked this question at a time
when a large number of State Department and U.S. Army classified
documents had been posted on Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks website.
These WikiLeaks revelations made, as Snowden knew they would,
front- page headlines. His “question” was only rhetorical. No covert
NSA document had ever been published in the press as of 2012. One
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 47
9/29/16 5:51 PM
48 | how america lost its secrets
reason why NSA documents remained secrets, as all intelligence
workers at Dell were told when they signed their oath to protect
NSA secrets, was that the unauthorized release of communications
intelligence documents would violate U.S. espionage laws. Even so,
there was no shortage of activists overseas, such as Assange, who
would be willing to publish NSA documents revealing its global surveillance
activities. Cyberpunks, as these activists called themselves,
tended to be hostile to the NSA because they believed (correctly)
that it monitored their activities on the Internet. This anti- NSA
view was well represented at the Chaos Computer Club convention
in Berlin in 2012. In addressing these cyberpunks, Assange and his
followers at WikiLeaks declared that the main enemy in cyberspace
was the NSA. The NSA documents Snowden had taken were far
more explosive than anything Assange had posted to date because
they contained NSA intelligence source material.
In the late fall of 2012, Snowden further tested his newly found
powers. Using an alias, he reached out to some of the leading hacktivists.
It opened a door for him to the darker side of cyberspace.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 48
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 6
Hacktivist
When you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss gazes into you.
— friedrich nietzsche
By the time that Snowden had begun hacking into NSA files
in 2012, the alienated hacktivist battling to unlock the secrets
of evil corporations and governments had become a stock hero of
popular culture. For example, in the international best- selling Girl
with the Dragon Tattoo Trilogy by Stieg Larsson, the heroine, a
self- educated hacker in her twenties named Lisbeth Salander, steals
incriminating documents from computers that provide the journalist
Mikael Blomkvist with scoops that save from bankruptcy the progressive
magazine he edits. The journalists at the magazine accept
her sociopathic behavior, which includes embezzling millions of dollars,
extortion, maiming, and murder, because her hacking exposes
crimes and abuses of power. In the real- world universe, hacktivists
also use their skills to attempt to redress perceived abuses of power.
For example, in December 2010, the group Anonymous, whose
members, called Anons, often wear Guy Fawkes masks resembling
those worn in the 2006 movie V for Vendetta, launched a successful
denial- of- service attack called Operation Avenge Assange. It was
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 49
9/29/16 5:51 PM
50 | how america lost its secrets
aimed at paralyzing companies, including PayPal and MasterCard,
that refused to process donations for WikiLeaks, which these Anons
believed were stifling the freedom of the Internet. Because hacktivists
often use illicit means to redress their grievances, such as denialof-
service attacks, theft of passwords, and hacking into computers,
they must conceal their true identities to avoid the retribution of
the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. This requires them to
operate on the dark side of cyberspace, which has become known as
the dark net. Fortunately for hacktivists, the dark net is accessible to
anyone.
It is a place frequented by those who want to avoid laws, regulations,
and government surveillance. Its denizens include cyber saboteurs,
industrial spies, purveyors of illegal contraband, spammers,
pranksters, identity thieves, video pirates, bullies, slanderers, drug
dealers, child pornographers, money launderers, contract killers,
inside traders, anarchists, terrorists, and the intelligence services of
many countries.
Sue Halpern, writing about it in The New York Review of Books,
noted, “My own forays to the dark Net include visits to sites offering
counterfeit drivers’ licenses, methamphetamine, a template for
a US twenty- dollar bill, files to make a 3D- printed gun, and books
describing how to receive illegal goods in the mail without getting
caught. There were, too, links to rape and child abuse videos.”
To operate effectively on the dark net, one often needs a mask
of anonymity. But it is not easy to completely hide one’s tracks
in cyberspace. The way that the Internet ordinarily works is that
whenever an individual sends e- mails or instant messages or visits
a website, his or her identity can be referenced by the IP address
assigned to him or her by the Internet service provider. If dark net
users’ IP addresses are discoverable, they obviously cannot remain
anonymous. So, to evade this built- in Internet transparency, dark
side users have come to rely on ingenious software to hide their
IP addresses. The most commonly used software for this purpose
is Tor, which was first called the Onion Router, because it moves IP
addresses through multiple layers. Tor software hides the IP address
by routing messages through a network of Tor- enabled relay stations,
called nodes. Each node further obscures the user’s IP, even
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 50
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Hacktivist | 51
from the next node in the network. This scrambling allows messages
to exit the chain of Tor nodes without an easily discoverable IP. By
doing so, it “anomizes” each user of the dark side.
Because of the anonymity it provides, Tor became the software of
choice for individuals and organizations who wanted to hide their
identities. For example, Tor software made possible Silk Road, which
acted as an exchange for drug dealers, assassins, safecrackers, and
prostitutes until it was closed down by the FBI in 2013. It was created
by Ross Ulbricht, a Libertarian who wore a Ron Paul T- shirt,
as a website where “people could buy anything anonymously, with
no trail whatsoever that led back to them.” (Ulbricht received a life
sentence for running this criminal enterprise in May 2015.)
Tor software was also employed by Private Bradley Manning
(now Chelsea Manning) to transfer some fifty thousand diplomatic
cables and military reports from his laptop to Assange’s WikiLeaks
website. Eventually, Manning was identified by a fellow hacker, convicted
by a military court for violations of the Espionage Act, and
sentenced to thirty- five years in prison. Tor enabled WikiLeaks to
publish other secret data, such as material acquired in the theft of
Sony’s files, allegedly by the North Korean intelligence service, in
2015. It was the means for guaranteeing anonymity to the IT workers
who responded to Assange’s by now famous clarion call to unite.
It allowed system administrators who opposed the “surveillance
state,” as well as other disgruntled employees of government agencies
or corporations, to send documents they copied to the WikiLeaks
website without revealing their IP addresses.
Because WikiLeaks did not know the identity of its sources, it
could not be legally compelled to reveal them. “Tor’s importance
to WikiLeaks cannot be overstated,” Assange said in an interview
with Rolling Stone in 2012. Indeed, without the anonymity provided
by its Tor software, WikiLeaks could not have easily entered into a
document- sharing arrangement with major newspapers, including
The Guardian, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El
País. Through the magic of Tor, these newspapers simply attribute
their sources to WikiLeaks, which, in turn, made Assange a major
force in international journalism.
Ironically, Tor was a creation of U.S. intelligence. In the early years
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 51
9/29/16 5:51 PM
52 | how america lost its secrets
of the twenty- first century, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency developed it to
allow American intelligence operatives to cloak their movements on
the Internet. They could anonymously manipulate websites operated
by Islamic radicals, for example, and create their own Trojan
horse sites to lure would- be terrorists and spies. As it turned out,
that use of Tor software had a conceptual flaw. If U.S. intelligence
services used it, the targets could figure out that anyone visiting a
site without an IP address was using Tor software to hide it. If Tor
was exclusively used by U.S. intelligence services, the targets could
further deduce that all the anonymous visitors were avatars for
American intelligence. It would be analogous to undercover police
using pink- colored cars that civilians did not use.
To remedy this flaw, the U.S. government made Tor software open
source in 2008 and freely available to everyone in the world. It even
provided funding for its promulgation, with the State Department,
the National Science Foundation, and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors financing Tor’s core developer. The public rationale for
this generosity was that Tor could serve as a tool for, as the State
Department called it, “democracy advocates in authoritarian states.”
While Tor software remained a useful tool in covert operations by
the CIA, the DIA, and the FBI, it was anathema to the NSA because
it made it more difficult for it to track potential targets.
As Tor software became widely used by adversaries (as well as
common criminals), the NSA sought to find vulnerabilities in it. “It
should hardly be surprising that our intelligence agencies seek ways
to counteract targets that use Tor software to hide their communications,”
explained an NSA spokesperson. The NSA’s adversaries also
took an interest in identifying Tor users because they might include
political dissidents and potential spies.
Tor software also took on a cultlike importance to hacktivists concerned
with the U.S. government’s tracking their activities. Catherine
A. Fitzpatrick provides an illuminating insight into the mind- set of
these hacktivists in her 2014 book, Privacy for Me and Not for Thee.
She describes them as largely “radical anarchists” who believe “the
state is all- powerful, that law- enforcement is so strong that it will
prevail anyway, and that they are a persecuted minority.” As a refuge
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 52
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Hacktivist | 53
against the surveillance of the state, and in particular the NSA, they
not only attempt to hide their own identities but also use encryption
to obscure their messages. Their goal is to free their movements “of
any interference from law- enforcement.” In this mind- set, according
to Fitzpatrick, “they believe government intelligence agencies
will stop at nothing to stop them from absolute encryption.”
Tor software was a means to defeat the NSA, but for it to be successful,
there needed to be such a proliferation of Tor servers that
the NSA could not piece together IP addresses. The problem was that
the Tor Project, as they called it, was still a very tiny operation in
2012. It employed fewer than a hundred core developers, who were
located mainly in Germany, Iceland, Japan, Estonia, and the United
States. Its staff worked mainly out of a single room in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
The guiding spirit behind the Tor movement in the private sector
was Jacob Appelbaum, a charismatic twenty- eight- year- old who had
grown up in Northern California. Like Snowden, he had dropped
out of high school. Appelbaum identified himself to his followers on
the Internet as a “hacktivist” battling state surveillance. For him, as
for many in the hacktivist culture, the main enemy was the NSA.
After all, the NSA had a vast army of computer scientists working
to defeat Tor software. Appelbaum was well connected in this culture,
having been the North American representative for WikiLeaks
before he moved to Berlin in 2013. He also managed WikiLeaks’s
cyber security when it released the classified documents it obtained
from Manning in 2010. He was so well regarded among hacktivists
that Assange chose him as his keynote speaker replacement at
the Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) convention in New York City.
Assange told Rolling Stone, “Jake [Appelbaum] has been a tireless
promoter behind the scenes of our cause.” For its part, Rolling Stone
titled its profile of Appelbaum “Meet the Most Dangerous Man in
Cyberspace.” (Assange needed a replacement for this particular event
because he feared if he came to New York, he would be arrested for
releasing the Manning files on WikiLeaks.)
In Berlin, Appelbaum went to extreme lengths to protect himself
from American surveillance. For example, when George Packer
interviewed him for The New Yorker in 2014, he insisted on meet-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 53
9/29/16 5:51 PM
54 | how america lost its secrets
ing with Packer naked in a sauna so he could be sure Packer did not
have a recording device (other than his notebook). Appelbaum stated
repeatedly in interviews that he was being spied upon by America.
While his claims might have sounded paranoid to his interviewers,
as a character in Joseph Heller’s Catch- 22 famously said, “Just
because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t after you.”
Runa Sandvik, a close associate of Appelbaum’s, also worked
tirelessly to extend Tor’s cloak of anonymity in the private sector
against the surveillance of the NSA and other would- be intruders
of privacy. A Norwegian national in her mid- twenties, she wrote a
well- followed blog on Internet privacy for Forbes in 2012, in which
she identified herself as a privacy and security researcher working
at the intersection of technology, law, and policy. Appelbaum and
Sandvik both came in contact with Snowden before he went public
and while he was still working for the NSA in Hawaii.
In 2012, Snowden become involved in the effort to encourage
the use of Tor software to protect privacy. He made no secret of his
concerns about electronic interceptions. According to an anonymous
co- worker, he even wore a jacket to work with a parody of the
NSA insignia, which, instead of merely depicting the NSA eagle,
showed the eagle clutching AT&T phone lines. He had also become
a member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the digital rights
organization that was helping finance Tor. He saw Tor software as a
remedy. “Without Tor,” he later wrote, “when you walk the streets
of the Internet, you’re always watched.” His efforts on behalf of Tor
were not limited to symbolic gestures. In 2012, he set up a twogigabyte
server called “The Signal,” which he described as the largest
Tor relay station exit node in Honolulu. He apparently paid for
it himself.
Through his work as a system administrator for Dell, he found
documents revealing NSA efforts, not yet successful, to defeat Tor’s
ability to camouflage a user’s identity on the Internet. He found that
the NSA was attempting to build backdoor entry ways into Tor software.
One of the NSA documents that he illicitly downloaded, titled
“Tor Stinks,” described the agency’s continuing efforts to penetrate
Tor servers. In addition, he downloaded NSA documents describing
programs begun in 2012 that aimed at searching the Internet for the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 54
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Hacktivist | 55
cyber signatures of foreign parties suspected of hacking into U.S.
government systems.
He also made efforts to directly contact Sandvik. She recalls
first hearing from Snowden in November 2012. He first wrote to
her under the alias Cincinnatus but later supplied his real name
and mailing address in Hawaii because he wanted her to mail him
authentic computer stickers from the Tor Project that he could use
as “swag,” as he wrote her, to attract further interest in Tor software
in Hawaii. As a result, she knew his identity seven months before he
went public in Hong Kong. He would later tell Sandvik from Moscow
that he had been “moonlighting” by working to advance the Tor
Project. He added, with some understatement, that his moonlighting
was “something the NSA might not have been too happy about.”
On November 18, 2012, while still working for Dell at the NSA,
his dual role led him to begin organizing a “CryptoParty” aimed at
finding new recruits for Tor. The CryptoParty movement had been
started in 2012 by Asher Wolf, a radical hacktivist and anarchist living
in Melbourne, Australia. She promoted the get- togethers not
unlike the Tupperware parties of the 1950s. The party organizer,
usually with a representative of the Tor Project, advertised the party
on the Internet. Attendees were encouraged to bring their own laptops
so they could install Tor as well as encryption software in them.
The attendees would then be instructed on how to use it. Finally,
those converted to Tor software would be told to proselytize about
its virtues by holding their own CryptoParty. Wolf’s idea was to use
these gatherings to expand the realm of Tor.
Snowden called his fete the Oahu CryptoParty. It had its own web
page. He told Wolf that it would be the first CryptoParty in Honolulu.
She wrote back advising him to “keep it simple.” (Wolf later
said she did not know he was working at the NSA.)
Snowden apparently had no inhibitions in staging a party that the
leadership of the NSA might consider subversive of its battle against
Tor. He even invited fellow NSA workers in Hawaii, as well as others
in the local computer culture. He asked Sandvik, who was living in
Washington, D.C., at the time, to participate, proposing that she cohost
the party with him. He scheduled it for December 11, 2012, in
Honolulu. According to Sandvik’s account, Snowden informed her
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 55
9/29/16 5:51 PM
56 | how america lost its secrets
that he “had been talking some of the more technical guys at work
into setting up some additional fast servers” for Tor. His “work”
place at the time was the NSA. So, if he was telling the truth, he
had already attempted to find co- workers at the NSA who might be
interested in attending an anti- NSA surveillance presentation.
Sandvik not only agreed to be Snowden’s co- presenter but made
the Oahu CryptoParty a Tor- sponsored event. Sandvik flew to
Honolulu on December 6, 2012. It was a fourteen- hour flight and
a relatively expensive one. She later told Wired magazine that the
invitation from Snowden coincided with her plan to take a “vacation
in Hawaii.” Whatever her reason, it brought her in direct contact
with a Tor supporter with access to the computers of its main enemy,
the NSA.
On December 11, following Snowden’s instructions, Sandvik
arrived shortly before 6:00 p.m. at the Fishcake gallery in downtown
Honolulu. She proceeded through a maze of furniture display rooms
to BoxJelly, a public space. She was then directed to a small back room
in which there were folding chairs and worktables already set up for
the event. Rechung Fujihira, the owner of BoxJelly, told me that Hi
Capacity, a “creative collective” of computer buffs, had arranged the
logistics for the event. As he recalled, Snowden had requested their
help for the CryptoParty.
Sandvik found Snowden waiting for her with Lindsay Mills,
whom he introduced to Sandvik as his girlfriend. He told Sandvik
that Mills was there to make a video of the event. Mills did not mention
the party in her blog. But that Snowden brought her and introduced
her to Sandvik suggests that he did not keep secret from her
his activities to further Tor.
The event started at 6:00 p.m. sharp. By Sandvik’s count, about
twenty people gradually filled the room. She reckoned that about
half of the attendees were from Snowden’s workplace. Snowden
began the presentation by giving reasons why Internet users needed
to defend their privacy by using both encryption and Tor software.
According to one attendee who asked not to be identified by name,
Snowden, while not revealing that he worked for the NSA, spoke
with such precise knowledge about government surveillance capabilities
that the attendee suspected Snowden worked for the govern-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 56
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Hacktivist | 57
ment. Snowden next introduced Sandvik, who took the podium and
discussed the work of the Tor Project, stressing the importance of
expanding the Tor network. Following their presentations, Snowden
and Sandvik took questions from the audience.
The Oahu CryptoParty, according to Sandvik, ended about
10:00 p.m. No one objected to Mills’s making a video of the meeting,
even though it was dedicated to the idea of protecting personal
privacy. The video was not posted on the Internet, so presumably
Snowden wanted it for his own purposes. Afterward, Sandvik went
to a local diner called Zippy’s for a late dinner. She left Hawaii two
days later.
Not all the hacktivists that Snowden invited were able to attend.
Parker Higgins, for example, a prime mover in the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and founder of the San Francisco CryptoParty, wrote
back to him that he was unable to attend the December CryptoParty
because of the high price of the airfare that month between San Francisco
and Honolulu. He added that he would try to attend Snowden’s
next CryptoParty, which was scheduled for February 23, 2013. (Higgins
would make headlines in 2013 by flying a chartered blimp over
the NSA’s secret facility in Utah and photographing it from the air.)
Snowden’s double duty continued: downloading secret documents
while remaining in touch with some of the leading figures
in the Tor Project under his various aliases. He also continued to
invite activists to his CryptoParties, and he openly advertised them
on the Internet until 2013. The CIA’s former deputy director Morell,
who reviewed the security situation at the NSA in 2014 as a member
of President Obama’s NSA Review Committee, found that the
NSA in the post– Cold War age had encouraged its technical workers
to freely discuss challenges that arose in its computer operations.
“The idea was to spread knowledge and learn from the successes
of others,” Morell wrote, “but it created enormous security vulnerability,
given the always- existent risk of an insider committed to
stealing secrets.” According to a former intelligence executive, this
new “open culture,” exemplified by largely unrestricted entry to the
NSANet by civilian contractors, fit the culture of the young civilians
on the “geek squads” who now ran the NSA’s computer networks.
It was remarkable that even in such an “open culture,” Snowden’s
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 57
9/29/16 5:51 PM
58 | how america lost its secrets
CryptoParty, Tor station, and other anti- NSA activities could go
unremarked upon. After all, ten or so NSA workers attended the
first party, and it is not unlikely that many of them recognized
him as their co- worker. If so, they knew (as did Sandvik and Mills)
that the Tor advocate “Cincinnatus” was Snowden. He had also not
been shy in contacting notable enemies of the NSA via e- mail, such
as Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Asher Wolf. If anyone,
including the security staff of the NSA, had been on the lookout for
dissident intelligence workers, this well- advertised gathering and its
organizer might have been of interest.
In 2014, I asked a former top NSA executive whether such activities
on behalf of Tor by an NSA employee would arouse the attention
of the NSA’s own “Q” counterespionage unit. He answered,
“Snowden was not an NSA employee.” Because Snowden was a
contract employee of Dell’s residing in the United States, the NSA
could not legally monitor his private activities or intercept his communication.
To do so would require a court- approved FBI request. So
Snowden/Cincinnatus was free to operate openly in recruiting NSA
workers, hacktivists, and computer buffs for his events. Ironically,
adversary intelligence services searching for disgruntled intelligence
workers had no such constraints.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 58
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 7
String Puller
It wasn’t that they put it on me as an individual— that I’m uniquely
qualified [or] an angel descending from the heavens— as that they
put it on someone, somewhere.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2013
Downloading NSA documents was not Snowden’s only rogue
activity while working at the NSA for Dell in 2012. Three
weeks after the CryptoParty, Snowden began anonymously contacting
a high- profile journalist. He used the same alias, Cincinnatus,
that he used with Sandvik and to advertise the Oahu CryptoParty.
The journalist to whom he wrote on December 1, 2012, was Glenn
Greenwald, the previously mentioned Rio- based columnist for The
Guardian.
Greenwald had not always been an activist journalist. He had
been a litigation lawyer at the elite New York firm of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz. He was also an entrepreneur, owning part of
Master Notions, a company that, among other things, had a 50 percent
financial interest in the pornographic website HJ (an acronym
that originally stood for “Hairy Jock”). All did not go well with this
enterprise. In 2004, Greenwald became involved in an acrimonious
lawsuit with his other associates in HJ. As a result, he had a number
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 59
9/29/16 5:51 PM
60 | how america lost its secrets
of open legal judgments filed against him, including an $85,000 lien
by the IRS.
After resigning from his law firm in 2005, he moved to Rio de
Janeiro and began a new career as a blogger for the Internet magazine
Salon. He wrote fierce, and often brilliant, polemics against U.S.
government surveillance and other perceived intrusions on personal
privacy. The extent of his bitter antagonism toward the activities of
the “surveillance state,” as he called it, was reflected in the title of
his 2006 book, How Would a Patriot Act? Defending American Values
from a President Run Amok. His position on surveillance was
unrelenting, even when it came to the president. “By ordering illegal
eavesdropping, the president had committed crimes and should be
held accountable for them,” Greenwald wrote. When Barack Obama
became president in 2009, Greenwald also attacked him for breaking
the law by “ordering illegal eavesdropping.” Because of his opposition
to Obama, he contributed money to the libertarian campaign of
Ron Paul, the same candidate to whom Snowden gave money.
In August 2012, he had transferred his provocative blog, which
had amassed a following of nearly one million readers (including
Snowden), from Salon to The Guardian. The British newspaper
shared his powerful anti- surveillance position, having first published
the WikiLeaks documents that had been illicitly leaked by Manning
and published by Assange in 2010.
Greenwald was an activist as well as a journalist. He joined the
board of directors of the Freedom of the Press Foundation (eventually
Runa Sandvik would join too). It had been set up expressly to
funnel money to both Assange’s WikiLeaks site and the defense fund
for Manning after he was arrested. Such a financial intermediary
was necessary because American credit card companies were blocking
money transfers to these two causes in 2012. This “blockade”
was taking its toll on WikiLeaks. According to Assange, “WikiLeaks
had been cut off from more than 90 percent of its finances.” The
Freedom of the Press Foundation came to its rescue. John Perry Barlow,
one of the songwriters for the Grateful Dead, was one of its
chief financial backers. “The first serious info war is now engaged,”
Barlow declared. “The field of battle is WikiLeaks.” He served with
Greenwald and Poitras on its board.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 60
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 61
Snowden was an avid reader of Greenwald’s screeds against the
government. If he were to assume the role of a modern- day Prometheus,
delivering forbidden NSA secrets to the public, Greenwald
would be a logical candidate to break the story. Snowden could safely
assume that Greenwald would be sympathetic to exposing NSA surveillance
from his many blogs, tweets, and YouTube comments on
the subject. For example, on November 13, 2012, just eighteen days
before Snowden contacted him, Greenwald had written a blog for
The Guardian asserting that the United States was “a surveillance
state run amok.” In it, echoing very closely what Snowden said at his
CryptoParty, Greenwald wrote, “Any remnants of internet anonymity
have been all but obliterated between the state and technology
companies.” Citing a story in The Washington Post, he continued,
“Every day, collection systems at the National Security Agency
intercept and store 1.7 billion e- mails, phone calls and other types
of communications.”
As a result, Greenwald called for action in that blog posting, writing,
“The US operates a sprawling, unaccountable Surveillance State
that, in violent breach of the core guarantees of the Fourth Amendment,
monitors and records virtually everything even the most
law- abiding citizens do.” That same week, Snowden invited Runa
Sandvik to co- host his CryptoParty.
One problem for Snowden in reaching out to Greenwald was
Greenwald’s lack of any encryption for his e- mails. Communicating
with a journalist like Greenwald who famously attacked the very
organization for which Snowden worked was itself a risky undertaking,
especially if he wanted to pass classified NSA documents to
him. If his e- mails were intercepted by the NSA in Brazil (where
Greenwald lived) and where the NSA was not restricted by U.S. law,
he could lose his job or even be arrested. As Cincinnatus, he told
Greenwald that he needed to immediately encrypt his computer. To
make his point, he cited Greenwald’s November 12, 2012, blog. In it,
Greenwald noted that General David Petraeus, then the CIA director,
had been caught in a sex scandal because his personal e- mails
had been intercepted. Snowden wrote to Greenwald that Petraeus
would not have been exposed if he had used encryption. Snowden
sent Greenwald instructions on how to install the necessary encryp-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 61
9/29/16 5:51 PM
62 | how america lost its secrets
tion software and a link to a twelve- minute video on encryption
(which might have been the same video he used at his CryptoParty
a few weeks earlier).
Greenwald did not manage to encrypt his computer, however,
and Snowden, unwilling to deal with Greenwald through an unencrypted
channel, broke off contact with him in January 2013. Even
so, he did not give up his plan of using Greenwald in his enterprise.
He merely sought an intermediary who used encryption.
He chose Laura Poitras. He knew she and Greenwald were founding
board members of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. Greenwald
had written about her extensively. For example, he wrote an
entire blog about her confrontation with the U.S. government and
her plans to make a documentary about the “US Government’s
increasing powers of domestic surveillance [through] its expanding
covert domestic NSA activities.”
Since 2011, Poitras had been diligently filming the construction
of a massive NSA repository for data in Bluffdale, Utah. In the antisurveillance
culture, the structure had become symbolic of the powers
of the NSA. In fact, it was the same NSA site that Parker Higgins
photographed from a blimp in the fall of 2013 and posted on the
Internet after Poitras had released her documentary about the NSA’s
use of the Bluffdale repository for domestic spying.
Aside from her connections with Greenwald, Poitras had other
impressive credentials. Born in 1964 in Boston, she came from a
wealthy family that donated large sums of money to philanthropic
causes, including $20 million for research on bipolar disorders. After
graduating from the New School for Public Engagement in 1996,
she pursued a career as an activist filmmaker. Her focus quickly
became exposing NSA surveillance. One of her short documentaries
about the NSA’s domestic surveillance program was featured on the
New York Times website and attracted enormous attention in 2012.
As a dedicated opponent of the surveillance state, she participated
in public events with William Binney, the ex- NSA whistle- blower,
and Jacob Appelbaum. In April 2012, for example, she made a presentation
at the Whitney Museum in New York with Binney and
Appelbaum. She had become such a leading activist against the NSA
by December 2012 that Appelbaum, after lauding her work, inter-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 62
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 63
spersed clips from her short film in his keynote address at the Chaos
Computer Club convention of hacktivists in Berlin that month.
Snowden also closely followed her rise in this world. By simply
googling Poitras’s name in January 2013, he would have learned
about her connections with Greenwald, Appelbaum, Binney,
Assange, and other leading figures in the anti- surveillance camp.
When asked later by Poitras why he had chosen her to help him,
Snowden replied, “I didn’t. You chose yourself.” The problem for
Snowden was anonymously drawing her into his enterprise.
Poitras was living in Berlin in January 2013, which made her vulnerable
to NSA surveillance. To get to her through an encrypted
channel, Snowden chose a circuitous approach. On January 11, he
wrote to Micah Lee in Berkeley, California. Given Lee’s residence
in the United States, as Snowden knew, the NSA would be legally
barred from monitoring his communications without a warrant.
He used Lee, who was the chief technology officer at the Freedom
of the Press Foundation, as the encrypted gateway to Poitras. Lee
was also well- connected to others whom Snowden had contacted
for his CryptoParty. Lee had been an associate of Runa Sandvik’s at
Tor and was a prominent member of Noisebridge, an eclectic antigovernment
hackers’ commune based in Northern California, of
which Appelbaum was also a member.
To contact Lee, Snowden chose the alias Anon108. Anon is an
alias frequently used by members of the Anonymous commune
of hacktivists. “I’m a friend,” Snowden wrote to Lee. “I need to get
information securely to Laura Poitras and her alone, but I can’t find
an email gpg key for her.” The “gpg” encryption key he asked for,
more commonly called a PGP key, was the so- called public key for
an encryption system called Pretty Good Privacy, or, for short, PGP.
This encryption system required both a public and a private key.
Snowden asked Lee to provide the former one, because Poitras had
the latter one. Lee wrote to Poitras about Anon108. The next day,
with the approval of Poitras, Lee supplied Poitras’s public key to
Snowden, or, as he knew him, Anon108.
With it, Snowden contacted Poitras directly. He asked her as a first
step to open an anonymous e- mail account using Tor software. Poitras
later wrote about this initial contact, “I was at that point film-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 63
9/29/16 5:51 PM
64 | how america lost its secrets
ing with several people who were all being targeted by the [U.S.]
government.” Many of the people she was filming, including Appelbaum,
Assange, Binney, and the former NSA employee Thomas
Drake, could attract interest by U.S. or foreign intelligence services.
Snowden asked Poitras to take out a new enciphering key to use
exclusively for her liaison with him. It provided them both with an
extra layer of protection from any surveillance by law enforcement.
Presumably, she accommodated his requests because she anticipated
that the anonymous person would use this encrypted channel to
send her highly sensitive material.
On January 23, Snowden wrote to Poitras under yet another alias.
This time he called himself Citizen Four. He wrote, “At this stage I
can offer nothing more than my word.” He then said falsely, “I am
a senior government employee in the intelligence community.” She
had no way of knowing at this “stage” that despite giving her his
“word,” he was not who he claimed to be. He was not a “government
employee,” he was not a “senior” official, and he was not a member
of the “intelligence community” (which is composed of the intelligence
services of the U.S. government). He would later also claim
to her that he had been “a senior adviser to the CIA” and “a senior
adviser to the DIA.” That was untrue, too. In January 2013, he was
merely a contract employee of Dell’s working as a computer technician
at the NSA base in Hawaii.
Snowden told her in his initial e- mail that he was well acquainted
with her career as an anti- surveillance activist. He said that he had
read Greenwald’s account in Salon that past April, a blog in which
Greenwald detailed the forty times in which Poitras was searched by
U.S. authorities. The story also said that Poitras believed she was on
a special watch list and under constant U.S. government surveillance.
She had come under such scrutiny by U.S. authorities, it turned out,
because of her documentary about American military abuses of civilians
in Iraq in 2006, titled My Country, My Country. While filming
it, she was at a place close to an insurgent ambush of U.S. troops in
Iraq. Her presence at the ambush site led army intelligence officers
to suspect (without any evidence) that she might have been tipped
off by the insurgents. She firmly denied the charge, and the government
never substantiated it. Even so, because of this incident, since
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 64
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 65
2006 she had been kept on a list that caused authorities to search her
at airports. As a result, she took elaborate countermeasures to evade
any possible surveillance of her communications.
Snowden knew about this incident because Greenwald described
it in great detail in a blog that Snowden read (as he later told Greenwald).
“Poitras is now forced to take extreme steps— ones that hamper
her ability to do her work,” Greenwald wrote. “She now avoids
traveling with any electronic devices. She uses alternative methods
to deliver the most sensitive parts of her work— raw film and interview
notes— to secure locations. She spends substantial time and
resources protecting her computers with encryption and password
defenses. Especially when she is in the US, she avoids talking on
the phone about her work, particularly to sources. And she simply
will not edit her films at her home out of fear— obviously well
grounded— that government agents will attempt to search and seize
the raw footage.” She claimed, as she told journalists, she was the
victim of “Kafkaesque government harassment.”
Snowden was duly impressed with her concerns about government
surveillance, which he agreed was ubiquitous. Indeed, he later
described her as “more paranoid when it comes to electronic security
than I can be.” He meant it as a compliment. Such functional paranoia
or “operational security,” as Greenwald would call the precautions
that she took, dovetailed with Snowden’s growing conviction
that universal encryption was necessary to defeat the surveillance
state. It also made her the perfect channel for Snowden to safely pass
some of the classified documents he stole to Greenwald and other
journalists.
It was not difficult to get her to cooperate in his plot. He wrote,
for example, “The surveillance you’ve experienced means you have
been ‘selected’— a term which will mean more to you as you learn
how the modern SIGINT [signals intelligence] system works.” Just
as she had been “chosen” by her work to act as his conduit, according
to Snowden, she had been chosen by the NSA as a target because
of her work. The idea of her being “selected” by an invisible signals
intelligence agency, the NSA, could only excite her longtime concerns
about being watched by the government.
“Your victimization by the NSA system means that you are well
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 65
9/29/16 5:51 PM
66 | how america lost its secrets
aware of the threat that [the NSA’s] unrestricted, secret abilities pose
for democracies,” he continued. “I hope you understand that contacting
you is extremely high risk and if you are willing to agree
to the following precautions before I share more, this will not be a
waste of your time.” Further playing on her concern, he asked her to
confirm to him “that no one has ever had a copy of your private key
and that it uses a strong pass phrase.” Such precautions were necessary
because “your adversary is capable of one trillion guesses per
second.” That “adversary” was, as she knew from her previous film,
the NSA. At this point, she knew she was entering into a dangerous
liaison with an unknown party in pursuit of NSA secrets. She wondered
if he might be part of a plan to entrap her or her contacts like
Assange and Appelbaum, as she noted in her diary. “Is C4 a trap?”
she asked herself, referring to her Citizen Four source. “Will he put
me in prison?”
To elude this “adversary,” Snowden stressed to Poitras that she
would have to adopt a conspiratorial frame of mind. “If the device
you store the private key and enter your pass phrase on has been
hacked, it is trivial to decrypt our communications,” he explained. “If
you publish the source material, I will likely be immediately implicated.”
If her correspondent could be “immediately implicated,” it
meant that he was a person authorized to handle these secrets. So
Poitras knew, as early as January 2013, that she was creating an
encrypted channel for someone with access to NSA secrets who
would be incriminated by providing them to her.
The key source for Poitras’s previously referred to short video
was Binney. Like her new source, he had been authorized to handle
NSA secrets. Binney had been an NSA technical director until he
had retired in 2001. The NSA’s domestic surveillance program that
Binney told the press about years before being interviewed in Poitras’s
film was called Stellarwind. It involved data mining domestic
communications and financial transactions that had been authorized
by President George W. Bush in 2001 after 9/11 as commander- inchief
under the war powers given to him following the attacks. It
indeed led to a major exposé on domestic spying by The New York
Times in December 2005.
Binney had never provided Poitras with any NSA documents
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 66
9/30/16 11:09 AM
String Puller | 67
to back up the charges he made that Stellarwind was an unlawful
domestic surveillance operation. He could not have done so without
violating his sworn oath and, for that matter, U.S. anti- espionage
statutes. Binney made it clear to her and other journalists that he
was not a lawbreaker. But her new source, C4, was willing to do
what Binney (and other insiders) had refused to do. He was offering
in these e- mails to provide her with secret government documents,
even though it would implicate him as an outlaw. To further
whet her appetite, he told her that these up- to- date NSA documents
would fully substantiate the allegations that Binney made in her
film. Even more important, he said Binney’s 2001 disclosures were
still relevant to her cause. “What you know as Stellarwind has
grown,” he wrote to her. “The expanded special source operations
that took over Stellarwind’s share of the pie have spread all over the
world to practically include comprehensive coverage of the United
States.” In fact, as Snowden knew from the Inspector General report
he had read, the NSA had terminated Stellarwind almost a decade
earlier. President Bush ended it after top officials of the Justice
Department insisted that he did not have the legal authority for the
domestic part of Stellarwind. Instead, he asked Congress to revise
FISA to meet the objections of the Justice Department. The result
was the FISA Amendment Act of 2006. Unlike the previous Stellarwind
program, it did not permit domestic surveillance. It specified
that the government could not target any person in the United
States or anywhere else in the world under this authority. Nor could
it target any foreign person, even one residing outside of the United
States, to acquire information from a particular known person inside
the United States. As the act recognized that information about U.S.
citizens might mistakenly be intercepted by the NSA, it required
that such data about Americans be expunged in a bimonthly review
by a Justice Department task force. Although the NSA program in
place in 2013 was not the comprehensive domestic surveillance that
Snowden claimed it to be, Poitras had no way of knowing at this
early state that her source was misleading her.
He offered to substantiate her worst fears about the growth of
NSA surveillance: “I know the location of most domestic interception
points, and that the largest telecommunication companies in the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 67
9/30/16 11:09 AM
68 | how america lost its secrets
US are betraying the trust of their customers, which I can prove.”
He even proffered evidence implicating President Barack Obama in
illegal surveillance. “There is a detailed policy framework, a kind of
martial law for cyber operations, created by the White House. It’s
called presidential policy 20,” he wrote to her. It was an eighteenpage
directive that Obama had signed four months earlier in October
2012. Snowden was offering to reveal to her up- to- date evidence
of a surveillance state in America presided over by the president
himself. It was what she had been searching for over the past three
years. How could she, as an activist filmmaker, resist such a sensational
offer?
He further explained to her that he had placed great trust in her
discretion. “No one, not even my most trusted confidante, is aware
of my intentions, and it would not be fair for them to fall under suspicion
for my actions,” he said.
Poitras must have found it flattering that a total stranger was
willing to disclose to her in e- mails what he would not tell even his
“most trusted confidante” about his intentions to commit an illicit
breach of U.S. national security. It also put her under enormous
stress. She noted in her journal that the pressure made her feel as if
she were “underwater.” “I am battling with my nervous system. It
doesn’t let me rest or sleep. Eye twitches, clenched throat, and now
literally waiting to be raided.”
Snowden was also taking an extraordinary risk. After all, he had
no way of knowing who else she told about him. She had long been
concerned, with good reason, that the U.S. government was out to
get her. An unknown person offering to supply her with secret documents
could be attempting to entrap her. So Snowden could not preclude
the possibility that she would consult with others about the
offer he was making her. Because her current documentary project
included interviews by her with Assange, Appelbaum, and three ex-
NSA executives, intelligence services with sophisticated surveillance
capabilities might also have taken a professional interest in her communications,
as Poitras herself had suspected. Even if Snowden was
somehow able to use his position as a system administrator at Dell
to ascertain that the NSA did not have Poitras under surveillance, he
could not be sure that other agencies, such as the Russian and Chi-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 68
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 69
nese intelligence services, were not monitoring his communications
with her. It was, however, a chance Snowden was willing to take.
Snowden, in any case, did not intend to conceal his identity for
more than a few months. He told Poitras he had a specific purpose
in allowing her to name him in her ongoing film project. Indeed,
he said it was essential in his plan to prevent others, including presumably
his “most trusted confidante,” from being suspected by law
enforcement of helping him in his enterprise. He prevailed on her
to accommodate his plan, saying, “You may be the only one who
can prevent that, and that is by immediately nailing me to the cross
rather than trying to protect me as a source.” His choice of the imagery
of crucifixion suggested that like Jesus Christ he was willing to
sacrifice himself for the sake of others.
In keeping with their operational security arrangement, Snowden
said that he would first send her an encrypted file of documents that
she would not be able to read. Only after his conditions were met and
“everything else is done,” he said, “the key will follow.” He was now
pulling the strings. To get that key, she had to follow his instructions.
One of his conditions was that she help him recruit Greenwald
and other outlets for his disclosures. “The material provided and
the investigative effort required will be too much for any one person,”
he wrote to Poitras. He next directed her to contact Greenwald.
“I recommend that at the very minimum you involve Greenwald. I
believe you know him.” (Snowden apparently did not tell her that
he had unsuccessfully attempted to reach out to Greenwald before he
had contacted her.)
His continued interest in Greenwald was understandable. Aside
from Greenwald’s opposition to what he called the “Surveillance
State,” he was a gateway to The Guardian. That publication had
become an important player in the business of disclosing government
documents by publishing a large part of the U.S. documents
supplied to WikiLeaks, as we have seen. By breaking whistleblowing
stories about U.S. intelligence, it had also greatly increased
the circulation of its website. As an establishment newspaper, it also
gave these WikiLeaks stories credibility with the media. So despite
Greenwald’s inability to create an encrypted channel, Snowden still
needed him. He had no reason to believe that Greenwald would turn
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 69
9/29/16 5:51 PM
70 | how america lost its secrets
down the opportunity for a whistle- blowing scoop for The Guardian.
After all, the classified documents Snowden would provide him
would also give credence to both Greenwald’s book and his many
blogs denouncing U.S. government surveillance.
Aside from Greenwald and Poitras, Snowden sought an outlet
inside the American establishment. So he had Poitras write to Barton
Gellman, the Pulitzer Prize– winning reporter for The Washington
Post. Poitras had met Gellman in 2010, when they were both fellows
at NYU’s Center on Law and Security. Poitras had requested help
in encrypting her computer from Karen Greenberg, the executive
director of the center, who took her “by the hand” to meet Gellman,
Greenberg’s resident expert on encryption software. Born in 1960,
Gellman graduated from Princeton in 1981 and became an awardwinning
investigative reporter for the Miami Herald, the Post, and
Time magazine. He was also the author of Angler: The Cheney Vice
Presidency. If Gellman could be drawn into the enterprise, he could
provide Snowden with a gateway to the prestigious American paper
credited with bringing down President Richard Nixon in the Watergate
scandal.
Poitras, as the go- between for Snowden, immediately contacted
Gellman. After telling him she was involved in a story about NSA
surveillance, she suggested that they meet in New York City.
For their rendezvous, Poitras took a number of precautions to
evade anyone attempting to follow her. She had Gellman first meet
her in one coffee shop in lower Manhattan. When he arrived, she had
him follow her on foot to another coffee shop, following her antisurveillance
tradecraft. Once assured no one was watching them, she
ordered coffee for herself and Gellman. Over coffee, she told Gellman
about Snowden, whom she described as her anonymous source.
She said that he was willing to supply Gellman with documents that
would expose domestic surveillance, if Gellman agreed to write a
story on it for the Post. Even though Gellman had left the staff of
the Post in 2010, he had previously written several stories on that
subject for the newspaper, and he was also highly regarded by the
editors there. Gellman was interested in Poitras’s offer (although he
would consult a friend at the Justice Department about the legality
of publishing NSA documents).
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 70
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 71
Snowden had now laid the groundwork for at least two possible
outlets. Poitras, however, was having some difficulty in bringing
Greenwald in on the plan. Like Snowden, she did not trust writing
to him in unencrypted e- mails, and because Greenwald lived in Brazil,
she still had not found an opportunity for a face- to- face meeting
with him.
That opportunity arose in mid- April 2013. Greenwald had flown
to the United States to give the lead speech at an event in Yonkers,
New York, sponsored by the Council on American- Islamic Relations,
a pro- Muslim civil rights organization. He had delivered the
keynote speech at its previous meeting in San Jose, California, where
his impassioned depiction of the American “Surveillance State”
received a rousing ovation from the attendees. He was invited to
speak at this award dinner for its East Coast chapter.
Poitras flew from Berlin to New York to see him. On April 19,
2013, she arranged to meet Greenwald at noon in the restaurant of
the Marriott hotel where Greenwald was staying. When Greenwald
arrived at the restaurant carrying a cell phone, she explained to him
that the NSA could surreptitiously turn his cell phone into a microphone
and use it to eavesdrop on their conversation. She told him to
go back to his room and leave his phone there. When he returned,
phoneless, she took further precautions by having them change
tables several times. Greenwald accepted these tactics because, as he
later said, she was in charge of their “operational security.”
When they finally settled at a table in the nearly empty restaurant,
she showed Greenwald e- mails she had received from Citizen
Four. Greenwald, as he recounted, made “no connection” to the
“long- forgotten emails” he had received from Snowden under the
alias Cincinnatus. Reading the e- mails that Snowden had sent to
Poitras, he was impressed with the “sincerity” of the anonymous
correspondent.
When Poitras showed Greenwald Citizen Four’s mission statement
in which he said his motive was to end the U.S. “surveillance
state,” Greenwald was further impressed with the source. The surveillance
state Snowden described closely dovetailed with the surveillance
state that Greenwald had described himself in his speech
at the Council on American- Islamic Relations dinner in 2012. Of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 71
9/29/16 5:51 PM
72 | how america lost its secrets
course, the similarity of the phrasing might not have been entirely
coincidental. Greenwald’s 2012 speech had been put on YouTube and
widely circulated on the Internet just a few days before Snowden
first wrote to him on December 1, 2012. Snowden identified himself
as a privacy advocate, which was also how Greenwald often identified
himself in his speeches. He also echoed other concerns Greenwald
had publicly expressed, including defending American privacy
from government intrusions.
Snowden promised the leaks he would supply would provide dramatic
results. He asserted in one of his e- mails to Poitras that the
“shock” of the documents he would give Greenwald would result in
the public’s learning about the secret “mechanisms through which
our privacy is violated.” According to Snowden’s assessment, following
that initial uproar, they could achieve another objective in their
common cause. “We can guarantee for all people equal protection
against unreasonable search,” he wrote. In light of this convergence
of views, it is not surprising that Greenwald was fully convinced
of Citizen Four’s bona fides. He said to Poitras, “He’s real,” and he
agreed to help break the story in The Guardian.
Poitras now revealed to Greenwald that Citizen Four would deliver
an entire trove of secret documents to them in six to eight weeks.
According to this timetable, the Greenwald scoop and the “shock”
Citizen Four promised would come in early to mid- June 2013.
At this point in April, Snowden was in full control. Although
his job at Dell involved endlessly monitoring largely meaningless
encrypted messages in the NSA tunnel, he had been able to get three
major journalists to react favorably to his proposal. None of them
knew his name, position, age, location, or where precisely he worked.
Nor did they know the means by which he planned to obtain the
secrets that he dangled before them. They also did not know where,
or even if, they would meet their source. Their total knowledge about
him was the description he improperly gave of himself: a “senior
government employee in the intelligence community” (Greenwald
speculated that he was a disgruntled CIA station chief).
Even though they were operating largely in the dark, these three
journalists acted as almost any other ambitious reporter would if he
or she were offered a major scoop about illegal acts of the govern-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 72
9/29/16 5:51 PM
String Puller | 73
ment. In addition, the information was in line with what they had
previously investigated or written about. None of these journalists
had any reason to doubt at this point that their anonymous source
was anything but the sincere whistle- blower he claimed to be. They
could not have known from his anonymous e- mails that aside from
the whistle- blowing documents he promised them, he was in the
process of stealing a large number of other documents that concerned
the NSA’s sources and methods in foreign countries. These
documents, to which Snowden never referred in his correspondence
with them, had little if anything at all to do with domestic spying on
American citizens.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 73
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 8
Raider of the Inner Sanctum
They think there’s a smoking gun in there that would be the
death of them all politically.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
The nightmare of the NSA is a penetration. As the CIA, the
FBI, and the NSA found out in the 1990s, no intelligence service
is invulnerable to it. Any employee of a large intelligence organization
can turn, or be turned, against it. Among the more than ten
thousand intelligence workers employed by the NSA, it is a near
certainty that over time more than one of them will become dissatisfied
with their work. A worker may have a personal grievance
about salary, lack of promotion, or treatment by his or her superiors.
Disenchantment with the NSA may also proceed from idealistic
objections. The NSA is in the business of secretly intercepting
messages, and an insider could come to find its spying activities at
odds with his or her own beliefs about the violation of privacy. For
any of these reasons, a disgruntled insider could go rogue. He or she
then might attempt to right a perceived wrong by disclosing NSA
secrets to another party. That party might then induce or blackmail
the rogue employee into disclosing further secrets.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 74
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Raider of the Inner Sanctum | 75
To guard against this, the NSA has developed a well- organized
system for stratifying its data so that obtaining critical secrets
required a rogue employee to burrow into its heavily protected inner
sanctum. As part of this system, the NSA divides its data into different
tiers depending on the importance of the secrets to its operations.
The first tier, Level 1, is mainly administrative material. This data
would include FISA court orders and other directives its employees
might need to check on to carry out their tasks. Level 2 contains
data from which the secret sources have been removed. This tier,
available to other intelligence services and policy makers, includes
reports and analysis that can be shared. Level 3 contains documents
that cannot be shared outside a small group of authorized individuals,
because they disclose the secret sources through which the NSA
surreptitiously obtained the information. This third tier includes,
for example, compiled lists of sources in China, Russia, Iran, and
other adversary countries. It also discloses the exotic methods the
NSA uses to get some of this data. Level 3 documents also include
reports on specific NSA, CIA, and Pentagon operations unknown to
adversaries. These Level 3 documents are described by NSA executives
as “the Keys to the Kingdom,” because they could invalidate
America’s entire intelligence enterprise if they fell into the hands of
an adversary. And, as far as is known, prior to 2013, there had been
no successful theft of any Level 3 documents.
Because of their extreme sensitivity, Level 3 documents were not
handled by most of the private firms providing independent contractors.
At Dell, Snowden had access mainly to Level 1 and Level 2 data
(which he could, and did, download from shared sites on NSANet).
These lower- level documents had whistle- blowing potential because
they concerned NSA operations in the United States. They did not
reveal, however, sources that the NSA used in intercepting the military
and civilian activities of foreign adversaries.
Snowden quit his job at Dell as a system administrator on
March 15, 2013, to take another job working for the NSA in Hawaii
at Booz Allen Hamilton. Unlike other outside contractors that serviced
the NSA, the firm he now chose specialized in handling the
NSA’s Level 3 data.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 75
9/29/16 5:51 PM
76 | how america lost its secrets
When Snowden applied to Booz Allen earlier in March 2013, the
company had no opening for a system administrator at the National
Threat Operations Center, an NSA unit in which it dealt with
Level 3 data. It did have an opening for an infrastructure analyst, a
lower- paying job involving maintaining the computer technology
necessary to monitor threats. Despite a cut in pay, Snowden took
that job. “Snowden was an IT guy, not a SIGINT analyst,” a former
NSA Signals Intelligence officer pointed out. “He was working as a
contracted infrastructure analyst for NSA’s Information Assurance
arm, . . . [which, ironically as it turned out] protects classified U.S.
communications from potential intruders.” Steven Bay, the manager
at Booz Allen who hired and supervised Snowden, recalled that the
first “red flag” came up soon after Snowden began he training, when
“Snowden began asking about a highly classified mass-surveillance
program” to which Snowden did not have access (although Bay did).
In retrospect, Bay realized that Snowden had applied for the job for a
specific reason. “He targeted our [Booz Allen] contract directly,” Bay
said. “Somehow he figured out that our contract, and what we did
on that contract, were the types of gates he needed to get access to.”
Snowden subsequently told the South China Morning Post that
he took this job to “get access to lists of machines all over the world
the NSA had hacked.” If so, he was after the keys to the NSA’s kingdom
of global surveillance. Booz Allen held those keys. “He targeted
my company because we enjoy more access than other companies,”
Booz Allen’s vice- chairman Michael McConnell said with the benefit
of hindsight. As a result of the theft, he appraised, “an entire generation
of intelligence was lost.” McConnell, a former NSA director,
was in a position to know.
Snowden’s sudden career change had both advantages and disadvantages
for the enterprise he was planning. The main advantage
was that he would have proximity to the computers in which were
kept the “lists” he sought of NSA global sources. The main disadvantage,
aside from a cut in salary, was that he would no longer be a
system administrator. This change meant he would no longer have
privileges to bypass password restrictions or temporarily transfer
data. Instead, as an infrastructure analyst, he would not have pass-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 76
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Raider of the Inner Sanctum | 77
word access, at least during the two- month- long training period, to
the computers that he had not been specifically “read into,” which
did not include those computers that stored the Level 3 lists. Access
to these tightly controlled compartments was limited to only a handful
of analysts at the center who had a need to know.
Because the new job entailed handling higher- level secret documents,
Booz Allen had stricter requirements for applicants than
Dell. To slip by them, Snowden had engaged in a minor subterfuge.
He wrote on his application that he was expecting a master’s degree
from the online division of Liverpool University in England. In fact,
he had not completed a single course at Liverpool and would not be
receiving any sort of a degree from it. Booz Allen did not verify this
and had agreed to hire him as a trainee- analyst. It did not change
that decision even after it found out about his subterfuge.
According to Admiral McConnell, Snowden never actually
worked in the Booz Allen offices, which are housed in a skyscraper in
downtown Honolulu. Instead, he was immediately assigned to work
at the NSA’s highly sensitive National Threat Operations Center at
the Kunia base, the same location where he had worked for Dell.
Before he could begin working there, however, he needed to fly to
Maryland to take a mandatory orientation course at the NSA. The
course was given in an eleven- story building, with a sheer wall of
black glass, on the NSA’s 350- acre campus at Fort Meade. He arrived
there from Hawaii on April 1, 2013. Like every other Booz Allen
contractor who worked at the NSA’s center, Snowden was required
to sign the “Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure
Agreement.” In this document, Snowden acknowledged that he had
been granted access to sensitive compartmented information, called
SCI, as part of his work and that he understood that any disclosure
of that information to an unauthorized person would violate federal
criminal law. He was also told, as were all new contract employees
at Booz Allen, that its disclosure could damage the interests of
the United States and benefit its enemies. In signing the document,
he swore an oath not to divulge any of this information without
first receiving written approval from U.S. authorities. So less than
two months before he downloaded sensitive compartmented infor-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 77
9/29/16 5:51 PM
78 | how america lost its secrets
mation, he was fully aware of what the consequences of divulging
this information would be. By this time, as we know, he had already
agreed to deliver classified data to three journalists.
Snowden believed that bringing complaints to NSA lawyers or
supervisors was, as he put it, “playing with fire.” “When I was at
NSA,” Snowden later said in Moscow, “everybody knew that for
anything more serious than workplace harassment, going through
the official process was a career-ender at best.”
Nevertheless, on April 5, 2013, while still in the training facility
in Maryland, he apparently sought to establish a paper trail for himself.
He wrote a letter to NSA’s Office of the General Counsel asking
whether or not NSA directives take precedence over acts of Congress.
A lawyer from the Office of the General Counsel responded
three days later, addressing Snowden as “Dear Ed.” The lawyer said
that acts of Congress take precedence over NSA directives. He also
suggested that “Ed” phone him if he needed any further clarification.
Presumably, Snowden had asked the question to elicit a reply
he could later use to bolster his claim that the NSA had ignored or
rejected policies regarding NSA directives. Instead, the “Dear Ed”
response was of little use to Snowden, because it did not dispute his
point that NSA directives must lawfully conform to the acts of Congress.
The NSA lawyer never heard back from “Ed.”
Snowden completed his orientation course at Fort Meade on Friday,
April 12, 2013. While he was in Maryland, he took time off to
pay visits to both of his divorced parents. It would be the last time he
would see either of them in the United States.
He returned on April 13 to Hawaii. One domestic task he had to
attend to was helping Mills pack up their possessions, which they
stored in boxes in the garage. The lease on their house was up on
April 30, 2013, and they had to move. According to Mills, they found
a temporary rental just a few blocks away.
On Monday, April 15, Snowden began on- the- job training as
an analyst at the National Threat Operations Center. He would
not complete the course. The same week he began the training, he
prepared his exit by writing to Booz Allen and saying he needed a
brief medical leave in May to undergo treatment for epilepsy symptoms.
As far as is known, he did not suffer from epilepsy. Booz Allen
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 78
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Raider of the Inner Sanctum | 79
required a minimum of one month’s notice for foreign travel. By
making the request, he lessened the likelihood that it would arouse
undue suspicion when he departed for Hong Kong with stolen documents
on May 18. This brief window left him some four weeks to
take the lists that he coveted.
Snowden carried out the heist with precision reminiscent of a
Mission: Impossible movie caper. First, he needed to get passwords to
up to twenty- four compartments at the National Threat Operations
Center that he had not been read into. Even in the “open culture”
of the NSA, this was not an easy challenge. He would be asking
one or more intelligence professionals to break strict NSA rules
that not only prohibited them from disclosing their passwords to an
unauthorized party such as himself but required them to report any
unauthorized person who asked to use their passwords. Remarkably,
he accomplished this incredible feat. He gained access to twenty- four
compartments containing the NSA’s most closely guarded secrets in
a matter of a few weeks.
Next, he had to find the lists he was seeking in a vast ocean of
data. For this task, he used software applications called spiders to
crawl through the data and find the files he was after. He deployed
these robotic spiders, which presumably had been programmed in
advance, soon after he began working at the center. According to the
subsequent NSA damage assessment, Snowden’s spiders indexed
well over one million documents. Many of those that he copied and
moved were from Level 3 sensitive compartmented information,
according to the NSA analysis. The spiders also made his penetration
relatively safe. As previously mentioned, the Hawaii base did
not have a real- time auditing system. So alarm bells did not go off in
the security office when he indexed documents.
Finally, Snowden had to find a way to transfer this data to a computer
with an opened USB port. This task was complicated by a security
precaution. Most of the computers at the center had had their
ports sealed shut to prevent unauthorized downloads. Making the
transfer even more difficult, he was working as an analyst in training
in an open- plan office with closed- circuit security cameras. But it
was not impossible. System administrators sometimes used service
computers that had unsealed ports to back up data before they did
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 79
9/29/16 5:51 PM
80 | how america lost its secrets
maintenance work. Even though Snowden was no longer a system
administrator, he could still perhaps befriend a system administrator
or even steal or borrow a service computer.
Whatever the NSA’s and Booz Allen’s security measures, Snowden
succeeded in getting the files. In a matter of a few weeks, he managed
to download hundreds of thousands of Level 3 documents to an
unsealed computer. He also took some less sensitive documents from
the administrative file (which contained mainly Level 1 documents)
at the end of April. These later acquisitions included an order from
the FISA court issued on April 25, 2013.
He had completed the operation by May 17, the last day he would
ever enter the NSA facility. He transferred the data he had amassed
on the service computer, including the lists of the computers in Russia
and China that the NSA had succeeded in penetrating, onto storage
devices, which he later said were thumb drives. Then he coolly
walked past the security guards at the exit, who only seldom performed
random checks on NSA employees.
He carried out the entire operation with such brilliant stealth that
he left few if any clues behind as to how he obtained his colleagues’
passwords to multiple compartments, moved the data from many
different supposedly sealed computers to an opened service machine,
or downloaded these documents to multiple thumb drives without
arousing suspicion. The NSA would not discover the theft for fifteen
days.
His departure from Hawaii was also well prepared. Lindsay Mills
had departed that morning for a planned two- week visit to the outer
islands. This trip allowed him to pack his belongings without saying
anything to her that might be difficult for her to later explain. He
simply left a note that she could show to authorities saying that he
was away on a “business trip.” He informed Bay that he would have
to go in for epilepsy tests on the following Monday and Tuesday. If
the results weren’t good, he might have to be out even longer.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 80
9/29/16 5:51 PM
chapter 9
Escape Artist
I’m not self- destructive. I don’t want to self- immolate and erase
myself from the pages of history. But if we don’t take chances, we
can’t win.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
The next evening, May 18, Snowden drove to Honolulu International
Airport. He left his leased car in the parking lot. He
took with him only carry- on baggage, including a backpack and a
laptop with a Tor sticker on it. “I took everything I had on my back,”
he said, referring to the backpack. He also said that he took enough
cash to pay for his fugitive life and he took the thumb drives containing
the NSA’s keys to the kingdom.
At this point, of course, Snowden was not wanted by the authorities.
He had provided his employer and the NSA with a medical
excuse for his absence from work so he would not be immediately
missed. He had a valid passport, a credit card, and ID. Snowden’s destination
was Hong Kong. After crossing the international date line,
Snowden waited about three hours in the transit zone of Narita. He
then boarded a plane to Hong Kong. After the four- hour flight from
Narita, he arrived in Hong Kong early in the morning on May 20.
He had visited Hong Kong at least once before, with Lindsay
Mills, when he was stationed in Japan. According to Albert Ho, his
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 81
9/29/16 5:51 PM
82 | how america lost its secrets
Hong Kong lawyer, Snowden stayed at a residence arranged for him
in advance by a party whom Snowden knew prior to his arrival. As
noted earlier, for the next ten days, Snowden did not use his credit
card or leave any paper trail to his location. Wherever he was, “his
first priority,” as he later told Greenwald, was to find a place safe
from U.S. countermeasures. He brought with him a large number
of electronic copies of NSA documents marked TS/SCI/NOFORN,
which stood for “Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information,
and No Foreign Distribution.” According to government rules,
data carrying these labels could not be removed from a governmentapproved
“SCI facility.” But Snowden, who brought them with him
into this semiautonomous zone in China, broke these rules.
Wherever Snowden was staying, apparently he believed he was
relatively safe. “That whole period was very carefully planned and
orchestrated,” Snowden later told The Guardian in Moscow. On
May 22, he sent an e-mail to Bay (who did not know he had left
Hawaii) saying that his epilepsy tests came back with “bad” results,
and he needed further medical attention. Here Snowden communicated
directly first with Gellman and then with Greenwald. He
e- mailed Gellman under the alias “Verax.”
Already, via Poitras, he had provided Gellman with PowerPoint
slides from an NSA presentation about a joint FBI- NSA- CIA
operation code- named PRISM. He believed it qualified as whistleblowing
because it revealed that the NSA, in intercepting e- mails,
tweets, postings, and other web interactions about foreign terrorists,
incidentally also picked up data about Americans. According to the
rules imposed on the NSA by a 2007 presidential directive, whatever
information was accidently picked up about Americans was supposed
to be filtered out, and hundreds of compliance officers were to
recheck the data every ninety days to assure that directive was being
carried out. Even so, it was likely some data was not expunged in this
process. So PRISM could cause embarrassment for the NSA.
Snowden had not yet made arrangements to meet journalists, but
now he proposed that Gellman join him in Hong Kong. In attempting
to convince him of the urgency of the trip, he wrote that he had reason
to believe that “omniscient State powers” imperiled “our freedom
and way of life.” He noted, with a touch of modesty, “Perhaps
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 82
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Escape Artist | 83
I am naive.” He also added dramatically, “I have risked my life and
family.” Even so, Gellman declined coming to Hong Kong. (According
to Greenwald, Gellman could not make the trip, because lawyers
for The Washington Post were uneasy with having a reporter receive
classified documents in a part of China.)
On May 24, 2013, Snowden attempted to apply more pressure on
Gellman by telling him that the story about the PRISM program
had to be published by the Post within seventy- two hours. Gellman
could not accede to such a condition, because the decision of when to
publish a story was made not by him but by the editors of the newspaper.
He told Snowden that the earliest the story could be published
was June 6, 2013, which was well past Snowden’s deadline.
Snowden next turned to Greenwald in Brazil. Both Poitras and
Micah Lee had made great efforts to tutor Greenwald on encryption
protocols, with Lee’s sending Greenwald a DVD by FedEx that would
allow him to receive both encrypted messages and encrypted phone
calls. Even then, Greenwald was unable to fully install it. As a result,
Greenwald still had not met Snowden’s requisites on encrypting his
computer.
With Gellman uncertain, Greenwald was now essential to Snowden’s
plan. If he was to have any newspaper outlet, he needed to
persuade Greenwald to come to Hong Kong. At this point, he took
matters into his own hands. On May 25, Snowden somewhat aggressively
e- mailed Greenwald, saying, “I’ve been working on a major
project with a mutual friend of ours. You recently had to decline
short- term travel to meet with me.” Although he did not specify the
“short- term travel” to which he referred, he added pointedly, “You
need to be involved in this story.” He suggested that they immediately
speak on the phone via a website that encrypts conversations.
Snowden began the call by complaining, “I don’t like how this
is developing.” He made it clear that he, not the journalist he had
selected, was pulling the strings. If Greenwald wanted the scoop, he
had to follow Snowden’s instructions, which included dividing the
scoops between The Guardian and The Washington Post. According
to his plan, Gellman would break the PRISM story in the Post, and
Greenwald would break the “mass domestic spying” story in The
Guardian. In addition, he insisted that The Guardian publish his per-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 83
9/29/16 5:51 PM
84 | how america lost its secrets
sonal manifesto alongside its story. As he envisioned it, the media
event would also include a video component in which Greenwald
would interview him.
Greenwald agreed to this micromanaging, So Snowden said he
would send him what he called a “welcome package” of documents
to demonstrate his good faith. His plan also required a face- to- face
meeting. Snowden told him, “The first order of business is to get you
to Hong Kong.” The whole conversation lasted two hours, according
to Greenwald.
Snowden sent him twenty classified NSA documents labeled “Top
Secret.” He also included in the package his personal manifesto,
which asserted that the NSA was part of an international conspiracy
of intelligence agencies that were working to “inflict upon the world
a system of secret, pervasive surveillance from which there is no
refuge.”
Meanwhile, Snowden told Poitras he was sending her a number of
NSA documents, including a FISA warrant that had been issued less
than a month earlier. He wanted that FISA warrant to serve as the
basis of Greenwald’s scoop. It was perfect whistle- blowing material
for The Guardian because it ordered Verizon to turn over all its billing
records for ninety days to the NSA. It was as close to a smoking
gun as anything he had copied at the NSA. It would also get attention
because James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, had
stated before Congress just two months earlier that the NSA did not
collect phone data in America. This warrant would allow The Guardian,
in the best tradition of gotcha journalism, to catch Clapper in an
apparent lie.
Continuing his string pulling, Snowden instructed Poitras not to
show the FISA warrant to Greenwald until they were safely aboard
a plane to Hong Kong. That would prevent Greenwald from releasing
the story previously. He also sent Poitras an entire encrypted
file of NSA documents, saying it would “include my true name and
details for the record, though it will be your decision as to whether
or how to declare my involvement.” He did not send her the key to
decipher the file, saying, “The key will follow when everything else
is done.” He further told her that he preferred that her new film
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 84
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Escape Artist | 85
focus on him as the sole perpetrator of the leak so that no one else at
the NSA would be suspected.
Poitras and Gellman were not the only journalists involved in
the news event. Poitras also asked Appelbaum to help her interview
Snowden about the NSA’s operations. She later said that she needed
someone with technical expertise in government surveillance to test
the bona fides of Citizen Four. She believed that Appelbaum, who
had participated in her anti- NSA presentations in 2012, qualified for
the position.
Snowden previously had contact with Appelbaum. Appelbaum
had communicated with Snowden under his Oahu CryptoParty alias
about an obscure piece of software just a few weeks after Snowden
had met with Runa Sandvik in Hawaii in December 2012. Appelbaum,
in fact, had worked with Sandvik as a core developer of Tor
software. Snowden allowed Appelbaum to put detailed questions to
him concerning the secret operations of the NSA before he met with
Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong. Indeed, Poitras joined him
in asking Snowden via encrypted e- mails such questions as “What
are some of the big surveillance programs that are active today
and how do international partners aid the NSA?” “Does the NSA
partner with other nations, like Israel?” and “Do private companies
help the NSA?” Snowden answered all the questions to the satisfaction
of Appelbaum and Poitras. (The interview was published on
July 8, 2013, with Snowden’s approval on the website of Der Spiegel,
the German weekly, which had also published the WikiLeaks
documents.)
As the days ticked away while Snowden was waiting for Greenwald
in Hong Kong, Greenwald was awaiting a green light to go
there from Janine Gibson, the editor of the Guardian website, who
was based in New York. Under Gibson’s leadership, The Guardian’s
website had effectively “gone into the business of publishing government
secrets,” as the Guardian columnist Michael Wolff pointed
out. Most of the documents had been supplied by Bradley Manning
via WikiLeaks. Few if any of these previous documents The
Guardian published were highly classified, and none were SCI top
secret documents. The NSA documents Greenwald had received
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 85
9/29/16 5:51 PM
86 | how america lost its secrets
from Citizen Four were another matter. They contained the sort of
SCI communications intelligence data that no major newspaper had
ever published before. Their disclosure might result in journalists’
being imprisoned, because both British law and U.S. law criminalized
the disclosure by anyone of communications intelligence. As a
lawyer, Greenwald recognized this danger. On the other hand, the
NSA documents were far more explosive than the WikiLeaks material
and promised an even greater spike in circulation. So Greenwald
assumed that Gibson would be willing to authorize their publication
and provide the expenses for his trip to Hong Kong.
He flew from Rio to New York on May 30 to meet in person
with Gibson, who had concerns about publishing what were purported
to be top secret documents that came from an anonymous
source. She was certainly not willing to go along with Citizen Four’s
demand that The Guardian publish his personal manifesto alongside
the documents. Aside from its shrill and alarming tone, it sounded,
as she told Greenwald, “a bit Ted Kaczynski- ish,” referring to the
mathematician known as the Unabomber who had maimed or killed
twenty- six people with anonymous mail bombs between 1978 and
1995. Kaczynski had also demanded that newspapers publish his
personal manifesto. Gibson explained to Greenwald, “It is going to
sound crazy to some people.” Her concern was that it would detract
from the credibility of the rest of the story. Snowden had also written
to Greenwald to explain his position. “Even the Constitution is
subverted when the appetites of power demand it,” Snowden said.
Paraphrasing President Thomas Jefferson, he continued, “Let us
speak no more of faith in man, but bind him down from mischief by
the chains of cryptography.” Snowden, showing his cultlike faith in
encryption, substituted “cryptography” for Jefferson’s word “constitution.”
Gibson was unmoved. The stolen NSA documents were
another matter. They were an enormous scoop that could have a
greater impact than the WikiLeaks scoop.
Gibson authorized Greenwald’s trip to Hong Kong on the condition
that he take with him a Guardian staffer in whom she had
confidence, the Scottish- born Ewen MacAskill, a sixty- one- year- old
veteran journalist who had been the Washington bureau chief for
The Guardian. His assignment was to evaluate the bona fides of the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 86
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Escape Artist | 87
anonymous source in Hong Kong for Gibson. Greenwald accepted
her terms. Poitras, who would be accompanying them, would be
paying her own way.
In case The Guardian failed to publish the story, Snowden had a
contingency plan in place. While Greenwald was negotiating with
Gibson, Snowden arranged for Micah Lee, Poitras’s associate at the
Freedom of the Press Foundation, to build a personal website for
him. Writing to Lee from Hong Kong, first under his alias Anon108
and later under his real name, Snowden said that he planned to post
his “anti- surveillance manifesto.” He would also use it to post “a
global petition against surveillance.” Snowden had Lee name the site
“SupportOnlineRights.com.” According to Lee, the website would
be built with a “dead man’s switch,” which would automatically
trigger the release of NSA documents if Snowden was arrested. It
was not clear whether Lee was doing this work as a freelancer or in
his capacity as the chief technology officer for the Freedom of the
Press Foundation. The website Lee built for Snowden proved unnecessary
when Poitras e- mailed him on June 1 that The Guardian had
approved the trip and she and Greenwald were booked on a Cathay
Pacific flight to Hong Kong. They would arrive the next day.
In his preparation to go public in Hong Kong, Snowden showed
himself fully capable of orchestrating what would become a major
news story. He not only picked the journalists who would break
it but also instructed each of them as to the timing, sequence, and
content of their initial disclosures. In the security of his unknown
residence in Hong Kong, he also worked to carefully separate the
purloined NSA documents into two very different caches. “I carefully
evaluated every single document I disclosed,” Snowden
explained to the Guardian journalists in early June. The documents
in this first cache were selected to serve what he termed the “public
interest.” In the hands of journalists, these selected documents,
and the story he fashioned to accompany them, would burnish his
image in the public consciousness as a whistle- blower. He did not
turn over the second cache, telling Greenwald, “There are all sorts
of documents that would have made a big impact that I didn’t turn
over.”
By the time he received the message from Poitras, Snowden had
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 87
9/29/16 5:51 PM
88 | how america lost its secrets
finished his preparations for the journalists. With selected documents
copied on a thumb drive, he moved from the residence where
he had been staying for ten days to a venue for meeting the reporters.
The place he chose, as noted earlier, was the Mira hotel in the
Kowloon district of Hong Kong, where he checked in under his own
name. He e- mailed Poitras his name and the address of the hotel;
there was no longer any reason to hide his true identity.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 88
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 10
Whistle- blower
They elected me. The overseers . . . The [American] system failed
comprehensively, and each level of oversight, each level of responsibility
that should have addressed this, abdicated their responsibility.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2013
While snowden in Hong Kong was attempting to reel in
the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from
her “island- hopping” trip to find their house partially flooded and
Snowden nowhere to be found. In a brief note Snowden left her, he
said he was away on a business trip and indicated that, at least temporarily,
their eight- year relationship was on hold.
“I feel alone, lost, overwhelmed, and desperate for a reprieve from
the bipolar nature of my current situation,” she wrote in her journal
on June 2 (which would be June 3 across the international timeline
in Hong Kong). “I’ve nearly lost my mind, family, and house over
the past few weeks.” She also noted in her online journal, “Oh and
I physically lost my memory [SIM] card with nearly all my adventure
photos,” as well as other personal data. The loss would make it
difficult to reconstruct her past activities with Snowden.
In Hong Kong, if Snowden were following Lindsay’s online journal,
he would have read that his girlfriend had returned home, lost
her data, and needed a “reprieve” from the situation in which he had
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 89
9/29/16 5:51 PM
90 | how america lost its secrets
put her. But because they were exchanging private text messages
by then, he would not have needed to consult her public journal.
Snowden was certainly aware that he would soon be the object of a
manhunt that could involve those with whom he was acquainted. He
instructed Poitras to mask their e- mail communications in cyberspace
“so we don’t have a clue or record of your true name in your
file communication chain.” Such precautions were necessary, he
explained to her, because “every trick in the book is likely to be used
in looking into this.” The journalists arrived the evening of June 2.
The Mira hotel can be entered by guests both through a groundfloor
lobby with a restaurant and a smaller third- floor lobby that
connects to the Mira shopping mall. The instructions that Snowden
sent Poitras on her arrival were an exercise in control: “On timing,
regarding meeting up in Hong Kong, the first rendezvous attempt
will be at 10 a.m. local time. We will meet in the hallway outside
of the restaurant in the Mira Hotel. I will be working on a Rubik’s
cube so that you can identify me. Approach me and ask if I know the
hours of the restaurant. I’ll respond by stating that I’m not sure and
suggest you try the lounge instead. I’ll offer to show you where it is,
and at that point we’re good. You simply need to follow naturally.”
According to Greenwald’s account, Snowden changed the plan to the
upper lobby. “We were to go to the third floor,” Greenwald writes.
“We were to wait on a couch near a ‘giant alligator,’ ” which Poitras
said was a room decoration. (A hotel executive told me that the hotel
knew of no plastic alligator on the third floor but possibly it had
been temporarily parked there by a hotel guest.) They were then
to give the recognition signal. Although these instructions provided
the atmospherics of “an international spy thriller,” as Greenwald
described them, Snowden hardly needed any spy tradecraft to recognize
Greenwald and Poitras because there were many photographs
of them on the Internet.
In any case, they gave the recognition signal, twice, in the designated
place, and a young man walked over to them holding
a Rubik’s Cube. Greenwald noted, “The first thing I saw was the
unsolved Rubik’s Cube, twirling in the man’s left hand.” The man
said, “Hello,” and introduced himself as “Ed Snowden.”
Greenwald was particularly surprised by Snowden’s boyish looks.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 90
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Whistle- blower | 91
“The initial impression was one of extreme confusion,” Greenwald
wrote in his book. “I was expecting to meet somebody in his sixties
or seventies, someone very senior in the agency, because I knew
almost nothing about him prior to our arrival in Hong Kong.” His
initial confusion was understandable. Snowden, it will be recalled,
had falsely identified himself to them in an e- mail as a senior member
of the intelligence community.
Snowden led Greenwald and Poitras to the nearby elevator, and
they went through various corridors of the hotel to his room on
the tenth floor. It was mainly occupied by a king- sized bed, but it
also featured a sleek writing desk in the corner, two chairs, and a
modernistic lamp. The bathroom was behind a glass partition, which
could be closed off by a black louver blind. There was also a small
refrigerator in which Snowden asked them to stow their cell phones.
Snowden, as we know, had already told Poitras that he wanted
her to make a documentary of the meeting. She therefore wasted
no time in mounting her camera on a tripod. “Minutes after meeting,
I set up the camera,” she said. Snowden told her, “When you
are involved in an action which is likely to get you indicted, you
typically don’t have a camera rolling in the room.” Nevertheless,
he allowed her to film his actions for the next eight days. One possible
reason is that he had no intention of standing trial. In any case,
as Poitras found out, Snowden was anything but camera shy. Over
the next week, she would shoot over twenty hours of Snowden’s
activities in that small room. It was essentially a one- man show, a
presentation of him, by himself, for the appreciation of a global public.
Poitras knew virtually nothing about her subject until ten minutes
before she began filming him. She had not even googled him,
because she was concerned that her Internet search might alert the
NSA and law enforcement authorities. In an over- the- top waiver of
his own privacy, he allowed her to film him washing in the bathroom,
preening his hair in the mirror, napping on his bed, getting
dressed, and packing his bag. He even permitted her to film a private
computer exchange between him and Mills (who was in Honolulu).
That day Mills informed Snowden that two government investigators
had come to their home in Hawaii, asking her about Snowden’s
whereabouts. When he had failed to show up for work on June 3 it
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 91
9/29/16 5:51 PM
92 | how america lost its secrets
evidently set off alarm bells at Booz Allen and the NSA. Snowden
expressed anger to the journalists in the room at the NSA’s intrusions
on the privacy of his girlfriend.
Snowden also performed his security procedures on camera,
including stuffing bed pillows under the door to block any eavesdroppers
and throwing a red blanket over his head, which he called
jokingly his “magical cloak of power.” He explained to Greenwald
that he donned his “cloak” when he turned on his laptop to prevent
any hidden cameras in the room from spotting his password. He also
checked the hotel phone for bugs. It was not without irony that he
went through these security rituals to protect his data as he allowed
Poitras to film NSA data on his computer screen. Because he planned
to use these journalists as his outlets to go public in a few days, the
security measures he performed while on camera would only serve
a temporary purpose.
The centerpiece of the planned video would take the form of an
interview with Greenwald. Snowden himself provided the talking
points. The filming would eventually provide Poitras with a featurelength
documentary, Citizenfour, which would be commercially
released in October 2014 and win an Academy Award for her.
The next day, Ewen MacAskill, whom Poitras had not wanted
Greenwald to bring to the initial meeting, joined Poitras and Greenwald
in Snowden’s room. Snowden insisted that MacAskill also go
through the ritual of stowing his cell phone in the minibar refrigerator.
Not without irony, Snowden’s own phone can be seen on his bed
recharging. Although MacAskill was sent by Gibson to the event to
verify the source’s bona fides, he had apparently hardly been briefed.
The questioning went as follows:
macaskill: Sorry, I don’t know anything about you.
snowden: OK, I work for—
macaskill: Sorry, I don’t know even your name.
snowden: Oh, sorry, my name is Edward Snowden. I go by Ed.
MacAskill went on to ask him to enumerate the various positions
he held during his career in intelligence. Snowden was not entirely
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 92
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Whistle- blower | 93
truthful in describing himself. He said that he had been a senior
adviser to the CIA, when he had been just a telecommunications support
officer. He also said he had been a senior adviser at the Defense
Intelligence Agency, even though, according to that intelligence
service, he was never employed there. (He did speak at an interagency
counterintelligence course the DIA had sponsored.) He said
he had a $200,000- a- year salary from Booz Allen when, according
to Booz Allen, it was $133,000. It is understandable that he wanted
to impress these Guardian journalists in light of his young age and
boyish appearance, even to the extent of meretriciously claiming
in the video that he had been personally given the “authority” at
the NSA to intercept President Obama’s private communications,
which, according to an NSA spokeswoman, was not true. No NSA
employee, and certainly no civilian contract worker, was given the
authority to spy on the president of the United States, she insisted.
Such career enhancements reinforced the fact that Snowden altered
reality when it suited his purpose with journalists.
Snowden had greatly exaggerated or misrepresented the positions
he held with the CIA and the DIA, but no effort was made by
the team of journalists to verify the information. Instead, MacAskill
wrote to Janine Gibson in New York, “The Guinness is good.” It was
a prearranged code by which MacAskill certified Snowden’s credibility
for The Guardian. Gibson told Greenwald to proceed with the
story. Snowden had already provided Poitras and Greenwald with
thumb drives on which he had loaded the documents he wanted
them to use.
Greenwald wrote his first story about NSA transgressions based
almost entirely on the FISA warrant involving Verizon’s cooperation
that Snowden had copied from the administrative file. Before
the story could be published, however, the Guardian policy required
relevant American government officials be given the opportunity to
respond. Gibson made the requisite call to the White House national
security spokesperson, Caitlin Hayden, who arranged a conference
call with the FBI’s deputy director, Sean Joyce, the NSA’s deputy
director, Chris Inglis, and Robert Litt, the legal officer for the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence. After duly taking into account
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 93
9/29/16 5:51 PM
94 | how america lost its secrets
the response of these three officials, which included the admonition
by Litt that “no serious news organization would publish this,” Gibson
gave the green light to publish the story.
The story broke on June 6. “NSA Collecting Phone Records of
Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,” proclaimed the Guardian
headline. Under Greenwald’s byline, it said, “Exclusive: Top secret
court order requiring Verizon to hand over all call data shows scale
of domestic surveillance under Obama.” Along with it was the FISA
order. The PRISM story broke hours later in The Washington Post.
Written by Gellman and Poitras, it claimed that the NSA and the
FBI were tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading
U.S. Internet companies, which were knowingly participating in the
operation. The latter allegation turned out to be not entirely true,
because some of the Internet companies cited in the story denied
that they had knowingly participated. The back- to- back publication
of these two stories by The Guardian and the Post, however, provided
the explosive “shock,” at least in the global media, that Snowden had
predicted.
Snowden’s identity had not been revealed in either the Guardian
or the Post story on June 6. Snowden, however, insisted on outing
himself. He explained to Greenwald that he needed to “define himself”
before the U.S. government “demonized” him as a spy. That
self- definition would be accomplished by a twelve- minute video
titled “Whistleblower.” Poitras extracted much of the material for
the video from the twenty or so hours she had shot. In the filmed
interview, Snowden voiced many of the same statements he had
made in his manifesto, so he no longer needed to post that on the
Internet. When he insisted on the immediate airing of the video,
Greenwald told him that by going public in this way, he was saying
“fuck you” to the American government. Snowden replied, “I want
to identify myself as the person behind these disclosures.”
On June 9, the video was posted on the Guardian website with the
Freedom of the Press Foundation getting an on- screen credit. “My
name is Ed Snowden,” the extraordinary disclosure began. He then
described how the NSA was watching U.S. citizens. Even though the
NSA press spokesperson subsequently disputed some of his more
dramatic claims, such as his assertion that he had the authority at
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 94
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Whistle- blower | 95
the NSA “to wiretap anyone, even the president,” the press largely
accepted his claims as established facts. As for American surveillance,
he declared, “I don’t want to live in a society that does those sorts of
things.”
The Guardian story accompanying the video carried the headline
“Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations.” Overnight, Snowden became a global celebrity
and, to much of the world, a hero.
The next morning he packed his belongings into a backpack and
moved, without notifying the front desk, to another room Poitras
had rented at the Mira. Complicated schemes, especially when they
involve transferring state secrets to unauthorized parties in a foreign
country, do not necessarily go as planned. That was true of
Snowden’s escape plan. Snowden had no plan to stay put and face
the music. On the morning of June 10, though, there was apparently
a problem. Robert Tibbo and Jonathan Man, the lawyers who, along
with Albert Ho, had been retained for Snowden by an unidentified
party, received an emergency phone call early in the morning telling
them to help Snowden move to a safe location. Although Tibbo
would not identify the person who had called, the message had been
relayed to Man and him through Ho’s office. When Tibbo called
Snowden offering to help him move, Snowden told him, “I can make
myself unrecognizable.”
Tibbo and Man immediately proceeded to the mall adjacent to
the Mira hotel, where they met Snowden. After he signed a document
appointing Ho’s law firm as his “legal adviser,” the three of
them slipped out via the mall exit. Tibbo and Man planned to move
Snowden to the apartments of refugees who were their clients.
Snowden’s credit card had been frozen, so it is not clear who
paid his sizable hotel bill. According to hotel records, it was paid
by another credit card. Poitras, who had taken a room at the hotel,
might have used her own credit card, or Snowden might have had
another benefactor in Hong Kong. In any case, the lawyers escorted
Snowden to a prearranged residence.
“I am in a safe house for now,” Snowden wrote to Greenwald on
June 11. The situation might not have been totally under his control,
because he added, “But I have no idea how safe it is.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 95
9/29/16 5:51 PM
96 | how america lost its secrets
Greenwald flew back to Brazil that day. Soon afterward, he would
resign from The Guardian. In February 2014, he became the cofounding
editor of The Intercept, an online publication dedicated to
investigative journalism, which was backed by the Internet billionaire
Pierre Omidyar.
Poitras remained in Hong Kong, where she moved, along with the
Guardian reporter MacAskill, to the five- star Sheraton Hong Kong
Hotel & Towers, which, like the Mira hotel, was on Nathan Road in
Kowloon. The Guardian paid the bill. Her next task was to set up
what turned out to be Snowden’s final interview in Hong Kong. It
was scheduled for June 12.
The journalist chosen was Lana Lam, a young Australian reporter
working for the South China Morning Post. Tibbo had suggested
Lam to Snowden. She had served as Tibbo’s outlet on previous news
stories, and, as he told me, he found her to be a totally reliable journalist.
He brought her to Poitras’s suite at the Sheraton in Kowloon.
First, Lam had to agree to the conditions of the interview, which
included submitting the story to Poitras for Snowden’s approval.
Next, as Lam put it, Poitras “confiscated” her cell phone. Finally,
after a ten- minute wait, Poitras took her to another room and sat
her before a black laptop. The laptop, which had a Tor sticker on it,
had on its screen an online chat room where she was connected by
Poitras to Snowden.
“Hi Lana, thanks for coming for this,” Snowden said from his safe
house. He told her that the NSA had intercepted data from at least
sixty- one thousand different computers in Hong Kong, China, and
elsewhere. To expose what he called America’s “hypocrisy” in accusing
China of cyber espionage, he supplied her with relevant NSA
documents. “Last week the American government happily operated
in the shadows with no respect for the consent of the governed, but
no longer,” he said. “The United States government has committed a
tremendous number of crimes against Hong Kong [and] the People’s
Republic of China as well.” Under Poitras’s close supervision, Lam
was allowed to ask Snowden more questions about the NSA’s interception
of communications in Hong Kong and China. He told her, “I
have had many opportunities to flee Hong Kong, but I would rather
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 96
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Whistle- blower | 97
stay and fight the United States government in the courts.” That bit
of braggadocio would not be proven out.
Greenwald, Poitras, and MacAskill in their reporting did not
concern themselves with any of the mechanics of the largest theft
of top secret documents in the history of the United States. In the
entire filmed interview at the Mira hotel, for example, they did not
ask their source how he managed to get access to the documents.
Lam, however, asked him about how he widened his access. When
she asked him why he had switched jobs from Dell to Booz Allen
Hamilton in March 2013, his answer provided her with a real scoop:
“My position with Booz Allen Hamilton granted me access to lists
of machines all over the world the NSA hacked.” Snowden told her
that he deliberately went to Booz Allen Hamilton to get access to
the “lists” revealing the NSA’s sources in foreign countries. This
admission could further complicate his legal situation in Hong Kong
because it suggested that he meant to steal documents even before
he had known their content. In fact, to protect himself, he restricted
Lam from publishing this part of the interview until after he had
departed Hong Kong. (It was not published until June 24, a day after
he arrived in Russia.) This condition indicated to Lam that as early
as June 12, if not before, he was planning on leaving Hong Kong.
His interview with Lam didn’t reveal how he had learned about
these “lists” before taking the job. Nor did he reveal to her what he
planned to do with these lists. He made it clear to her, however, that
he had not disposed of all his secret documents. “If I have time to go
through this information,” he said, “I would like to make it available
to journalists in each country to make their own assessment,
independent of my bias, as to whether or not the knowledge of US
network operations against their people should be published.” So as
late as June 12, Snowden was still reading and assessing the files he
had stolen from the NSA four weeks earlier.
Poitras vetted the Lam interview. Soon afterward, she suspected
that she was being followed. That was likely, because by June 14 all
the intelligence services in Hong Kong knew that she was in contact
with Snowden.
“I was being tailed,” Poitras recalled in an interview with a Vogue
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 97
9/29/16 5:51 PM
98 | how america lost its secrets
reporter in Berlin in 2014. “The risks became very great,” she said in
describing her situation in Hong Kong. So, on June 15, she left Hong
Kong and flew back to Berlin, where she began editing her footage
of the Snowden interview.
Meanwhile, Snowden, organizing his own exit from Hong Kong,
placed a call to Julian Assange.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 98
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 11
Enter Assange
Thanks to Russia (and thanks to WikiLeaks), Snowden remains
free.
— julian assange, Newsweek, 2015
Julian assange had made a brilliant career of trafficking in
state, military, and corporate secrets. Born on July 3, 1971, in
Queensland, Australia, Assange began his hacking career while still
a teenager. Using the alias Mendax (“the untruthful one”), he had
hacked into the computers of the Pentagon, the U.S. Navy, NASA,
Citibank, Lockheed Martin, and Australia’s Overseas Telecommunications
Commission before he was twenty. At the age of twenty- five,
he pleaded guilty to twenty- five charges of hacking in Australia but
was released on a good behavior bond. In 2006, with the spread of
Tor software, he co- founded WikiLeaks, a website in which secret
documents could be anonymously sent and posted. The site received
little public attention until Bradley Manning sent it several hundred
thousand lowly classified U.S. military and State Department
documents in April 2010. With these stolen documents, WikiLeaks
became a media sensation, and Assange, the runner- up for Time’s
Man of the Year for 2010, became a leading figure, along with Appelbaum,
in the global hacktivist underground.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 99
9/29/16 5:51 PM
100 | how america lost its secrets
In November 2010, however, he ran into a legal problem in
Sweden. A judge in Stockholm ordered his detention on suspicion
of rape, sexual molestation, and unlawful coercion. He denied the
charges but was arrested in London on a European arrest warrant. In
December, he was released on a $312,700 bail deposit (supplied by
his supporters) and confined to Ellingham Hall in Norfolk, England.
While awaiting the outcome of the extradition proceedings, he lived
there with Sarah Harrison, his twenty- eight- year- old deputy at
WikiLeaks. A graduate of the elite Sevenoaks School in Kent, Harrison
served as Assange’s liaison with the outside world. Although she
was officially given the title “investigative editor” of WikiLeaks, she
worked so closely with Assange during this period that the British
press carried stories saying she was his paramour. Harrison worked
on a WikiLeaks documentary titled Mediastan, which concerned
WikiLeaks’s exposure of U.S. secret operations in Russia and other
parts of the former Soviet Union. It was a project that took her to
Russia and provided her with a multi- entry Russian visa.
In June 2012, after the extradition order was upheld, Assange
jumped bail and fled to the Ecuador embassy in London. For the next
year, his only visible means of income was a weekly program from
the embassy. It was sponsored in 2012 by RT television, a Moscowbased,
English- language news channel funded by the Russian government,
which would also finance and release Mediastan. This
sponsorship suggests that the Russian government saw potential
value in the document- gathering activities of WikiLeaks.
Snowden telephoned Assange at his refuge at the Ecuador
embassy on June 10, 2013. According to Assange, Snowden needed
help for his exit plan. He wanted Assange to use WikiLeaks’s
“resources” to get him out of Hong Kong. Assange considered it a
surprising request, because Snowden had not given any of the stolen
documents to WikiLeaks. In their discussion, according to Assange,
Snowden claimed that one reason he decided to take the secret NSA
documents was the brutal treatment of Bradley Manning after he
was arrested in 2010 by the U.S. government. “Snowden told me
they had abused Manning in a way that contributed to his decision
to become a whistle- blower,” Assange said in an interview in 2015.
If Manning’s mistreatment was Snowden’s motive, it was a sharp
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 100
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Enter Assange | 101
departure from the position Snowden had taken in his postings on
the Ars Technica site in January 2009. He complained in a post there
about the detrimental consequences to U.S. intelligence of leakers’
revealing “classified shit” to The New York Times, and he suggested
as punishment “those people should be shot in the balls.” Either he
had a change of heart, or he was telling Assange what he believed he
wanted to hear.
Assange counseled Snowden to go directly to Russia. “My advice
was that he should take asylum in Russia despite the negative PR
consequences,” he told the London Times in 2015. He said, “Snowden
was well aware of the spin that would be put on it if he took asylum
in Russia.” So a story would be released presumably by WikiLeaks,
coinciding with his departure, asserting that Snowden was “bound
for the republic of Ecuador via a safe route.” When Snowden asked
how he would carry out the plan, Assange told him that he would
immediately dispatch one of his senior staff members to help him
engineer his escape to Russia. That senior staff member was Sarah
Harrison.
After speaking to Snowden, Assange called Harrison, who was in
Melbourne. She had gone there a month earlier to help organize
Assange’s somewhat quixotic election campaign for president of
Australia. Assange told her to forget the campaign and go to Hong
Kong. She was to use WikiLeaks’s resources to save Snowden from “a
lifetime in prison.” Presumably, Assange told her that he had advised
Snowden to proceed to Russia. Harrison later said that she didn’t
even bother to pack her clothing after hearing from Assange. She
caught the next plane to Hong Kong and arrived there on June 11—
the same day that Snowden texted Greenwald he was in a safe house
and before Snowden’s explosive interview with Lam. Harrison had
her own connections in Hong Kong. Her two younger sisters, Kate
and Alexandra, lived there and were part of the expatriate community.
She also had an older brother, Simon, who headed Avra, a ship
brokerage and commodity trading company, headquartered in Singapore,
but he frequently traveled to Hong Kong on business.
Like Poitras, Sarah Harrison took great care to shield her movements.
She did not have a Twitter, Facebook, or any other social media
account. She did not own a cell phone for fear of being tracked by an
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 101
9/29/16 5:51 PM
102 | how america lost its secrets
intelligence service. When she traveled, she bought “burner” phones
locally and disposed of them before any calls could be traced back to
her. Upon arriving in Hong Kong, she avoided meeting Snowden
face- to- face out of concern about the surveillance of American intelligence
there. Instead, for thirteen days in Hong Kong she worked
through intermediaries. Her task was not only to arrange Snowden’s
escape route but also to create diversions to camouflage his real destination.
Under Assange’s tutelage, she had made deceptive ploys an
integral part of her tradecraft. “We were working very hard to lay as
many false trails as possible,” she later told an interviewer in Berlin.
According to Assange, she booked decoy flights for Snowden to
Beijing and New Delhi. She also used Snowden’s credit card number
to pay for the flight to India; because the card was blocked, she knew
there was a high probability that it would come to the attention of
U.S. intelligence. According to Harrison, she booked no fewer than
a dozen such decoy tickets to confuse Snowden’s possible pursuers
in U.S. intelligence. The only actual ticket she bought for Snowden,
according to an Aeroflot official, was one to Moscow at the last minute.
She bought a ticket for herself on the same flight, leaving on
June 23.
The source of the money for the Assange- Harrison operation is
unclear. Subsequently, Harrison said she was setting up secret bank
accounts to help organize such transborder escapes. Assange said she
was using “WikiLeaks’s resources.” Harrison said the “WikiLeaks
team” helped fund Snowden’s flight to Russia from Hong Kong, as
well as her own flight there. But WikiLeaks was not an organization
with spare cash in June 2013. Assange had forfeited his own bail by
fleeing to the embassy of Ecuador, offending many of his financial
supporters in Britain. He had also all but exhausted his bank account.
Aside from money that dribbled in from Poitras’s six- month- old
Freedom of the Press Foundation, the only steady source of funds
for WikiLeaks in 2013 was the previously mentioned payments
Assange received from the Russian government’s RT television.
Mounting pressure was brought on the Hong Kong government
to take action against Snowden. On June 16, the U.S. government
informed the Hong Kong authorities that it had filed a criminal
complaint against Snowden and would be seeking his extradition.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 102
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Enter Assange | 103
Because Hong Kong had a vigorously enforced extradition agreement
with the United States, as mentioned above, it was expected
that Snowden would be taken into custody. But China had the final
say in any extradition decision. In fact, China had explicitly been
given the right of vetoing any extraditions for any reason in the
formal 1999 agreement between Hong Kong and the United States.
Because the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, had just met with President
Obama in California, China also had an interest in avoiding
embarrassing public demonstrations on behalf of Snowden. According
to a well- placed official in Hong Kong, China’s liaison office in
Hong Kong told the Hong Kong Authority in no uncertain terms
that Snowden had to be out of Hong Kong by June 23.
On June 19, Snowden had a meeting with Tibbo, the barrister who
would handle any eventual court case, and Man and Ho, the Hong
Kong solicitors who had been retained for him. It took place in a
small apartment where, according to Ho, they ate pizza while they
discussed Snowden’s options.
Tibbo wanted Snowden to remain in Hong Kong, allow himself
to be arrested, seek bail, and fight extradition in court. Tibbo said
he planned to mount a powerful legal defense against extradition
by using a provision in Hong Kong’s extradition treaty with the
United States that protects fugitives from persecution on political
grounds. After he told Snowden that it would entail a long court
battle, Snowden asked him if he could avoid even being arrested.
Tibbo explained that Hong Kong courts, which closely follow
British law, would certainly issue an arrest warrant for him immediately
after the United States formally filed charges against him.
Those charges could come within hours, he reckoned. Soon afterward,
Snowden would be temporarily jailed, and his computers,
electronic gear, and thumb drives would be seized and placed in the
custody of the court. Tibbo would immediately seek his release on
bail but could not guarantee an outcome because Snowden, who
had fled U.S. jurisdiction, might be considered a flight risk. If so,
Snowden could remain incarcerated during the long court battle.
During the litigation, Snowden would have a platform to make
his case against U.S. surveillance. Indeed, Tibbo’s strategy involved
building massive public support for Snowden’s cause. Once the U.S.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 103
9/29/16 5:51 PM
104 | how america lost its secrets
government filed charges, though, Snowden could further expect it
would invalidate his passport to go anywhere except for his return to
the United States, and Interpol would issue a red alert to all its members.
Because his case involved national security secrets, he had also
to consider that the Hong Kong court could deny him any use of the
Internet until his extradition case was settled. If Snowden wanted to
leave Hong Kong, he had to act swiftly.
Tibbo, although evasive on the point when I interviewed him,
might not have known about the escape Harrison was planning. He
did not know that Snowden’s other alternatives were not good. He
had no money, and his credit card had been blocked. He had no visas
to go to any other country, and Interpol would issue its own border
alert as soon as the United States filed its charges. At that point,
Hong Kong airport authorities would be officially notified and could
prevent him from leaving the city. Even if he somehow got out, he
would be an international fugitive. Tibbo counseled Snowden to seek
redress in the Hong Kong courts.
Snowden, though, had no intention of allowing himself to be
arrested. Despite what he had told Lana Lam only one week earlier,
at least for publication, about his determination to seek justice in
the Hong Kong courts, he had not planned to use Hong Kong as
anything more than a temporary stopover on his escape route. Two
months later and safely in Moscow, he made this point clear in a
lengthy interview with Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian.
He told him that it had never been part of his plan to use Hong
Kong to escape the legal consequences of his act. “The purpose of my
mission [to Hong Kong] was to get the information to journalists.”
If so, he had merely been using Tibbo, Man, and Ho to provide him
with temporary cover while, following the instructions of Assange,
Harrison laid down the smoke screen for his escape to Moscow.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 104
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 12
Fugitive
If I end up in chains in Guantánamo, I can live with that.
— edward snowden, Hong Kong, 2013
During his interviews with Poitras and Greenwald in June,
Snowden said stoically, “If I am arrested, I am arrested.” His
fatalistic words notwithstanding, Snowden had made plans to seek
a haven from American justice well before his meeting them. As
early as May 24, 2013, he had suggested to Barton Gellman that
he was making arrangements with a foreign government. To that
end, he asked Gellman to insert an encrypted key in the Internet
version of the NSA exposé that Snowden proposed he write for The
Washington Post. He told him the purpose of the encrypted key was
to assist him with a foreign government. Snowden did not identify
any foreign government to Gellman, but Gellman said he knew
that Snowden wanted to “seek asylum” overseas. He decided against
assisting him. “I can’t help him evade U.S. jurisdiction— I don’t want
to, and I can’t,” he later explained. “It’s not my job. It’s not the relationship.
I am a journalist.”
Although Gellman suspected that Iceland might be the foreign
government in question, Snowden, as it turned out, had never con-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 105
9/29/16 5:51 PM
106 | how america lost its secrets
tacted the consulate of Iceland while he was in Hong Kong. “We had
heard nothing from Snowden,” an Iceland government official told
Vanity Fair.
Snowden also did not contact the government of Ecuador while
in Hong Kong. In mid- June, while Harrison was laying down false
tracks for Snowden in Hong Kong, Assange in London asked Fidel
Narváez, who was a friend of his and the legal attaché in the London
embassy of Ecuador, to issue a document that Snowden could
use. But this document was not delivered to Snowden in Hong Kong
(and it was later invalidated by Ecuador). There are no direct flights
to Ecuador from Hong Kong. If Snowden had really planned to go to
Ecuador without stopping in a country allied with the United States,
he would have had to fly to Cuba. He would need a Cuban travel
document to do that, which he could have obtained from the Cuban
consulate anytime during his month in Hong Kong. But he did not
obtain it. Nor did he acquire a visa to go to any other country in
Latin America or elsewhere while in Hong Kong. So where was he
headed?
Whatever foreign government with which Snowden was dealing
earlier presumably did not have an extradition treaty with the
United States. Almost all other countries that did not have active
extradition treaties with the United States could not be directly
reached by air. With three notable exceptions, the flights to most of
these countries had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the
United States, where officials could seize Snowden. The three exceptions
were China, North Korea (via China), and Russia.
The only one of these three countries that Snowden is known
to have had contact with directly during his thirty- three- day stay
in Hong Kong was Russia. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin,
revealed these contacts in a televised press briefing in September
2013. Putin did not provide the date of these contacts, but he provided
an intriguing clue. Snowden was identified to him, according
to Putin, not by name but merely as an “agent of special services.”
If his name was not given to Putin, it might have been because
Snowden’s first meeting with the Russians had taken place before
Snowden became a household name on June 9, 2013.
For his part, Snowden was evasive when discussing his con-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 106
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Fugitive | 107
tacts with Russia while still in Hong Kong. When Lana Lam asked
Snowden on June 12, 2013, whether he had already requested asylum
from the Russian government, he deferred, saying, “My only
comment is that I am glad there are governments that refuse to be
intimidated by great power.” The Russian government was clearly
not intimidated by the threats of reprisals by the United States, as
the Obama administration would learn after Snowden’s arrival in
Russia on June 23. Snowden could only have known that with certainty
on June 12 if he had been in contact with Russian officials
prior to his interview with Lam.
If Putin’s own description of Snowden’s interactions with the
Russians in Hong Kong is to be believed, the decision to facilitate
Snowden’s escape to Russia had been kicked all the way up the Russian
chain of command to Putin. Presumably, this decision- making
process began earlier than June 21, when Snowden was said to have
gone to the consulate. But how much earlier? Because Snowden had
arrived in Hong Kong on May 20, his contacts with Russian officials
could have occurred in May. Such a contact with the Russians
would fit with Snowden’s telling Gellman on May 24 that he needed
his help in dealing with the diplomatic mission of a country that
Snowden did not identify.
In any case, Putin said an American “agent of the special services”
had contacted Russian diplomats because he wanted assistance. The
agent, Snowden, of course, needed assistance to escape from Hong
Kong. The decision to accept him in Russia, given the international
ramifications, would have to be made at a much higher level than the
Russian mission in Hong Kong.
Nine days before Snowden boarded Aeroflot Flight SU213 to
Moscow on June 23, the United States had filed a criminal complaint
against him. It had also officially alerted Interpol when it unsealed
the complaint on June 21. It had invalidated his U.S. passport except
to return to America (although he still had it in his possession at
the Hong Kong airport). Because by this time he was the most
famous visitor in Hong Kong, his passage through passport control
on June 23 might have reflected the acquiescence of the Hong Kong
authorities to the reported request of China to be rid of Snowden by
that date.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 107
9/29/16 5:51 PM
108 | how america lost its secrets
According to one Aeroflot official, ordinarily all international passengers
are required to have a valid passport as well as a visa to the
country of final destination. Snowden had neither a valid passport
nor a visa. Still Snowden was able to board the flight to Moscow.
Aeroflot, a state- controlled airline, presumably responds to the Russian
government on matters where Putin has given his approval.
Snowden first met Harrison in person on June 23. She was waiting
for him in the car that Jonathan Man had arranged to take him
to the airport that morning. Snowden was dressed in a gray shirt
and khaki slacks. Harrison was dressed in jeans and flip- flops. She
said she had chosen this dress style so that they would blend in at
the airport with vacationing tourists. She had financed the trip, and
she was apparently now calling the shots. Harrison’s concern was
that they might be arrested at the airport, so Man accompanied them
through passport control. He was able to do this because he bought
a ticket on the cheapest available international flight. Harrison had
given Man a phone number to call if they got arrested. When she
and Snowden boarded the flight at 12:45 p.m., Harrison effectively
became Snowden’s second “carer”— a job that would require her
presence in Moscow for the next four months.
Snowden had pretty much remained silent until the plane took
off. The first full proper sentence she heard from him as they headed
for Moscow, as she recalled, was “I didn’t expect that WikiLeaks was
going to send a ninja to get me out.”
Meanwhile, Assange continued creating “distractions,” as he put
it. On June 24, a booking was made for Snowden on an Aeroflot
flight to Cuba, and this information was relayed to the foreign press
organization in Moscow, resulting in over a dozen reporters flying
to Havana on the flight. Snowden, of course, never showed up for it.
“In some of our communications, we deliberately spoke about that
[flight] on open lines to lawyers in the United States,” Assange said.
One subsequent piece of his misinformation was that Snowden was
flying to Bolivia on the private plane of the Bolivian president, Evo
Morales (who was then in Moscow for a meeting). That misinformation
had the desired effect. U.S. allies in Europe, including France,
Spain, and Portugal, refused to allow that plane to fly through its
airspace, forcing the plane to land in Austria. This misinformation
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 108
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Fugitive | 109
resulted in an international incident but did not change the fact that
Snowden was still in the custody of Russian authorities.
Snowden came to realize that those assisting him, including
Assange and Harrison, were taking serious risks. “Anyone in a threemile
radius [of me] is going to get hammered,” he later said in 2015
to a reporter from Vogue. (After finally leaving Snowden in Moscow
on November 3, 2013, Harrison moved to Berlin, where she set up
an organization to provide, as she termed it, “an underground railroad”
for other fugitives who had made available documents exposing
government secrets.)
Snowden was sequestered in the transit zone of the Moscow airport
for thirty- seven days. A Russian intermediary provided him
with a Russian classic to read while awaiting asylum. It was Fyodor
Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, whose protagonist, Rodion
Romanovich Raskolnikov, is a dissenter who believes breaking the
law is morally justified by the unfair abuses of the political system.
Snowden received official sanctuary in Russia on August 1, 2013.
His public statements in Hong Kong that he was willing to go to
prison so that others could live freely in a democratic society were,
as it turned out, mere rhetoric. Instead of risking prison, he had successfully
escaped to a country in which he would be treated as a hero
for defying the U.S. government. He had not sacrificed himself; he
had transformed himself. He had risen from being a lowly technician
in Hawaii whose talents went largely unrecognized to the status
of an international media star in Moscow. In his new role, he could
make Internet appearances via Skype to prestigious gatherings, such
as the TED conference, where he would be roundly applauded as an
Internet hero, as well as be paid a $20,000 fee for just his electronic
participation. He would be beamed into dozens of ACLU meetings
where he was celebrated as a defender of American liberty. He would
describe to sympathetic audiences in Germany, Norway, and France
the unfairness of the American legal system, asserting that it was
denying him a “fair trial.” He would now make front- page news
by granting interviews to The New York Times, The Washington
Post, The Nation, and other publications. He would join Poitras and
Greenwald on the board of directors of the Freedom of the Press
Foundation. He would be the subject of an Oscar- winning documen-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 109
9/29/16 5:51 PM
110 | how america lost its secrets
tary, the hero of the 2016 Hollywood movie Snowden (directed by
Oliver Stone), and a consultant to the 2015 season of the television
series Homeland. He would be nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2014. He would attract over one million followers to his
tweets in 2015. “For me, in terms of personal satisfaction, the mission’s
already accomplished. I already won,” he informed the Post
in his first live interview in Moscow in December 2013. It was a
mission that involved a very high- stakes enterprise: taking not only
domestic surveillance documents but America’s military and foreign
intelligence secrets abroad.
Whistle- blowers do not ordinarily steal military secrets. Nor do
they flee to the territory of America’s principal adversaries. A fugitive,
especially one lacking a Russian visa, does not wind up in Moscow
by pure accident. It’s hard to imagine that a Russian president
with the KGB background of Putin would give his personal sanction
for a high- profile exfiltration from Hong Kong without weighing
the gain that might proceed from it. Whatever else may be said of
Putin, his actions show him to be a calculating opportunist. Part of
his calculus would be that the defector from American intelligence
had taken possession of a great number of potentially valuable documents
from the inner sanctum of the NSA and, aside from these
documents, claimed to hold secrets of great importance in his head.
To be sure, the practical value of this stolen archive would require
a lengthy evaluation by Russia’s other intelligence services. But it
is hard to believe that a defector who put himself in the hands of
the FSB, the successor to the KGB, and other Russian intelligence
services wouldn’t be expected to cooperate with them. Even if such
a defector did not carry these files with him to Moscow, intelligence
services have the means to recover digital files, even after they are
erased from a computer or if they are sent to the cloud. Moreover,
once secret documents are taken, they are compromised. Yet for
much of the American public, Snowden remained a hero.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 110
9/29/16 5:51 PM
part two
THE INTELLIGENCE CRISIS
What you’ve seen so far [in the Snowden theft of documents]
is just the tip of the iceberg.
—retired admiral michael mcconnell,
vice- chairman, Booz Allen Hamilton, 2013
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 111
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 112
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 13
The Great Divide
That moral decision to tell the public about spying that affects all
of us has been costly, but it was the right thing to do and I have
no regrets.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2013
In the twelve- minute video on The Guardian’s website,
Snowden correctly identified himself as an infrastructure analyst
at a regional base of the National Security Agency in Oahu, Hawaii.
He also revealed in a calm, unemotional voice that he had been the
source for the stories in both The Guardian and The Washington
Post. He said that he had supplied the secret, classified documents
that the two newspapers had used in their scoops about domestic
surveillance being conducted by the NSA, America’s enormous electronic
surveillance agency. These sensational revelations had been,
literally, the talk of the world, and now, in another major news event,
the boyish- looking Snowden took responsibility for what would
turn out to be the largest theft of top secret documents in the history
of U.S. intelligence.
In the video, it will be recalled, Glenn Greenwald, who had broken
the NSA story in The Guardian, questioned Snowden. What
was his motive? Greenwald asked. Why did he do it? Snowden
replied that he had become horrified by the NSA’s secret operations,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 113
9/29/16 5:51 PM
114 | how america lost its secrets
which, to him, represented a kind of distillation of the excesses of
the American national security state, and he had therefore made it
his mission to blow the whistle. He believed that the public needed
to be informed of the existence of a vast, secret surveillance operation
directed against tens of millions of Americans that flagrantly
violated U.S. laws and was a grave threat to their privacy and their
freedoms. Within hours of the release of that video on the Guardian
website, Snowden was known throughout the world as a courageous
whistle- blower.
In Laura Poitras’s remarks in accepting her Academy Award for
Citizenfour on February 22, 2015, she said that Snowden acted as a
whistle- blower not only to “expose a threat to our privacy but to our
democracy itself.” She received a standing ovation.
A large part of the public who viewed this powerful film, including
many of my colleagues in journalism whose writing I greatly
respect, came to accept Snowden’s whistle- blowing narrative. The
film so convincingly depicted Snowden as an altruistic young man
willing to risk his own personal freedom and face years of imprisonment
for the sake of others that editorial writers asked that he be
given clemency from prosecution.
“Sitting on his unmade bed— white sheets and covers, white headboard,
white bathrobe, white skin— Snowden seems like a figure
in some obscure ritual, being readied for sacrifice,” George Packer
wrote about the film in a widely read article in The New Yorker.
This powerful narrative, as lucidly articulated by Poitras, Greenwald,
and other Snowden supporters, described the NSA activities
exposed by Snowden as part of a vast criminal conspiracy involving,
among others, President Obama, James Clapper, the director of
national intelligence, and both Democratic and Republican members
of the congressional oversight committees. It further derided any
claims that there was evidence that Snowden’s theft of NSA secrets
went beyond simply exposing government misdeeds. For example,
this narrative asserted, as if it were established fact, that U.S. government
officials had deliberately “trapped” Snowden in Russia.
According to Snowden, the purpose of this government ploy was
to “demonize” him. “There was no question that I was going to be
subject to a demonization campaign,” Snowden said in an interview
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 114
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 115
from Moscow, “They [Greenwald and Poitras] actually recorded me
on camera saying this before I revealed my identity.” The purpose
of this demonization was to divert attention from the government’s
own crimes.
To be sure, it is not unprecedented for the government to release
defamatory information about individuals who have embarrassed
U.S. intelligence by defecting. When two NSA analysts, William
Martin and Bernon Mitchell, defected to Russia in the 1960s and
accused the NSA of violating international law after arriving in
Moscow, U.S. government officials responded by putting out the
story that they were homosexual lovers, which was both untrue and
irrelevant to the intelligence secrets that they had compromised. It
is certainly possible that the government put out information to
intentionally defame Snowden. Secretary of State John Kerry characterized
him as a coward who should “man up” by returning to the
United States.
While one can discount such characterizations against Snowden
by government officials as demonization, as I do, one cannot as easily
dismiss the independent evidence that undermines Snowden’s
assertion that his sole motive was blowing the whistle on illicit surveillance
in the United States. For example, in 2014, the Lawfare
Institute, a nonprofit organization that publishes a blog on national
security concerns, in cooperation with the Brookings Institution,
did an independent analysis of all the published documents that
Snowden provided to the media. It concluded that with some notable
exceptions, such as the two documents initially published by The
Guardian and the Post, the now- famous FISA Verizon warrant and
the PRISM slides, few of the other documents that Snowden had
given Poitras and Greenwald for publication had anything to do
with either domestic surveillance or infringements on the privacy of
Americans. By the Lawfare Institute’s count, 32 of Snowden’s leaks
to these journalists concerned the NSA’s overseas sources and methods,
9 identified overseas locations of the NSA’s intelligence bases,
25 revealed the identities of foreign officials of interest to U.S. intelligence
agencies, 14 disclosed information about Internet companies
legally cooperating with the NSA, and 19 concerned technology
products that the NSA had been using or researching.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 115
9/29/16 5:51 PM
116 | how america lost its secrets
Some secret methods that Snowden made public compromised
the NSA’s state- of- the- art technology of which adversaries had
been unaware. For example, the NSA had devised an ingenious technology
in 2008 for tapping into computers abroad that had been
“air- gapped,” or intentionally isolated from any network to protect
highly sensitive information, such as missile telemetry, nuclear bomb
development, and cyber- warfare capabilities. The secret method that
the NSA used involved surreptitiously implanting speck- sized circuit
boards into air- gapped computers. These devices then covertly
transmitted the data back in bursts of radio waves. Once Snowden
exposed this technology, and the radio frequency transmission it
used, America lost this intelligence capability.
In addition, a considerable number of the published documents
did not even belong to the NSA but were copies of reports sent to
the NSA by its allies, including the British, Australian, Canadian,
French, Norwegian, and Israeli intelligence services. Snowden provided
journalists with secret documents from the British cyber
service GCHQ, describing its plans to obtain a legal warrant to penetrate
the Russian computer security firm Kaspersky to expand its
“computer network exploitation capability.” What the GCHQ was
revealing in this secret document was its own capabilities to monitor
a Russian target of interest to British intelligence. While the release
of these foreign documents might have embarrassed allies of the
United States, they exposed no violations of U.S. law by the NSA. It
was a legitimate part of the NSA’s job to share information with its
allies. This raises the question: What constitutes whistle- blowing?
To the general public no doubt, a whistle- blower is simply a person
who exposes government misdeeds from inside that government.
But in the eyes of the law, someone who discloses classified
information to an unauthorized person, even as an act of personal
conscience, is not exempt from the punitive consequences of this act.
Indeed, if a person deliberately reveals secret U.S. operations, especially
ones that compromise the sources and methods of U.S. intelligence
services, he or she may run afoul of American espionage laws.
In the past, when government employees have disclosed highly
classified information to journalists to redress perceived government
misconduct, they were almost always prosecuted. During
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 116
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 117
Barack Obama’s presidency, there were six government employees
who, as a matter of personal conscience, shared classified information
they obtained from the FBI, the CIA, the State Department,
and the U.S. Army with journalists. They were all convicted: Shamai
Leibowitz in 2010, Chelsea Manning in 2013, John Kiriakou in
2013, Donald Sachtleben in 2013, Stephen Kim in 2014, and Jeffrey
Sterling in 2014. Like Snowden, they claimed to be whistle- blowers
informing the public of government abuses. But because they disclosed
classified documents, they were dealt with as lawbreakers. All
six were indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. Sterling,
a CIA officer who allegedly turned over a document to James Risen,
a Pulitzer Prize– winning reporter for the Times, was sentenced to
forty- two months. The most severe sentence was meted out to Private
Manning, whom an army court sentenced to thirty- five years
in a military stockade, as noted earlier.
The prison time that others received did not go unnoticed by
Snowden. He had been following the Manning case since 2012. In
fact, he posted about it shortly before he began stealing far more
damaging documents than Manning had. He would therefore likely
have been aware that by revealing state secrets he had sworn to protect,
he would be risking imprisonment unless, unlike Manning, he
fled the country. His motives, no matter how noble they might be,
would not spare him— any more than they spared the other six—
from determined federal prosecution.
The view of those on the Snowden side of the divide is grounded
not in legal definitions but in a broader notion of morality. Snowden’s
supporters do not accept that the law should be applied to Snowden
in this fashion. A writer for The New Yorker termed it “an act of
civil disobedience.” His supporters argue that Snowden had a moral
imperative to act, even if it meant breaking the law. They fully accept
his view that he had a higher duty to protect citizens of all countries
in the world from, as he put it, “secret pervasive surveillance.”
That higher duty transcended any narrower legal definitions of lawbreaking.
Ben Wizner, a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties
Union who has represented Snowden since October 2013, argues
that Snowden’s taking of classified documents was an “act of conscience”
that overrode any legal constraints because it “revitalized
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 117
9/29/16 5:51 PM
118 | how america lost its secrets
democratic oversight in the U.S.” and, without question, caused a
much- needed debate on government surveillance.
In this ends- justify- the- means view, any person with access to
government secrets can authorize him- or herself to reveal those
secrets to the world if she or he believes it serves the public good.
Further, because doing so would be an “act of conscience,” he or she
should be immune from legal prosecution.
For Snowden’s supporters, his “act of conscience” justifies his
claim to being a whistle- blower, even though the preponderance of
the secrets he disclosed had to do with the NSA’s authorized activity
of using its multibillion- dollar global arrays of sensors to intercept
data in foreign countries. For example, one of the thirty allied
intelligence services that the NSA cooperated with in 2013 was the
cyber service of Israel. Because Snowden deemed this cooperation
to infringe on privacy rights, he revealed documents bearing on
the NSA’s data exchange with Israel. He subsequently told James
Bamford, in an interview in Wired magazine in August 2014, that
supplying such intelligence to Israel was “one of the biggest abuses
we’ve seen.” Snowden therefore believed he was justified in revealing
information concerning Arab communications in Gaza, the West
Bank, and Lebanon that the NSA had provided the Israeli cyber service,
known as Unit 8200. In doing so, he compromised an Israeli
source. But how could this act qualify as whistle- blowing? Providing
Israel with such data was not some NSA rogue operation. It was part
of a policy that had been approved by every American president—
and every Congress— since 1948. Snowden had every right to personally
disagree with this established U.S. policy of aiding Israel with
intelligence, but it is another matter to release secret documents to
support his view. If the concept of whistle- blowing were expanded
to cover intelligence workers who steal secrets because they disagree
with their government’s foreign policy, it would also have to include
many notorious spies, such as Kim Philby.
Snowden’s concept of whistle- blowing also applied to the NSA’s
spying on adversary nations. “We’ve crossed lines,” Snowden said
in regard to China. “We’re hacking universities and hospitals and
wholly civilian infrastructure.” The NSA’s operations against China
were such “a real concern” for Snowden that he targeted lists of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 118
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 119
the NSA’s penetrations in China. Putin echoed this expansion of the
whistle- blowing concept to adversaries. He complimented Snowden
for having “uncovered illegal acts by the United States around the
globe.” Putin’s defense of Snowden not only implied a global concept
of whistle- blowing that justifies breaking U.S. laws but also pointed
to America’s double standard in publicly complaining about Russian
and Chinese cyber espionage.
Snowden’s whistle- blower interpretation gained immense public
resonance. Even after President Obama and leaders of both houses
of Congress roundly denounced Snowden for betraying American
secrets, the majority of the public, according to a Quinnipiac poll
taken in July 2013, still considered “Snowden a whistleblower who
did a service revealing government domestic spying programs.”
Moreover, Snowden’s revelations helped stoke a growing distrust of
the American government itself. According to polls conducted by
the Pew Research Center after Snowden came forward, just 19 percent
of the public said that “they can trust the government always
or most of the time.” The support for Snowden was not limited to
America. On October 29, 2015, a majority of the European Parliament
voted to award Snowden the official status of a “human rights
defender.”
The former congressman Ron Paul went even further. He organized
a clemency petition in February 2014 for Snowden, stating,
“Thanks to one man’s courageous actions, Americans know about
the truly egregious ways their government is spying on them,” and
his son Senator Rand Paul, who was a candidate for the Republican
presidential nomination in 2016, called for a pardon for Snowden.
Senator Paul’s concern fitted with the growing public apprehension
over increasing intrusion on privacy. Snowden was correct,
in my opinion, in describing the threat of a surveillance state and
the loss of privacy as a legitimate public concern. “We actually buy
cell phones that are the equivalent of a network microphone that
we carry around in our pockets voluntarily,” he pointed out from
Moscow.
The very technology involved in the electronic equipment we all
use in the twenty- first century has made mass surveillance part of
our daily life. There can be little doubt that our privacy has been
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 119
9/29/16 5:51 PM
120 | how america lost its secrets
largely eroded, if not entirely negated, by the widespread use of
cell phones, credit cards, social media, and the search engines of the
Internet. When we use smart phones, our location is relayed to our
telephone service provider every three seconds. The phone companies
collect and archive our phone usage “metadata,” which includes
whom we called and how long we spoke. When we use Google
to search for anyone or anything on the Internet, that activity is
captured by Google, a company whose profits mainly come from
making available to advertisers the results of its surveillance and
collection of its users’ searches. When we use Gmail, Google’s e- mail
service, used by nearly one billion senders and recipients, we agree
to allow Google to read the actual contents of our correspondence to
find keywords of interest to advertisers.
When we use a credit card, the credit card company also retains
data about what we buy and where we go. When we travel in automobiles
equipped with GPS, every turn and stop is tracked and
recorded. And when we are in public places with CCTV (closedcircuit
television) cameras, our image is recorded and archived.
When we use Facebook, Twitter, and other so- called social media, as
over two billion people do today, we allow these companies to collect,
retain, and exploit their surveillance of our movements, associations
with other people, and stated preferences. When we use Amazon and
other online stores, we allow them to track and archive a great deal
of our commercial activity. For Internet companies such as Facebook,
Twitter, and Yahoo!, like Google, collecting private data on hundreds
of millions of their members provides them with vast searchable
databases that are easily marketable. The exploitation of these databases
is a fundamental aspect of their business plans. Without such
surveillance of their users, social media companies would not be able
to turn a profit. Indeed, they may be more aptly called surveillance
media than social media. For those of us who use them to post pictures
and communicate, any notion of personal privacy is largely
illusory.
To be sure, there is a distinction to be made between the surveillance
of our activities to which we voluntarily agree in exchange
for the benefits and conveniences that we gain from social media,
search engines, and other Internet companies and the surveillance
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 120
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 121
done by the government, which we do not voluntarily invite— or
want. We willingly waive our privacy for corporations but not for
governments.
What the public might not fully realize, however, is that the government
can access all the personal information in the databases of
private companies if it issues a subpoena or search warrant, which it
does often. As Snowden himself pointed out, “If Facebook is going
to hand over all of your messages, all of your wall posts, all of your
private photos, all of your private details from their server, the government
has no need to intercept all of the communications that constitute
those private records.” These Internet companies, even if they
are only interested in exploiting the data for their own profit, cannot
refuse to share this information with the NSA, the FBI, and other
government agencies if they have a subpoena or search warrant.
That reality became evident to me in my investigation of the rape
charges brought (and subsequently dropped) against Dominique
Strauss- Kahn, the managing director of the International Monetary
Fund, in 2011. Immediately after his arrest, Cyrus Vance Jr., the district
attorney of New York County, issued a subpoena for Strauss-
Kahn’s cell phone records, credit card records, hotel room electronic
key records, e- mails, room service bills, and the CCTV videos of his
activities (some of which I published in my article about the case
in The New York Review of Books). Nor is this access uncommon.
According to Vance in 2016, his office issues thousands of such subpoenas
every year. Even though Apple made headlines by refusing
to comply with a court order to help the FBI unlock the iPhone of
a dead mass murderer in 2016, it had complied with many previous
subpoenas. In fact, in 2015 alone, it quietly provided the backed- up
data of some seventy- one hundred iPhone customers to government
authorities.
If anyone doubts the pervasiveness of government data collection,
consider a little- known government agency called the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. Created in 2010 by Congress, it mines
data on a monthly basis from some 600 million personal credit card
accounts, targeting about 95 percent of the credit card users in the
United States. In addition, through eleven other data- mining programs,
it gathers data on everything from private home mortgages
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 121
9/29/16 5:51 PM
122 | how america lost its secrets
and student loans to credit scores and overdrafts in personal bank
accounts. This ubiquitous surveillance of virtually every non-cash
transaction came about because of advances in computer technology
that made it economically feasible to mine such data.
Snowden’s concern about NSA domestic surveillance is certainly
not misplaced. Ever since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA has increasingly
played a role in this surveillance state, not by its own choice, but
because Congress mandated it. In 2001, it empowered the NSA to
obtain and archive data on American citizens. Accordingly, the NSA
obtained the billing records of customers from phone and Internet
companies and archived these records. The bulk collection of these
billing records was intended to build a searchable database for the
government that could be used to trace the history of the telephone
and Internet activities in the United States of FBI- designated foreign
terrorists and spies abroad. The government’s rationale for keeping
these anti-terrorist programs secret from the public was that it did
not want the foreign suspects to realize their communications in
America were being monitored.
The public only learned that the phone company was routinely
turning over its billing records on June 6, 2013, when Snowden disclosed
it to The Guardian and The Washington Post. The documents
he provided the journalists showed that the NSA had been obtaining
phone records collected by Verizon every three months. While
this revelation might have shocked the American public, the NSA
had not acted on its own. It had acted under a warrant issued by a
secret court established by Congress in 1978 as part of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act for each request for records. Congress
empowered the FISA court, whose judges are appointed by the president,
to hear cases and authorize search warrants in secret in cases
involving national security.
As its name implies, the FISA court was meant to deal with matters
bearing on foreign intelligence activities in the United States. That
restriction changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
A month after the attacks, Congress expanded the purview of the
FISA court by passing the USA Patriot Act (an acronym that stands
for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism). Part of the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 122
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 123
act, Section 215, euphemistically referred to as the “library records”
provision, permitted the FISA court to issue warrants authorizing
searches of records by the NSA and other federal agencies to investigate
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
Through these FISA authorizations, the NSA could obtain “tangible
things” such as “books, records, papers, documents, and other items.”
Under the interpretation of this section of the law by both the Bush
and the Obama administrations, the FISA court was enabled by
Congress to issue warrants to telephone companies demanding that
they turn over to the NSA the bulk billing records of all calls made
in America. The FISA court need only deem these records to be “relevant”
to the FBI’s investigations of terrorists and spies.
Essentially, the NSA, to create a searchable database of telephone
billing records, used the FISA court’s controversial interpretation of
the word “relevant” in Section 215. Such a “haystack,” as the NSA
called the national collection of billing records, could allow the FBI
to instantly find missing “needles,” as this tracking was supposed to
work, even if the connections were made years earlier. For example,
if the FBI had a lead on a foreign suspect, it could search the database
for any telephone calls made by the foreign suspect to telephone
numbers in America and then who those people called. The
FBI always had this power, if it obtained a warrant, but it did not
previously have the “haystack” of records in a single database. General
Keith Alexander, who headed the NSA between 2005 and 2014,
believed that maintaining such a haystack database made sense. “His
approach was, ‘Let’s collect the whole haystack,’ ” according to one
former senior U.S. intelligence official quoted by The Washington
Post.
According to critics of NSA domestic surveillance, including the
ACLU, the results provided by this vast database did not justify its
immense potential for abuse. In early May 2015, just three weeks
before this part of the Patriot Act was set to expire, a three- judge
panel of the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York
agreed with the ACLU position, overturning a lower court decision
that said it was legal. The panel found that the word “relevant”
in the act was not intended by Congress to justify the acquisition
and storing of the bulk records of telephone companies for possible
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 123
9/29/16 5:51 PM
124 | how america lost its secrets
future use. Soon afterward, Congress replaced the Patriot Act with
the USA Freedom Act, which effectively transferred bulk storage of
billing records from the NSA to the phone companies themselves.
Despite the change in venue, the records of individuals were still not
completely private. Under the new law, the FBI via a FISA warrant
could still search the phone company’s databases.
The core of Snowden’s charge in the media was that the FISA
court overreached its authority by issuing sweeping warrants that
allowed the NSA to obtain data collected by private phone and Internet
companies. In the initial story published in The Guardian on
June 6, Snowden disclosed one such FISA warrant to support his
charge. It was issued by Judge Roger Vinson of the FISA court on
April 25, 2013, and ordered Verizon to turn over to the FBI all its
billing records of landline customers for the next ninety days. The
FBI presented this FISA authorization to the NSA, which acts as
a service organization for the FBI and the CIA in collecting communications
data. The NSA, with the FISA warrant in hand, then
obtained the Verizon billing records.
Snowden also provided the Post and The Guardian with another
secret document: a PowerPoint presentation on twenty slides, sent
by the NSA to other intelligence agencies. It described a program
it was using for monitoring the Internet. Its code name was the
aforementioned PRISM. It was authorized under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and was designed to collect
messages sent over the Internet from foreigners. Such information
was in fact obtained with the knowledge of the service providers. It
also required a written directive from both the attorney general and
the director of national intelligence and a review by the Department
of Justice every three months for each and every case. After obtaining
this data, the NSA ran programs, as required by law, to filter out
all domestic Internet communications, but, as Snowden pointed out,
domestic information was also accidently picked up. Whenever the
Justice Department actually opened an investigation against Americans
in contact with foreign suspects, as it did in 170 cases in 2013,
it could obtain warrants from the FISA court to search these Americans’
Internet activities.
These two documents raised legitimate questions for many
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 124
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 125
Americans, including members of Congress, about the proper role
of the FISA court, including whether it should conduct its business
in secret. If Snowden had released only these two documents that
related to unwarranted domestic surveillance and other possible violations
of the law by the NSA, it would be difficult for any reasonable
person not to see his actions as a potentially valuable public service.
Indeed, additional safeguards were necessary in an age in which new
technologies enabled mass surveillance of the public. As the threejudge
panel of the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals would later
find, Congress had not intended Section 215 of the Patriot Act to
be used to justify the bulk collection of American records. If he had
limited his illegal downloading to the few documents about bulk collection,
it would be more difficult to argue that he was not a whistleblower
in the spirit if not the letter of the law, and even a hero in
the struggle to preserve our civil liberties. But in fact, Snowden took
a great many other secret documents that did not bear on the civil
liberties of Americans. He claimed he was acting on behalf of citizens
in foreign countries by exposing the NSA’s and the CIA’s spying
operations abroad, but that same claim could also be made by any
espionage agent stealing U.S. secrets to benefit the people of another
country.
As a result, the Snowden case produced a great divide in the
American appreciation of him. On one hand, he has been almost
universally lauded and lionized by what might be seen as the mainstream
media, by numerous academics, and even, as we have seen,
by members of Congress. The journalists who assisted him, Greenwald,
Poitras, and Gellman, have been celebrated for the roles they
played in bringing Snowden’s revelations to the public and received
the 2014 Polk Award for national security reporting. The Post and
The Guardian, the newspapers that initially published the purloined
documents, won the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for public service.
In other circles, the reaction has been very different. American
and British intelligence officials, senior members of the Obama
administration, and members of the oversight committees of Congress
do not view Snowden as a hero or even an authentic whistleblower.
Instead, they see him as a betrayer of secrets who willfully
brought damage to the United States and benefits to its adversar-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 125
9/29/16 5:51 PM
126 | how america lost its secrets
ies. The holders of this darker view of Snowden base it on classified
reports of the full extent of the theft of classified data. Those officials
believe that only a handful of the tens of thousands of documents he
stole involved domestic surveillance and that those few documents
served as a cover for a much larger theft.
Admiral Michael Rogers, who replaced General Alexander as
head of the NSA in March 2014, said at a public forum at Princeton
University, “Edward Snowden is not the ‘whistleblower’ some have
labeled him to be.” He further explained to Congress, “Snowden
stole from the United States government a large amount of classified
information, a small portion of which is germane to his apparent
central argument regarding NSA and privacy issues.”
General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
went even further. In testifying before the House Armed Services
Committee on March 6, 2014, after estimating that the Snowden
breach could cost the military “billions” to repair, he added, “The
vast majority of the electronic documents that Snowden exfiltrated
from our highest levels of security had nothing to do with exposing
government oversight of domestic activities.” Dempsey based this
assessment on a then still- secret Defense Intelligence Agency report
on the breach. The classified DIA report showed that Snowden took
“over 900,000” military files from the Department of Defense in
addition to the NSA files he had taken. The Defense Department
loss in terms of the number of files stolen actually exceeded the
loss— in sheer numbers— of NSA documents. Lieutenant General
Mike Flynn, the DIA director who directed the study, testified to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the breach “has caused
grave damage to our national security.”
To be sure, this was not the first time that the cryptological
branches of the military had been compromised. The spy ring of John
Walker had provided thousands of the navy’s reports on breaking
Russian ciphers to the KGB during the Cold War. But the Snowden
breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater
than any past breach.
The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director
of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking
the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addressed
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 126
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 127
the privacy issue.” Instead, as Morell put it, “he backed up a virtual
tractor trailer and emptied a warehouse full of documents— the vast
majority of which he could not possibly have read and few of which
he would likely understand— [and] he delivered the documents to a
variety of news organizations and God knows who else.” As a result,
Morell concluded, “Snowden’s disclosures will go down in history
as the greatest compromise of classified information ever.” General
Alexander, the head of the NSA at the time of the theft, asserted that
Snowden did “the greatest damage to our combined nations’ intelligence
systems that we have ever suffered.” Obviously, military
intelligence officers would not be on Snowden’s side of the divide
(and the Snowden breach ended the careers of many of them, including
Alexander). But political leaders in both parties could also be
found on the anti- Snowden side of the divide. “I don’t look at this as
being a whistle- blower,” the Democratic senator Dianne Feinstein of
California, the head of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said after
she was briefed on Snowden’s theft. “I think it’s an act of treason.”
The Republican representative Mike Rogers of Michigan, her counterpart
on the House Intelligence Committee, said on the NBC program
Meet the Press that Snowden might be working for a foreign
intelligence service. And a former prominent member of President
Obama’s cabinet went even further, suggesting to me off the record
in March 2016 that there are only three possible explanations for the
Snowden heist: (1) it was a Russian espionage operation; (2) it was a
Chinese espionage operation; (3) it was a joint Sino- Russian operation.
These severe accusations generated much heat but little light.
They were not accompanied by any evidence showing that Snowden
had acted in concert with any foreign power in stealing the files or,
for that matter, that he was not acting out of his own personal convictions,
no matter how misguided they might have been.
On this side of the divide, Snowden’s critics regard the whistleblowing
narrative as at best incomplete and at worst fodder for the
naive. They point out that the FISA document that gave him credentials
as a whistle- blower was only issued in the last week of April
2013, which was four months after he first contacted Greenwald and
almost nine months after he began illegally copying secret documents.
They further believe that the evidence contradicts Snowden’s
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 127
9/29/16 5:51 PM
128 | how america lost its secrets
claims that he stole only documents that exposed NSA transgressions
into domestic surveillance, that he turned over all the stolen
documents to journalists, and that he was forced to remain in Moscow
by the actions of the U.S. government. They also find that the
unprecedented size and complexity of the penetration of NSA files,
compromising hundreds of thousands of secret documents pertaining
to U.S. operations against adversary nations, according to the
NSA’s and the Pentagon’s estimates, is not easily explained given
Snowden’s avowed purpose for his theft.
The deep split in how Snowden is perceived brings to mind the
famous drawing of a duck- rabbit cartoon first published in 1900 in
the book Fact and Fable in Psychology. The figure is perceived either
as a duck or as a rabbit, but it cannot be seen as both simultaneously.
Whether a person sees a rabbit or a duck in this test may depend
on the information available to that person. Similarly, what may
account for the sharp divide between the pro- Snowden and the anti-
Snowden camps is a disparity in their available information.
The pro- Snowden camp’s view is largely informed by Snowden
himself. Snowden supporters prefer to believe his words rather than
his actions. In the anti- Snowden camp are administration officials
and the members of the House and Senate intelligence oversight
committees who have been at least partially briefed on the continuing
investigations of the Snowden affair. The members of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, for example, were told by David
Leatherwood, the director of operations for the Defense Intelligence
Agency, that the military files compromised by Snowden included
documents bearing on military plans and weapons systems; foreign
governments’ intelligence activities (including special activities),
intelligence sources, or methods of cryptology; scientific and technological
matters relating to national security; and vulnerable systems,
installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, and protection services
related to national security and the development, production, or use
of weapons of mass destruction. The members of the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, but not the public, have also been
privy to an NSA investigation that established the chronology of
Snowden’s actions, including changing jobs, copying more than one
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 128
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 129
million classified documents at the Signals Intelligence Center in
Hawaii, and flying to Russia.
Additional information does not necessarily change the minds of
people who already have a firm view. In the field of social psychology,
the testing of “confirmation theory” consistently shows that
people tend to more readily reject new information that contradicts
their pre-existing beliefs. For example, when Lee Harvey Oswald
was arrested in the Texas Theater on November 22, 1963, he said
famously, “I haven’t shot anybody.” Ten months later, the Warren
Commission presented evidence, including ballistic tests, that it
claimed showed that Oswald had shot three people, including President
John F. Kennedy, less than an hour before making his statement.
Yet many of those who believed Oswald’s public proclamation of
his innocence chose to believe that the government had falsified
all the incriminating evidence to tarnish Oswald (who had been
killed on November 24, 1963) rather than accept that they had
been wrong in believing Oswald.
The charges, countercharges, and defamatory name- calling in the
Snowden case therefore only deepened the great divide. Those who
saw Snowden as a democratic hero exposing the abuses of power of
an out- of- control national security state tended to dismiss anything
that depicted Snowden in a negative light as a fabrication, while
those who saw Snowden as a “traitor” tended to dismiss anything
that depicted him in a more positive light.
When it comes to the murky universe of spy agencies, the problem
in deciding where the truth lies is further heightened by the
possibility of deliberate deception. Spy masters are, after all, in the
business of concealing their most sensitive operations. It is often
considered essential that important secrets be protected by what
Winston Churchill famously termed “a bodyguard of lies.” Top
intelligence officials are not exempt from this practice. Consider, for
example, the response to a question concerning the NSA’s operations
made by James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, to
the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 12, 2013. The Democratic
senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, who was on the committee,
asked the spymaster if the NSA collected data on Americans. Clap-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 129
9/29/16 5:51 PM
130 | how america lost its secrets
per answered that the NSA did not knowingly “collect any type of
data” on millions of Americans. Clapper’s answer was clearly untrue,
but it did not mislead Senator Wyden or any other members of the
Senate Intelligence Committee; Clapper had truthfully testified in a
classified session of the committee earlier that week that the NSA
did collect Americans’ telephone records. It was the American people
who were being misled. Yet none of the senators on the committee
corrected this obviously false answer. When Clapper realized he had
misspoken, he could not publicly correct the record of the public session,
because to do so would be revealing classified information he
had sworn to protect. No doubt other intelligence officers find themselves
in a similar bind in discussing secret matters. This suggests
that there is a risk in accepting statements made by the intelligence
chiefs at face value.
But Snowden also has a credibility problem. He has told numerous
untruths, including some calculated to help him insinuate himself
into the key positions from which he stole secrets and some calculated
to cover up the nature of his theft. For example, Snowden got
access in the spring of 2013 to the NSA’s super-secret computers that
stored these electronic files by working at Booz Allen Hamilton. On
his application to Booz Allen in March 2013, as we’ve seen, Snowden
claimed to be in the process of completing a master’s degree at the
University of Liverpool in computer security sciences. Snowden had
not completed a single course there and purposely lied to get access
to classified documents and then to get safely away with them.
He was also not entirely truthful with the journalists whose
trust he sought when it suited his purpose of protecting himself.
For example, as we have seen, in contacting Laura Poitras under the
alias Citizen Four in January 2013, he told her that he was currently
a “government employee,” although in fact he was working for a
private contractor at the time.
Snowden had little concern about misleading journalists when
it suited his purpose. For example, he told Alan Rusbridger of The
Guardian, Brian Williams of NBC News, James Bamford of Wired,
Katrina vanden Heuvel of The Nation, Barton Gellman, and Jane
Mayer of The New Yorker that the U.S. government intentionally
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 130
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 131
acted to “trap” him in Moscow by revoking his passport while he
was already on a plane to Moscow on the afternoon of June 23.
None of these journalists asked Snowden what the basis for his oftrepeated
allegation was. If they had, they would have discovered that
he had no independent basis for his assertion. When asked about it
during the Q&A following his July 12 press conference in Moscow,
he indeed said that the only knowledge he had about the suspension
of his passport was what he had “read” in the news reports. But
all the news stories prior to his statement reported that his passport
had been revoked on June 22, while he was still in Hong Kong.
ABC News, for example, reported that the U.S. “Consul General–
Hong Kong confirmed Hong Kong authorities were notified that Mr.
Snowden’s passport was revoked June 22.” By advancing that date
to when his plane was in “midair” on June 23, Snowden provided to
unsuspecting journalists an untrue alibi for his presence in Russia.
The credibility problem with Snowden assumed a more sinister
dimension once he put himself and his fate in the hands of the Russian
authorities in Moscow. Even though the Obama administration
decided against revealing the extent of the Russian intelligence service’s
participation in Snowden’s move from Hong Kong to Moscow,
or what intelligence services call an “exfiltration,” I was told
by a presidential national security staff adviser that the government
acted to protect the intelligence sources used by the CIA, the NSA,
and the FBI to track Snowden’s movements in the latter part of June
in Hong Kong. The CIA’s deputy director, Morell, would go no further
than to state that during that period he had no doubt that the
intelligence services of Russia and China “had an enormous interest
in him and the information he [Snowden] had stolen.” Presumably,
the last thing these adversary services would want would be to make
this “interest” transparent to the United States.
The role of concealment must be taken into account when assessing
information bearing on the work of espionage services. When
I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton— the CIA’s legendary excounterintelligence
chief, active in the 1970s— for a book on deception,
I learned that intelligence services play by a different set of
rules from historians when it comes to their espionage successes.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 131
9/29/16 5:51 PM
132 | how america lost its secrets
Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the
complexity of espionage. He said, “It’s not enough just to steal a
secret. It must be done in a way that the theft remains undetected.”
Deception is employed to obscure the nature and the extent of
the espionage theft. One of the most famous examples of this principle
was the deception used by British intelligence in World War II
to conceal its success in breaking the German ciphers generated by
the Enigma machines. If German naval intelligence had discovered
Britain was able to read the ciphers it used to communicate with its
U- boats, it would have stopped using them. So British intelligence
hid its coup by supplying false information to known German spies
to account for the sinking of U- boats, including the canard that British
aerial cameras could detect one ingredient in the paint used to
camouflage the U- boats.
That same hoary principle of deception applies to modern- day
communications intelligence. If the Russian, Chinese, or any other
adversary intelligence service got its hands on the documents stolen
by Snowden from the NSA’s repositories in Hawaii in 2013, it would
likely employ deception, including well- crafted lies, to create as
much ambiguity as possible as to the missing documents. From this
counterintelligence perspective, the intelligence issue that spawned
the great divide cannot be resolved by accepting the uncorroborated
statements made by a source, such as Snowden, who may be in the
hands of the Russian security services in Moscow.
By the same token, the calculations made by NSA officials about
the extent of the theft are also suspect. After all, the NSA is an intelligence
service that often engages in secret machinations. We know
that its top officials reported to the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees, as well as the president’s national security adviser, that
Snowden compromised over one million documents. But if this was
disinformation, it is difficult to see its purpose. Inflating the extent
of the damage of the Snowden breach to the president, Congress,
and the secretary of defense obviously reflected poorly on their own
management of the NSA, and their own careers. Yet such a possibility
cannot be precluded in the arcane world of intelligence.
As in any case involving the loss of state secrets, uncontested facts
remain in extremely short supply. The opinion- laden appellatives
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 132
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Great Divide | 133
such as “patriot” and “traitor” that have tended to fill the gap in
the great divide do little to address the important mystery of how
many thousands of state secrets were taken from the United States.
How did Snowden breach the supposedly formidable defenses of the
NSA? Did he have any assistance? How did he escape to Moscow?
And what was the final destination of the stolen documents? How
Snowden succeeded in this coup cannot simply be pieced together
from his own statements and interviews. The story also requires a
visit into the wilderness of mirrors of a counterintelligence investigation.
For this endeavor, it is necessary to return to the crime scene:
the NSA’s base in Hawaii.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 133
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 14
The Crime Scene Investigation
Any private contractor, not even an employee of the government,
could walk into the NSA building, take whatever they wanted,
and walk out with it and they would never know.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
Fifteen miles northwest of Honolulu on the island of Oahu,
adjacent to the sprawling Wheeler Air Force Base, is a 250,000-
square- foot, man- made mound of earth and reinforced concrete surrounded
by an electrified fence. Inside the mound is a three- story
structure originally built by the air force in World War II as a bombproof
aircraft repair facility. In the Cold War, it was modernized to
withstand enemy chemical, biological, radiological, or electromagnetic
pulse attacks and was used by the navy’s operation center for
its Pacific fleet. After the Cold War, the huge edifice was turned over
to the NSA, which, as stated earlier, had been created as an intelligence
service to intercept the communications and signals of foreign
countries after World War II, a mission that included vacuuming
into its giant computer arrays telephone messages, missile telemetry,
submarine signals, and virtually everything on the electromagnetic
spectrum of interest to the U.S. Defense Department and
U.S. intelligence agencies. As the NSA developed it, this Hawaiian
base became one of its primary regional bases for gathering Asian
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 134
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 135
communications intelligence. It provided a valuable window on the
activities of adversary nations in the Pacific region and was able to
monitor the ballistic missile tests and submarine activities of China,
North Korea, and Russia. By 2013, the Kunia base had a vast array
of state- of- the- art technology, including ninety Cray supercomputers
arranged in a horseshoe configuration, used to decipher and
make sense of the intercepted signals from China, Russia, and North
Korea. At the heart of the Hawaiian complex was a unit with both
military and civilian employees. A large share of the civilians who
ran the computers worked under two- year contracts with the NSA’s
leading civilian contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton.
General Alexander, who, as I said, headed the NSA in 2013, first
learned about an impending story in The Guardian on June 4, while
he was in Germany meeting with its top intelligence officials, from
Janine Gibson, The Guardian’s American website editor. She had
notified the NSA it intended to break a story focusing on the organization.
It took NSA counterintelligence less than forty- eight hours
to determine that a civilian employee at the base from which documents
were stolen had not reported back to work on May 22. His
civilian supervisor had delayed reporting the absence to the NSA
until May 28. It also determined that the missing civilian employee,
Snowden, had lied on his application for a medical leave and had
flown to Hong Kong. Personal records showed he was being trained
as an analyst at the Threat Operations Center and had worked there
for less than six weeks. He had taken the medical leave on May 18
and left the country by plane. By June 6, he had become the NSA’s
main suspect.
Alexander flew to Washington, D.C., after assigning the sensitive
job of investigating the breach to a team headed by Richard
“Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Operations
Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland.
Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment investigation
because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under
his command. Ledgett flew to Hawaii, where his first task was to
reconstruct the chronology of Snowden’s moves, or, as the tactic is
called in counterintelligence parlance, “walking the cat back.”
The NSA had also notified the FBI of Snowden’s possible involve-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 135
9/29/16 5:51 PM
136 | how america lost its secrets
ment in the theft of state secrets in the first week of June. The FBI
is in charge of criminal investigations of civilian U.S. intelligence
workers, even if the alleged crime occurs on an NSA base. The FBI
immediately dispatched a task force of agents to investigate a potential
espionage case in Hawaii. When questioned, Lindsay Mills said
Snowden was away on a business trip. After determining from
airline and hotel data that he was in Hong Kong, the FBI realized
Snowden was a possible intelligence defector. It froze his credit and
bank cards. It also notified the passport office in the State Department
and the legal attachés at the Hong Kong consulate. The legal
attachés, who were actually FBI field agents posted in Hong Kong,
located Snowden at the Mira hotel on June 8. On the evening of
June 9, Snowden revealed in his twelve- minute video posted on the
Guardian website that he was the source of the stolen NSA documents.
Because Hong Kong is part of China, U.S. law enforcement
did not have the means to recover them.
At that point, determining the magnitude of the theft of documents
became a critical concern of the investigation. Aside from the
few dozen documents published by The Guardian and The Washington
Post, what else had Snowden stolen?
Within the next few days, a small army of forensic investigators
from the FBI, the Defense Department, and the “Q” counterintelligence
division of the NSA swarmed onto the NSA base in Hawaii.
The proximate crime scene for their investigation was the National
Threat Operations Center. They examined the cubicle where
Snowden had last worked and then began retracing all his activities
at the NSA from 2009 to 2013. To begin with, they needed to
find out how many documents from the center had been copied and
taken by Snowden.
Meanwhile, the Defense Intelligence Agency (the Pentagon’s own
intelligence service) was kept partially in the dark. Although the
NSA is officially part of the Department of Defense, it operated with
a high degree of autonomy with its own inspector general, investigative
staff, and reporting channels. The DIA did not learn from
the NSA that Snowden had stolen military documents concerning
the joint Cyber Command until July 10. The number of stolen military
documents from the Department of Defense was staggering.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 136
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 137
The DIA found from its forensic examination that Snowden had
copied “over 900,000” military files. Many of these non- NSA files
came from the Cyber Command, which had been set up in 2011
by the NSA and the army, navy, marine, and air force cryptological
services to combat the threat of warfare in cyberspace. The loss
was considered of such importance that between 200 and 250 military
intelligence officers worked day and night for the next four
months, according to the DIA’s classified report, to “triage, analyze,
and assess Department of Defense impacts related to the Snowden
compromise.” The job of this unit, called the Joint Staff Mitigation
Oversight Task Force, was to attempt to contain the damage caused
by the Snowden breach. In many cases, containment meant shutting
down NSA operations in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran so
they could not be used to confuse and distract the U.S. military.
The NSA and the Defense Department were not the only government
agencies concerned with determining the extent of the
breach. The NSA acted as a service organization for the CIA through
handling most if not all of its requests for communications intelligence
to support both its international espionage and its analytic
operations. Although the CIA and the NSA were both part of the socalled
intelligence community, the NSA did not immediately share
with the CIA details of the Snowden breach. Despite the immense
potential damage of the theft, it was not until June 10 that the CIA’s
director, John Owen Brennan, and his deputy, Michael Morell, were
briefed by the NSA. When Morell realized how much data Snowden
had taken, he was astounded.
“You might have thought of all the government entities on the
planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been
the NSA,” he wrote. “But it turned out that the NSA had left itself
vulnerable.” According to Morell, he bluntly told the NSA briefer
that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all,
the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically,
Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA documents
been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been
stealing documents? Had Snowden been working “with any foreign
intelligence service, either wittingly or not”?
According to Morell, the effort to get a direct answer from NSA
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 137
9/29/16 5:51 PM
138 | how america lost its secrets
officials to these three key questions “proved maddeningly difficult.”
He found that in mid- June NSA officials with whom he dealt
were so “distraught at the massive security breach” that initially
they refused to allow even CIA officers to participate in the ongoing
security review. A former NSA executive told me there was “near
panic” at the NSA. Finally, Morell called Chris Inglis, a former professor
of computer science who had risen to be the NSA’s deputy
director at the time of the breach. Inglis, who headed operations for
the NSA, told him “the news was not good.” Among the data copied
by Snowden were a large number of CIA secrets. By the time the
CIA learned that its secrets had been compromised, Snowden was
headed to Russia.
The investigation of a crime involving potential espionage is no
easy task. In this case, it required attempting to solve a jigsaw puzzle
in which not only were key pieces missing but also, because it
involved adversary intelligence services, some of the found pieces
might deliberately have been twisted to mislead the U.S. investigators.
By late July, NSA investigators had made their initial assessment.
They determined that most of the material had been taken from
sealed- off areas known in intelligence speak as “compartments,”
which in this case were files stored on computers that were isolated
from any network. Each compartment electronically tracks all the
activities that occur in it on its logs, including the password identity
of any person who has gained entry to any compartment. From a
forensic examination of these logs, NSA investigators were quickly
able to reconstruct the timeline of the theft. The logs showed that an
unauthorized party without proper passwords had begun copying
files in mid- April, which was just days after Snowden began his job
at the center. The illicit activity ended just before Snowden’s last day
of work there. So this piece fit in with Snowden’s guilt.
The size of the theft was another matter. Ledgett was certainly in
a position to know (in the shake- up that followed, he would replace
Inglis as deputy director of the NSA). According to Ledgett, the perpetrator
had “touched” 1.7 million documents, moving from compartment
to compartment. Of these “touched” documents, according
to the analysis of the logs, more than one million of them had been
moved by the unauthorized party in mid- May to an auxiliary com-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 138
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 139
puter intended to be used for temporary storage by authorized service
personnel. Finally, the data was transferred off this auxiliary
computer presumably to thumb drives or other external storage
devices. This download occurred just days before Snowden left the
NSA on May 17, 2013, having told the agency that he needed a medical
leave of absence.
The quantity of stolen documents, 1.7 million, does not necessarily
reveal the damage and can itself be misleading. Many documents
do not reveal current or known sources or methods, and others may
have little value to an enemy. And a large portion of the documents
might have been duplications. The quality of some of these documents
is another matter. Just one document that exposed a source
or method of which enemies are unaware can be of immense value.
One such document taken by Snowden provided what Ledgett called
“a roadmap” to the NSA’s current secret operations, revealing to an
adversary such as Russia, China, or Iran “what we know, what we
don’t know, and, implicitly, a way to protect themselves.” There were
many documents in the Snowden breach that met these criteria,
according to a national security official at the Obama White House.
General Alexander closely followed the investigation as it developed
over the summer of 2013. By then, of course, the whole world
knew that Snowden had stolen a vast trove of NSA documents.
Alexander saw major inconsistencies developing between Snowden’s
personal account of the theft and what had actually happened. The
timeline established by the government’s investigators did not
match Snowden’s story line. “Something is not right,” Alexander
said in an interview.
For one thing, Snowden had made the claim to journalists, four
months after he was in Russia, that he had turned over all the
documents he took from the NSA’s compartments to Poitras and
Green wald in Hong Kong. On August 18, the investigators had the
opportunity to examine the files that Snowden had given to Poitras
and Greenwald. This discovery came when British authorities, under
Schedule 7 of Britain’s Terrorism Act, detained David Miranda,
Green wald’s romantic partner, at Heathrow Airport. Miranda was
suspected of acting as a courier for Greenwald and Poitras. According
to Greenwald’s account, Snowden had given both him and Poi-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 139
9/29/16 5:51 PM
140 | how america lost its secrets
tras identical copies of the NSA documents in Hong Kong. When
Green wald returned home to Rio de Janeiro, he found his copy was
corrupted. But Poitras still had her digital copy of whatever stolen
documents Snowden had distributed to them. So Greenwald dispatched
Miranda from Rio to Berlin to get a copy of Poitras’s thumb
drive. On the return trip, Miranda’s plane stopped at Heathrow,
where British authorities detained him and temporarily took the
thumb drive from him. Poitras had written out the password for
Greenwald, and Miranda kept it with the thumb drive. The British
copied the contents and shared them with the NSA. As a result,
the NSA discovered that Snowden had only given Poitras fifty- eight
thousand documents. The damage assessment team under Ledgett
determined that some of these documents had been edited out of
much larger documents that the NSA logs showed Snowden had
copied. By the count of both the NSA and the Defense Department
teams, almost one million documents were unaccounted for. What
happened to the missing documents?
The NSA investigation found that the chronology of the theft
of documents did not support Snowden’s claim to journalists that
he had only been seeking whistle- blowing documents. Most of the
documents he took first did not concern the domestic activities of the
NSA. Only toward the end of the theft did he copy documents that
would qualify as whistle- blowing. The court order to Verizon that
was the basis of the initial Guardian exposé was only issued by the
FISA court on April 27, 2013. The other main whistle- blowing document
he revealed, the PowerPoint presentation about PRISM, was
only issued in April 2013. Yet Snowden had been downloading documents
for at least nine months before he copied these documents.
When I discussed the chronology of the copied documents with
a former government official briefed on the investigation, he suggested
that Snowden’s purpose might have changed between 2012
and 2013. When I asked him what might have induced the change,
he replied, “That is one of the unanswered questions.” That Snowden
only took these two whistle- blowing documents at the tail end of
his nine- month operation, and after he had contacted Poitras and
Green wald, suggests he might have had another motive prior to
contacting journalists. In light of this chronology, the investigation
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 140
9/30/16 11:09 AM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 141
had to consider the possibility that his whistle- blowing was, partly if
not wholly, a cover for another enterprise.
Snowden told journalists he had access to “millions of records
that [he] could walk out the door with at any time with no accountability,
no oversight, no auditing, the government didn’t even know
they were gone.” However, he was not among the limited number
of individuals at the center who had access to these documents.
Both the NSA’s and Booz Allen’s employment records showed that
Snowden had not yet completed his requisite on- the- job training
when he carried out the theft. Consequently, he had not yet been
provided with the passwords he needed to get the documents. Even
if he had remained at the NSA long enough to finish his training,
he would only have been provided with the password to the particular
compartment relevant to his work, not to all compartments. The
tight control over these passwords was, according to a former top
NSA official, a critical part of the NSA’s security framework. He told
me that Snowden, at least during the period of the thefts in April
and May 2013, had no more legitimate access to the compartments
than the cleaning personnel. Somehow, though, Snowden converted
his proximity to access.
If a hundred top- quality diamonds were stolen from locked vaults
at Tiffany by a recently hired trainee who, it turned out, did not have
the combination to open these vaults, the police would be expected to
consider that the trainee might have had help from a current or former
insider at the company who knew the combinations. Snowden,
who had accomplished a similarly inexplicable feat, said in his video
confession that he was solely responsible. However, it is perfectly
logical to assume, given the circumstances, that he might have had
help, unwitting or witting.
The FBI could assume either that the NSA’s security regime was
so badly flawed that Snowden could trick his fellow workers into
providing him with access or that there was another individual at
the center who might have assisted or directed Snowden. When the
investigation came to this fork in the road in the summer of 2013,
according to a source on the House Intelligence Committee, it chose
the former route.
Finally, there was the question of whether Snowden had gone to
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 141
9/30/16 11:09 AM
142 | how america lost its secrets
Russia by design or by accident. Whenever an intelligence worker
steals sensitive compartmented information of interest to a foreign
adversary and then defects to that adversary, it raises at least the
specter of state- sponsored espionage. It is a commonly accepted presumption
in counterintelligence that a spy, fearing arrest, flees to
a country that has some reason to offer him protection. When the
British spies Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby fled to
Moscow during the Cold War, the presumption was that they had a
prior intelligence connection with Russia. Philby confirmed that in
his 1968 memoir, My Silent War. So in the case of Snowden, counterintelligence
had to consider the possibility that his theft of state
secrets and his arrival in Moscow might not be totally coincidental.
Snowden blamed high officials in the U.S. government who purposely
“trapped him” in Russia. He told the editor of The Nation,
“I’m in exile. My government revoked my passport intentionally to
leave me exiled” and “chose to keep me in Russia.” He repeated that
assertion over a dozen times, but as we’ve seen, it had no basis in
fact. Whenever criminal charges are lodged against a U.S. citizen by
the Department of Justice, the State Department, in accordance with
the U.S. code of justice, marks in the electronic passport validation
advisory system that that person’s passport is valid only for return
to the United States. After criminal charges were publicly filed
against Snowden on June 21, it advised foreign governments that
because Snowden was wanted on felony charges, he “should not be
allowed to proceed in any further international travel, other than is
necessary to return him to the United States.” Rather than “exiling”
Snowden, the government acted to facilitate his return home. With
his passport, he could have flown home from either Hong Kong or
Moscow, where he, like any other person accused of a felony, would
face the charges against him. Snowden’s unfounded claims suggested
to investigators that he had something to hide about his arrival in
Russia.
The counterintelligence investigation had access to State Department
records showing that its representatives in Hong Kong had
informed authorities there on June 16 that there were criminal
charges against Snowden. Only a typographical error in spelling out
Snowden’s middle name— James instead of Joseph— in the criminal
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 142
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 143
charges prevented the Hong Kong police from immediately ordering
his detention. His Hong Kong lawyers were certainly advised of
these pending charges no later than June 21, when they were published
on the front page of the South China Morning Post in Hong
Kong. Presumably, Snowden knew that actions by the U.S. government
were already in progress and that one of these actions would
include restricting his passport. One of his lawyers, Jonathan Man,
even accompanied Snowden to the airport out of his concern that he
would not be allowed by Hong Kong authorities to go through passport
control. Ordinarily, Hong Kong passport control scans passports
when tourists exit but does not check them against a computerized
database.
In any case, when Snowden arrived in Russia on June 23, any
future international travel decisions for him would be up to the government
of Russia, not that of the United States. It could have sent
him back to Hong Kong, as is normally done when someone arrives
without a proper visa, or to the United States. The only government
with the actual means to “trap” him in Russia was the Russian
government.
Senior intelligence officials also knew that the U.S. government,
rather than conspiring to keep Snowden in Moscow, had met nearly
every day while he was in Hong Kong with Lisa Monaco, President
Obama’s homeland security adviser, in the White House Situation
Room to find a way to prevent Snowden and his cache of secrets
from falling into Russian hands. Robert S. Mueller III, then the FBI
director, reportedly even directly appealed to the FSB head, Alexander
Bortnikov, to return Snowden to the United States.
U.S. intelligence also knew that it was no accident that Snowden
wound up in the hands of Russia. He had been in contact with Russian
officials in Hong Kong. It will be recalled that Putin admitted to
this liaison on September 3, in a press briefing on state- owned Channel
One television; he also divulged that he had advance knowledge
of Snowden’s plan.
“I will tell you something I have never said before,” Putin said.
Snowden “first went to Hong Kong and got in touch with our diplomatic
representatives.” Putin was told then that an American “agent
of special services” was seeking to come to Russia. Putin added that
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 143
9/29/16 5:51 PM
144 | how america lost its secrets
he declared that this agent would be “welcome, provided, however,
that he stops any kind of activity that could damage Russian- US
relations.”
Even before that public confirmation of the Russian role in Hong
Kong, the White House was well aware of it. On June 23, the Democratic
senator Charles Schumer of New York correctly said, based
on a White House briefing, that “Vladimir Putin had personally
approved Snowden’s flight” to Moscow. The NSA had the means to
monitor Russian communication between Moscow and Hong Kong.
The NSA also reportedly intercepted contacts between these Russian
officials and Russian representatives of Aeroflot, the Russian stateowned
airline that had flights between Hong Kong and Moscow.
Aeroflot (like most other international carriers) ordinarily requires
international passengers to have both a valid passport and, if necessary,
a visa to the country of their destination. Those rules had to
be waived for Snowden’s exfiltration from Hong Kong. Snowden’s
defection to Moscow was not a haphazard result of unexpected circumstances.
Russia obviously knew he was coming. This raised new
questions for the investigation. What led Snowden to defect to Russia?
Was his arrival in Moscow planned by Russian intelligence in
advance of his going public in Hong Kong? Was any other party,
such as China, privy to the plan? Was there a quid pro quo?
Putin’s authorization could certainly account for Aeroflot’s waiving
its usual passport and visa check to allow Snowden to board its
plane, as well as the dispatch with which Russian officials whisked
Snowden off the plane after it landed at the Moscow airport. It could
also account for Snowden’s vanishing from public view for the next
three weeks and the promulgation of the cover story that Snowden
was unwillingly trapped at the airport by the U.S. government. The
reasons behind Putin’s move were less clear.
By September 2013, the investigation was looking into a veritable
abyss. Snowden’s culpability was no longer an issue. What was
lacking from Snowden’s video, or the two- hour film made by Laura
Poitras, was any specific information on how many documents he
had copied, how he had obtained the passwords to the computers
on which they were stored, the period of time involved in the theft,
or how he had breached all the security measures of the NSA in
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 144
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Crime Scene Investigation | 145
Hawaii. Nor would that data be forthcoming from Snowden, who
may be the only witness to the crime. By June 23, he was in a safe
haven in Moscow. Even though the grand jury case against Snowden
was cut and dry, it was also irrelevant because the United States does
not have an extradition treaty with Russia.
The purpose of the intelligence investigation went far beyond
determining Snowden’s guilt or innocence, however. Its job was to
find out how such a massive theft of documents could occur, how the
perpetrator escaped, and, perhaps most urgent, who had obtained the
unaccounted- for stolen documents from Snowden.
In his interviews with journalists in Moscow, Snowden studiously
avoided describing the means by which he breached the security
aperture of America’s most secret intelligence service. He only told
the journalists who came to Moscow to interview him, with a bit of
pseudo- modesty, that he was not “an angel” who descended from
heaven to carry out the theft. But the question of how Snowden
stole these documents may be the most important part of the story.
The NSA, after all, furnishes communications intelligence to the
president, his national security advisers, and the Department of
Defense, intelligence that is supposedly derived from secret sources
in adversary nations. If these adversary nations learn about the
NSA’s sources, then the information, if not worthless, cannot be
fully trusted. The most basic responsibility of the NSA is to protect
its sources. Yet Snowden walked away with long lists of them.
In doing so, he amply demonstrated that a single civilian employee
working for an outside contractor, even one not having the necessary
passwords and other access privileges, could steal documents
that betrayed these vital sources. He also demonstrated that such a
massive theft could go undetected for at least two weeks.
If Snowden managed this feat on his own, as he claims in his
Hong Kong video, it suggests that any other civilian employee with
a perceived grievance against NSA practices or American foreign
policy could also walk away with some of the most precious secrets
held by U.S. intelligence. Such vulnerability extends to tens of thousands
of civilian contract employees in positions similar to the one
held by Snowden. The lone disgruntled employee explanation is
therefore hardly reassuring. If true, it calls into question the entire
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 145
9/29/16 5:51 PM
146 | how america lost its secrets
multibillion- dollar enterprise of outsourcing the management of the
NSA’s computer networks and other technical work to outside contractors.
It also casts doubts on the post- 9/11 decision by the intelligence
community to strip away much of the NSA’s “stovepiping”
that previously insulated its most sensitive computers. Without
such stovepiping, any rogue civilian employee could bring down the
entire edifice of shared intelligence.
A finding that Snowden had acted in concert with others in breaching
compartments at the NSA would hardly be any more reassuring.
Such collaboration among intelligence workers would reflect gravely
on the mind- set of the NSA. Snowden described an atmosphere in
which intelligence workers exchanged lewd photographs of foreign
suspects. Some NSA employees met to protest the NSA policies. Did
this violation of the NSA’s rules also involve abetting the theft of
documents? If so, the NSA would have to evaluate further vulnerabilities
that might arise when it entrusts its secrets to technicians
who do not share its values. A collaborative breach would signal an
immense failure of the present concept of the counterintelligence
regime in the NSA.
From what I gathered from government officials who were familiar
with the investigation, there was a concern that answering the
“how” question would rouse serious doubts about the very ability
of the NSA to carry out its core mission of protecting the government’s
intelligence secrets. However it was organized, it was clear
that Snowden had played a major role in what amounted to a brilliant
intelligence coup.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 146
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 15
Did Snowden Act Alone?
When you look at the totality of Snowden’s actions certainly one
hypothesis that jumps out at you, that seems to explain his ability
to do all these things, is that he had help and had help from
somebody who was very competent in these matters.
— general michael hayden, former director, NSA and CIA
A
whistle- blower enters the enterprise of stealing state
secrets for reasons of conscience, but so do many spies. Such
conscience- driven spies are called, in CIA parlance, “ideological
agents.” For instance, the British diplomat Donald Maclean, one
of the most important Russian spies in the Cold War, was an ideological
recruit. He stole immensely valuable U.S. nuclear secrets
for the Russian intelligence service without receiving any monetary
compensation.
The acceptance of money is not necessarily a meaningful distinction
when it comes to espionage. To be sure, many spies get
paid, but some whistle- blowers also receive a rich bounty for their
work. Indeed, under federal laws, whistle- blowers can qualify for
multimillion- dollar bounties for exposing financial malfeasance. The
whistle- blower Bradley Birkenfeld, for example, after he himself
was paroled from prison in 2012, received an award of $104 million
for providing data that exposed illicit tax sheltering at the Swiss UBS
bank. Assange also offered political whistle- blowers six- figure cash
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 147
9/29/16 5:51 PM
148 | how america lost its secrets
bounties from money raised on the Internet. In 2015, for instance,
WikiLeaks offered $100,000 bounties to any whistle- blowers who
provided the site with secret documents exposing details of the
Trans- Pacific Trade Agreement.
Nor is acting alone necessarily a line that divides whistle- blowers
from spies. In many cases, whistle- blowers have accomplices who
help them carry out their mission. For example, in 1969, the celebrated
whistle- blower Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst at the
Rand Corporation, had an accomplice, Anthony Russo, who had also
worked at Rand. (Both were indicted by the government.) Acting in
concert, they copied secret documents that became known famously
as the Pentagon Papers.
Whistle- blowers can also, like conventional spies, enter into elaborate
conspiracies to carry out an operation. On the night of March 8,
1971, eight whistle- blowers working together with burglary tools
broke into the FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, and stole almost all
the FBI files there. The conspirators escaped and kept their identities
secret for over forty- two years.
Self- definitions also do not necessarily produce a distinction
between whistle- blowers and conventional spies. Consider Philip
Agee, who left the CIA in 1969 for what he described as “reasons
of conscience.” Specifically, he said he objected to the CIA’s covert
support of Latin American dictators. After contacting the Soviet
embassy in Mexico City, he defected to Cuba, where he leaked information
that exposed CIA operations. Although Agee insisted he was
a whistle- blower, and he adamantly denied offering any secrets to the
Soviet Union, the KGB viewed him as a conventional spy. According
to Oleg Kalugin, the top Soviet counterintelligence officer in the
KGB in Moscow, who defected to the United States, Agee offered
CIA secrets first to the KGB residency in Mexico City in 1973 and
then to the Cuban intelligence service. Agee provided the KGB with
a “treasure trove” of U.S. secrets, Kalugin revealed. “I then sat in
my office in Moscow reading the growing list of revelations coming
from Agee.” Despite this disparity, Agee still defined himself to the
public as a whistle- blower because he also had exposed CIA operations
to the public.
The Snowden case blurs the demarcation line even further. Unlike
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 148
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Did Snowden Act Alone? | 149
other whistle- blowers who uncovered what they considered government
malfeasance by virtue of their jobs, Snowden, by his own
admission, took a new job in 2013 specifically to get access to the SCI
files concerning NSA sources that he stole from the Threat Operations
Center. Switching jobs in order to widen one’s access to state
secrets is an activity usually associated with penetration agents, not
whistle- blowers. While the technical distinction between a whistleblower
and a spy may still serve the media in the case of Snowden,
it does not help in solving the counterintelligence conundrum. A
complex theft of state secrets had been successfully carried out in
a supposedly secure site. The only known witness, Snowden, had
escaped to Russia, where he could be of no help in reconstructing the
crime for American intelligence agencies. The stolen data was kept
in the equivalent of sealed “vaults”— actually computer drives that
were not connected to the NSA network. If ever there was a lockedroom
mystery, this was it.
According to the FBI investigation, Snowden pierced these barriers
by using passwords that belonged to other people and using credentials
that allowed him to masquerade as a system administrator.
It was a feat that must have required meticulous planning.
To address such a mystery, a counterintelligence investigation
starts with a tabula rasa, stripping away all the previous assumptions,
including that Snowden was the lone perpetrator. It builds
alternative scenarios to test against the known facts. To be sure, scenario
building differs from that of a conventional forensic investigation
aimed at finding pieces of evidence that can be used to persuade
a jury in a courtroom. Unlike a judicial investigation concerned with
guilt and innocence, scenario building looks to develop a story that
is, concurrently, intrinsically consistent and humanly plausible, and
in the process it also identifies and explores the possible holes in the
case.
“Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world
of perceptions. They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions
inside the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and
transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions,”
wrote Pierre Wack in the Harvard Business Review in 1985.
Such scenarios must aim at constituting a limited set of mutually
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 149
9/29/16 5:51 PM
150 | how america lost its secrets
exclusive alternatives. The point is to assure that any alternative that
fits the relevant facts, no matter how implausible it may initially
seem to be, is not neglected.
One of the most vexing problems that had to be explained by these
scenarios is how Snowden got the passwords to up to twenty- four of
these vaults. He could not have obtained these passwords during his
previous employment at Dell, because Dell technicians did not have
access to the Level 3 documents stored in these compartments. Nor,
as noted earlier, was he given access to them when he transferred to
Booz Allen, because he had not completed the requisite training.
Snowden had also, it will be recalled, relinquished his privileges as
a system administrator when he transferred to Booz Allen, so he did
not have the privilege to override password protection. In short, his
new position as an infrastructure analyst did not give him the ability
to enter compartments that he had not yet been read into.
As I’ve said, there are two possible ways he could have gotten
these passwords: either he had assistance from a party who had
access to them, or he found flaws in the NSA’s security procedures
that left the supposedly closed vaults effectively unlocked.
The Unwitting Accomplice Possibility
It is possible that if Snowden received assistance, it was entirely
unwitting. He might have obtained some passwords through deception,
such as tricking co- workers into typing their passwords into
a device that captured them. As the NSA informed Congress in
2014, three of his fellow workers told the FBI that Snowden might
have deceived them to gain access to their passwords. He could have
simply asked other analysts at the center who had been read into
compartments for their passwords. Such an approach would be
extremely risky for the analyst, who could lose his job and security
clearance by cooperating. It could also be risky for Snowden because
any analyst he approached was supposed to report any request for
a password to a security officer. Making such requests even more
suspicious, Snowden had been working at the Threat Operations
Center for just a few weeks as a trainee and was not well known to
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 150
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Did Snowden Act Alone? | 151
other analysts there. “It is inconceivable to me that his co- workers
would divulge their passwords to him,” a former Booz Allen executive,
who had also worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, told
me. “If he was a system administrator, he might trick a threat analyst
into entering his password into his computer under the pretext
that he needed it to deal with an urgent hardware issue.” But,
it will be recalled, Snowden was not a system administrator at the
center. Snowden therefore “had no plausible reason for requesting
passwords to compartments he had not been read into,” the former
executive said. He said that NSA executives might have been read
into all twenty- four of the compartments, but he deemed it inconceivable
they would illicitly share their passwords with Snowden. I
asked him what the chance was of his voluntarily obtaining some
twenty- four passwords from co- workers in five weeks. “In my opinion,
near zero,” he said.
It is possible of course that Snowden could have simply observed
others typing in their passwords, one by one, but that would take
time and possibly attract attention. I asked the former Booz Allen
contractor whether it was possible that Snowden could have used a
device for intercepting another computer’s electronic signals, called
by hackers a “key logger.” Such a device, which is obtainable over
the Internet, could be used to steal the passwords of the analysts
who had been read into the compartments. My source said that
while it was possible that Snowden smuggled in a key logger in his
backpack, it could not be operated unless it was hardwired to a computer
inside the center, because, like those at all other NSA facilities,
the computers had been insulated to block any form of wireless
transmission. This precaution was taken to guard against an EMP, or
electromagnetic pulse, attack by an enemy. The only way Snowden
could intercept keystrokes was to attach a cable from his key logger
to each of his fellow workers’ computers. In this scenario, he would
have had to surreptitiously build his own wired network connecting
his hidden key logger to twenty- four separate computers. Moreover,
he would have to do this wiring in an open- plan office where
he could not count on these additional wires, even if rigged one by
one, not being noticed by either other analysts in the room or the
“geek squad” of system administrators who regularly checked con-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 151
9/29/16 5:51 PM
152 | how america lost its secrets
nections. Making the task even more risky, according to my Booz
Allen source, there were closed- circuit cameras. The only way he
could mitigate the risk of detection was by having someone help
him build this network.
Even if Snowden had managed to obtain all the necessary passwords
from colleagues, he would have had to transfer the files to an
external storage device. This was not a matter of simply attaching
a thumb drive or other external device to a port, because, unlike in
movies such as Mission: Impossible, the ports on the computers at
the NSA were ordinarily sealed shut. This measure was taken specifically
to prevent any unauthorized downloading by NSA workers.
The only people at the center who had the authorization, and the
means, to open these ports and transfer data were system administrators,
according to the former Booz Allen executive. System
administrators needed to have this privilege to deal with glitches
in the computers. Snowden was no longer a system administrator
and had no such privileges. So again, he would have needed help.
He would have needed to either borrow a system administrator’s
credential or forge his own.
The credential he would need is called a public key infrastructure,
or PKI, card with its authentication code embedded in a magnetic
strip. When I asked the former Booz Allen executive if Snowden
possessed the skill set to forge such a card, he said that he strongly
doubted any NSA employee would be capable of such a forgery
without special equipment. Just asking such a favor could “set off
alarms,” my source said.
The unwitting accomplice scenario had another stumbling block:
time. We know from Poitras that Snowden told her in early April
2013 that he planned to deliver documents to her in six to eight
weeks (which he in fact did). But he had not yet started working for
Booz Allen at the center until that same month. It does not seem
plausible that in making such a commitment he was merely counting
on his ingenuity in the face of strangers to fulfill it. The only way
he could have known for certain that he would be able to borrow a
PKI card and obtain the passwords, whether by trickery, by observation,
or by a key router, before he had begun working at the center
was that he already knew someone there who would help him.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 152
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Witting Accomplice Possibility
Did Snowden Act Alone? | 153
The witting accomplice scenario better fits with the principle in logic
called Occam’s razor, which suggests that when one is choosing
between alternative explanations, the one that requires the fewest
assumptions should be given priority. It would be relatively easy
to gain access to passwords if Snowden had the cooperation of an
insider at the center who had been read into the compartments or,
even better, if he had the cooperation of a system administrator with
the necessary PKI cards and shell keys to bypass the password protection.
Such an accomplice could also help explain how Snowden
was able to get the job at the center in the first place, how he knew
in advance that he could find there the “lists” of the NSA sources in
foreign countries, and how he knew that there were security traps at
the center. Such a witting accomplice might even have prepared in
advance the “spiders” that Snowden used to index the files.
The witting accomplice scenario of course requires an unsettling
expansion of the plot. It means Snowden collaborated with one or
more insiders at the center to steal secret documents. It is not difficult
to imagine, in light of the lax background checks for outside
contractors servicing the NSA, that there were others in the “geek
squad” who shared Snowden’s antipathy to NSA surveillance. Certainly,
we know that Snowden found other NSA workers who were
willing to attend his anti- surveillance CryptoParty in December
2012. Some might be willing to offer Snowden help if he was willing
to go public. Indeed, if the geek culture produced one Snowden, why
wouldn’t it produce others? If such an accomplice lacked Snowden’s
willingness to flee to another country, he might have limited his participation
to supplying technical assistance. For his part, Snowden
might have agreed to divert suspicion from his accomplice by taking
sole responsibility for the crime when he went public.
All of this is theoretically possible, but no witting accomplice was
ever identified. The FBI, which was in charge of the domestic part of
the investigation of the Snowden case, questioned all of Snowden’s
co- workers at the center over the course of six months and failed
to find anyone who knowingly helped Snowden. If the accomplice
was an idealistic amateur, it is likely the FBI would have found him.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 153
9/29/16 5:51 PM
154 | how america lost its secrets
Three co- workers did admit to the FBI, as noted earlier, that they
might have inadvertently given Snowden their passwords, but these
three slips would not account for Snowden’s breach of all the other
compartments. Of course, there might have also been less forthcoming
co- workers who hid their slips in divulging their passwords to
Snowden.
This raises the more sinister possibility that the accomplice
was not an amateur co- worker but a spy who was already in place
when Snowden arrived. Such a penetration agent could have been
recruited by an adversary intelligence service before Snowden came
on the scene. After Snowden expressed a desire to expose the NSA’s
domestic surveillance, it could then have used him as an “umbrella”
to hide its own activities. Finding such a means to protect a source
while exploiting his or her information is not uncommon in espionage
operations, and because Snowden was willing to flee America
and go public, he could serve as a near- perfect umbrella. “Snowden
may have carried out of the NSA many more documents than he
knew about,” Tyler Drumheller, the former CIA station chief, said. It
could also account for the disparity between the claims of Snowden
and the NSA damage assessment as to the number of documents
that were compromised.
As far- fetched as this scenario may seem, less than three years
before the Snowden breach the NSA had received a warning from
a CIA mole (to be discussed in greater detail later) that the Russian
intelligence service might have recruited a KGB mole at the Fort
Meade headquarters of the NSA. No mole was found in 2010, and
if one existed, it could not have been Snowden, who was working
for the NSA in Japan in 2010. Such a putative mole could conceivably
have acquired enough information to later facilitate Snowden’s
operation.
As Snowden acknowledges, he was not a happy worker at the
NSA. He complained in his posts over the Internet between 2010
and 2013 about superiors and what he considered NSA abuses to
co- workers. If someone assumed the guise of a reluctant whistleblower,
he would have little difficulty in approaching Snowden.
Snowden might not even know his true affiliation beyond that he
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 154
9/29/16 5:51 PM
Did Snowden Act Alone? | 155
shared Snowden’s anti- surveillance views. If Snowden then voiced
an interest in exposing the NSA’s secrets, this person could supply
him with the necessary guidance, steering a still- unsuspecting
Snowden first to the Booz Allen position and afterward to his associates
in Hong Kong. By taking sole credit for the coup in the video
that he made with Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong, he acted, as
he told Greenwald, to divert suspicion from anyone else. This move
could also give any collaborator he might have had in Hawaii time
to cover his or her tracks.
The astronomer Carl Sagan famously said in regard to searching
the universe for signals from other civilizations that the “absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence.” That injunction also applies
to the spooky universe of espionage. The fact that a mole hunt fails
to find a hidden collaborator at the NSA does not necessarily mean
such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases
in which Russian moles eluded long, intensive investigations. Robert
Hanssen penetrated the FBI for over twenty years for the KGB
without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames acted as a KGB mole
in the CIA for more than ten years and passed all the CIA’s sophisticated
lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded intensive FBI
and CIA investigations that lasted over a decade. According to Victor
Cherkashin, their KGB case officer, whom I interviewed in Moscow
in 2015, the KGB was able to hide their existence from investigators
for such a long period partly because of the widespread belief in U.S.
intelligence that moles were fictional creatures that sprang from the
“paranoid mind” of James Jesus Angleton. When I then cited the
signature line from the movie The Usual Suspects, “The greatest
trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist,”
Cherkashin thinly smiled and said, “CIA denial [of moles] certainly
helped.”
In view of such past successes of the Russian intelligence services,
it cannot be precluded that there was another person in the NSA
working with the enthusiastic Snowden as cover to prevent any light
from falling on his own surreptitious spying. While it may seem
extremely unlikely that Snowden had such assistance, the alternative
scenario, that Snowden broke into the sealed compartments and
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 155
9/29/16 5:51 PM
156 | how america lost its secrets
made off with the documents without any assistance, seems equally
unlikely.
Even if Snowden had been, as he claims, a pure idealist seeking
to right a perceived wrong, it does not exclude the possibility
of his becoming entangled in the plots of others. Intelligence services
make it their business to bring about such witting or unwitting
entanglements.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 156
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 16
The Question of When
The NSA was actually concerned back in the time of the cryptowars
with improving American security. Nowadays, we see that
their priority is weakening our security.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2015
In his 1974 novel, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, John Le Carré
helped establish the concept in the public imagination of a mole
burrowing into a rival intelligence service. Le Carré’s now-classic
mole, code- named Gerald by the KGB, managed in the novel to gain
access to the inner sanctum of the British intelligence service MI6.
Aided and guided by his controllers in Moscow, he systematically
stole British intelligence secrets. As Le Carré wove the plot, the brilliantly
orchestrated operation involved spotting, compromising, and
recruiting others to gradually advance Gerald the mole to a position
of power. Such well- organized penetrations are not limited to fiction.
The career of the KGB mole Heinz Felfe, who was advanced through
the ranks of West German intelligence by an elaborate series of sacrifices
by his controllers in Moscow until he actually headed West
German counterintelligence in 1961, could have served as the nonfiction
inspiration for Le Carré’s 1963 novel, The Spy Who Came
in from the Cold. As U.S. intelligence only found out after the Cold
War ended, the KGB also had the ability to sustain moles for decades.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 157
9/29/16 5:51 PM
158 | how america lost its secrets
The CIA also had its share of long- term successes, such as Alexander
Poteyev, who fed the CIA secrets for over ten years while
burrowing into Russian intelligence. In the choreography of these
operations, as in Le Carré’s fiction, rival intelligence services ensnared
and sacrificed recruits, as if playing a chess game, to advance their
moles. Despite notable successes such as Felfe and Poteyev, a great
number of these elaborate conspiracies fail to insinuate a mole into
their adversaries’ confidence. Intelligence services therefore also
take advantage of a more prosaic source: the self- generated spy, or,
as they are called in the trade, a “walk- in.”
Although they are largely unsung in novels, these walk- ins are an
important part of espionage. A counterespionage review done for the
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1990
found that most U.S. spies in the Cold War had taken documents on
their own volition and only afterward offered them to an adversary
service. Self- generated spies have diverse motives. Some intelligence
workers steal secrets for financial gain. Others take them to further
an ideological interest. As opportunistic enterprises, intelligence services
do not turn walk- ins away if they have valuable intelligence.
Indeed, some of the most successful moles were not recruited, or even
controlled, by spy agencies. They were self- generated penetrations,
or “espionage sources,” as the KGB preferred to call them, who first
stole secrets and later voluntarily delivered them to an adversary.
Hanssen, who successfully penetrated the FBI for the Russian
intelligence services from 1979 to 2001, according to the assessment
of a 2002 presidential commission, had caused “the worst intelligence
disaster in US history.” Eleven years later, George Ellard, a
former NSA inspector general who had been a member of that commission,
compared Hanssen with Snowden “in that they both used
very well- honed IT abilities to steal and disclose classified information
vital to our national security.”
It is also possible to exploit a walk- in even after he has left his
service. For example, the KGB major Anatoliy Golitsyn was an ideological
self- generated spy who walked into the U.S. embassy in Helsinki
on December 15, 1961. He asked to see the CIA officer on duty
and announced to him that he had collected a trove of KGB secrets,
including information that could identify its key spies in the West.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 158
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Question of When | 159
He offered to defect to the United States. The CIA accepted his offer,
and through this archive of secrets he had previously compiled, he
became one of the CIA’s most productive sources in the Cold War.
The job of an intelligence service is to take advantage of whatever
opportunities come its way in the form of self- generated spies. If
a Russian walk- in had not yet burned his bridges to his own service,
U.S. intelligence officers were under instructions to attempt to
persuade the walk- in to return to his post in Russia and serve as a
“defector- in- place,” or mole. “While defectors can and do provide
critical information,” a CIA memorandum on walk- ins during the
Cold War noted, “there are very few cases in which the same individual
may not have been of greater value if he had returned to his
post.” Of course, if a walk- in believed he was already compromised,
as Golitsyn did, a decision would have to be made whether the value
of his intelligence merited exfiltrating him to the United States.
This required evaluating the bona fides of the walk- in. Not all
walk- ins are accepted as defectors. Some walk- ins are deemed “dangles,”
or agents dispatched by the KGB to test and confuse the CIA.
Others are rejected as political liabilities, as happened to Wang Lijun,
a well- connected police chief in China. In February 2012, Wang
walked into the U.S. consulate in Chengdu asking for asylum. The
State Department decided against it. After Wang left U.S. protection,
he was arrested for corruption and received a fifteen- year prison
sentence. Such decisions about walk- ins are not made without due
consideration, often at the highest level of a government, because
exfiltrating a defector can result in diplomatic ruptures and political
embarrassments.
Conversely, it raises espionage concerns when an adversary government
authorizes the exfiltration of a rogue employee of an intelligence
service. At minimum, it suggests that a rival government
placed value on what the defector could provide it. The Snowden
case is no exception. Whatever Snowden’s prior relations might have
been with Russia, it can be assumed that after he fled to Moscow,
in light of the intelligence value of the stolen documents, he would
wind up in the hands of the Russian security services. That assumption
was reinforced by subsequent countermeasures that were
implemented by adversaries moved to block secret sources of NSA
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 159
9/29/16 5:51 PM
160 | how america lost its secrets
surveillance, as the CIA deputy director later revealed. Such moves
could indicate that at least part of the U.S. communications intelligence
that Snowden had stolen was in enemy hands. The CIA and
NSA’s monitoring of these countermeasures was itself extremely
delicate, because revealing what they learned about Russian and
Chinese countermeasures risked compromising even more U.S.
communications sources than had Snowden.
General Alexander said in his interview with The Australian
Financial Review, “We absolutely need to know what Russia’s
involvement is with Snowden.” He further said, “I think Snowden
is now being manipulated by Russian intelligence. I just don’t know
when that exactly started.” At what point did Snowden first come in
contact with the Russians? The counterintelligence issue was not if
this U.S. intelligence defector in Moscow was under Russian control
but when he came under it.
There were three possible time periods when Snowden might
have been brought under control by the Russian intelligence service:
while he was still working for the NSA; after he arrived in Hong
Kong on May 20, 2013; or after he arrived in Russia on June 23,
2013.
The NSA Scenario
The first scenario could stretch as far back as when Snowden was
forced out of the CIA in 2009. It will be recalled that the CIA had
planned to launch a security investigation of Snowden, but it was
aborted when he resigned. He had also incurred large losses speculating
in the financial markets in Geneva, which is the kind of activity
that had in the past attracted the interest of foreign intelligence
services. So it has to be considered in this scenario that Snowden had
been recruited by the Russians after he left the CIA and directed to
take jobs at civilian contractors servicing the NSA.
Such “career management,” as it is called by the CIA, could
explain why Snowden had switched jobs in March 2013 to Booz
Allen Hamilton, which, unlike his previous employer, Dell, allowed
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 160
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Question of When | 161
him to gain proximity to the super-secret lists of the telecommunications
systems that the NSA had penetrated in Russia and China.
This could account for how he managed to acquire the necessary
passwords to accrue privileged information. It could also account for
why the documents he copied that pertained to NSA operations in
Russia were not among those he gave to Poitras, Greenwald, and
other journalists. Because Russia has had an active intelligencesharing
treaty with China since 1996, it could further explain why
his first stop was Hong Kong, a part of China. It was a safe venue for
debriefing Snowden, as well as establishing his credentials among
journalists as a whistle- blower, before a decision was made to allow
him to proceed to Russia.
The nearly fatal problem with this early recruitment scenario is
Snowden’s contacts with journalists. Snowden, it will be recalled,
had contacted Greenwald in December 2012. Greenwald was a highprofile
blogger in Brazil who did not use encryption or any security
safeguards. Next, he contacted Poitras in January 2013 in Berlin;
she was a magnet for NSA dissidents. Both of these contacts put
Snowden’s clandestine downloading at grave risk. As known opponents
of U.S. intelligence agencies, these journalists might be, as they
themselves suspected they were, under surveillance by American,
British, Brazilian, or German intelligence services. Greenwald and
Poitras might also tell others who were either under surveillance or
informers. So no matter what precautions Snowden took, his secret
enterprise, or just the fact he was in contact with anti- government
activists, might be detected. At minimum, he could lose his access to
secrets and be of no further use as a source at the NSA. He could also
be interrogated and reveal the way he was brought under control. If
Snowden had actually been under the control of the Russian intelligence
service, the last thing it would allow was for him to take such
a risk— or even to contact a single journalist. After all, the purpose
of an espionage operation is to steal secrets without alerting anyone
to the theft.
A former CIA officer told me that while anything could “go haywire”
in an intelligence operation, it would be “unthinkable” that
the Russian intelligence service would permit an undercover source
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 161
9/29/16 5:51 PM
162 | how america lost its secrets
it controlled in the NSA to expose himself by contacting journalists.
Snowden’s continued interactions with Poitras and Greenwald make
it implausible that he was under Russian control before he went to
Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Scenario
The most compelling support for the scenario that Snowden was
brought under Russian control while he was in Hong Kong comes, it
will be recalled, from Vladimir Putin. His disclosure about the case
leaves little doubt that Russian officials had engaged Snowden in
Hong Kong, that Putin had authorized his trip to Moscow, and that
the Russian government allowed him to fly to Moscow without a
Russian visa. We know that Putin’s version is supported by U.S. surveillance
of Snowden’s activities in Hong Kong. We also know that
the Russians went to some lengths not only to facilitate his trip to
Moscow but to arrange to keep him in Russia. This supports the
possibility that the Russian intelligence service managed to bring
Snowden under its sway during his thirty- four days in Hong Kong.
The Russian intelligence service might even have been aware
of Snowden and his anti- NSA activities before his arrival on May
20. Snowden was anything but discreet in his contacts with strangers
in the anti- surveillance movement, including such well- known
activists as Runa Sandvik (to whom he revealed his true name and
address via e- mail), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins,
and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of
this circle were being watched by a hostile service,” a former NSA
counterintelligence officer told me in 2015. When I told him that
Poitras and others in her circle had used PGP encryption, aliases,
and Tor software in their exchanges with Snowden, he said, arching
his eyebrows, “That might work against amateurs, but it wouldn’t
stop the Russians if they thought they might have a defector in the
NSA.” He explained that both the NSA and hostile services have the
“means” to bypass such safeguards.
I asked what the Russian intelligence service would have done if
it had indeed spotted Snowden in late 2012 or early 2013. “Maybe
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 162
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Question of When | 163
just research him,” he replied. As we know now, he pointed out, Russia
and China probably had access to the 127- page standard form in
his personnel file that he updated in 2011. They also had the capability
to track his air travel to Hong Kong. “Could someone have
steered him to Hong Kong?” I asked. He answered, with a shrug,
“That depends on whether Snowden had a confidante who could
have influenced him.”
Whenever adversaries became aware of Snowden in this scenario,
it was not until after he copied the NSA secrets and took them with
him to Hong Kong that Russian intelligence officers offered him a
deal. So from the Russian point of view, Snowden had already burned
his bridges. Because he had used other people’s passwords and access
privileges to get into computers that he was not authorized to use,
illegally moved documents, and given a false reason for his medical
leave, it was only a matter of time, as he told Greenwald in his
interview in Hong Kong, before NSA investigators would identify
him as a possible spy. He could be of no further use at the NSA to an
adversary. His intelligence value now lay in the documents he had
taken with him or stored in the cloud as well as his ability to help
clarify them in debriefing sessions. He could also inflict damage on
the morale and public standing of the NSA by denouncing its spying
in the media.
Once Snowden was in Hong Kong, the Russians would have no
reason to restrain him from holding a press event or releasing a
video. In fact, the KGB had organized press conferences for all the
previous NSA defectors to Moscow. Hong Kong was a perfect venue
for a well- staged media event because all the major newspapers in
the world had bureaus there. Snowden’s disclosures about NSA spying
could serve to weaken the NSA’s relations with its allies.
It is also possible that Russian or Chinese intelligence did not
become aware of Snowden until after he went public in June by
having The Guardian release his video. The video would have convinced
the Russians or the Chinese of how dissatisfied Snowden was
with the NSA. Because dissatisfaction is one of the classic means of
recruitment in the intelligence business, he would certainly become
a prime target for recruitment after he went public.
The CIA also considered the possibility that Snowden might
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 163
9/29/16 5:51 PM
164 | how america lost its secrets
have been reeled in unwittingly. Morell suggested in his book that
Snowden might not himself have fully realized “when and how he
would be used.”
It can be safely assumed that the decision made by Putin’s intelligence
service to allow Snowden to travel to Russia proceeded from
something other than softhearted sentiment about his welfare. After
Putin learned that there was an American in Hong Kong from the
“special services” seeking to come to Russia, he also learned from
Snowden’s own disclosure on the video released that Snowden had
taken a large number of NSA documents to Hong Kong: indeed,
some were shown on the video. After that self- outing by Snowden,
Putin had plenty of time to calculate the advantages and disadvantages
of allowing him to come to Moscow.
Putin could offer him not only freedom from arrest but also a
platform to express his views. The exploitation of an intelligence
defector, even after he yields his secrets, can be the final stage of
a successful intelligence operation. The CIA considered one of its
greatest coups of the Cold War its release of the espionage- acquired
secret speech of Nikita Khrushchev to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1956 exposing the transgressions of the previous
regime of Joseph Stalin. Making public these deeds was meant by
the CIA to sow discord both inside the Soviet Union and to disrupt
its relations with its allies. General Alexander suggested that Putin
might similarly be “looking to capitalize on the fact that [Snowden’s]
actions are enormously disruptive and damaging to US interests.”
This potential gain, if Alexander’s assessment is correct, provided
Putin with an additional reason to have his representatives in Hong
Kong offer Snowden exfiltration.
Snowden was in no position to refuse. After the release of the
video, there was no going back to America without his facing a
determined criminal prosecution. He would have known that in
almost every prior case intelligence workers who had intentionally
released even a single classified document had gone to prison. As his
Internet postings show, he had closely followed the ordeal of Bradley
Manning, whose trial was coming to its conclusion while Snowden
was in Hong Kong. Manning had been kept in solitary confinement
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 164
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Question of When | 165
under horrific conditions for over a year while awaiting his trial and
was facing a long prison sentence. There was no reason for Snowden
to expect a better outcome for himself if he returned to the United
States or was arrested anywhere else that had an extradition treaty
with the United States. As the Russian officials in Hong Kong would
have informed him, Russia had no extradition treaty with the United
States. It was also one of the few places in the world that he could
reach from Hong Kong without flying through airspace in which he
might be intercepted by a U.S. ally. Snowden was told he could take
the direct Aeroflot flight to Moscow without a valid passport or visa.
That Snowden’s alternative to going to Russia was going to prison
gave the Russians considerable leverage in Hong Kong. The Russian
“diplomats” could have used this leverage to extract a quid pro
quo. The price of admission might have meant putting himself in the
hands of Russian intelligence and telling it all he knew.
The Moscow Scenario
The final possibility is that Snowden did not come under Russian
control until after he arrived in Moscow. After assessing the negative
attitude that Snowden expressed toward government authority
on the video that was released by The Guardian, the Russian “diplomats”
in Hong Kong might have concluded that Snowden could bolt
if too much pressure was exerted on him there. The Russians could
afford to be patient. They knew that Interpol and the United States
would be pursuing Snowden throughout the world and that he had
no valid travel documents and that his credit cards had been frozen.
They would likely know that Sarah Harrison had arranged his flight
to Moscow on June 23. So they had no urgent need to apply pressure
on him before his plane landed in Russia.
After the Russians took him in a “special operation” from the
plane at the airport, he was informed by Russian authorities that
he would not be allowed to go to Cuba, Venezuela, Iceland, Ecuador,
or any other country without the permission of Russian officials,
which would not be immediately forthcoming. He was now at the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 165
9/29/16 5:51 PM
166 | how america lost its secrets
mercy of the Russian authorities. There was good reason for keeping
him in a virtual prison in Russia. “He can compromise thousands
of intelligence and military officials,” Sergei Alexandrovich Markov,
the co- chairman of the National Strategic Council of Russia and an
adviser to Putin, pointed out. “We can’t send him back just because
America demands it.”
So Snowden was consigned to the transit zone of the airport,
which is a twilight zone neither inside nor outside Russia, a netherworld
that extends beyond the confines of the airport to include safe
houses and other facilities maintained by the FSB for the purposes
of interrogation and security. Stranded at the Moscow airport, no
matter what he had believed earlier in Hong Kong, Snowden would
quickly realize that he had only one viable option: seeking protection
in Russia.
Even though the FSB is known by U.S. intelligence to strictly
control the movements and contacts of former members of foreign
intelligence services in Russia, Snowden might not have realized the
full extent of the FSB’s interest in him. He naively told The Washington
Post in December 2013, in Moscow, “I am still working for
the NSA right now. They are the only ones who don’t realize it.”
Whatever he might have been thinking, a former U.S. communications
intelligence worker who stole American state secrets, such as
Snowden, would be under the FSB’s scrutiny.
Andrei Soldatov, the co- author of the 2010 book The New Nobility:
The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring
Legacy of the KGB, who was personally knowledgeable about
FSB procedures, explained the FSB would monitor “every facet of
Snowden’s communications, and his life.” General Oleg Kalugin,
who, as previously mentioned, defected from the KGB to the United
States in 1995, added that the FSB (following the standard operating
procedures of the KGB) would be “his hosts and they are taking care
of him.” Kalugin further said in 2014, “Whatever he had access to in
his former days at NSA, I believe he shared all of it with the Russians,
and they are very grateful.” This assessment was backed by Frants
Klintsevich. As the first deputy chairman of the Kremlin’s defense
and security committee at the time of Snowden’s defection, he was
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 166
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Question of When | 167
in a position to know Snowden’s contribution. “Let’s be frank,” he
said in a taped interview with NPR (in Russian), “Snowden did share
intelligence. This is what security services do. If there’s a possibility
to get information, they will get it.”
Even without Klintsevich’s comments, top American intelligence
officers had little doubt that the Russian security services would do
their job. Michael Hayden, for example, who in succession headed
three American intelligence services, was certainly in a position to
appreciate the capabilities of the Russian and Chinese intelligence
services. He told me in 2014 that he saw no other possibility than
that Snowden would be induced to cooperate in this situation, saying,
“I would lose all respect for the Russian and Chinese security
services if they haven’t fully exploited everything Snowden had to
give.” They certainly had that opportunity when Snowden spent
almost six weeks at Sheremetyevo International Airport. The FSB
controlled his access to food, lodgings, the Internet, and whatever
else he needed to survive there. If he did not cooperate, the FSB
could also return him to the United States, where in the eyes of the
Department of Justice he had betrayed the United States by stealing
secrets and taking them abroad. What recourse did Snowden have?
In a word, the FSB held all the cards but one— Snowden’s help with
the stolen documents. Even if Snowden disliked the tactics of the
Russian security services, he now had a powerful inducement not to
decline the requests of the Russian authorities.
Two weeks after his arrival, the Russian authorities provided him
with a convenient path to full cooperation with Russia. He was put
in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver- haired,
fifty- two- year- old lawyer who is known to be a personal friend of
Putin’s. Kucherena did tasks for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament,
or Duma. He had excellent connections in the Russian security
apparatus because he served on the oversight committee of the
FSB. Kucherena offered to serve as Snowden’s pro bono lawyer. On
July 12, Snowden officially retained him as his legal representative in
Moscow. In explaining the relationship, Kucherena said, “Officially,
he is my client, but at the same time, I provide a number of other
services to him.” According to Kucherena, Snowden turned down
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 167
9/29/16 5:51 PM
168 | how america lost its secrets
all requests to meet with any representative of the U.S. embassy in
Moscow. From that point on, he would act as Snowden’s go- between
with the FSB and other Russian agencies.
At the outset, Kucherena made it clear to Snowden that he would
have to play by Moscow’s rules before the Kremlin would grant him
permission to stay in Russia. To begin with, Snowden had to withdraw
any applications he had made elsewhere for asylum. He had to
put his fate entirely in the hands of Putin’s Russia. He would also
have to be fully candid with the Russian authorities on what was of
great value to Putin: the secret documents he had acquired.
Eighteen days later, Snowden received Russian identification
papers that allowed him to resettle in Moscow. He was provided
with a residence and allowed to set up a broadcasting studio in it
that he could use for Internet appearances at well- attended events
around the world, such as South by Southwest and TED. Snowden
was, according to Kucherena, also furnished with bodyguards. To
help earn his keep, he was said by Kucherena to be employed at an
unidentified Moscow cyber- security firm. To complete his resettlement,
Lindsay Mills, whom he had left behind in Hawaii, was given
a three- month visa and was allowed to temporarily live with him in
Moscow. This afforded him a lifestyle that Snowden described in an
interview as “great.”
It would strain credibility that such privileges would be awarded to
an intelligence defector who had refused to cooperate with Russian
authorities. In Snowden’s case, he was even allowed to participate in
Putin’s telethon on state- controlled television. On it, he was called
on to ask Putin if the Russian government violated the privacy of
Russian citizens in the same way that the American government
violated the rights of its citizens. Putin, smiling at Snowden’s presumably
vetted question, answered in a single word: “No.”
In the Moscow scenario, the Russians acted to advance their interests.
They gave Snowden sanctuary, support, perks, and high- level
treatment because he agreed to cooperate with them. If Snowden
had not paid this basic price of admission, either in Russia or before
his arrival, he would not have been accorded this privileged status.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 168
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 17
The Keys to the Kingdom
Are Missing
There’s a zero percent chance the Russians or Chinese have
received any documents.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2013
A
critical missing piece in the Snowden enigma is the whereabouts
of the NSA documents. Greenwald told the Associated
Press that the documents that Snowden had taken from the NSA
constituted “the instruction manual for how the NSA is built” and
that they “would allow somebody who read them to know exactly
how the NSA does what it does, which would in turn allow them to
evade that surveillance or replicate it.” Snowden, for his part, said on
camera in his Hong Kong interview in June 2013 that NSA investigators
would have “a heart attack” when they discovered the extent
of the breach.
Ledgett, the NSA official who had conducted the damage assessment,
while not having a heart attack, confirmed that Snowden had
taken a massive number of documents and among them was what
he deemed the NSA’s “keys to the kingdom.” These keys could presumably
open up the mechanism through which the United States
learns about the secret activities of other nations and, by doing so,
bring down the American signals intelligence system that had for
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 169
9/29/16 5:51 PM
170 | how america lost its secrets
sixty years monitored government communications. It had also kept
track of adversaries’ missile telemetry, submarine movements, and
nuclear proliferation.
The Snowden breach was not without precedent at the NSA.
There had been two Russian spies at the NSA during the Cold
War, Jack Dunlap and David Sheldon Boone, who took a limited
number of documents, but no one since the end of the Cold War
is known to have taken a single NSA classified document. Now an
insider had removed a vast number of the NSA’s documents. Many
of these documents were classified TS/SCI— “Top Secret, Sensitive
Compartmented Information”— which, as NSA secrets went, were
deemed the gold standard of espionage because they revealed the
sources used in communications intelligence. Whatever the assessment
of Snowden’s motivation, the single question that needed to be
answered was, what happened to these stolen files?
Recall the huge disparity between the number of documents that
the NSA calculated that Snowden compromised and the number of
documents he is known to have handed over to journalists in Hong
Kong on a thumb drive. When the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees asked the NSA how many documents Snowden took,
the NSA could not come up with a definitive number despite having
employed a world- class team of experts to reconstruct the crime. The
NSA could say that 1.7 million documents had been selected in two
dozen NSA computers during Snowden’s brief tenure at Booz Allen
in 2013, including documents from the Department of Defense, the
NSA, and the CIA. Of these “touched” documents, some 1.3 million
had been copied and moved to another computer.
There was evidence that Snowden had used preprogrammed spiders
to find and index the documents. He had said that he took the
job at Booz Allen to get access to data that he copied. So as far as the
NSA was concerned, of course, the 1.3 million documents he copied
and moved were considered compromised. On top of this haul,
Snowden had copied files while working at Dell in 2012. As a system
administrator there, he could download data without leaving a
digital trail. As previously mentioned, more than half the documents
actually published in newspapers had been taken during Snowden’s
time at Dell.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 170
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 171
Snowden’s supporters do not accept that he stole such a large number
of documents. According to Greenwald, the NSA vastly exaggerated
the magnitude of the theft in order to “demonize” Snowden.
Snowden also disputed the magnitude of the 1.7 million number. He
told James Bamford of Wired in early 2014 that he took far fewer
than the 1.7 million documents that the NSA reported were compromised.
He offered, however, no more specific details on the magnitude
of his theft. Nor did he offer Bamford any way to verify his
assertion other than to say that he had purposely left behind “a trail
of digital bread crumbs” at the NSA base in Hawaii so that the NSA
could determine which documents he “touched” but did not download.
A government official familiar with the investigation said no
such “bread crumbs” were found by the NSA.
It is possible that the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett
falsified its findings or otherwise inflated the number of documents
that Snowden stole. NSA executives might have also lied
to Congress to exaggerate the loss. But why would these officials
engage in an orchestrated deception that made them look bad? Exaggerating
the magnitude of the theft would only magnify Ledgett and
the NSA’s failure in its mission to protect U.S. secrets.
Officials had no reason to demonize Snowden for legal reasons.
He already had been. Greenwald and Poitras had already revealed
that Snowden had given them a vast number of NSA classified documents
on a thumb drive that revealed, as Greenwald put it, the “blueprints”
of the NSA. This drive contained, it will be recalled, no fewer
than 58,000 highly classified documents. In the eyes of the law, that
constituted an unprecedented breach of the laws passed to protect
communications intelligence. In any case, in Russia Snowden was
not in any jeopardy, no matter how many documents he was said to
have stolen. Interestingly, the thirty- five- page Defense Intelligence
Agency’s damage assessment reports that 900,000 Pentagon documents
compromised by Snowden were not made public. That was
only disclosed via a Vice magazine Freedom of Information request
in June 2015.
Many of the putative 1.3 million documents that the NSA says
were copied and moved were duplicate copies. Others were outdated
or otherwise useless routing data. So the quantity does not tell the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 171
9/29/16 5:51 PM
172 | how america lost its secrets
whole story. Of far more importance is the quality of some of the
data that Snowden had copied. Just a single one of these documents
could cripple not just the NSA but America’s entire multibilliondollar
apparatus for intercepting foreign intelligence. The previously
cited road map, which was thirty- one thousand pages long, listed
critical gaps in U.S. coverage of China, Russia, and other adversaries,
including those cited by President Obama’s national security team.
It was not found among the files on the thumb drive given to Poitras
and Greenwald. Nor were most of the missing Level 3 lists concerning
NSA activities in Russia and China found on the thumb drive,
even though Snowden said he had taken his final job at Booz Allen
to get access to these lists. If Snowden had not given these documents
to Poitras, Greenwald, or other journalists, where were they?
The compartment logs showed that Snowden copied and transferred
these Level 3 documents in his final week at the NSA. He
presumably had them in his possession in Hong Kong when he
arrived on May 20. On June 3, according to Greenwald, Snowden
was still sorting through the documents to determine which ones
were appropriate to give to journalists. On June 12, he told the
reporter Lana Lam in Hong Kong that he was going through the
documents, country by country, to determine which additional ones
he should pass on to journalists. Eleven days later, he departed Hong
Kong for Moscow carrying at least one laptop computer. After arriving
in Moscow, he suggested he still had NSA secrets in his possession.
“No intelligence service— not even our own— has the capacity
to compromise the secrets I continue to protect,” he wrote to the
former senator Gordon Humphrey. “I cannot be coerced into revealing
that information, even under torture.” Much of the material he
copied while working at Booz Allen remained, as far as the NSA
could determine, missing. Had he brought these files under his “protection”
to Russia?
An answer soon came from Snowden’s Moscow lawyer. On September
23, Anatoly Kucherena was extensively interviewed on the
RT channel in Russia. The interviewer, Sophie Shevardnadze, who
had a show called SophieCo, was a well- admired journalist. She is
the granddaughter of Eduard Shevardnadze, a former foreign minis-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 172
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 173
ter and Politburo member of the Soviet Union and, after the Soviet
Union broke up, the first president of Georgia. Even though she had
interviewed many top political figures in Russia, obtaining an hourlong
interview with Kucherena was a coup because, until then, he
had not discussed Snowden in a television interview.
About halfway through the interview, Shevardnadze brought
up the highly sensitive subject of the disposition of the NSA documents.
If anyone was in a position to know about these documents,
it was Kucherena. He had acted as an intermediary for Snowden
in his negotiations with Russian authorities, including the FSB. As
such, he would be privy to the status of the secret material that was
of interest to the Russian intelligence services. When I interviewed
Kucherena in Moscow in 2015, he told me that “all the reports” concerning
Snowden had been turned over to him by “Russian authorities”
in July 2013. “I had all of Snowden’s statements,” he said. If so,
he presumably knew what Snowden had told the Russian security
services.
Had Snowden come to Russia with empty hands or bearing gifts?
Shevardnadze directly asked Kucherena if Snowden had given all
the documents he had taken from the NSA to journalists in Hong
Kong. Kucherena answered her question without any evasion, saying
that Snowden had only given “some” of the NSA’s documents in
his possession to journalists in Hong Kong. He had kept the remaining
documents in his possession. That confirmed what Snowden had
told Greenwald, Poitras, and Lam in Hong Kong. Snowden told them
that he had divided the stolen NSA documents into two separate sets
of documents. One set he gave to Poitras and Greenwald on thumb
drives. The other set, which he told them he considered too sensitive
for these journalists, he retained for himself. U.S. investigators
at the NSA, the CIA, and the Department of Defense would like to
know what Snowden did with the set of documents he had retained
for himself and had not shared with the journalists in Hong Kong.
Shevardnadze, who makes it a point to drill her interviewees,
pressed Kucherena as to whether Snowden still had these NSA files,
or “material,” in Russia. The dialogue went as follows (from the
transcript supplied to me by Shevardnadze).
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 173
9/29/16 5:51 PM
174 | how america lost its secrets
shevardnadze: So he [Snowden] does have some materials that
haven’t been made public yet?
kucherena: Certainly.
Shevardnadze asked the next logical question: “Why did Russia
get involved in this whole thing if it got nothing out of it?”
“Snowden spent quite a few years working for the CIA. We haven’t
fully realized yet the importance of his revelations.” Kucherena was
on the FSB’s public oversight board. He was clearly in the picture.
Kucherena’s answer was completely consistent with the statement
Snowden made three weeks after arriving in Russia in his previously
mentioned e- mail to Senator Humphrey.
It is certainly possible that Snowden transferred the NSA files
from his own computers and thumb drives to storage on a remote
server in the cloud before coming to Russia. The “cloud” is actually
not in the sky but a term used for remote storage servers, such as
those provided by Dropbox, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and other
Internet companies. Anyone who is connected to the Internet can
store and retrieve files by entering a user name and a password.
For Kucherena to be certain Snowden had access to the so- farunrevealed
data, Snowden must have demonstrated his access either
to him or to the authorities. The Russians obviously knew Snowden
had the means to retrieve this data one way or the other. Because the
data concerned electronic espionage against Russia, the FSB would
have been keen to obtain the documents, and the FSB is not known
to take no for an answer in issues involving espionage.
Even if Snowden refused to furnish his key encryption, according
to a former National Security Council staffer, the Russian cyber
service in 2013 had the means, the time, and the incentive to break
the encryption. It is unlikely it would have had to go through the
trouble. It doesn’t take a great stretch of the imagination to conclude
that, willingly or under duress, Snowden shared his access to his
treasure trove of documents with the agencies that were literally in
control of his life in Russia.
Kucherena’s answer on the television program may also help to
explain Putin’s decision to allow Snowden to come to Moscow. It
was not a minor sacrifice for Putin. His foreign minister, Sergei Lav-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 174
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 175
rov, had spent almost six months negotiating with Hillary Clinton’s
State Department a one- on- one summit between President Obama
and President Putin. Not only would this summit be a diplomatic
coup for Russia, but also it would add to Putin’s personal credibility
in advance of the Olympic Games in Russia. In mid- June, after
U.S. intelligence reported to Obama’s national security adviser that
Snowden was in contact with Russian officials in Hong Kong, the
State Department explicitly told Lavrov that allowing Snowden
to defect to Russia would be viewed by President Obama as a blatantly
unfriendly act. As such, it could (and did) lead to the cancellation
of the planned summit. Putin knew the downside of admitting
Snowden.
But if Snowden had a large archive of files containing the sources
of the NSA’s electronic interceptions, as Snowden claimed he had in
Hong Kong, there was an enormous potential intelligence upside.
Putin had to choose between the loss of an Obama summit and
an intelligence coup. Would Putin have made the choice he did if
Snowden had destroyed, or refused to share, the stolen data?
“No country, not even the United States, would grant sanctuary
to an intelligence defector who refused to be cooperative,” answered
a former CIA officer who had spent a decade dealing with Russian
intelligence defectors. “That’s not how it works.” If so, it seems plausible
to believe that, as Kucherena said, the documents Snowden
brought to Russia explain why Russia exfiltrated him from Hong
Kong and provided him with a safe haven.
The Quickly Changing Narrative
Three weeks after Kucherena’s appearance on Shevardnadze’s show,
on October 17, Snowden had his first interview exchange with a
journalist since his arrival in Russia. It was over the Internet with
James Risen of The New York Times, as noted earlier. Snowden now
asserted a very different narrative. The subsequent front- page story,
which carried the headline “Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files
to Russia,” reported that Snowden claimed he gave all his documents
to journalists in Hong Kong and brought none of them to Russia. He
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 175
9/29/16 5:51 PM
176 | how america lost its secrets
also said that he was “100 percent” certain that no foreign intelligence
service had had access to them at any point during his journey
from Honolulu to Moscow. When I later asked Kucherena in Moscow
why Snowden changed his story in direct contradiction of what
Kucherena had stated, he said, “Wizner.”
He was referring to Ben Wizner, Snowden’s ACLU lawyer in
Washington, D.C. Wizner had joined the ACLU in August 2001
after graduating from NYU Law School and clerking for a federal
judge. At the ACLU, he became an effective foe of NSA surveillance.
“I had spent ten years before this [Snowden leak] trying to bring
lawsuits against the intelligence community,” he explained in an
interview with Forbes in 2014. Prior to the Snowden leak, he had
frequently been consulted by Poitras on government surveillance
issues (and appeared in Poitras’s 2010 documentary, The Oath). He
had also been engaged in a lawsuit aimed at exposing the NSA’s subpoenas
for Verizon records.
He had first learned about Snowden from Poitras in January
2013 while Snowden was still working for Dell at the NSA base in
Hawaii. At that time, Poitras did not know Snowden’s real name, but
she informed Wizner that she was in touch with a person identifying
himself as a senior officer in U.S. intelligence. (Poitras did not
know at that time that her source, Snowden, was lying to her about
his position.) Wizner also was shown e-mails by Poitras in which
Snowden said he had information about the government’s secret
domestic surveillance program. Wizner, according to Poitras, advised
her to stay in touch with this source.
On July 13, 2013, after Snowden asked for asylum in Russia,
Kucherena arranged an encrypted chat between Snowden and Wizner.
According to Wizner, Snowden asked him at the outset, “Do you
have standing now?” It was a question that suggested that Snowden
was aware that the ACLU needed to gain standing in federal court to
challenge the government’s alleged domestic surveillance. Up until
now, it was unsuccessful because it had no way to show it was a victim
of surveillance. The FISA order to Verizon, which Snowden had
taken had provided that standing to Wizner and the ACLU.
Aside from the opportunity Snowden offered the ACLU, Wizner
no doubt believed in the salutary benefit of Snowden’s revela-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 176
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 177
tions. When they discussed Snowden’s legal situation in America,
Snowden expressed an interest in obtaining some form of amnesty
from prosecution. Wizner was willing to attempt to explore making
a possible deal with the Department of Justice, but it would not be an
easy task, especially if Snowden had turned over NSA documents to
a foreign power.
Even to argue that Snowden was merely an NSA whistle- blower
presented a serious challenge for Wizner. The ACLU had been
involved with previous NSA whistle- blowers, but Snowden’s case
differed from those cases in important ways. Those whistle- blowers
had not intentionally taken any NSA documents. Snowden, on the
other hand, had not only taken a large number of NSA documents
but also released tens of thousands of these top secret files to journalists
based in Germany and Brazil, as well as to other unauthorized
recipients. In addition, the Whistleblower Protection Act, passed
by Congress in 1989, does not exempt an insider, such as Snowden,
who signs a secrecy oath from the legal consequences of disclosing
classified documents to journalists or other unauthorized people.
Consequently, getting some form of amnesty for Snowden required
bolstering his image as a person taking personal risks to fight for
America. But if Snowden had taken even a single top secret document
to Russia, it would strengthen the case in the court of public
opinion that he had stolen communications intelligence secrets with
the intent to damage the United States, which under the provisions
of federal law could be considered espionage. In this regard, Kucherena’s
disclosure was extremely damaging to Snowden’s position, and
Snowden had, after all, already found refuge in Russia. Snowden
had two options, according to Wizner, the “first is to be where he is
in Russia. And the second is to be in a maximum security prison cell,
cut off from the world.” These, of course, would be the options of
any espionage defector who fled to Russia.
One way to mitigate the damage was for Snowden to substitute
a new narrative. Wizner took it upon himself to screen potential
journalists and other outlets for Snowden. He told a reporter for
The New York Times that, except for Oliver Stone, all individuals
who have “met with Snowden have just gone through me, and
we’ve hooked it up.” Nor did he limit his extraordinary control to
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 177
9/30/16 11:09 AM
178 | how america lost its secrets
interviews. In the case of Stone’s movie Snowden, Wizner asked for
the right to veto any shots featuring Snowden in the film. In it, he
would tell handpicked journalists that he had given all his documents
to Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong and took none of
them to Russia. Wizner could then argue that documents such as the
FISA court order were improperly classified secret and that disclosing
them served the public good. The government might not be able
to contest his claim without further revealing NSA sources. Under
these circumstances, it might be induced to agree to a plea bargain
for Snowden. Changing the narrative would also help enhance his
public image as a whistle- blower.
Snowden’s new narrative that he had destroyed all the documents
he had in his possession before coming to Moscow and had no access
to any NSA documents, not even those that he had distributed to
journalists, was reinforced in a series of interviews that Wizner
helped arrange. “I went the first six months without giving an interview,”
Snowden later said. “It wasn’t until December 2013 that I
gave my first interview to Barton Gellman.” (Snowden did not count
his Internet exchange with Risen in October as an “interview”.)
In late December 2013, Snowden met with Barton Gellman. It was
his first face- to- face meeting with a journalist since he had arrived in
Russia in June. Snowden turned his laptop toward Gellman and, as
if proving his point, said to him, “There’s nothing on it. . . . My hard
drive is completely blank.” That his computer had no files stored on
it at that moment of course meant very little. Just six weeks earlier,
Snowden had met with the former CIA officer Ray McGovern, who
had been invited to meet him in Moscow along with three other
American whistle- blowers. At that meeting, he told McGovern that
he had stored all the NSA data he had taken on external hard drives.
Gellman asked about the precise whereabouts of the files, but, as he
reported, Snowden declined to answer that question. He would only
say that he was “confident he did not expose them to Chinese intelligence
in Hong Kong.” That answer did not nail down the issue,
so Wizner arranged for Vanity Fair, which was preparing an article
on Snowden, to submit questions. In his reply to them, Snowden
wrote that he destroyed all his files in Hong Kong because he didn’t
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 178
9/30/16 11:09 AM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 179
want to risk bringing them to Russia. He expanded on this claim in
three more interviews. These interviews were all with three journalists
who had opposed NSA surveillance: James Bamford, writing
for Wired magazine; Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian;
and Katrina vanden Heuvel, the editor of The Nation. He also gave
a televised interview to Brian Williams of NBC News in which he
explained that because he had no access to the NSA documents in
Russia, he could not provide access to the Russians even if they
“break my fingers.”
Snowden did not specify where, when, or how the putative
destruction of the files occurred and offered neither witnesses nor
evidence, other than the meaningless blank laptop screen, to corroborate
it. Still his new self- serving narrative was widely accepted
by the media. The fact remains, though, that Snowden went to considerable
risk to select, copy, and steal Level 3 documents before
leaving Hawaii for Hong Kong. These secrets were his last potential
bargaining chips. Why would he have destroyed them in June in
Hong Kong?
It is also difficult for me to accept that Snowden would destroy
these documents because he feared the Russians might get them.
If he was so concerned about the possibility, he could have stayed
in Hong Kong and fought extradition instead of flying to Russia.
Surely he must have realized that even without the files on his computer,
the Russian intelligence service could still obtain the NSA
secrets he held in his head. Indeed, as he told the Times, the secrets
he held in his head would have devastating consequences for NSA
operations.
In light of Kucherena’s statement that in Russia Snowden had
access to NSA documents, it would require a serious suspension of
disbelief to accept Snowden’s new narrative. Even if one were willing
to accept his new claim, it still would not mean that the NSA
documents had not fallen into the hands of adversaries. If he had
destroyed all of the electronic copies of the NSA’s data before boarding
his flight to Moscow, he still couldn’t be “100 percent” certain, as
he claimed, that the data had not been accessed by others prior to his
departure from Hong Kong. His files could have been copied with-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 179
9/29/16 5:51 PM
180 | how america lost its secrets
out his knowledge, just as he had copied them without the NSA’s
knowledge. As former U.S. intelligence officers pointed out to me,
adversary services could not be expected to shirk from employing
their full capabilities once they learned that an American “agent of
special services,” as Putin called him, had brought stolen NSA documents
to Hong Kong.
The Times reported from Hong Kong that two sources, both of
whom worked for major government intelligence agencies, “said
they believed that the Chinese government had managed to drain
the contents” of the laptop that Snowden brought to Hong Kong.
That China had the capability to obtain Snowden’s data was also
the view of the former CIA deputy director Morell. He said, “Both
the Chinese and the Russians would have used everything in their
tool kit— from human approaches to technical attacks— to get at
Snowden’s stolen data.”
Snowden would not have been a particularly difficult target for
them, especially after he started disclosing secrets to journalists at
the Mira hotel. Not only could the Chinese service approach the
security staff at the Mira, but they could track him after he left the
hotel and moved, along with his computers, in and out of several
residences arranged by his carer. Snowden, after all, had put himself
in the hands of people whom he had never met before, including
three Hong Kong lawyers, a carer, and three Guardian journalists.
It is likely that the efforts of these adversary intelligence services to
find him, and the NSA data, would further intensify after Snowden
revealed to the South China Morning Post on June 12 that he had
access to NSA lists of computers in China and elsewhere that the
NSA had penetrated.
It wouldn’t be only the Chinese service on his trail. The Russian
intelligence service would also likely be tasked to acquire these
NSA documents after Snowden’s meeting with Russian officials in
Hong Kong. And while he could get away with giving coy and elusive
answers to journalists who asked him about the whereabouts of
the NSA data, the Russian and Chinese officials in Hong Kong who
could offer him an escape route from prison would likely demand
more specific answers about the whereabouts of data they had not
already obtained by technical means.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 180
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 181
The Post– Hong Kong Documents
The NSA concern about who had access to its missing files deepened
further when NSA documents continued to surface in the press after
Snowden went to Moscow. If U.S. intelligence needed any further
evidence that someone had access to the documents, these additional
revelations provided it.
The most sensational of them was a purported document attributed
to Snowden concerning the NSA hacking of the cell phone of
the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. The story was published
on October 23 on the Der Spiegel website. Appelbaum was the coauthor
of the story. Even though Snowden had by now been in Russia
for four months, he was cited in the story, along with unnamed
“others,” as the source for the NSA document. Snowden did not
deny it. Indeed, he took a measure of credit for the revelation, saying
on German TV, “What I can say is we know Angela Merkel was
monitored by the National Security Agency.” If Snowden had been
involved in the release of this document, it would be consistent with
Kucherena’s assertion that he had access to the archive.
Adding to the intrigue, Poitras was apparently caught by surprise
when the Merkel story broke in Der Spiegel. She urgently texted
Snowden on what she called “background” (which ordinarily means
that a journalist will not attribute information to a source). She asked
him in the text to explain the NSA’s actions. Snowden explained to
her that Merkel was listed by her true name (and not by a code name)
in the NSA document because the German chancellor was an NSA
“target not an asset.” Presumably, Poitras would have already known
that distinction if she had the document referred to in Der Spiegel.
If the Merkel document was not among the data given to Poitras in
Hong Kong, how did it get to the authors of the Der Spiegel article?
Appelbaum, of course, had been in contact with Snowden before he
went public. He had served as Poitras’s co- interrogator of Snowden
while he was still working at the NSA in May 2013. Appelbaum
was also one of the leading supporters of WikiLeaks. Because he
was famously an advocate of revealing government secrets, it seems
unlikely that he would have delayed releasing such a bombshell
about Merkel’s phone if Snowden had given him this document
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 181
9/29/16 5:51 PM
182 | how america lost its secrets
before he left Hong Kong in June 2013. Why would Appelbaum keep
it secret for more than four months? The same pressure to publish
would also apply to the journalists Snowden had dealt with in Hong
Kong. If Snowden had given Poitras, Greenwald, Lam, or MacAskill
the Merkel document, or even told them about it in their interviews
with him in Hong Kong, The Guardian would have certainly rushed
out such a scoop.
According to a source with knowledge of the Snowden investigation,
there was no document referencing any spying on Merkel’s
phone among the fifty- eight thousand documents on the thumb
drive that Snowden had given to Poitras and Greenwald in Hong
Kong. That absence would explain why Poitras had to send a text to
Snowden in Moscow to ask for an explanation after the story broke.
Further confirmation of the absence of this document in the
material Snowden provided journalists in Hong Kong comes from
James Bamford, a well- respected expert on the NSA. In the course
of researching his 2014 article on Snowden for Wired, he was given
access to all the documents Snowden gave to Poitras, Greenwald, and
Gellman. Bamford used a sophisticated indexing program to search
through the database specifically for the Merkel material. He did not
find any. He reported that no document given to journalists in Hong
Kong even mentioned Merkel. It therefore appeared that the Merkel
document was provided to Der Spiegel after Snowden went to Moscow.
If so, some party had access to NSA documents after Snowden
arrived in Russia and provided the Der Spiegel authors with the
scoop. In that context, it might not have been a pure coincidence that
Kucherena disclosed that Snowden had access to documents that he
had not given to journalists in Hong Kong shortly before just such a
document was published in Germany.
Bamford explored the possibility that there might be another person
in the NSA who was stealing documents. He wrote to Poitras
and asked her whether the Merkel document could have come from
another person in the NSA. She declined, via a letter from her lawyer,
to answer that question. But because she had not been the author of
the Der Spiegel article, and had not been given the document, there
is no reason to believe that she would know its provenance.
Documents continued to emerge years after Snowden arrived in
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 182
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 183
Moscow that were more embarrassing to America. In June 2015, the
WikiLeaks website released another putative Snowden document,
two years after he had supposedly wiped his computer clean in Hong
Kong. It revealed that the NSA had targeted the telephones of three
consecutive presidents of France— Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy,
and François Hollande.
According to a former NSA official, this document, like the 2013
Merkel material, was not among the data on the thumb drive given
to journalists in Hong Kong, which Greenwald confirmed. Greenwald
suggested to The New York Times that it might have been stolen
by another penetration in the NSA, presumably one who had
access to the same secret compartments as Snowden in 2013. Since
Greenwald and Poitras had no way of knowing about the documents
that Snowden did not give them, it is equally possible that the Russian
intelligence services obtained this document from Snowden and
later gave it to WikiLeaks. The release on Assange’s WikiLeaks site
came in the midst of NATO war games held near the Russian border,
which Putin had vehemently denounced. The accompanying article
was co- authored by Assange, who now claimed to have access to
Snowden’s NSA material. Because Assange had been in telephonic
contact with Snowden in Hong Kong, and his deputy, Sarah Harrison,
had spent five months in Moscow with Snowden in 2013, it
is certainly possible Snowden was his source. But it seems difficult
to believe that Assange waited two years before publishing because
he has made it part of his modus operandi to publish documents
immediately. Because WikiLeaks receives documents anonymously
via its Tor software, any party with access to the Snowden files
could have sent it. Subsequently, in July 2016, Assange released via
WikiLeaks a cache of politically disruptive documents from the files
of the Democratic National Committee. U.S. intelligence strongly
suspected they been stolen by the Russian intelligence services and
sent to WikiLeaks. If so, Russia made use of Assange and WikiLeaks
to exploit selected fruits of its espionage activities
Greenwald and Poitras also released belated documents. On
July 15, 2015, their web publication, The Intercept, released a
Snowden document that cited an NSA intercept of an Israeli military
communication concerning an Israeli raid in Syria on August 1,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 183
9/29/16 5:51 PM
184 | how america lost its secrets
2008. It revealed that a group of Israeli commandos killed General
Muhammad Suleiman, a top aide to President Bashar al- Assad
who had been working with North Korea to build a nuclear facility
in Syria. Israel had destroyed that facility in Operation Orchard
nearly a year earlier. Whatever the purpose of this new release of an
NSA document (which had little if anything to do with any of the
NSA’s own operations), it was not among the data that Snowden had
given Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong in 2013, according to a
source with access to the investigation. Next, on January 28, 2016,
The Intercept published data taken from a GHCQ (the British cipher
service) file furnished by Snowden revealing military intelligence
activities abroad. Specifically, it disclosed that the United States and
Britain were intercepting data from Israel’s military drones in 2008.
British intelligence had determined in 2013 that the material sent
to Greenwald via a courier did not contain such GCHQ documents.
If that is the case, then Poitras and Greenwald, like Appelbaum and
Assange, were still receiving NSA documents that Snowden had
allegedly stolen a long time after he went to Russia and claimed he
had destroyed all his files.
The NSA reportedly determined that these belated documents,
most of which concerned American allies in Germany, France, and
Israel, had been among the material copied during the Snowden
breach. They provided further reason to believe that someone still
had access to the documents that were not distributed to journalists
in Hong Kong. Kucherena’s disclosure, just before the first post–
Hong Kong release, that Snowden still had access to the NSA files
made it appear plausible that Snowden sent these documents to Der
Spiegel, WikiLeaks, and The Intercept.
A former high- ranking KGB officer I interviewed had a very different
view. He told me that in his experience an intelligence defector
to Russia would not be allowed to distribute secret material to
journalists without explicit approval by the security service tending
him. He added that this injunction would be especially true in
the case of Snowden because Putin had publicly enjoined him from
releasing U.S. intelligence data. The more plausible alternative was
that this material was released at the behest of the Russian intelligence
service.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 184
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing | 185
The mystery of the post– Hong Kong documents also intrigued
members of the U.S. intelligence community with whom I discussed
it. When I asked a former intelligence executive about the ultimate
source for the Merkel story, he responded, “If Snowden didn’t give
journalists this document in Hong Kong, we can assume an intermediary
fed it to Appelbaum to publish in Der Spiegel.” According
to him, the NSA investigation had determined that Snowden indeed
had copied an NSA list of the cell phone numbers of foreign leaders,
including the number of Merkel. This list became the basis of the
Der Spiegel story.
It was also clear that Snowden gave credence to the release in Moscow.
He made a major point about the hacking of Merkel’s phone
in an interview with Wired in 2014. Just about two weeks before
the leak, Kucherena said Snowden still had access to the documents.
Clearly, someone had access. But whoever was behind it, the release
of information about the alleged bugging of Merkel’s phone resulted
in badly fraying U.S. relations with Germany in the midst of developing
troubles in Ukraine. As it later turned out, according to the
investigation of the German federal prosecutor, which concluded in
2015, there was no evidence found in this document, or elsewhere,
that Merkel’s calls were ever actually intercepted. Although they
revealed little if anything that the intelligence services of Germany,
France, and Israel were not already aware of, they raised a public
outcry in allies against NSA surveillance, and the outcry became the
event itself.
While these post– Hong Kong documents had little if any intelligence
value, they provided further evidence that at least part of
the stolen NSA documents was in the hands of a party hostile to the
United States. If so, it wasn’t much of a leap to assume that this party
also had access to the far more valuable Level 3 documents revealing
the NSA’s sources and methods, such as the one that Ledgett had
described as a “roadmap” to U.S. electronic espionage against Russia
and China.
Within the intelligence community, this concern was heightened
by new countermeasures to this espionage employed by Russia and
China after Snowden reached Moscow. For example, there were
indications that the NSA had lost part of its capabilities to follow
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 185
9/29/16 5:51 PM
186 | how america lost its secrets
Russian troop movements in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. U.S.
intelligence officials even went so far as to suggest, according to a
report in The Wall Street Journal, that “Russian planners might
have gotten a jump on the West by evading U.S. eavesdropping.”
Britain also discovered that some of its secret operations had been
compromised after Snowden went to Moscow. According to a 2015
story in the Sunday Times of London, British intelligence had determined
that Britain’s intelligence- gathering sources had been exposed
to adversary services by documents that Snowden had stolen from
the NSA in 2013. These documents had been provided to the NSA
by the GCHQ. Unless such intelligence disasters were freak aberrations,
it appeared to confirm General Alexander’s warning in 2014
that the NSA was “losing some of its capabilities, because they’re
being disclosed to our adversaries.”
Snowden’s supporters disputed this view. If only as an act of faith
in Snowden’s personal integrity, they continued to believe his avowal
to Senator Humphrey that he had acted to protect U.S. secrets by
shielding them from adversary intelligence services after he took
them abroad. They also continued to take him at his word when he
said he had destroyed all the NSA documents before going to Russia.
Despite such protestations of patriotic loyalty, U.S. intelligence
officials could not so easily dismiss the possibility that the missing
documents still existed. After all, a U.S. intelligence worker who is
dedicated to protecting America’s secrets from its adversaries does
not ordinarily steal them.
The NSA, the CIA, and the Department of Defense therefore
had little choice but to assume the worst had happened: Russia and
China had obtained access to the “keys to the kingdom.” Whatever
the extent of the actual damage, it was up to Alexander’s replacement,
Admiral Michael Rogers, both to restore morale and to rebuild
the capabilities of America’s electronic intelligence in the wake of
the massive breach. According to a national security staff member
in the Obama White House, that job would take more than a decade.
The NSA had failed to protect vital assets. This intelligence failure
did not happen out of the blue.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 186
9/29/16 5:51 PM
c h a p t e r 18
The Unheeded Warning
The NSA— the world’s most capable signals intelligence organization,
an agency immensely skilled in stealing digital data— had
had its pockets thoroughly picked.
— cia deputy director michael morell, 2015
In april 2010, the CIA received a stark reminder of the ongoing
nature of Russian espionage. It came in the form of a message
from one of its best- placed moles in the Russian intelligence service.
This surreptitious source was Alexander Poteyev, a fifty- four- yearold
colonel in the SVR, which was the successor agency to the first
chief directorate of the KGB. While the FSB took over the KGB’s
domestic role in 1991, the SVR became Russia’s foreign intelligence
service. Its operation center was in the Yasenevo district of Moscow.
The CIA had recruited Poteyev as a mole in the 1990s when he had
been stationed at the Russian embassy in Washington, D.C. That it
could sustain a mole in Moscow for over a decade attested to its capabilities
in the espionage business. After he returned to Moscow, still
secretly on the CIA’s payroll, he became the deputy chief of the SVR’s
“American” section. This unit of Russian intelligence had the primary
responsibility for establishing spies in the CIA, the FBI, the
NSA, and other American intelligence agencies.
The SVR’s last known (or caught) mole in U.S. intelligence was
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 187
9/29/16 5:51 PM
188 | how america lost its secrets
the CIA officer Harold Nicholson, in 1996. Before it could expand its
espionage capabilities, it needed to build a network of Russian agents
in the United States. For this network, it needed to groom so- called
illegals, or agents who were not connected to the Russian embassy.
This so- called illegals network was necessary because presumably
all Russian diplomats, including the so- called legal members of Russian
intelligence, were under constant surveillance by the FBI.
Advances in surveillance technology in the twenty- first century
made it increasingly difficult to communicate with recruits through
its diplomatic missions. To evade it, the “American” division of the
SVR was given the task of placing individuals in the United States
disguised as ordinary Americans. Their “legend,” or operational
cover, could be thin because they would not be applying for jobs in
the government. Their job was simply to blend in with their community
until they were called upon by the “American” department
in Moscow to service a mole who had been planted in U.S. intelligence
or other parts of the U.S. government. Until they were activated
by such a call, they were classified as sleeper agents. Unlike the
SVR’s “legal” officers, who were attached to Russian embassies as
diplomats and were protected from arrest by the Treaty of Vienna,
the SVR’s illegal agents lack diplomatic immunity. According to
Pavel Sudoplatov, who defected from the KGB in the Cold War, the
sole job of such sleeper agents was to “live under cover in the West
awaiting assignments for the Center.” One assignment that justifies
the expense of maintaining such agents is to service a penetration,
after one is made, in the U.S. intelligence establishment. While waiting
to be activated for such a job, sleeper agents were instructed to
build every detail of their cover identity so as to perfectly blend in
with Americans.
To build this American network of sleeper agents took the better
part of a decade. In 2005, the SVR’s “American” section in Moscow
had begun methodically installing them in the United States.
Almost all were Russian citizens who had assumed new identities to
better blend into their communities.
The CIA learned of this sleeper program through Poteyev soon
after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I
was writing my book on international deception, James Jesus Angle-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 188
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Unheeded Warning | 189
ton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services
requires understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition
to them.” His view, though his opponents inside the CIA would
call it with some justification an obsession, was that an intelligence
service had to focus on the moves of its rivals. To accomplish this
“business” in the first decade of the twenty- first century, the CIA
had to establish why its new opposition, the SVR, was laying the
foundation for an espionage operation. What were its priorities in
the resumption of the intelligence war? Its inside man in the SVR,
Poteyev, provided it with a tremendous advantage in this relationship.
He knew the links in a sleeper network that the SVR believed
was safely hidden from surveillance. If they were followed, when
they were activated, they could expose whatever recruits the SVR
had in the American government. The CIA duly shared this information
about the sleeper ring with the FBI, which had the responsibility
for the surveillance of foreign agents in the United States.
The FBI, for its part, kept the Russian sleeper agents under tight
surveillance— an operation that grew in complexity and expense as
more SVR agents arrived in the United States.
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Poteyev was following the unfolding
operation. Part of his SVR job was to continue preparing these
“Americans,” as they were called by the SVR, for their assignments.
Some had been sent as couples, others as singles. One of the singles
that Poteyev personally handled was Anna Kushchyenko. She
was a strikingly beautiful Russian student who changed her name
to Anna Chapman by briefly marrying a British citizen she met at
a rave party. After taking his name, she left him. After completing
her training in Russia, she was sent by the SVR to New York City
to establish herself as an international real estate specialist. Other
“Americans” under Poteyev’s watch became travel agents, students,
and financial advisers. In all, Poteyev identified to the CIA twelve
such sleeper agents. The cost of FBI surveillance of them over the
years became sizable. According to a former FBI agent, around- theclock
surveillance on the movements and communications of a single
individual can cost over $10,000 a day.
When the CIA received Poteyev’s message in 2010 warning that
Russian military intelligence had asked the SVR to activate some of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 189
9/29/16 5:51 PM
190 | how america lost its secrets
its sleeper agents for a highly sensitive assignment, that suggested
Russian intelligence had found a possible source who could supply
it with valuable information. According to a former CIA intelligence
official who later became involved in the case, the assignment
involved preparing these agents to service a potential source in the
NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland. If true, it suggested that Russian
intelligence either had found or was working on a means of penetrating
the NSA.
In 2010, the NSA division that handled such security and espionage
threats reportedly initiated a counterespionage probe at the
NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters. According to a former NSA official,
“They [were] looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA [was]
convinced resided at Fort Meade and possibly other DoD Intel offices,
like DIA.” Because the NSA’s cryptological service had in 2010
thirty- five thousand military and civilian contractor employees, the
search for a possible leak was no easy matter. According to a subsequent
note in the NSA’s secret budget report to Congress, it would
require “a minimum of 4,000 periodic investigations of employees
in position to compromise sensitive information” to safely guard
against “insider threats by trusted insiders who seek to exploit their
authorized access to sensitive information to harm U.S. interests.”
According to a former executive in the intelligence community,
that amount of investigation far exceeded the budgetary capabilities
of the NSA. So while the investigation found no evidence of
SVR recruitment, it remained possible that Russian intelligence had
found a candidate in the NSA.
Meanwhile, in June 2010, to preempt such a leak in U.S. intelligence
and avoid any potential embarrassment that could result, the
FBI decided it could no longer engage in this sort of an intelligence
game with the sleeper network. It arrested all twelve sleeper agents
identified by Poteyev. After receiving a great deal of public attention
(which led to their inspiring the FX series The Americans), the
sleeper agents were deported to Russia. This move had both advantages
and disadvantages. The main advantage was that it severed any
communication link between the putative person of interest in the
NSA and Russian intelligence via the sleeper agents. The main disadvantage
was that it eliminated the possibility that FBI surveillance
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 190
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Unheeded Warning | 191
of the illegals might lead the FBI to a possible recruit in the NSA or
elsewhere.
The preemptive arrests also had an unforeseen consequence.
They resulted in accidently compromising Poteyev. When Chapman
returned to Moscow after a spy exchange, she was taken to
a well- publicized dinner with Putin. Afterward, she informed her
debriefer at the SVR that only Poteyev had been in a position to
know the password that an FBI agent had used to try to deceive
her into believing she was speaking to an SVR officer. This brought
Poteyev under immediate suspicion. Tipped off by the CIA to the
FBI’s error, Poteyev managed to escape by taking a train from Moscow
to Belarus, where the CIA exfiltrated him to the United States.
Poteyev had been saved from prison— or worse— but he was no longer
useful to the CIA as a mole. Without the services of Poteyev in
the SVR in Moscow, U.S. intelligence was unable to find out further
details about the mission to which Poteyev’s sleeper agents were to
be assigned. All it had discovered was the history of the preparations
for a major espionage revival. It now knew that the SVR had
installed plumbing in America and that one or more agents in this
network had been activated to handle a possible recruit in the NSA.
But without anyone left in the sleeper network to follow and without
an inside source in the SVR, it had no further avenues to fruitfully
pursue. The revelation of the sleeper agents had little if any
other intelligence value.
The NSA’s own security investigation turned up no evidence of a
leak at Fort Meade in 2010. That of course doesn’t mean there hadn’t
been one. The Russian intelligence service had demonstrated in the
past that it was well schooled in covering its tracks in operations
against U.S. communications intelligence. For example, CIA counterintelligence
had learned from a KGB defector in the early 1960s
that Russian intelligence had penetrated the cipher room at the U.S.
embassy in Moscow and, because of this operation, the KGB was able
to decipher crucial communications. Even so, it failed to find either
the perpetrator or any evidence of his existence for more than half
a century. The operation was only definitively revealed by the Russian
spymaster Sergey Kondrashev in 2007. Tennent Bagley, who
headed the CIA’s Soviet bloc counterintelligence at the time, lately
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 191
9/29/16 5:51 PM
192 | how america lost its secrets
wrote in his book that the ability of Russian intelligence to conceal
this penetration for more than half a century “broke the record for
secret keeping.”
This Russian ability to penetrate U.S. intelligence was not entirely
defeated by America’s implementation of more sophisticated security
procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive
background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it,
the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of
false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the
Cold War in the late 1980s through the mid- 1990s. It found Russia
had dispatched at least half a dozen double agents who provided
misleading information to their CIA case officers.
Because the KGB operation went undetected for nearly a decade,
the disinformation prepared in Moscow had been incorporated into
reports (which had a distinctive blue stripe to signify their importance)
that had been provided to Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush,
and Bill Clinton. Even more shocking, in tracing the path of this
disinformation, the inspector general found that the “senior CIA
officers responsible for these reports had known that some of their
sources for this information were controlled by Russian intelligence,”
yet they did not inform the president and officials receiving
the blue- striped reports that they included Russian misinformation.
What the CIA director John Deutch called “an inexcusable lapse”
also reflected a form of institutional willful blindness in U.S. intelligence,
borne out of a bureaucratic fear of career embarrassment so
well described in Le Carré’s spy novels. Detecting intelligence failures
has, if anything, become even more difficult in the age of the
anonymous Internet.
The Snowden breach demonstrated the NSA had few if any failsafe
defenses against would- be leakers of communications intelligence.
In the new domain of cyber warfare, conventional defensive
rules do not apply. “There are no rivers or hills up here. It’s all flat.
All advantage goes to the attacker,” General Hayden said in an interview
in 2015 with the publisher of The Wall Street Journal. His point
was that because there are no defensive positions, the United States
in cyber warfare must rely on an aggressive offensive. If fully successful,
such an offensive would so deeply penetrate the defenses of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 192
9/29/16 5:51 PM
The Unheeded Warning | 193
an adversary’s intelligence organization that it could not mount any
of its own surprise cyber attacks. It would also make it difficult if not
impossible for adversary services to recruit a spy in the NSA. For
example, the CIA penetration of the SVR in 2010 prevented it from
using its sleeper network against U.S. targets. “The best defense
in this game may be an overwhelming offensive,” a former intelligence
official said to me. “But that strategy only works if we can
keep secret sensitive sources.”
Central to this offensive strategy was the NSA’s National Threat
Operations Center in Oahu. It employed threat analysts to surreptitiously
monitor the secret activities of potential enemies, mainly
China, Russia, and North Korea. A large part of their job was to
make transparent to the United States the hostile activities of the
Russian and Chinese services so that they posed little if any intelligence
threat to America. This strategy worked so long as the NSA
guarded itself, but it also raised the issue, as the Roman Juvenal
famously warned, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (Who will guard
the guards themselves?)
Less than three years after the NSA had received the Poteyev
warning, instead of guarding secrets, Snowden stole them. Despite
all the measures the NSA had taken to protect its vital secrets, a
lowly civilian employee had walked away with the lists of secret
NSA sources in China and Russia and then gone first to China and
then to Russia. In the hands of their intelligence services, these stolen
lists had the potential to totally upend the NSA’s offensive strategy.
Because Russia and China have an intelligence treaty for sharing
such spoils between them when it is to their mutual advantage, it
had to be assumed that if either country had acquired the secrets
from Snowden, they would be shared between them, altering the
balance of power between the communications intelligence services
of the United States and its adversaries.
Following the Snowden breach, both China and Russia had
immense successes in breaking through the defenses of U.S. government
networks, including the reported breaches in 2014 and 2015 of
U.S. personnel files and background checks. When I asked General
Hayden in June 2015 if these successes were made easier by those
documents compromised by Snowden, he replied, “Even though I
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 193
9/29/16 5:51 PM
194 | how america lost its secrets
cannot make a direct correlation here, unarguably our adversaries
know far more about how we collect signals intelligence than they
ever did before [Snowden].”
If Snowden could cause such massive damage, so could other civilian
trainees at the NSA. Someone in the chain of command had to
take responsibility. General Alexander tendered his resignation on
June 30, 2013. “I’m the director,” he said, falling on his sword. “Ultimately,
I’m accountable.” Because President Obama did not want
the head of the NSA resigning in the midst of the Snowden crisis,
he asked him to stay on for another six months. He then appointed
Rogers to be his replacement. Meanwhile, it had become undeniably
clear to the review committee appointed by President Obama in
2013 that the NSA’s own defenses had catastrophically failed. If so,
this change was the equivalent of rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic after it hit the iceberg.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 194
9/29/16 5:51 PM
part three
THE GAME OF NATIONS
I learned that just beneath the surface there’s another world,
and still different worlds as you dig deeper.
—david lynch, on his 1986 film, Blue Velvet
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 195
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 196
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 19
The Rise of the NSA
There are many things we do in intelligence that, if revealed,
would have the potential for all kinds of blowback.
— james clapper, director of national intelligence, 2013
In the game of nations, which often is not visible to public
scrutiny, the great prize is state secrets that reveal the hidden
weaknesses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most important
of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just
such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the
spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage
in this subterranean competition was its undisputed dominance in
the business of obtaining and deciphering the communications of
other nations. The NSA was the instrument by which the United
States both protected its own secret communications and stole the
secrets of foreign nations. The NSA, however, has an Achilles’s heel:
It is dependent on civilian computer technicians who do not necessarily
share its values to operate its complex system. Because of this
dependence, it was not able in 2013, as it turned out, to protect its
crucial sources and methods.
Snowden exposed this vulnerability when he walked away with
the aforementioned descriptions of the gaps in America’s coverage
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 197
9/30/16 8:13 AM
198 | how america lost its secrets
of the communications of its adversaries. Even though the Cold War
had been declared over after the collapse of the Soviet Union a quarter
of a century earlier, the age- old enterprise of espionage did not
end with it. Russia and China still sought to blunt the edge that the
NSA gave the United States. The Snowden breach therefore needs to
be considered in the context of the once and future intelligence war.
The modern enterprise of reading the communications of other
nations traces back in the United States to military code- breaking
efforts preceding America’s entry into World War I. The invention
of the radio at the end of the nineteenth century soon provided the
means of rapidly sending and getting messages from ships, submarines,
ground forces, spies, and embassies. These over- the- air messages
could also be intercepted from the ether by adversaries. If they
were to remain secret, they could not be sent in plain text. They
had to be sent in either code, in which letters are substituted for one
another, or, more effectively, a cipher, in which numbers are substituted
for letters. Making and breaking codes and ciphers became
a crucial enterprise for nations. By 1914, the U.S. Army and Navy
had set up units, staffed by mathematicians, linguists, and crossword
puzzle solvers, to intercept and decode enemy messages. After the
war had ended in 1918, these units were fused into a cover corporation
called the Code Compilation Company, which moved to new
offices on Thirty- Seventh Street and Madison Avenue in New York
City.
Under the supervision of the famous cryptographer Herbert O.
Yardley, a team of twenty code breakers was employed in what was
called the Black Chamber. Yardley arranged for Western Union,
which had the telegraph monopoly in America, to provide the Black
Chamber with all the telegrams coming into the United States. “Its
far- seeking eyes penetrate the secret conference chambers at Washington,
Tokyo, London, Paris, Geneva, Rome,” Yardley wrote about
the Black Chamber. “Its sensitive ears catch the faintest whispering
in the foreign capitals of the world.” But in 1929, at the instructions
of President Herbert Hoover, Secretary of State Henry Stimson
closed the Black Chamber, saying famously, “Gentlemen should not
read each other’s mail.”
The moratorium did not last long. With war looming in Asia and
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 198
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Rise of the NSA | 199
Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reactivated the operation
as the Signal Security Agency. It proved its value in breaking the
Japanese machine- generated cipher “Purple.” In June 1942, using
deciphered Japanese messages to pinpoint the location of the Japanese
fleet at Midway, America won a decisive naval victory in the
Pacific. Germany’s Enigma encoding machines, with three encoding
wheels, proved more of a challenge. Initially, British cryptanalysts
led by the brilliant mathematician Alan Turing succeeded in building
a rudimentary computer to decipher Germany’s messages to its
submarines and bombers, but in 1942 Germany added a fourth set of
encoding wheels, escalating what was essentially a battle of machine
intelligence. The U.S. Navy then contracted with the National Cash
Register Company to build a computing machine capable of breaking
the improved Enigma, and in May 1943 it succeeded.
By the time the war ended in 1945, the United States had over
one hundred giant decryption machines in operation. This unrivaled
capability to read the communications of foreign nations, which
remained one of America’s most closely guarded secrets, was transferred
to the Army Security Agency based at Fort Meade, Maryland.
Then, on October 24, 1952, President Harry S. Truman greatly
expanded its purview and changed its name to the National Security
Agency.
The NSA was given two missions. The first one was protecting
the communications of the U.S. government. The main risk was that
the Soviets would find a way of breaching U.S. government channels
of communications. The second mission was intercepting all the
relevant communications and signals of foreign governments. This
latter mandate included the governments of allies as well as enemies.
The president, the other intelligence services, and the Department
of Defense deemed what was relevant for national security. Even
though the NSA remained part of the Department of Defense, its
job went far beyond providing military intelligence. It also acted as
a service agency to other American intelligence services. They prepared
shopping lists of foreign communications intelligence targets
for the NSA to pursue.
As the Cold War heated up in the 1960s, the NSA provided intelligence
not only to the Pentagon but to the Department of State, the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 199
9/30/16 8:13 AM
200 | how america lost its secrets
Central Intelligence Agency, the Treasury Department, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and the FBI. With a multibillion- dollar “black
budget” hidden from public scrutiny, the NSA’s technology directorate
invested in state- of- the- art equipment, including supercomputers
that could break almost any cipher, antennas mounted on geosynchronous
satellites that vacuumed in billions of foreign telephone
calls, and other exotic capabilities. It also devised stealthy means of
breaking into channels that its adversaries believed were secure. This
enterprise required not only an army of technical specialists capable
of remotely intercepting even the faintest traces of electromagnetic
signals, hacking into computers, and eavesdropping on distant conversations
but also special units called “tailored access operations,”
to plant listening devices in embassies and diplomatic pouches. The
NSA also organized elaborate expeditions to give access to or even
penetrate physical cables in enemy territory. In 1971, for example,
the NSA sent a specially equipped submarine into Russia’s Sea of
Okhotsk in Asia to tap through Arctic ice. The target was a Russian
cable four hundred feet below the surface that connected the Russian
naval headquarters in Vladivostok with a missile testing range.
In 1980, President Ronald Reagan gave the NSA a clear mandate
to expand its interception of foreign communications. In Executive
Order 12333, he told the NSA that “all means, consistent with applicable
Federal law and this [Executive] order, and with full consideration
of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain
reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its
interests.” It did not restrict any foreign country, either an adversary
or an ally, from its surveillance.
The NSA’s target soon became nothing short of the entire electromagnetic
spectrum. “We are approaching a time when we will
be able to survey almost any point on the earth’s surface with some
sensor,” Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former director of central
intelligence, wrote in 1985. “We should soon be able to keep track
of most of the activities on the surface of the earth.” Bobby Ray
Inman, a former director of the NSA and deputy director of the CIA,
argued that the “vastness of the [American] intelligence ‘take’ from
the Soviet Union, and the pattern of continuity going back years,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 200
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Rise of the NSA | 201
even decades,” greatly diminished the possibility of Soviet deception
so long as the NSA kept secret its sources.
The NSA did not rely entirely on its own sensors for this global
surveillance. It also formed intelligence- sharing alliances with key
allies. The most important was with the British code- breaking service,
GCHQ, which had achieved enormous success in World War II
in using computers to crack the German Enigma cipher. This alliance
expanded to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in the socalled
Five Eyes Alliance. Because over 80 percent of international
phone calls and Internet traffic passed through fiber- optic cables in
these five countries, the alliance had the capability of monitoring
almost all phone and Internet communications.
The NSA also established fruitful liaisons with the cyber services
of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Israel,
Japan, and South Korea, which were often willing to provide the
NSA with access to telecommunications links in their countries.
These long- term allies greatly strengthened the NSA’s hand in other
ways in the intelligence war. For example, the so- called James Bond
provision of the British Intelligence Services Act of 1994 allowed
officers of the GCHQ to commit illegal acts outside Britain, including
planting devices to intercept data from computer servers, cell
phones, and other electronic targets. And, as Snowden’s release of
documents revealed in 2013 and 2014, these foreign allies fully
shared their information with the NSA.
Of course, the liaison between the NSA and its allies was a twoway
street. In 2013, none of these other countries had a global network
of geosynchronous sensors in outer space and under the ocean
that could monitor signals from missile launching, submarines,
military deployments, nuclear tests, and other matters of strategic
importance to them. Nor did these allies have the cipher- breaking
capabilities of the array of NSA supercomputers. The NSA had
assiduously built these means at a cost of over half a trillion dollars
and employed tens of thousands of linguists who could translate
almost any dialect or language of interest.
Even though these allies had their own cipher services and local
capabilities, they depended on the NSA to provide them with a large
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 201
9/30/16 8:13 AM
202 | how america lost its secrets
share of their signals intelligence. From the perspective of defending
themselves from potential threats, the deal that these allies had with
the NSA was mutually advantageous.
The NSA’s overseas intelligence gathering was not limited to
adversary nations. With the exception of the Five Eyes allies, it
gathered data that was deemed important by the president and the
Defense Department in friendly countries. These operations had
been approved by every American president and funded by every
American Congress since 1941. After all, even in the realm of allies,
activities take place that run counter to American interests. The 9/11
conspiracy, for example, was hatched in Hamburg, Germany, and
financed in Dubai and Saudi Arabia.
Nor were American allies unaware of the reach of the NSA. “Yes,
my continental European friends, we have spied on you. And it is
true we use computers to sort through data by using keywords,”
the former CIA director James Woolsey wrote in The Wall Street
Journal in 2000. “Have you stopped to ask yourselves what we are
looking for?” Whether or not it was appreciated by other countries,
the global harvesting of communications intelligence by the NSA
was hardly a secret.
As the NSA expanded further, it delegated part of its work to
regional bases, including ones in Utah, Texas, Hawaii, and Japan. The
paramount task of the NSA remained monitoring the channels of
communications that an adversary might use. The vast proliferation
of these channels in cyberspace, which included e- mail, social
media, document sharing, and other innovations of the Internet age,
greatly complicated this task. Even so, this challenge was not insurmountable,
because most of the Internet actually traveled through
fiberglass landline cables that crossed the territories of the United
States, Britain, and Australia. So the NSA found the technical means,
including voluntarily gaining access to major Internet companies, to
“harvest” vast amounts of this Internet data. America’s other intelligence
agencies quickly recognized the value of the communications
intelligence gleaned from foreign telecommunications. John E.
McLaughlin, who was the CIA’s acting director in 2004, described
the NSA as nothing less than the “very foundation of U.S. intelligence.”
It served as a “foundation” for the CIA because intercepted
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 202
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Rise of the NSA | 203
communications intelligence allowed the CIA (and other U.S. intelligence
services) to test and verify the reports of their human sources
in foreign countries. Moreover, because of the immense amount of
foreign data that the NSA vacuumed in through its global sensors,
it provided the CIA with an effective means for discovering new
targets in adversary nations.
By the first decade of this century, the NSA’s surreptitious efforts
to render the Internet transparent to U.S. intelligence had earned it
a new set of enemies. They were the previously mentioned hacktivists
who were attempting to shield the activities of Internet users
from the intrusions of government surveillance. They employed
both encryption and Tor software to defeat that surveillance. But the
NSA did not conceal that it was intent on countering any attempt to
interfere with its surveillance of the Internet. It built back doors into
encryption and worked to unravel the Tor scrambling of IP addresses.
It made leading hacktivists targets. Brian Hale, the spokesman for
the director of national intelligence, disclosed that the United States
routinely intercepted the cyber signatures of parties suspected of
hacking into U.S. government networks.
Following the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center, the surveillance of the Internet became an integral part of
the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. In October 2001, Congress
expanded the NSA’s mandate by passing the USA Patriot Act.
As I described earlier, Section 215 of the act directly authorized
the NSA, with the approval of the FISA court, to collect and store
domestic telephone billing records. The idea was to better coordinate
domestic and foreign intelligence about al- Qaeda and other jihadist
groups. This put the NSA directly in the anti- terrorist business.
It also necessitated the NSA vastly increasing its coverage of the
Internet.
The mantra in government in this post- 9/11 intelligence world
became “connect the dots.” Congress through this act essentially
demolished the wall between domestic and foreign intelligence
when any NSA activity related to foreign- directed terrorism. It further
made the NSA a partner with the FBI in tracking phone calls
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 203
9/30/16 8:13 AM
204 | how america lost its secrets
made from phones originating outside the United States by known
foreign jihadists. If these calls were made to individuals inside, the
NSA was now authorized to retrieve the billing records of the person
called and those people whom he or she called. These traces were
then supplied to the FBI. The new duties also increased the NSA’s
need to create new bureaucratic mechanisms to monitor its compliance
with FISA court orders. Rajesh De, the NSA’s general counsel at
the time of the Snowden breach, described the NSA as becoming by
2013 “one of the most regulated enterprises in the world.” Grafted
onto its intelligence activities were layers of mandated reporting to
oversight officials. Not only did the NSA have its own chief compliance
officer, chief privacy and civil liberties officer, and independent
inspector general, but the NSA also had to report to a different set
of compliance officers at the Department of Defense, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Justice.
Additionally, the Department of Justice dispatched a team of lawyers
every sixty days to review the results of “every single tasking decision”
approved by the FISA court.
According to De, just assembling these reports involved thousands
of hours of manpower. In addition, the president’s Oversight Board
required that the NSA’s Office of the General Counsel and inspector
general supply it every ninety days with a list of every single
error and deviation from procedure made by every NSA employee
anywhere in the world, including even minor typing errors. These
requirements, according to De, inundated a large part of the NSA
legal and executive staff in a sea of red tape. Yet this regulation could
not undo surveillance programs such as the one Snowden revealed
of Verizon’s turning over the billing records of its customers to the
NSA, because the NSA was in compliance with the FISA court order
(even though, as it turned out in 2015, the FISA court might have
erred in interpreting the law).
The NSA’s focus on surveillance might have led to the neglect of
its other mission: protecting the integrity of the channels through
which the White House, government agencies, and military units
send information. This task had been made vastly more difficult
by the proliferation of computer networks, texting, and e- mails.
To protect government networks from cyber attacks, the Penta-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 204
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Rise of the NSA | 205
gon belatedly created the U.S. Cyber Command in 2009. In it, the
cyber- defense units of the army, navy, marines, and air force cyber
forces were merged together and put under the command of the
NSA director. General Keith Alexander became the first director
of this new command. One problem for the Cyber Command was
separating attacks by civilians, including criminals, hacktivists, and
anarchists, from cyber warfare sponsored and supported by adversary
states. Because foreign intelligence services often closely imitated
the tools of civilian hackers, and were even known to provide
them with hacking tools, it was not easy for the Cyber Command
to unambiguously determine if the ultimate perpetrator of a cyber
attack was state sponsored. For example, the identification of North
Korea as the principal actor behind the attack on Sony in December
2014 appeared to be a rare success, but many cyber- security experts
believed that it might be a false trail used to hide the real attacker.
Clues could be fabricated in cyberspace to point to the wrong party.
The job of the Cyber Command was to prevent such an attack. To
this end, it planted viruses on hundreds of thousands of computers
in private hands to act as sentinels to spot other suspicious viruses
that could mount such an attack. Private computers had become
a new battleground in the cyber wars. It also built a capability to
retaliate. Still, cyber attacks, which were launched through layers of
other countries’ computers, could not be unambiguously traced back
to the true perpetrator.
This escalation by the Cyber Command set the stage for expanded
forms of warfare in cyberspace. “The Chinese are viewed as the
source of a great many attacks on western infrastructure and just
recently, the U.S. electrical grid,” General Alexander said in explaining
the need for this consolidation. “If that is determined to be an
organized attack, I would want to go and take down the source of
those attacks.” The same retaliation would presumably be used
against Russia, Iran, or any other adversary. Dominance of cyberspace
itself now became part of the NSA’s mandate.
Even so, the most important job of the NSA remained intercepting
secret information from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
To this end, it had an annual budget of $12.3 billion and some thirtyfive
thousand military and civilian employees. In 2013, James Clap-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 205
9/30/16 8:13 AM
206 | how america lost its secrets
per, director of national intelligence, justified the secret intelligence
budget by saying in an open session of Congress, “We are bolstering
our support for clandestine SIGINT [signals intelligence] capabilities
to collect against high priority targets, including foreign leadership
targets,” and to develop “groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities
to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit Internet traffic.” It
was no secret to Congress, even before Snowden, that the NSA was
attempting to monitor the Internet. What was a closely held secret
before Snowden revealed it was that the NSA had found a way in
2007 to intercept Internet traffic before it was encrypted.
Through all this tumult, the heart of the NSA’s activity remained
its five- thousand- acre base at Fort Meade, Maryland. It commanded
the most powerful mechanism for intercepting communications that
the world had ever seen. No other country came close to its technology
for intercepting information. The NSA not only was able to
intercept secret information from potential adversaries but also— at
least until the Snowden breach— managed to conceal these means
from them. As long as these adversaries remained blind to the ways
in which their communications were being intercepted, deciphered,
and read by the NSA, they could not take effective countermeasures.
Consequently, the NSA had the capability to provide the president
and his advisers with continuous insights into the thinking and
planning of potential enemies.
Keeping its sources and methods secret was no easy task. The
NSA’s technicians had to deal with continuous technical challenges
to provide a seamless harvesting of data from a wide range of communication
devices, including telephones, computers, and the Internet.
It required continuous intra- agency communications between
the NSA’s own intelligence officers and a growing number of civilian
technicians. It even had its own “Wiki- style” network through which
they could discuss problems, called the NSANet. Because it could
not tightly control access to this technical network, it expunged any
mention of the sources and methods from the material circulated on
the classified NSA network. Instead, it stored them in discrete computers,
called compartments, which were disconnected from other
computers at the NSA. These compartments could only be accessed
by a limited number of analysts and NSA executives who had a need
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 206
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Rise of the NSA | 207
to know about the data they contained. These compartments were
the final line of defense against an inside intruder.
In 2009, Snowden, as we know, found his way into the NSA
through a temporary job with an outside contractor that was working
for the NSA’s Technology Directorate to repair and update its
backup system. Four years later, by maneuvering to get hired by
another outside contractor with access to the NSA’s sources and
methods, he was able to steal secrets stored in isolated computers
bearing directly on the ongoing intelligence war. Snowden also
copied from these compartments in a matter of weeks, as has been
previously mentioned, the NSA’s Level 3 sources and methods used
against Russia, Iran, and China. The Snowden breach demonstrated
that the NSA’s envelope of secrecy was at best illusory.
After this immense loss, the NSA’s sources inside these adversary
countries were largely compromised, even if they were not closed
down. Once these adversaries were in a position to know what channels
the NSA was intercepting, they could use these same channels
to mislead U.S. intelligence. A former top intelligence official told
me, “The queen on our chessboard had been taken.”
The NSA moved to mitigate the damage and find new ways of
obtaining unexpected intelligence. In June 2014, the new NSA director,
Rogers, had to confront flagging morale that, according to General
Hayden, was near paralyzing the intelligence service. Rogers
recognized that as a direct result of the Snowden breach, “the nation
has lost capabilities against adversaries right now who are attempting
to actively undermine us.” But even with that loss, he observed,
“the sky has not fallen.”
As in the Chicken Little fable he cited, the world had not ended
for the NSA. Nor had it ended for the multibillion- dollar outsourcing
enterprise it superintended. The NSA might have lost many
of its sources, or “capabilities,” but Rogers held out hope that new
sources could eventually be found to replace them. Compromised
codes, after all, could be changed. New technological methods could
be devised. New vulnerabilities could also be targeted in enemy territories.
Although repairing the damage might take many “decades,”
according to Michael McConnell, the vice- chairman of Booz Allen,
the new director had to get on with that task. McConnell, a for-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 207
9/30/16 8:13 AM
208 | how america lost its secrets
mer NSA director himself, pointed out that the NSA director’s “first
responsibility is to be the chief cheerleader.” Rebuilding the NSA
capabilities assumed, however, that there would not be another
Snowden- sized breach.
The question remained: How could the NSA’s vaunted secrecy
have been so deeply penetrated by a mere analyst in training at a
regional base in Oahu? The perpetrator himself could not be asked if
he was in Moscow pointing to the “incompetence” of the NSA in his
Moscow interviews. What was known, though, was that the young
man who had taken the “queen” from the board had gained entry to
the NSA’s secret chambers through the back door, a portal opened to
him by the NSA’s reliance on outside contractors.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 208
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 20
The NSA’s Back Door
You have private for- profit companies doing inherently governmental
work like targeted espionage, surveillance, compromising
foreign systems. And there’s very little oversight, there’s very
little review.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
Prior to snowden’s theft of NSA documents, the single most
shattering blow to the confidence of the U.S. intelligence community
was the 1994 exposure of Aldrich Ames as a long- serving
Russian mole in the CIA. Ames, it will be recalled, had been a highranking
CIA officer, working at the CIA’s Counterintelligence Center
Analysis Group, before he was arrested by the FBI. He had also
worked as a mole for Russian intelligence.
In a plea bargain to avoid a death sentence (he was sentenced to
life imprisonment), he admitted that he had successfully burrowed
into the CIA and had worked there for over nine years on behalf of
the KGB. His description of his sub- rosa activities as a mole was part
of the plea bargain. This stunning revelation shook the CIA leadership
to its core. Until then, CIA executives steadfastly denied that it
was possible that the KGB could sustain a mole in American intelligence.
The Ames arrest also led the NSA to reassess its own vulnerability
to penetration. Could there be an Ames inside the NSA?
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 209
9/30/16 8:13 AM
210 | how america lost its secrets
The question was considered by the NSA’s National Threat Operations
Center, the same unit from which Edward Snowden later
stole a huge trove of secret documents. According to a report in 1996
titled “Out of Control” (later released by the NSA), the danger of
an Ames- type penetration could not be excluded. Even though the
“threat officer” who wrote this report was not identified by name,
his analysis proved incredibly prescient. He said that the NSA’s drive
to enhance its performance by networking its computers would
result in the intelligence services’ putting “all their classified information
‘eggs’ into one very precarious basket.” The basket was the
computer networks run by technicians called system administrators.
He pointed out that the NSA was becoming increasingly dependent
on such networked computer systems, and he predicted that the
NSA’s “Aldrich Ames,” as he put it, would be a “system administrator,”
which was the position that Edward Snowden held nearly two
decades later at Dell when he began stealing secrets.
The NSA’s system administrators were, as the threat officer
pointed out, very different from the traditional military employees
at the NSA. They were usually civilians who effectively served as
repairmen for complex computer systems. Moreover, many of them
had not been directly hired by the NSA. Instead, their recruitment
had been privatized to outside contractors.
This outsourcing had deep roots tracing back to World War II. Ed
Booz and Jim Allen, the founders of Booz Allen Hamilton, obtained
contracts to help manage ship construction from the U.S. Navy.
After the war ended, they sought contracts for their firm in classified
work. These contracts grew in size as the NSA needed more
and more system administrators and other information technologists
to manage the computer networks. These system administrators
needed to be given special privileges to do their service job. One
such privilege allowed them to bypass password protection. Another
privilege allowed then to temporarily transfer data to an external
storage device while they repaired computers. These two privileges
greatly increased the risk of a massive breach. Seeing them as the
weak link in the chain, the threat officer wrote in the report that
“system administrators are likely to be increasingly targeted by for-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 210
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The NSA’s Back Door | 211
eign intelligence services because of their special access to information.”
Before the computerization of the NSA, the threat officer noted,
code clerks and other low- level NSA communicators had been the
targets of adversary intelligence services. But the increasing reliance
on computer technicians presented foreign intelligence services
with much richer targets. He predicted that they would adapt their
recruiting to this new reality. Specifically, he argued that adversary
intelligence services would now focus their attention on system
administrators. “With system administrators,” he said, “the situation
is potentially much worse than it has ever been with communicators.”
The reason, he explained, was that “system administrators
can so easily, and quickly, steal vast quantities of information.”
He further suggested that because system administrators are
often drawn from the counterculture of hacking, they are more
likely to be vulnerable to an adversary service using a fake identity
for its approach, or a “false flag.” A “false flag” was a term originally
applied to a pirate ship that temporarily hoisted any flag that would
allow it to gain proximity to its intended prey, but in modern times
it describes a technique employed by espionage services to surreptitiously
lure a prospect. False flags were a staple used by the KGB
in espionage recruitment during the Cold War. They were usually
employed when a target for recruitment was not ideologically disposed
to assisting the intelligence service. To overcome that problem,
recruiters hide their true identities and adopt a more sympathetic,
bogus one.
In 1973, the KGB, working through one of its agents in the U.S.
Navy, used the false flag of Israel to recruit Jerry Alfred Whitworth,
who served as a communications officer with a top secret clearance
for the navy. Like many other KGB recruits, Whitworth came from
a broken family, dropped out of high school, took technical courses,
and got a job as a communications officer. He was not disposed to
working for Russia. But he was willing to steal enciphered and
plain text cables to help in the defense of Israel. After he was thoroughly
compromised by his espionage work, he was told by the KGB
recruiter that he was actually working for Russia, but by this time
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 211
9/30/16 8:13 AM
212 | how america lost its secrets
he was too deeply compromised to quit. He continued his espionage
work for another eight years. (Whitworth, who was arrested by the
FBI in 1985, was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 365 years
in prison.)
The Internet provided an almost ideal environment for false flags
because its users commonly adopt aliases, screen names, and other
avatars. The threat officer explained how easy it would be for the
KGB to adapt such a false flag when dealing with a dissident system
administrator working for U.S. intelligence. As the threat officer
pointed out in his report, the KGB had used false flags in the late
1980s to surreptitiously recruit members of the “German Hanover
Hackers,” a community of anarchistic hackers who breached computer
networks for fun and profit. Until then, these hacktivists stole
corporate and private passwords, credit card information, and other
privileged documents as a form of freelance espionage. Because of
their fervent anti- authority ideology, the KGB disguised its recruiters
as fellow hacktivists. The KGB succeeded in getting the Hanover
hackers to steal log- in account identifications, source codes, and other
information from U.S. government computer networks.
The weak link of system administrators became increasingly relevant
as the NSA moved further into the digital age. By the beginning
of this century, its growing networks of computers were largely
operated by civilian technicians, including system administrators,
infrastructure analysts, and information technologists, who were
needed to keep the system running. Despite the warning by the
threat officer, the NSA became more and more reliant on these outsiders
as it reorganized to meet its new mandates for surveillance of
the Internet in the war on terrorism.
The NSA had to compete with technology companies, such as
Google, Apple, and Facebook, for the services of experienced IT
workers. Though Booz Allen had been providing technically trained
specialists to the government since the 1940s and ’50s, congressionally
imposed salary caps put the NSA at a disadvantage to private
firms in its recruitment efforts. As a result, it increasingly contracted
with private firms to find talent, especially in the rush for data-based
intelligence following 9/11. Booz Allen, to meet increased demand,
recruited civilian technicians from many unconventional areas,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 212
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The NSA’s Back Door | 213
including the hacking culture. Ex- hackers who lacked (or shunned)
employment opportunities in the corporate sector were suitable
candidates for the system administrator jobs that these firms had
contracted to supply the NSA. In the rush to expand, little heed was
paid to the 1996 warning that this hacking culture might provide
a portal to anti- government hacktivist groups. The NSA became
so enamored with this new computer technology that it neglected
the security implications of employing outsiders to service it. “All
of us just fell in love with the ease and convenience and scale [of
electronic storage],” General Hayden, who headed the NSA at the
time, said to The Wall Street Journal in 2015. “So we decided to take
things we used to keep if not in a safe, at least in our desk drawer,
and put it up here [in a computer network], where it’s by definition
more vulnerable.” Making matters even worse, as has previously
been discussed, the NSA stripped away much of the so- called stovepiping
that insulated highly sensitive data from the NSA’s other
computer networks. FBI Director Mueller, in his “Statement Before
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs,”described a decade of post–9/11 intelligence reorganization
thus: “One of the first steps was to centralize control and management
of counterterrorism operations at headquarters to avoid the
‘stove-piping’ of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual
field offices across the country.” Here the NSA was merely following
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data
more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist
attacks, but as a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became more
open to its new army of civilian technicians.
By 2013, much of the job of managing the NSA’s classified computers
had been handed over to a handful of private companies: Booz
Allen Hamilton, which handled the most highly secret work; Dell
SecureWorks; Microsoft; Raytheon; and IBM. In many respects,
these five companies acted less like management consultants and
more like temporary employment agencies in finding for the NSA
the computer specialists who had the necessary security clearances.
The NSA found that the universe of independent contractors was
governed by very different considerations from that of intelligence
services. Unlike intelligence services, their fate depended on turning
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 213
9/30/16 8:13 AM
214 | how america lost its secrets
profits. Because the value of their contracts was largely limited by
competitive bidding, their business plans were predicated on their
ability to minimize the costs of fulfilling these contracts. Their principal
cost was the salaries they paid their independent contractors.
Their business plans therefore depended on finding large numbers
of computer technicians in the private realm willing to work at an
NSA base at relatively low wages. This task became more difficult as
many potential recruits could find higher- paying employment with
more of a future in the burgeoning private sphere. But the companies
could also increase their revenue streams by getting additional
contracts, which, in turn, meant recruiting even more workers.
Such a business plan could hardly afford to give the highest priority
to the low probability of a security risk. In the private sector,
there is usually an unambiguous external measure of failure. An
automobile company such as General Motors can measure the performance
of its executives by reckoning its change in net income.
With secret intelligence work, the metrics for failure are far less
clear. This curious aspect of secret work was part of the advice given
to a White House lawyer in the Obama administration seeking a
position with the NSA in 2012, who was told that among the advantages
of working for a super-secret agency was that if one errs or
has a failure, “it stays secret.” The Snowden case showed that not all
failures stay secret.
The NSA can certainly quantify the amount of data it is intercepting,
but it obviously cannot count the intelligence that it misses. The
a priori proposition in the intelligence game is that “what is successfully
hidden is never found.” But one failure that cannot be hidden
is a security breach in which a perpetrator uses NSA data to publicly
expose the NSA’s sources.
Until the Snowden breach in 2013, the NSA had experienced only
one such public failure. It was the capture by North Korea in 1968 of
the USS Pueblo, which had been carrying out highly sensitive electronic
communications interception for the NSA. The Pueblo crew
failed to destroy the NSA’s encoding machines, which were flown
to Russia several days later. It was a horrible, costly breach. The
Snowden breach was much worse because, among the thousands of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 214
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The NSA’s Back Door | 215
documents he stole, he selected lists of the NSA’s secret sources in
adversary nations.
The Snowden breach was a failure that directly traced back to the
NSA’s largest and most trusted contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton,
calling into question the vexing issue of privatizing secret intelligence.
Booz Allen, like other private firms that did work for the government,
was in the business to make money. Indeed, it had found
government contracts so much more profitable than its work in
the private sector that it sold its private sector unit to Price Waterhouse.
The profitability of government work led the Carlyle Group’s
private equity fund to acquire a controlling stake in Booz Allen in
July 2008. By 2013, it had increased its revenue by more than $1.3
billion by expanding its government contracts. Even more impressive,
its operating profit on these contracts had doubled. It did not
need to increase its core internal staff to achieve these profits, it just
had to hire outside contractors. In 2008, Booz Allen claimed 20,000
employees on its internal staff; in 2013, it claimed fewer than 5,000.
The resulting “reduced headcount,” according to its January 30,
2013, quarterly report, greatly decreased its costs for incentive pay.
It mainly accomplished this reduction by expanding the number of
outside contractors it employed, 8,000 in these five years, by one
Wall Street analyst’s calculation. They were employed as system
administrators, infrastructure analysts, computer security specialists,
and other “geek squad” jobs at the NSA and other government
agencies. Their main qualification was their prior security clearances
(which as mentioned earlier saved Booz Allen the expense of vetting
them and also the loss of income while waiting many months for a
clearance).
Snowden therefore was highly desirable for Booz Allen from an
economic point of view. Even though he had no prior experience as
an infrastructure analyst, and he had been detected being untruthful
about his degree in computer sciences, he not only had a SCI security
clearance but was willing to take a cut in pay. In keeping with
the Booz Allen business plan, such a recruit provided another cog in
its profit machine.
Not only had the NSA outsourced much of its computer opera-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 215
9/30/16 8:13 AM
216 | how america lost its secrets
tions to private companies, but the Clinton administration in 1996
had privatized background checks for government employees
requiring security clearances. The idea, backed by Vice President
Al Gore, was to reduce the size of the federal government by outsourcing
investigating the backgrounds of millions of government
applicants for jobs. The task had previously been performed by the
FBI, but it was assumed that a profit- making business could do it
faster and more efficiently. The private company named U.S. Investigations
Services was purchased in 2007 for $1.5 billion by Providence
Equity Partners, a rapidly expanding investment firm founded
in 1989 by graduates of Duke, Brown University, and the Harvard
Business School. So like Booz Allen, USIS was backed by a hedge
fund determined to make money by systematically cutting the cost
of a service previously carried out by the government.
But such outsourcing had drawbacks. For one thing, unlike the
FBI, USIS lacked the investigative clout to gain entry to certain government
agencies. A Congressional review found that the privacy
act permits disclosure of government agency records to the private
firm if they are part of a “routine use of the records,” but intelligence
agencies did not consider all such requests to be “routine. For example,
when it did the background check on Snowden in 2011, it could
not get access to his CIA file. The “derog” in his file might have set
off alarm bells, as might the fear that he had been threatened by an
internal investigation over his alleged computer tampering in 2009.
The FBI might have learned this about Snowden if it had done his
background check.
The lack of adequate oversight was another problem. USIS closed
cases and cleared applicants without completing an adequate investigation.
According to a U.S. government suit filed in 2014, USIS
had prematurely closed over 665,000 investigations in order to get
paid for them more quickly. Because the more cases it completed
each month, the more money it received from the government, the
lawsuit alleged that USIS employees often “flushed” or ended cases
before completing a full investigation to meet corporate- imposed
quotas for getting bonuses. One employee, in an e- mail cited in the
government’s complaint, said they “flushed everything like a dead
goldfish.” As a result, some information specialists entering the NSA
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 216
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The NSA’s Back Door | 217
through the back door of outside contractors were not fully vetted.
(On August 20, 2015, USIS agreed to forfeit $30 million in fees to
settle the lawsuit.)
USIS was also open to sophisticated hacking attacks by outsiders.
In August 2014, the Department of Homeland Security’s counterintelligence
unit discovered such a massive and persistent breach
in USIS that it shut down its entire exchange of data with it. The
intrusion into USIS records in this case was attributed to hackers in
China most likely linked to the Chinese intelligence service. Such
massive intrusions dated back to 2011. USIS’s lack of security in its
website left a gaping hole through which outside parties, including
Chinese and Russian hackers, could learn both the identity and the
background information of specialists applying for jobs at the NSA.
These private companies also did not sufficiently protect the personal
data of their independent contractors working at the NSA.
The hackers’ group Anonymous took credit for the successful 2011
attack on the Booz Allen Hamilton servers. It also cracked the algorithms
used to protect employees. It next injected so- called Trojan
horse viruses and other malicious codes into Booz Allen servers
that allowed it future entry. If amateur hackers such as Anonymous
could break into the computers of the NSA’s largest contractor, so
could adversaries’ state espionage services with far more advanced
hacking tools. From these sites, China or Russia could obtain all the
job applications and personal résumés submitted to contractors such
as Booz Allen. It could then compile a list of the best candidates to
do its bidding.
These deficiencies in the private sector were compounded by
the failure of security in the government’s own Office of Personnel
Management. It used a computer system called e- QIP in which
intelligence employees, including outside contractors, updated their
computerized records to maintain or upgrade their security clearances.
For example, Snowden updated his clearance in 2011. To do
so, these employees constantly updated their financial and personal
information. As it turned out, there was a major hole in the e- QIP
system. It has repeatedly been hacked by unknown parties since
2010. In 2015, the U.S. government told Congress that China was
most likely responsible, but Russia and other nations with sophis-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 217
9/30/16 8:13 AM
218 | how america lost its secrets
ticated cyber services could have also participated in the hacking. In
any case, the records of over nineteen million employees, including
intelligence workers, became available to a hostile intelligence service.
This breach would allow hostile services to obtain a great deal
of information about independent contractors working at the NSA.
They could then use this data to follow the movements of any of
these intelligence workers they deemed of interest.
Despite all the potential flaws in it, the outsourcing system continued
in place. It even featured a revolving door through which Booz
Allen hired retiring executives from the intelligence services, such
as the former NSA director Michael McConnell; James Woolsey, a
former director of the CIA; and the retired general James Clapper,
who later served as director of national intelligence.
The cozy relationship between the private firms and the NSA
notwithstanding, the NSA leadership operated as if it were unaware
that outsourcing could create a security problem. As far back as
2005 General Hayden, then the departing head of the NSA, had
been warned of one such vulnerability in a memorandum written
by a counterintelligence officer at the NSA. Like the earlier 1996
report by the threat officer, this memorandum noted the NSA had
ceded responsibility for managing its secret systems to outsiders and
warned that the NSA’s reliance on them to manage its computers
had opened a back door into the NSA. In addition, it warned that
once an outside contractor managed to slip in through this back door,
he could easily jump from one outsourcer to another. This was what
Snowden did when he moved from Dell to Booz Allen Hamilton in
2013.
Despite its security flaws, outsourcing seemed to provide a number
of advantages to the NSA. For one thing, it provided a means for
circumventing the budget restrictions imposed by Congress on hiring
new employees. In addition, because private companies had less
rigid hiring standards, it greatly expanded the pool of young system
administrators by tapping into computer cultures that would be
antagonistic to working directly for the government. Finally, it drew
less on NSA resources. Because these information technologists
were only temporary employees, they were not entitled to military
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 218
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The NSA’s Back Door | 219
pensions, paid medical leave, and other benefits. It was a system that
effectively replaced military careerists with freelancers.
The irony of the situation was that the NSA had surrounded its
front doors with rings of barbed wire, closed- circuit cameras, and
armed guards, but for reasons of economy, bureaucratic restrictions,
and convenience it had left the back door of outsourcing open to
temporary employees of private companies, even though it might
take some time for them to gain entry to its inner sanctum.
“It was not a question of if but when one of the contractors would
go rogue,” the former NSA executive who wrote the 2015 memorandum
told me. Snowden answered that question in 2013. Even more
extraordinary than the theft itself was the reaction to it by the NSA.
It turned out that there was no cost of failure levied against the outside
contractor Booz Allen, which had employed Snowden when he
bypassed its security regime to steal the keys to the kingdom. Even
though the counterintelligence investigation showed Snowden stole
documents from compartments to which he did not have access, the
NSA did not penalize Booz Allen. Instead, its revenues and profits
from government contracts markedly increased between 2013 and
2015.
Nor did the NSA alter its reliance on private contractors. The back
door to the NSA remained wide open. Outsourcing to private companies
has become an all but irreplaceable part of the intelligence
system in America, Snowden’s actions, and the risk of future similar
actions, notwithstanding.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 219
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 21
The Russians Are Coming
The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster
of the century.
— vladimir putin
In the first invasion of a European country since the end of
the Cold War, Russian military forces moved into the Crimea and
other parts of eastern Ukraine in February and March 2014. Unlike
with previous Russian troop movements, such as those into Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany during the Cold War,
the weeklong massing of Russian elite troops and sophisticated
equipment for the move into Ukraine almost totally evaded detection
by the NSA’s surveillance. Never before had the NSA’s multibilliondollar
armada of sensors and other apparatus for intercepting signals
missed such a massive military operation. According to a report in
The Wall Street Journal that cited Pentagon sources, Russian units
had managed to hide all electronic traces of their elaborate preparations.
If so, after more than half a century of attempted penetrations,
Russia had apparently found a means of stymieing the interception
capabilities of the NSA.
Putin had firm ideas about restoring Russia’s power in the post–
Cold War era. A formidable KGB officer before he became president
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 220
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 221
of the Russian Federation in 2000, he made no secret that his goal
was to prevent the United States from obtaining what he termed
“global hegemony.” His logic was clear. He judged the breakup of
the Soviet Union in 1991 to be, as he put it, “a geopolitical disaster.”
He argued that the breakup had provided the United States with the
means to become the singular dominant power in the world.
He sought to prevent that outcome by moving aggressively to
redress this loss of Russian power. He upgraded Russia’s nuclear
force, modernized Russia’s elite military units, and greatly strengthened
Russia’s relations with China. The last measure was essential
because China was Russia’s principal ally in opposing the extension
of American dominance. Yet there was still an immense gap between
them and the United States in communications intelligence.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the NSA had continued to
build up its technological capabilities, while Russia teetered on the
edge of collapse in the early 1990s. But as previously mentioned,
the NSA’s legal mandate had been limited by Congress to foreign
interceptions (at least prior to 9/11). As a result, it was required to
separate out domestic from foreign surveillance, a massive process
that not only was time- consuming but could generate dissidence
within the ranks of American intelligence. It also could not legally
use its surveillance machinery to monitor the telephones and Internet
activities of the tens of thousands of civilian contractors who ran
its computer networks— at least not unless the FBI began an investigation
into them.
Here the Russian intelligence services had a clear advantage. They
had a lawful mandate to intercept any and all domestic communications.
In fact, a compulsory surveillance system called by its Russian
acronym SORM had been incorporated into Russian law in 1995.
It requires the FSB and seven other Russian security agencies to
monitor all forms of domestic communications including telephones
(SORM- 1), e- mails and other Internet activity (SORM- 2), and computer
data storage of billing information (SORM- 3). Not only did
Russia run a nationwide system of Internet filtering in 2013, but it
required its telecommunication companies to furnish it with worldwide
data.
The NSA also had to deal with many peripheral issues other than
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 221
9/30/16 8:13 AM
222 | how america lost its secrets
the activities of Russia and China. It was charged with monitoring
nuclear proliferation in Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea, potential
jihadist threats everywhere in the world, and much else. The
Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR, could put its limited
resources to work on redressing the gap with its main enemy: the
United States.
Nevertheless, Putin had to reckon with the reality in 2013 that
Russia could not compete with the NSA in the business of intercepting
communications. And if the NSA could listen in on all the
internal activities of its spy agencies and security regime, the ability
of Putin to use covert means to achieve his other global ambitions
would be impaired. In the cold peace that replaced the Cold War,
Russia had little hope of realizing these ambitions unless it could
weaken the NSA’s iron- tight grip on global communications intelligence.
One way to remedy the imbalance between Russian intelligence
and the NSA was via espionage. Here the SVR would be the
instrument, and the immediate objective would be to acquire the
NSA’s lists of its sources in Russia. If successful, it would be a game
changer.
Such an ambitious penetration of the NSA, to be sure, was a tall
order for Russian intelligence. Most of its moles recruited in the
NSA by the KGB had been code clerks, guards, translators, and lowlevel
analysts. They provided documents about the NSA’s cipher
breaking, but they lacked access to the lists of the NSA’s sources and
methods. These meager results did not inhibit Russian efforts. For
six decades, ever since the inception of the NSA in 1952, the Russian
intelligence service had engaged in a covert war with the NSA.
The Russian intelligence service is, as far as is known, the only
intelligence service in the world that ever succeeded in penetrating
the NSA. A number of NSA employees also defected to Moscow.
The history of this venerable enterprise is instructive.
The first two defectors in the NSA’s history were William Martin
and Bernon Mitchell. They were mathematicians working on the
NSA’s decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960.
The Russian intelligence service, then called the KGB, went to great
lengths to get propaganda value from their defections. It even organized
a ninety- minute press conference for them on September 6,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 222
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 223
1960, at the Hall of Journalists and invited all the foreign correspondents
in Moscow. Before television cameras, the defectors denounced
the NSA’s activities. Martin told how the NSA breached international
laws by spying on Germany, Britain, and other NATO allies.
Mitchell, for his part, suggested that the NSA’s practice of breaking
international laws could ignite a nuclear war. Indeed, he justified
their joint defection to Russia in heroic whistle- blowing terms,
saying, “We would attempt to crawl to the moon if we thought it
would lessen the threat of an atomic war.” The NSA review of the
case, however, assessed that little damage had been done, because the
NSA quickly changed the codes they had compromised. It noted,
“The Communist spymasters would undoubtedly have preferred
Martin and Mitchell to remain in place as moles, since their information
was dated as of the moment they left NSA.”
The next NSA defector was Victor Norris Hamilton, a translator
and analyst at the NSA. He arrived in Moscow in 1962, and like
Mitchell and Martin he claimed the status of a whistle- blower. This
time, the KGB provided a newspaper platform. Writing in the Russian
newspaper Izvestia, Hamilton revealed the extent of U.S. spying
on its allies in the Middle East.
None of these three 1960s defectors revealed what, if any, NSA
secret documents they had compromised. Nor did any of them ever
return to the United States. Martin changed his name to Vladimir
Sokolodsky, married a Russian woman, and died in Mexico City on
January 17, 1987. Mitchell vanished from sight and was reported to
have died in St. Petersburg on November 12, 2001. Hamilton, after
telling Russian authorities stories about hearing voices in his head
because of an NSA device implanted in his brain, was consigned to
Special Psychiatric Hospital No. 5 outside Moscow.
There were also KGB spies in the NSA who were caught or died
before they could defect. One of them was Sergeant Jack Dunlap.
He was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning in his garage on
July 23, 1963. Although there was no suicide note, his death was
ruled an apparent suicide. NSA classified documents were later discovered
in his house. After that, NSA investigators unraveled his
decade- long career as a KGB mole. Dunlap had been recruited by the
KGB in Turkey in 1952. The standard KGB tool kit for recruitment
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 223
9/30/16 8:13 AM
224 | how america lost its secrets
was called MICE. It stood for Money, Ideology, Compromise, and
Ego. The KGB used the first element, money, to compromise Dunlap.
After he was compromised, it exploited him by getting him to steal
NSA secrets. He had access to such secrets because he became the
personal driver to Major General Garrison Coverdale, the chief of
staff of the NSA. After Coverdale retired, he became the driver for
his successor, General Thomas Watlington. These positions afforded
him a security clearance and, even more important, a “no inspection”
status for the commanding general’s cars that he drove. This
perk allowed him to leave the base with secret documents, have them
photocopied by his KGB case officer, and then return them to the files
at the NSA base before anyone else knew they were missing. He also
used, likely at the suggestion of the KGB case officers, his “no inspection”
perk to offer other NSA employees a way of earning money.
He would smuggle off the base any items of government property
that they took. Once he had compromised them through thefts, he
was in a position to ask them for intelligence favors. This NSA ring
could not be fully investigated because of his untimely death. Other
than the packets of undelivered NSA documents found in his home,
the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB
penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered
by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death,
to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.)
The Russian intelligence services continued recruiting mercenary
spies in the NSA for the duration of the Cold War. The KGB successes
included Robert Lipka, a clerk at the NSA in the mid- 1960s,
who was caught in a sting operation by the FBI and sentenced to
eighteen years in a federal prison. Ronald Pelton, an NSA analyst,
was recruited after he retired from the NSA. After he was betrayed
by a KGB double agent in 1985, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Finally, there was David Sheldon Boone, an NSA code clerk,
who between 1988 and 1992 provided the KGB with NSA documents
in return for $60,000. Boone, sentenced to twenty- four years
in prison, was the last known KGB recruitment of the Cold War.
During the Cold War, Russian intelligence service officers operated
mainly under the cover of the embassies, consulates, United
Nations delegations, and other diplomatic missions of the Soviet
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 224
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 225
Union. As “diplomats,” they were protected from arrest by the terms
of the 1961 Treaty of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Their diplomatic cover, however, greatly limited their field for finding
potential recruits outside their universe of international meetings,
diplomatic receptions, UN organizations, scientific conferences,
and cultural exchanges. They therefore tended to recruit their counterparts
in adversary services.
In this regard, the successful entrapment of Harold Nicholson
in the 1990s is highly instructive. From his impressive record, he
seemed an unlikely candidate for recruitment. He had been a superpatriotic
American who had served as a captain in army intelligence
before joining the CIA in 1980. In the CIA, he had an unblemished
record as a career officer, serving as a station chief in Eastern
Europe and then the deputy chief of operations in Malaysia in 1992.
Even though his career was on the rise and he was a dedicated anti-
Communist, he became a target for the SVR when he was assigned
to the CIA’s elite Russian division. Because the job of this division
was to recruit Russian officials working abroad as diplomats, engineers,
and military officers, its operations brought its officers in close
contact with SVR officers. Nicholson therefore was required to meet
with Russian intelligence officers in Manila, Bucharest, Tokyo, and
Bangkok and “dangle” himself to the SVR by feigning disloyalty to
the CIA.
As part of these deception operations, Nicholson supplied the
Russians with tidbits of CIA secrets, or “chickenfeed,” that had been
approved by his superiors at the CIA. What his CIA superiors did
not fully take into account in this spy- versus- spy game was the
SVR’s ability to manipulate, compromise, and convert a “dangle” to
its own ends. As it turned out, Russian intelligence had been assembling
a psychological profile on Nicholson since the late 1980s and
found vulnerability: his resentment at the failure of his superiors
to recognize his achievements in intelligence. The Russians played
on this vulnerability to compromise him and then converted him to
becoming its mole inside the CIA.
Nicholson worked for the SVR first in Asia; then he was given a
management position at CIA headquarters, which is located in Langley,
Virginia. Among other secret documents, he provided the SVR
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 225
9/30/16 8:13 AM
226 | how america lost its secrets
with the identities of CIA officers sent to the CIA’s special training
school at Fort Peary, Virginia, which opened the door for the SVR to
make other potential recruitments. Meanwhile, it paid him $300,000
before he was finally arrested by the FBI in November 1996. (After
his conviction for espionage, he was sentenced to twenty- three years
in federal prison.) The CIA postmortem on Nicholson, who was the
highest- ranking CIA officer ever recruited (as far as is known), made
clear that even a loyal American, with no intention of betraying the
United States, could be entrapped in the spy game.
When it comes to recruiting moles in a larger universe, intelligence
services operate much like highly specialized corporate “headhunters,”
as James Jesus Angleton described the process to me during
the Cold War era. He was referring to the similar approach that corporate
human resource divisions had with espionage agencies. Both
headhunt by searching through a database of candidates for possible
recruits to fill specific positions. Both types of organizations have
researchers at their disposal to draw up rosters of potential recruits.
Both sort through available databases to determine which of the
names on the list have attributes that might qualify or disqualify
them for a recruitment pitch. Both also collect personal data on each
qualified candidate, including any indication of his or her ideological
leaning, political affiliations, financial standing, ambitions, and vanities,
to help them make a tempting offer.
But there are two important differences. First, unlike their counterparts
in the private sector, espionage headhunters ask their
candidates not only to take on a new job but also to keep their
employment secret from their present employer. Second, they ask
them to surreptitiously steal documents from him. Because they are
asking candidates to break the law, espionage services, unlike their
corporate counterparts in headhunting, obviously need to initially
hide from the candidates the dangerous nature of the work they will
do. Depending on the targeted recruit, they might disguise the task
as a heroic act, such as righting an injustice, exposing an illegal government
activity, or countering a regime of tyranny. This disguise is
called in the parlance of the trade a false flag, as mentioned earlier.
By using such a false flag, the SVR did not need to find a candidate
who was sympathetic to Russia or the Putin regime. In its long
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 226
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 227
history dating back to the era of the czars, Russian intelligence had
perfected the technique of false flag recruitment, through which it
assumes an identity to fit the ideological bent of a potential recruit.
Russian intelligence was well experienced with false flags. It first
used this technique following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 to
control dissidents both at home and abroad. The centerpiece, as later
analyzed by the CIA, was known as the “Trust” deception. It began
in August 1921 when a high- ranking official of the Communist
regime in Russia named Aleksandr Yakushev slipped away from a
Soviet trade delegation in Estonia and sought out a leading anti-
Communist exile he had known before the revolution in Russia. He
then told him that he represented a group of disillusioned officials in
Russia that included key members of the secret police, the army, and
the Interior Ministry. Yakushev said that they all had come to the
same conclusion: the Communist experiment in Russia had totally
failed and needed to be replaced. To effect this regime change, they
had formed an underground organization code- named the Trust,
because the cover for their conspiratorial activities was the Moscow
headquarters of the Municipal Credit Association, which was a trust
company. According to Yakushev’s account, it had become the equivalent
of a de facto government by 1921.
The exiled leader in Estonia reported this astonishing news to
British intelligence, which, along with French and American intelligence,
helped fund this newly emerged anti- Communist group.
Initially, British intelligence had doubts about the bona fides of the
Trust, as did other Western intelligence services sponsoring exile
groups. But they gradually accepted it after they received intelligence
reports confirming its operations from many other sources,
including Russian officials, diplomats, and military officers who
claimed to have defected from the Soviet government. Because these
reports all dovetailed, they recognized the Trust as a legitimately
underground organization.
Once the Trust had been established in the minds of the Western
intelligence services, it offered them as well as exile groups the
services of its network of collaborators. These services included
smuggling out dissidents, stealing secret documents, and disbursing
money inside Russia to sympathizers. Within a year, exile groups in
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 227
9/30/16 8:13 AM
228 | how america lost its secrets
Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Helsinki were using the Trust to deliver
arms and supplies to their partisans inside Russia. The Trust also
furnished spies’ and exiled leaders’ fake passports, which allowed
them to sneak back into Russia to participate in clandestine missions.
It even undertook sabotage and assassination missions paid for
by Western intelligence services. As they learned of police stations
being blown up and political prisoners escaped from prisons, these
agents and dissidents came to further believe in the power of the
Trust.
By the mid- 1920s, no fewer than eleven Western intelligence
services had become almost completely dependent on the Trust for
information about Russia. They also sent millions of dollars into
Russia via couriers to finance its activities.
But suddenly exiled leaders working in Russia under the aegis
of the Trust began to vanish. Then top Western intelligence agents,
including Sidney Reilly and Boris Savinkov, were arrested, and their
networks were eliminated. Instead of the Communist regime collapsing,
as the Trust had predicted, it consolidated its power and
wiped out all the dissident groups. Finally, in 1929, the Trust was
revealed by a defector to be a long- term false flag operation run by
the Russian intelligence service. Even the Trust building, rather than
being the cover for a subversive conspiracy, was the headquarters
for the Russian secret police during this eight- year operation. The
secret police had provided the documents fed to Western intelligence,
briefed the agents who pretended to defect, published the dissident
newspapers the Trust distributed, fabricated the passports it supplied
exiles, blew up Russian buildings, and staged jail breaks to make the
deception more credible. It also collected the money sent in by Western
intelligence services, which more than paid for the entire deception.
Because it was running the show, it could offer those lured into
the trap an opportunity to work for it as double agents. The alternative,
if they refused, was to face a firing squad.
Even after the Trust itself had been fully exposed, the Russian intelligence
service continued to succeed with other false flag deceptions.
During the Cold War, it set up a fake underground in Poland called
WIN, modeled on the Trust. It set up false flag groups in Ukraine,
Georgia, Lithuania, Albania, and Hungary. It also had agents mas-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 228
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 229
querade as members of the security services of Israel, South Africa,
Germany, France, and the United States to recruit unwitting agents.
These deceptions became an integral part of the recruitments of the
Russian intelligence services.
Penetrating the NSA and getting access to files from its stovepiped
computers was a far more difficult challenge for the SVR.
Approaching CIA officers, such as Nicholson, was relatively easy
because it was part of the CIA officers’ jobs to meet with their adversaries.
NSA officers, on the other hand, did not engage in “dangles”
or even attend diplomatic receptions. They had no reason, other than
a sinister one, to meet with a member of the Russian intelligence
service. Furthermore, unlike CIA officers, who, like Nicholson, are
often posted in neutral countries where they can be approached in a
social context, NSA officers work at well- guarded regional bases and
are not part of the diplomatic life. Because a known employee of a
foreign diplomatic mission could not even approach an NSA officer
without arousing suspicion, the SVR would need to use an intermediary,
called an access agent, whose affiliations were not known
to the FBI. Such an operation would require establishing a network
of illegals in America, as the SVR did after Putin became president.
Even then, the intermediary would have to find a plausible pretext
to approach the target without revealing his actual interest. Such
complex operations at the NSA, as far as is known, only yielded a
few low- level recruits.
The emergence of computer networks in the 1990s greatly
expanded the SVR’s recruiting horizon. It offered a new penetration
opportunity at the NSA: civilian technologists working under contract
for the U.S. government. Many of these civilians at the NSA,
especially the younger ones, as we know, had been drawn from the
hacking and game- playing culture; some had even taken courses on
hacking techniques. They presented the SVR with inviting targets
for recruitment. As was previously mentioned, Russian intelligence
had considerable experience in Germany with hacktivists, who
tended to be anarchists. There were also supporters of the libertarian
movement. The common denominator was often their resentment,
expressed in their postings, of the United States and its allies
attempting to limit the downloading of copyrighted music, movies,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 229
9/30/16 8:13 AM
230 | how america lost its secrets
and software on the Internet, all of which fell under the rubric of
“freedom of the Internet.” They also vocally objected to the NSA’s
using built- in back doors in its software to read their encrypted
messages. Such people were not difficult to find on the Internet.
The donors to Ron Paul’s libertarian election campaign (including
Snowden) were a matter of public record.
Even if there was no shortage of hacktivists who believed the surveillance
of the Internet by the NSA was an evil worth fighting, the
SVR still had to find a plausible way of approaching members of
this counterculture without offending them. Clearly, the SVR could
no longer use out- of- date Communist and anti- capitalist ideology
as a lure. Russia was far more authoritarian than the United States
when it came to the Internet. One viable alternative for the SVR was
custom- tailoring false flags to appeal to hacktivists.
For this purpose, the Internet provided a near- perfect realm.
Because it is a place where true identities cannot easily be verified,
intelligence services could employ a protean kit of disguises to
assume false identities to entice potential dissidents into communicating
with them. The KGB’s earlier efforts to use hacktivist groups
in Germany had produced little if any intelligence about the NSA
because of the stovepiping it used to isolate its computers from networks
that could be hacked into from the outside. It will be recalled
that the NSA threat officer had cited these failures in his 1996 report
on NSA vulnerability. He also said that efforts of the Russian intelligence
services to use false flag recruitments provided the KGB with
“a learning experience.” The KGB had learned that hacking by itself
could not breach the NSA’s protective stovepiping. He predicted that
its next logical move would be to “target insider computer personnel.”
This false flag recruitment would aim at, in his view, system
administrators, computer engineers, and cyber- service workers who
either were already inside the NSA or had a security clearance that
would facilitate getting jobs with NSA contractors.
Even with an appropriate false flag, the task of finding such a
“Prometheus” required obtaining a database of those working at
the NSA. There were some five thousand civilian technicians at the
NSA of all political stripes. Hacking into the personnel records of
the intelligence workers seeking to renew their security clearance
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 230
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 231
was a place to begin. The Internet provided the SVR with just this
opportunity. As you will recall, holes in the security of the computer
networks of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and
USIS and the websites of the companies supplying the NSA with
independent contractors had made the background checks on American
intelligence workers available to the Chinese, and presumably
other adversary intelligence service hackers, since 2011. If the SVR
had access to this personnel data, the research for a candidate would
be greatly facilitated. From the 127- page Standard Form 86, which
each applicant for a security clearance submits, the SVR could filter
out intelligence workers employed by the NSA by their educational
background, employment history, affiliations, and foreign contacts.
It could then search this data for candidates with a possible hacktivist
profile.
This data could next be crossed with a list of individuals the SVR
knew were in contact with high- profile activists who were part of the
anti- surveillance movements. This would include core participants
in the Tor Project, WikiLeaks, Noisebridge, CryptoParties, the Freedom
of the Press Foundation, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
(Snowden, for example, had been in touch with members of all
these groups in 2012 and 2013.)
The SVR would have little problem monitoring even encrypted
communications with leading figures in the anti- surveillance world.
These activists, despite secrecy rituals such as putting their cell
phones in refrigerators, remain visible to a sophisticated intelligence
service such as the SVR. All the defensive tactics of Laura Poitras,
including PGP encryption, Tor software, and air- gapped computers
(computers that have never been connected to the Internet), did not
keep secrets about her sources entirely to herself. Snowden, at a time
when he was stealing NSA secrets in February 2013, went to great
lengths to impress on Poitras the need for operational security about
his contacts with her, but that injunction did not prevent her from
telling at least five people about her source, including Micah Lee, the
Berkeley- based technology operative for the Freedom of the Press
Foundation; Jacob Appelbaum, the Tor proselytizer; Ben Wizner, the
ACLU lawyer; Barton Gellman; and Glenn Greenwald. “It is not me
that can’t keep a secret,” Abraham Lincoln joked. “It’s the people I
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 231
9/30/16 8:13 AM
232 | how america lost its secrets
tell it to that can’t.” In the same vein, Poitras could hardly rely on
these five confidants not to tell her secrets (and Snowden’s) to others.
Hours after he was told, Greenwald told his lover, David Miranda,
about the source in great detail. He even asked him to evaluate the
source’s bona fides for him. Gellman, for his part, raised the matter
with a former high official at the Justice Department.
Moreover, as the intelligence world knew, Poitras was herself
a veritable lightning rod for attracting ex- NSA employees who
objected to some of its surveillance programs. In 2012, her previously
mentioned filming in Berlin of NSA insiders could make her
communications of interest to intelligence services that wanted to
keep tabs on possible NSA dissidents.
Nor was Snowden himself overly discreet. It will be recalled that
he had also advertised his Tor- sponsored CryptoParty activities over
the Internet and supplied Runa Sandvik, who worked with Appelbaum,
his true name and address in Hawaii. Sandvik had no reason
not to share the identity of her co- presenter with others in the Tor
movement. Snowden, of course, had his girlfriend make a video of
his presentation as well. He also bragged about operating the largest
Tor outlets in Hawaii. Even if his Tor software provided him with a
measure of anonymity, it was not beyond the ability of the worldclass
cyber services to crack it.
Under Putin, Russia had built one of the leading cyber- espionage
services in the world. According to a 2009 NSA analysis of Russian
capabilities, which was obtained by The New York Times in 2013,
Russia’s highly sophisticated tools for cyber espionage were superior
to those of China or any other adversary nation. For example, investigators
from FireEye, a well- regarded Silicon Valley security firm,
found that in 2007 Russian hackers had developed a highly sophisticated
virus that could bypass the security measures of the servers
of both the U.S. government and its private contractors. According
to one computer security expert, the virus had made protected Internet
websites “sitting ducks” for these sophisticated Russian hackers.
The cryptographer Bruce Schneier, a leading specialist in computer
security, explained, “It is next to impossible to maintain privacy and
anonymity against a well- funded government adversary.”
Nor has the Russian cyber service made a secret out of the fact that
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 232
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Russians Are Coming | 233
it targets Tor software. It even offered a cash prize to anyone in the
hacking community who could break Tor. Prior to 2013, according
to cyber- security experts, it spent over a decade building cyber tools
aimed at unraveling the Tor networks used by hacktivists, criminal
enterprises, political dissidents, and rival intelligence operatives. To
this end, it reportedly attempted to map out computers that served
as major Tor exit nodes (such as the one Snowden operated in 2012
near an NSA regional base in Hawaii). It also reportedly attached
the equivalent of “electronic ink” to messages, which would allow
it to trace the path of messages that passed through them. Through
this technology, it could tag and follow Tor users as their communications
traveled across the Internet. It could even borrow their
Internet identities. To be sure, the NSA also had such a capability.
The Silk Road founder, Ross Ulbricht, discovered to his distress that
his Tor software did not make his computer server in Iceland invisible.
According to a former top official in the Justice Department, the
NSA was able to locate it by cracking the Tor software (Ulbricht is
currently serving a life sentence for his activities). Unlike adversary
services, however, the NSA needs a warrant to investigate U.S. citizens
who use Tor.
The NSA is hardly immune from an attack on its own computers.
As the former CIA deputy director Morell wrote in his 2015 book,
The Great War of Our Time, many financial institutions have “better
cyber security than the NSA.” The Internet certainly helped make
the activities of U.S. intelligence workers visible to the SVR.
But to achieve its goals, the SVR still had to find at least one disgruntled
civilian contractor inside the NSA who had access to the
sealed- off computer networks. Did it find its man? If so, was it before
or after Snowden arrived in Hong Kong with the Level 3 NSA files?
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 233
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 22
The Chinese Puzzle
The first [false assumption] is that China is an enemy of the
United States. It’s not.
— edward snowden, Hong Kong, 2013
On august 11, 2014, in the Atlantic Ocean, an event took place
of enormous concern to U.S. intelligence. A Chinese Jin- class
submarine launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile
released twelve independently targeted reentry vehicles, each simulating
a nuclear warhead. Some forty- four hundred miles away, in
China’s test range in the Xinjiang desert, each of the twelve simulated
nuclear warheads hit its target within a twelve- inch radius.
The test firing, which was closely monitored by the NSA, was a
strategic game changer. It meant that a single Jin- class submarine,
which carried twelve such missiles and 144 nuclear warheads, could
destroy every city of strategic importance in the United States. U.S.
intelligence further reported that China would soon use stealth
technology to make it more difficult to detect newer submarines and
give “China its first credible sea- based nuclear deterrent” against an
American attack.
By 2015, as its test in the Atlantic had foreshadowed, China had
armed its land- based as well as sea- based missiles with multiple
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 234
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Chinese Puzzle | 235
independently targeted warheads. Combined with the state- of- theart
technology it had licensed from Russia, its systematic use of
espionage even made it possible for China to build its own stealth
fighters.
Unlike the United States, China did not achieve this remarkable
capability to launch independently targeted miniaturized nuclear
weapons and stealth them by investing hundreds of billions of dollars
in developing them. It obtained this technology mainly through
espionage. The Chinese intelligence service stole a large part, if not
all, of America’s secret technology for weaponizing nuclear bombs
during the 1980s and 1990s. The theft was so massive that in 1998
the House of Representatives set up a special bipartisan investigative
unit called the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China.
Based on the intelligence amassed by the NSA, the CIA, and other
intelligence services, it concluded in its report that the Chinese intelligence
service had obtained both by electronic and by conventional
spying the warhead design of America’s seven most advanced thermonuclear
weapons. Moreover, it found that espionage successes
allowed China to so accelerate the design, development, and testing
of its own nuclear weapons that the new generation of Chinese
weapons would be “comparable in effectiveness to the weapons used
by the United States.” Further, the committee reported that these
thefts were the “results of decades of intelligence operations against
U.S. weapons laboratories.” The Chinese intelligence service further
obtained from private U.S. defense contractors through cyber espionage
important elements of the stealth technology used in advanced
planes and submarines. China shared (or exchanged) the fruits of its
espionage on nuclear warhead design with North Korea, Pakistan,
Iran, and Russia.
Despite its formidable intelligence coups in the United States, the
Chinese intelligence service managed to remain among the most
elusive of America’s intelligence adversaries. Its espionage organizations
are hidden behind layers of bureaucracy in the Ministry of
State Security, Chinese Communist Party structures, and the second,
third, and fourth department of the General Staff of the People’s
Liberation Army. Much of its cyber- espionage units are concealed
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 235
9/30/16 8:13 AM
236 | how america lost its secrets
on the campuses of its universities. Its hierarchy is also obscure.
Few traces have been uncovered of any conventional espionage networks
in the United States, and no major Chinese spy has ever been
arrested. Part of the reason that Chinese espionage has proved so elusive
to the eyes of Western counterintelligence is that, unlike Russia,
it did not ordinarily rely on intelligence officers in its embassies to
recruit penetration agents to steal secrets. It did not even have an
embassy in the United States during most of the Cold War. Instead,
its services specialize in mosaics of intelligence assembled from a
wide variety of sources, including nonclassified documents, returning
graduate students, scientific conferences, exchanges with allies,
and a vast operation of hacking into computers, or cyber espionage.
Such espionage is indeed a vast enterprise in China. Graduating
over 150,000 computer science engineers in the 1990s, it had no
shortage of personnel. It had also developed the cyber tool kit to gain
access to the computer networks of U.S. government contractors and
consultants in the private sector and government agencies, planting
“sleeper” bugs in networked computers. Like human sleeper agents,
these hidden programs can be activated when needed for operational
purposes. Chinese controllers can often retrieve e- mails and documents
and can turn on the cameras and microphones of personal
computers, tablets, and smart phones.
By 2007, Paul Strassmann, a top U.S. defense expert on cyber
espionage, reported that China had inserted “zombie” programs in
some 700,000 computers in the United States, which could be used to
mount cyber attacks to retrieve e- mails from other computers. The
Chinese service also reportedly penetrated companies that provide
Internet services, including Google, Yahoo!, Symantec, and Adobe,
which allowed it to track e- mails and enclosures of individuals. With
such an invisible army of zombie computers, it is not entirely surprising
that China finds little need to employ human sleeper agents.
Chinese cyber specialists used this capability to hack into the
computers of outside contractors, including Booz Allen and other
companies that supplied technologists to the NSA. It also had notable
successes in obtaining the dossiers of U.S. employees and independent
contractors at the NSA, the CIA, and other intelligence
services. Its intrusions, as previously noted, into computer networks
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 236
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Chinese Puzzle | 237
at the Office of Personnel Management traced back to 2009. Eventually,
by 2015, according to U.S. estimates, the cyber attack had
harvested over twenty million personnel files of past and present
federal government employees. In addition, it reaped over fourteen
million background checks of intelligence workers done by the Federal
Investigative Services.
All intelligence workers with a sensitive compartmented information
clearance, such as Snowden, were required to provide information
on these forms about all their foreign acquaintances, including
any non- U.S. officials whom the applicant knew or had had relationships
with in the past. They also had to list their foreign travel,
family members, police encounters, mental health issues, and credit
history. For good measure, Chinese hackers obtained the confidential
medical histories of government employees by hacking into the
computers of Anthem and other giant health- care companies. If
China’s intelligence services consolidated the fruits of these hacking
attacks, it would have a searchable database of almost everyone
working in the American defense and intelligence complex. From
this database, it could track individuals with high security clearances
vulnerable to being bribed, blackmailed, or tricked into cooperating.
No one doubted that the Chinese would use their cyber capabilities
to take advantage of opportunities presented in foreign computer
systems.
General Hayden said of the massive theft of intelligence personnel
records, “Those records are a legitimate foreign intelligence target.”
He added, “If I, as director of the NSA or CIA, would have
had the opportunity to grab the equivalent in the Chinese system,
I would not have thought twice.” If that opportunity did not arise
for the NSA or the CIA during Hayden’s tenure, it might have been
because no insider in the Chinese intelligence services provided U.S.
intelligence with a road map to it.
Cyber espionage was not the Chinese intelligence service’s only
powerful resource in the intelligence war. To get both electronic
intelligence and human intelligence about the United States, China
also had a highly productive intelligence- sharing treaty with Russia.
It was signed in 1992 after the Soviet Union was dissolved. Although
the terms of this exchange remain secret, defectors from the Rus-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 237
9/30/16 8:13 AM
238 | how america lost its secrets
sian KGB and SVR reported that Chinese intelligence received from
Russia a continuous stream of communications intelligence about
the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries.
Russia’s intelligence resources during this period were formidable.
They included geosynchronous satellites, listening stations
in Cuba, sleeper agents, and embassy- based spy networks. Presumably,
this relationship further deepened under President Putin’s
regime. Putin asserted in speeches in 2014 that Russia and China
continued to share a key strategic objective: countering the United
States’ domination of international relations, or what Putin terms
“a unipolar world order.” China’s president, Xi Jinping, expressed a
very similar view, saying in 2014 in a thinly veiled reference to the
United States that any attempt to “monopolize” international affairs
will not succeed.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been the major supplier
of almost all of China’s modern weaponry. It licenses for manufacture
in China avionics, air defense systems, missile launchers, stealth
technology, and submarine warfare equipment. To make these arms
effective, it also provides China with up- to- date intelligence about
the ability of the United States and its allies to counter them. While
such intelligence cooperation may be limited by the reality that
China and Russia still compete in many areas, they still have reason
to share much of the fruits of their cyber and conventional espionage
against the NSA in accordance with their intelligence. After all,
the NSA works to intercept the military and political secrets of both
these allies. Moreover, as the CIA’s former deputy director Morell
points out in his book, NSA secrets are a form of currency for adversaries
in the global intelligence war, saying that part of Snowden’s
cache could be traded by a country that acquired it to the intelligence
services of Iran and North Korea.
Snowden’s stay in Hong Kong from May 20 to June 23 in 2013
made the Chinese intelligence service, willy- nilly, a potential player
in whatever game he was involved in. China’s full responsibility for
Hong Kong’s national security and foreign affairs includes monitoring
foreign intelligence operatives. Chinese intelligence main-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 238
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Chinese Puzzle | 239
tains there its largest intelligence base outside mainland China. A
large contingent of its officers are stationed officially in the Prince
of Wales skyscraper in central Hong Kong and unofficially maintain
informers in Hong Kong’s police, governing authority, airport
administration, and other levers of power. It checks the computerized
visitors entering Hong Kong and has the capability to ferret
names that match those in the immense database its global cyber
espionage has amassed. When it detects the entry of any person of
possible intelligence interest, it can use its sophisticated array of
cyber tools to attempt to remotely steal data from that individual.
Such remote surveillance was so effective in 2013 that the U.S. State
Department had instructed all its personnel in Hong Kong to avoid
using their iPhones, Androids, BlackBerry phones, and other smart
phones when traveling to Hong Kong or China. Instead, it supplied
them with specially altered phones that disable location tracking
and have a remotely activated switch to completely cut off power
to its circuitry. No one in the intelligence community doubts the
prudence of taking such precautions in China, and it is nearly inconceivable
that Snowden, whose prior position at the NSA included
teaching military personnel about Chinese capacities, could himself
be unaware of Chinese intelligence service capabilities to acquire
travelers’ data in Hong Kong.
Once Hong Kong had served as a window into China for Western
intelligence, but in the first decade of this century the Chinese
intelligence service had achieved such a pervasive presence in Hong
Kong, and such ubiquitous electronic coverage of diplomats and
other foreigners even suspected of involvement in foreign intelligence
work, that the CIA and British intelligence found it almost
as difficult to operate in Hong Kong as in mainland China. Even
though the CIA kept officers there in 2013, it was considered “hostile
territory,” according to the former CIA officer Tyler Drumheller.
Snowden apparently knew the limits of CIA operations in Hong
Kong, which provided him with an envelope of protection. He told
Greenwald that he was counting on the Chinese presence in Hong
Kong to deter the CIA from intruding on their meetings.
When he flew to Hong Kong in May 2013, he took with him
NSA secrets, which he knew would be of great interest to China.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 239
9/30/16 8:13 AM
240 | how america lost its secrets
In fact, he advertised that he had such secrets in his interview with
the South China Morning Post. Whatever he might have assumed
about the inability of the CIA to stop him in Hong Kong, he could
not assume that Chinese intelligence services would relegate themselves
to a purely passive role when secret NSA documents were in
a hotel room in Hong Kong. Snowden might have esteemed himself
to be an independent actor playing Prometheus on a global stage
provided by YouTube, but the Chinese might have viewed him very
differently indeed.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 240
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 23
A Single Point of Failure
A single point of failure (SPOF) is a part of a system that, if it
fails, will stop the entire system from working.
—Wikipedia
Snowden described anyone who was the sole repository of
secrets that could undo the NSA’s intelligence gathering as “the
single point of failure.” While still shielding his own identity in May
2013, he wrote to Gellman that U.S. intelligence “will most certainly
kill you if they think you are the single point of failure that could
stop this disclosure and make them the sole owner of this information.”
Such a person of course would be of even greater interest to
adversary intelligence services if they were aware of the payload of
secrets that person was carrying because they could use it to unravel
the NSA’s sources and methods.
Snowden saw himself as that “single point of failure.” We know
that while still in Hong Kong he said he had obtained access to computers
that the NSA had penetrated throughout the world and in
Moscow he added that he had had “access to every [NSA] target,
every [NSA] active operation,” against the Chinese. “Full lists of
them,” which, if he chose to share them, could make China “go
dark.” To be sure, he did not refer to Russian intelligence activity in
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 241
9/30/16 8:13 AM
242 | how america lost its secrets
any interview that he ever gave in Moscow under Russian protection,
but he had similar access to NSA operations against Russia in
his job at the NSA’s Threat Operations Center.
The enormous power of the NSA rested in its ability to keep its
sources and methods secret from its foes. A queen on the chessboard
could be captured by a lowly pawn if it was well- placed. In
this case, the person who had it in his power to expose the NSA’s
critical sources and methods would no doubt be considered fair game
by America’s adversaries, including the Chinese and Russian cyber
services. Indeed, how could they resist such a prize?
Snowden might have believed that he was in control, but the CIA
believed that confidence was misinformed. “Snowden thinks he is
smart,” Morell said, after reviewing the case on a panel appointed
by President Obama, “but he was never in a position in his previous
jobs to fully understand the immense capabilities of our Russian and
Chinese counterparts.” He could adopt a cocky tone in his postmortem
conversations with journalists in Moscow, but in truth he had
no means to block the efforts of the Chinese or Russian services in
Hong Kong. Even before Snowden contacted its diplomats in Hong
Kong, the Russian intelligence service would swing into action to
determine his intelligence value.
How many days he planned to be in Hong Kong depended on how
speedily he could arrange a meeting with journalists. “The purpose of
my [Hong Kong] mission was to get the information to journalists,”
he told the editor of The Guardian after he was safely ensconced in
Moscow. He indicates that he was working under a tight clock. The
time pressure resulted in his e- mailing an ultimatum to Gellman on
May 24: either Gellman would publish the selected documents in
The Washington Post within seventy- two hours, or he would lose
the exclusive scoop. Snowden wanted the story to break on May 27,
without his true identity (which Gellman did not know) attached to
it. His identity would be known to a foreign mission in Hong Kong if
Gellman acceded to his demands, because, as previously mentioned,
Gellman’s story would enclose an encoded signal he planned to use
as proof of his bona fides. So even before the Guardian reporters had
agreed to come to Hong Kong, Snowden had plans to deal with a
foreign mission. If the Post had accepted his terms, Snowden would
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 242
9/30/16 8:13 AM
A Single Point of Failure | 243
have been in a very different position. The story would have broken
before Poitras or Greenwald even knew about Snowden’s presence
in Hong Kong, and his identity would be secret except for whatever
foreign mission he had contacted. But, as we know, the Post turned
down his ultimatum.
Time was running out if he was to break the story and leave Hong
Kong before the NSA realized he was missing. At best, he was safe
until June 3, when he was supposed to return from his medical leave.
If he failed to show up in Hawaii on June 3, alarm bells at the NSA
would go off, and it would not take long to find him. Airline records
would show that he had flown to Hong Kong. Snowden told Poitras
that NSA security would ask, “This guy isn’t where he says
he’s supposed to be. He’s supposed to be getting medical treatment.
Why the hell is he in Hong Kong?” It would not take long to determine
that he had lied about his medical treatment, and then the hunt
would begin.
He had, remember, already sent Poitras an enciphered file and told
her she would get the key once she followed his instructions. Greenwald
had still not committed himself to meeting Snowden. Greenwald
was, however, willing to publish the documents once Snowden
provided them. That Snowden remained in Hong Kong suggests that
his reason for going to and remaining in Hong Kong went beyond
just delivering documents to journalists, which he could have done
over the Internet. What he could not do in America, without risking
arrest, was to make and release a video.
In any event, after his attempt to pressure the Post, Snowden
asked Greenwald to fly immediately to Hong Kong. Presumably, he
still wanted Greenwald’s story and the video done in Hong Kong
before he became a suspect. If Greenwald and Poitras had immediately
flown to Hong Kong, it still might have left Snowden an escape
window.
But of course things do not always go as planned. Greenwald,
although agreeing to come to Hong Kong, waited in New York
for two days while the Guardian editors completed their due diligence.
Poitras waited with him. As a result of this delay, as we know,
Green wald and Poitras did not arrive at his hotel in Hong Kong until
June 3, only hours before Snowden became suspect at the NSA. “It
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 243
9/30/16 8:13 AM
244 | how america lost its secrets
was a nervous period,” Snowden recalled. Although he bravely told
The Guardian “there was no risk” that the information he carried
had been compromised by other parties in Hong Kong, that claim
was, at best, wishful thinking on his part.
By this time, he had registered at the hotel under his true name
and provided his credit card; he was in contact with three highprofile
journalists, two well- known hacktivists, and, as he suggested
to Gellman, a foreign diplomatic mission.
The mission’s interest would likely be piqued when the newspaper
published its first story on June 6. Greenwald then went on
TV in Hong Kong, revealing to every interested intelligence service
that a defector from the NSA was in Hong Kong providing secret
documents.
Poitras released the famous video showing Snowden and secret
NSA documents three days later. At this point, Snowden shone
brightly as a beacon to NSA secrets to every player in the intelligence
game, even if they did not know the extent of the damage he
could inflict on American intelligence.
Snowden fogged over his travel plans to the media by telling
reporters that he intended to remain in Hong Kong and fight extradition,
but certainly the Russian officials whom he contacted became
aware that he had other plans, having relayed his request to go to
Russia to their superiors in Moscow. And, unlike the media, any
sophisticated intelligence service was well aware of his movements.
In Hong Kong, cell phones emit their GPS location every three seconds;
even if Snowden disabled his own phone, lawyers and helpers
could be tracked with ease.
China’s president, Xi Jinping, who was meeting President Obama
for the first time in Rancho Mirage, California, on June 8, would
have been keenly interested in the unfolding Snowden affair. Obama
had publicly called Xi to task for Chinese cyber espionage, and now
that charge was undermined by Snowden’s accusation that the
United States was engaged in massive cyber espionage. U.S. intelligence
verified that China instituted a full- court press of Snowden
in Hong Kong immediately after the release of the video. From
that moment on, any communication or movement Snowden made
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 244
9/30/16 8:13 AM
A Single Point of Failure | 245
during his next fifteen days in Hong Kong would not likely escape
China’s scrutiny.
The United States had the ability to also follow Snowden’s movements
via the cell phones of his lawyers and other confederates
after he surfaced. All tracking could be done by the NSA. What the
United States lacked was any practical means to capture a highprofile
intelligence defector in a city that was part of China. By this
time, U.S. intelligence had established that Chinese and Hong Kong
security services were monitoring Snowden’s every move. This left
few options in the game for the United States. “I’m not going to
be scrambling jets to get a twenty- nine- year- old hacker,” President
Obama said on June 27.
The real prize, in any case, was not Snowden but the NSA’s secret
documents that he had with him. When Snowden was observed
entering the Russian consulate, the game was all but over. U.S. diplomats
could protest over back channels to Moscow, as they did, but
with a trove of NSA secrets at stake there was little expectation that
would stop the Russians. Two days later, the “single point of failure,”
as Snowden described himself, was on his way to Russia, where his
hosts would be calling the shots.
When a victory is obtained in a major sports event, it is cause for
public celebrations. The opposite is true in espionage. An intelligence
victory involving secret documents, even if it cannot be entirely
hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of
the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,”
Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring
a success.”
Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelligence
services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the selfdescribed
“single point of failure,” would work to cover their tracks in
the affair even before the Aeroflot plane carrying Snowden touched
down at Sheremetyevo International Airport on June 23. If any false
flag operations had been used to trick, mislead, or otherwise induce
Snowden to come to Hong Kong, they would be disbanded. If any
safe house had been used to quarter Snowden in his first eleven days
in Hong Kong, it would be shut down. If any operatives had been
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 245
9/30/16 8:13 AM
246 | how america lost its secrets
used in Hawaii to guide or assist Snowden, they would be put back
into sleeper mode. If any telltale traces had been left in chat rooms
or social media, they would be systematically deleted. Even more
important to the ultimate success of such a communications intelligence
coup, measures would be taken to conceal the extent of the
damage done by the “single point of failure” by not precipitously
closing down compromised sources. Snowden might believe that
the power of the information he held was so great that if disclosed
by him, all the NSA’s sources would immediately go dark in Russia
and China, but Russia might not wish to provide such clarity to its
adversaries. An intelligence service need not close down channels
it discovers are compromised by an adversary. Instead, it can elect
to continue to use them and furnish through them bits of sensitive
or misleading information to advance its own national interest. The
real danger here was not that the NSA’s “lights” would dramatically
be extinguished but that all the future messages illuminated by
those lights would be less reliable sources of intelligence. The game
of nations is, after all, merely a competition among adversaries to
gain advantages by the surreptitious exchange of both twisted and
straight information.
To review: When the NSA asserted in the summer of 2013 that
over one million documents had been compromised, it was recognizing
the most massive failure in its sixty- year history. Not only
were NSA secrets taken, but secret files from the CIA, the British
GCHQ, and America’s cyber military commands had been compromised.
It was, as Sir David Omand, the former head of the British
GCHQ, described it, a “huge strategic setback” for the West. The
genie could not be put back into the bottle. There is not a reset button
in this game. The best that the NSA could do now was damage
control while its adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Several
hundred U.S. and British intelligence officers worked around the
clock in Washington, D.C., Fort Meade, Maryland, and Cheltenham,
England, for months on end to determine which parts of the most
powerful communications intelligence system in the world could be
salvaged from what had been the Snowden breach.
Adding insult to injury, Snowden, speaking from his new perch
in Moscow, told applauding audiences that the entire purpose of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 246
9/30/16 8:13 AM
A Single Point of Failure | 247
the U.S. exercise, including deliberately “trapping” him in Moscow,
was to “demonize” him. “There was no question that I was going
to be subject to a demonization campaign.” Snowden said in Moscow,
“They [Greenwald and Poitras] actually recorded me on camera
saying this before I revealed my identity.” Snowden asserted this
“demonization” was to divert attention from the government’s own
crimes. By providing Snowden with this platform to rail against the
putative machinations of the United States, Putin laid claim to the
moral high ground.
Snowden’s motive in requesting documents from other foreign
intelligence services, such as the GCHQ, and copying lists of NSA
sources remains unexplained. It is difficult to believe that his motive
was whistle- blowing, because these documents were not among
those he gave to journalists in Hong Kong. Indeed, he did not provide
the journalists with the lists of sources that were particularly
relevant to the NSA’s surveillance of Russia. His legal representative
in Moscow, Kucherena, confirmed that Snowden had taken
secret “material” to Russia and had access to NSA documents that
he had not given to journalists. Those unrevealed documents would
be prized by many an adversary service. Did he use those documents
as leverage in his transformation? The role that Moscow might have
played in Snowden’s defection clearly requires a closer examination
of the machinations that brought Snowden to Russia. That is why I
visited Moscow in October 2015.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 247
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 248
9/30/16 8:13 AM
part four
MOSCOW CALLING
Deception is a state of mind— and the mind of the state.
— james jesus angleton
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 249
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 250
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 24
Off to Moscow
They talk about Russia like it’s the worst place on earth. Russia’s
great.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2015
Before flying to Moscow, I arranged to have dinner with
Oliver Stone at an Italian restaurant on the Upper East Side of
New York. I had greatly respected Stone’s ability as a film director
after watching him work on Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps, a film
in which I had a cameo role. I had also debated Stone about the historical
accuracy of his 1991 movie JFK at Town Hall in New York.
When we dined, he had just written, produced, and directed
Snowden, an independently financed film depicting Snowden, as
Stone put it, as “one of the great heroes of the twenty- first century.”
In preparing for it, Stone had seen Snowden in 2013 and 2014 and
had had a six- hour meeting with Putin.
I wanted to talk to Stone not to learn about the film but to learn
how he had gained access to Snowden in Moscow. I knew from the
documents taken from Sony Pictures Entertainment— allegedly by
North Korea— that Stone had paid The Guardian $700,000 for the
film rights to The Snowden Files, a book written by Luke Harding.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 251
9/30/16 8:13 AM
252 | how america lost its secrets
These documents also revealed that Stone had paid Anatoly Kucherena,
Snowden’s legal representative in Moscow, $1 million, supposedly
for the rights to his novel, Time of the Octopus. Even by
Hollywood standards, $1 million was an extraordinary sum to pay
for a yet- to- be- published work of Russian fiction, and it was especially
striking because Stone was making a fact- based movie using
the actual names of the characters, and he had already bought the
rights to The Snowden Files.
“Is your script based on Kucherena’s Time of the Octopus?” I
asked.
“No,” Stone replied. “I haven’t used it.”
He said that the payment was for what he termed “total access.”
He explained that Barbara Broccoli and Michael G. Wilson, the producers
of the James Bond franchise, had optioned Greenwald’s book
No Place to Hide to make into a movie about Snowden for Sony.
Stone said that the million- dollar deal with Kucherena effectively
guaranteed that any competing project would not have access to
Snowden. Sony consequently put the competing film on hold.
Lawyers often negotiate deals on behalf of a client, but blocking a
competing film requires considerably more influence with the powers
that be in Russia. Kucherena, though, was no ordinary lawyer.
Among other influential positions, I noted earlier, he was on the public
board of the Russian federal security bureau, which had assumed
the domestic operations of the defunct KGB in April 1995. In light
of such connections, Stone said Kucherena might be acting as an
intermediary for other parties who controlled access to Snowden in
Russia. In any case, his concern was making a movie, and Kucherena
delivered the exclusive access to Snowden.
Aside from being a skilled director, Stone is a shrewd producer
who knows how to close a deal. He assessed, correctly as it turned
out, that his project coupled with the payment to Kucherena would
effectively block Sony’s competing project. Where the money went
was far less clear.
Toward the end of our dinner, Stone told me that he did not know
I was writing a book about Snowden until a few weeks earlier. He
learned of my book from Snowden himself. He said Snowden had
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 252
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Off to Moscow | 253
expressed concern to him about the direction of the book I was writing.
“What is it about?” Stone asked me.
I was taken aback. I had no idea that Snowden was aware of my
book. (I had not tried to contact him.) I told Stone that I considered
Snowden an extraordinary man who had changed history and was
intentionally vague in my description of my book’s contents. Stone
seemed to be reassured, so I asked him about the possibility of my
seeing Snowden in Moscow. He said that I “might want to speak
to Anatoly [Kucherena].” Kucherena, it seemed to me, was clearly
Snowden’s gatekeeper.
In Snowden’s two years in Moscow, he, or his handlers, had granted
only a handful of face- to- face press interviews. Most of these were
with the journalists who had published his story, but one was with
James Bamford for his 2014 Wired piece. According to Bamford, it
took nearly nine months to arrange the meeting. “I have been trying
to set up an interview with him [Snowden]— traveling to Berlin,
Rio de Janeiro twice, and New York multiple times to talk with
the handful of his confidants who can arrange a meeting,” Bamford
recounted in Wired. After my dinner with Stone, I hoped to find a
quicker route.
I was advised by a Moscow- based journalist that I needed a
“fixer,” the curious term that journalists commonly use to describe a
local intermediary who arranges appointments in foreign countries.
I retained Zamir Gotta, a highly respected TV producer in Moscow,
who I was told had helped “fix” the Bamford interview with
Snowden.
“There is only one door to Snowden,” Zamir wrote to me. “His
name is Kucherena.” Zamir said Kucherena rarely saw journalists,
but he had a contact in his office. He further told me Kucherena
required any journalist seeking an interview with Snowden to
submit his questions to the lawyer two weeks in advance and, if
approved, to sign a document stating he would not deviate from the
questions. Next, my questions had to be translated from English to
Russian (even though Snowden does not speak Russian) and then
vetted by Kucherena’s staff. Zamir also suggested I stay at the Hotel
National in Red Square because Snowden had gone there for pre-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 253
9/30/16 8:13 AM
254 | how america lost its secrets
vious meetings with Bamford. So I sent Kucherena, via Zamir, ten
questions that I wanted to ask Snowden.
I next obtained a multi- entry Russian visa from the Russian consulate
in New York and booked myself a room in the Hotel National.
My night flight from New York to Moscow took just less than
eight hours and landed at Terminal D of Sheremetyevo International
Airport at 7:40 a.m. on October 29, 2015. I did not immediately
proceed through passport control, in part because I wanted to
explore the transit zone in which Snowden was supposedly trapped
for six weeks.
Sheremetyevo Two, where all international flights land, was built
in the waning days of the Cold War for international passengers
arriving for the Moscow 1980 Summer Olympics. It was modernized
in 2010, including opening a walkway that connects Terminals
D, E, and F for transit passengers.
Snowden had vanished, at least from public view, in this complex
of terminals for nearly six weeks in the summer of 2013. His
explanation to journalists, as will be recalled, was two part. First, he
said he had planned to board the next fight to Cuba and from there
proceed to Ecuador. He said that he was unable to board this flight
because his passport had been invalidated by the U.S. government
while he was flying to Russia. Second, after discovering his passport
had been revoked, he stayed in a capsule hotel in the transit zone for
the next thirty- nine days. To better understand the plausibility of
his version of those events, I proceeded through the transit passage
to Terminal F, where Snowden’s plane from Hong Kong had landed
at 5:15 p.m. Moscow time on June 23, 2013.
Snowden did not go through passport control upon arrival.
Before any of the other passengers were allowed to disembark from
the plane, Russian plainclothes officers from the special services
boarded the plane and asked both Snowden and Sarah Harrison, his
WikiLeaks- supplied “ninja,” to accompany them to a waiting car
that whisked them away. According to the account in Izvestia, “A
special operation was conducted for his reception and evacuation.” It
further said, “Snowden’s flight to Moscow was coordinated with the
Russian authorities and intelligence services.”
If not for the “special operation,” he could have easily gone by foot
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 254
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Off to Moscow | 255
to Terminal E. It is a nine- minute walk through the transit passageway.
Snowden, though, had one good reason for not going to Ecuador,
even if Russia had permitted it. He believed that he would be
vulnerable to rendition by the U.S. government in Ecuador. “If they
[the U.S. government] really wanted to capture me, they would’ve
allowed me to travel to Latin America, because the CIA can operate
with impunity down there,” he explained in the previously cited
interview with Katrina vanden Heuvel, the editor of The Nation, in
2014. He had already discussed the likelihood of his being captured
in Ecuador with Assange before his departure for Moscow. He later
told Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, that he considered
himself at risk in Latin America. So why would Snowden, who told
Greenwald that his “first priority” was his own “physical safety,”
leave the comparative safety of Russia to put himself in jeopardy in
Ecuador?
He had not obtained a visa to Ecuador at its consulate in Hong
Kong, as Kucherena confirmed. The Ecuador destination was, as we
have seen, a cover story put out by Assange and his associates, and it
worked with the press.
Over a hundred reporters and photographers scrambled aboard
Aeroflot Flight SU150 to Cuba the next morning in response to this
anonymous tip on a website, but Snowden was not aboard that flight
and was not seen in Terminal E. By the time the plane landed in
Cuba, Aeroflot denied that anyone named Snowden had ever been
booked on any of its flights to Cuba, a denial it continued to repeat to
every reporter who queried the airline for the next six weeks.
The first news that Snowden was still in Russia came on July 1,
2013. A statement posted on the WikiLeaks website— and signed
“Edward Snowden”— after thanking “friends new and old” for his
“continued liberty,” accused President Obama of pressuring “leaders
of nations from which I have requested protection to deny my asylum
petitions.” It added, “This kind of deception from a world leader
is not justice, and neither is the extralegal penalty of exile. These are
the old, bad tools of political aggression.” In fact, Snowden had not
suffered a “penalty of exile,” because his passport was still valid for
returning to the United States, but that was not an option for him as
the statement made clear.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 255
9/30/16 8:13 AM
256 | how america lost its secrets
Because the Aeroflot flight to Cuba was the only means of getting
directly from Moscow to Latin America, Russian reporters,
encouraged by WikiLeaks posts, continued taking the daily elevenhour
flight to Cuba until August 1. The charade only ended when
Kucherena said in a press conference at the airport that Snowden
would be taking up residency at an undisclosed location in Moscow
and walked out of the airport with Snowden.
Sarah Harrison, Snowden’s companion on the plane to Moscow,
told Vogue that she and Snowden for thirty- nine days had shared
a windowless room in the transit zone of the airport where they
watched TV, washed their clothes in a sink basin, and ate meals from
the nearby Burger King. The only hotel with windowless rooms
in the transit zone in 2013 was the Vozdushny V- Express Capsule
Hotel, located next to a newly opened Burger King.
The polite V- Express desk clerk, who spoke English, showed me
the standard windowless double room. It was approximately twentyfour
square feet in area. Most of the floor space was taken up by twin
beds. Across from the bed, behind a plastic curtain, was a stall with
a shower, a toilet, and a sink. It would be very cramped quarters for
two people to share for such an extended period. It cost 850 rubles an
hour (about $18 in 2013). For thirty- nine days, that hourly charge
would have added up to $16,600. Snowden claimed to the BBC that
he brought a large cache of cash to Russia, which he could have used
to pay the hotel. But such a long stay was not allowed, according to
the desk clerk. The maximum stay allowed by the hotel was twentyfour
hours. So either the rule was waived for Snowden, or Harrison
did not tell the full truth.
I learned from a former KGB officer that there are VIP quarters
beyond the confines of the airport, including suites at the fourhundred-
room Novotel hotel, which is located about seven miles
away, that are used for debriefing and other purposes by the security
services. According to him, the security services are not restricted
from entering and leaving the transit zone.
The possibility that Snowden was staying elsewhere would help
explain the futile search for him by a large number of reporters
over those thirty- nine days. When they learned from tweets that
Snowden was not aboard the plane to Havana on June 24, for weeks
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 256
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Off to Moscow | 257
they aggressively questioned all the restaurant employees, security
guards, and airport personnel they could find. They also bought
business- class tickets on flights just to gain access to VIP lounges in
the transit zones. Despite this intensive search, none of them found
a single person who had seen Snowden, although his image was constantly
shown on airport TV screens. Egor Piskunov, a reporter for
RT television, even rented a room in the V- Express Capsule Hotel
and “tipped” hotel employees, trying, without success, to get information.
Piskunov told me, “It was a total vanishing act.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 257
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 25
Through the Looking Glass
There’s definitely a deep state. Trust me, I’ve been there.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
While waiting to hear back from Kucherena’s office, I
arranged to meet with Victor Cherkashin, who had been one
of the most successful KGB spy handlers in the Cold War. Cherkashin,
born in 1932, had served in the KGB’s espionage branch
from 1952 until 1991 and now operated a private security firm in
Moscow. I was particularly interested in his recruitment of three
top American intelligence officers: Aldrich Ames of the CIA, Robert
Hanssen of the FBI, and Ronald Pelton of the NSA. I hoped that seeing
these intelligence coups through the eyes, and mind- set, of their
KGB handler might provide some historical context for the Snowden
defection. So I invited Cherkashin to lunch at Gusto, a quiet Italian
restaurant, located near the Chekhov Theater in Moscow.
Cherkashin, a tall thin man with silver hair, showed up promptly
at 1:00 p.m., wearing an elegant gray suit and dark tie. He walked
with a spry step. Because he had served in counterintelligence in the
Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., for nearly a decade, he spoke
flawless English.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 258
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Through the Looking Glass | 259
I began by asking him about one of the more celebrated cases he
had handled for the KGB, that of Ames, who had acted as a Russian
mole in the CIA between April 1985 and January 1994. In those nine
years, he rose, or was maneuvered by the KGB, into a top position
in the CIA’s highly sensitive Counterintelligence Center Analysis
Group, which allowed him to deliver hundreds of top secrets to the
KGB. In return, according to Cherkashin, Ames received between
$20,000 and $50,000 in cash for each delivery, which amounted to
$4.6 million over the nine years.
I asked Cherkashin about the weakness the KGB looked for in an
American intelligence worker that might lead him to copy and steal
top secret documents. How did he spot a potential Ames? Was it a
financial problem? Was it a sexual vulnerability? Was it an ideological
leaning?
“Nothing so dramatic,” he answered. When assessing Ames’s
biographical data, Cherkashin said he was looking for a well- placed
intelligence officer who was both dissatisfied with and antagonistic
to the service for which he worked.
“The classic disgruntled employee,” I interjected.
“Any intelligence officer who strongly feels that his superiors are
not listening to him, and that they are doing stupid things, is a candidate,”
he continued. He said he had found that the flaw in a prospect
that could be most dependably exploited was not his greed, lust,
or deviant behavior but his resentment over the way he was being
treated.
“Is that how you spotted Ames?”
“Actually, he approached us, not vice versa.” It was his job in the
CIA to approach opposition KGB officers. “But, yes, we saw the
potential,” he said.
Because Ames had been paid $50,000 in cash by Cherkashin for
his first delivery, I asked whether he fit into the category of a disgruntled
employee.
“Wasn’t he just a mercenary?” I asked.
“I knew from our intelligence reports that he needed money
for debts stemming from his divorce,” he answered. “But he was
also angry at the stupidity and paranoia of those running the CIA.
Ames told me at our first secret meeting that they were misleading
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 259
9/30/16 8:13 AM
260 | how america lost its secrets
Congress by exaggerating the Soviet threat.” Cherkashin evaluated
Ames as a man who felt not only slighted by his superiors but “helpless
to do anything about it” within the bureaucracy of the CIA.
“The money we gave, even if he could spend only a small portion
of it, gave him a sense of worth.” He explained that the KGB had
an entire team of psychologists in Moscow that worked on further
exploiting Ames’s resentment against his superiors.
The search for an adversary intelligence officer who resents his
service was not limited to KGB recruiters. It was also the “classic
attitude” that the CIA sought to exploit in its adversaries, according
to a former deputy director. “You find someone working for the
other side and tell him that he is not receiving the proper recognition,
pay, and honors due him,” Morell said, pointing out that the
same “psychological dynamic” could be used to motivate someone
to “act alone” in gathering espionage material.
I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cherkashin:
the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hanssen
was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk- in who
never entered the Soviet embassy or met with KGB case officers, but
in working as a KGB mole between 1979 and 2001, he had delivered
even more documents to the Russian intelligence services than
Ames. Cherkashin learned of this potential spy when he received an
anonymous letter from him identifying an FBI source in the Soviet
embassy. When that tip proved to be accurate, Cherkashin got the
resources he needed from the KGB to develop this source. From the
start of his work for the KGB, Hanssen laid down his own rules.
The KGB would deliver cash from which all the fingerprints were
removed to locations, or “dead drops,” he specified. He would deliver
documents exposing FBI, CIA, and NSA sources and methods in
another dead drop. The KGB would precisely follow his instructions.
Cherkashin told me that Hanssen’s “astounding self- recruitment”
was executed in such a way that the KGB never actually controlled
him. “He was our most important mole and we didn’t ever know his
identity, where he worked, or how he had access to FBI, CIA, and
NSA files.” Even so, the KGB (and later the SVR) paid him $600,000
in cash. In return, the anonymous spy delivered twenty- seven com-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 260
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Through the Looking Glass | 261
puter disks containing hundreds of secret documents revealing the
sources and methods of American intelligence. According to Cherkashin,
it was the largest haul of top secret documents ever obtained
by the KGB (although it was only a small fraction of the number of
top secret NSA, Department of Defense, and CIA documents taken
by Snowden in 2013). Cherkashin told me the price paid by Moscow
was a great bargain because it helped compromise “the NSA’s most
advanced electronic interception technology,” including a tunnel
under the Soviet embassy.
Yet it was only after newspapers reported that Hanssen had been
arrested by the FBI in February 2001 that Cherkashin learned the
name and position of the spy he had recruited. Cherkashin told me
that what mattered to the KGB was not “control” of an agent but the
value of the secrets he or she delivered. “Control is not necessary in
espionage as long as we manage to obtain the documents.” So in the
eyes of the KGB, anyone who elected to provide it with U.S. secrets
was a spy.
“All we knew was that he delivered valuable documents to us and
asked for cash in return,” he said. “We didn’t control him; he controlled
us.”
An uncontrolled mole who provided secrets to the KGB and the
SVR for twenty- two years was very different from fictional moles
in the spy movies. I asked whether it would have been better if the
KGB had him under its control.
“Possibly,” Cherkashin answered. “But as it turned out, Hanssen
was by far our most valuable penetration in the Cold War.”
“Could Hanssen really be called a mole?” I asked.
“A ‘mole’ is a term used in spy fiction,” he said. “We prefer the
more general term ‘espionage source.’ ”
“So anyone who delivers state secrets to the KGB, for whatever
reason, is an espionage source?” I asked.
“Certainly, if the information is valuable to us,” Cherkashin
answered.
“If some unknown person simply delivered a trove of top secret
communications secrets to the doorstep of Russia, would it be
accepted?” I asked with Snowden in mind.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 261
9/30/16 8:13 AM
262 | how america lost its secrets
“I can’t say what the SVR would do today. I am long retired,” he
said, with a nostalgic shake of his head. “But in my day, we needed
some reason to believe the gift was genuine.”
“Would you need to vet the person delivering it?”
“With Hanssen we did not have that opportunity,” he said. “If
we believed the documents were genuine, we would of course grab
them.”
The final recruitment I asked Cherkashin about was that of Ronald
Pelton, the civilian employee of the NSA who had retired in 1979.
Pelton had left the NSA without taking any classified documents
with him. After retiring, he had financial difficulties, and he sought
to get money from the KGB. On January 14, 1980, he walked into
the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., and asked to see an intelligence
officer. After he was ushered into a secure debriefing room, he
said that he had information that Russia would find interesting, but
he wanted money in return. What interested me about the Pelton
case was that Cherkashin proceeded to recruit Pelton, even though
he was no longer working at the NSA and no longer had access to
the NSA. In addition, because the FBI had twenty- four- hour surveillance
on the embassy, Pelton had almost certainly been photographed
entering it and had also possibly been recorded asking for
an intelligence officer by electronic bugs that the KGB suspected the
NSA had planted there. What did the KGB do in a situation in which
a former civilian employee at the NSA possessed no documents?
Despite the risks involved, Cherkashin decided Pelton had to be
debriefed by communications intelligence specialists. So he had him
disguised as a utility worker and smuggled out in a van to the residential
compound of the ambassador in Georgetown. A few days
later, he was dropped off at a shopping mall.
“Why did you go to such effort if Pelton had neither documents
nor access to the NSA?” I asked.
“It was the information in his head that we wanted.” Cherkashin
said that because the KGB rarely got access to any NSA officer, it
was worth the risk. So Pelton was given $5,000 in cash and a plane
ticket to Vienna, where he was domiciled at the residence of the
Soviet ambassador to Austria. A KGB electronic communications
expert, Anatoly Slavnov, was then sent to Vienna to supervise the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 262
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Through the Looking Glass | 263
Pelton debriefings. The debriefing sessions, which went on for fifteen
days, were from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. In them, Pelton managed to
recall Project A, a joint NSA- CIA- navy operation in which submarines
surreptitiously tapped into Soviet undersea cables in the Sea
of Okhotsk, which connected to the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s mainland
headquarters at Vladivostok. Pelton received another $30,000 from
the KGB.
“Did the information in his head prove valuable?” I asked.
“As long as the NSA didn’t know the tap was compromised by
Pelton, we could use the cable to send the NSA the information we
wanted it to intercept.” He said that while actual NSA documents
would have proved more useful than someone’s memories, “Our job
is to take advantage of whatever we can get.”
Two years later, Pelton was again flown to Vienna for another
debriefing to see if he could recall any further details. According to
Cherkashin, the KGB’s job was to leave no stone unturned when
it came to the NSA’s sources. In 1985, the KGB’s task ended when
Pelton was arrested by the FBI. Like Ames and Hanssen, Pelton was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
Looking at his watch, Cherkashin politely excused himself.
I subsequently spoke to Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko, who had
been a foreign intelligence officer in the KGB between 1958 and
1985 and continued his intelligence work until recently as chief
counterterrorism expert of the Russian- led Collective Security
Treaty Organization. Over a leisurely coffee in the bar of the Hotel
National, he told me that many “walk- ins” who contacted Soviet
officials in his time were emotionally disturbed, but all of them had
to be assessed for possible intelligence value. “Our job was to find
espionage sources,” he said with a twinkle in his eye. “The Internet
has changed the espionage business since secret documents can be
massively downloaded by an unhappy employee,” he said, “but they
still need to be assessed by a professional.”
Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence
was clearly opportunistic. If these practices continued, they
put Snowden’s situation in a new light for me. If Russian intelligence
considered it worthwhile to send a former civilian worker at
the NSA, such as Ronald Pelton, two thousand miles from Washing-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 263
9/30/16 8:13 AM
264 | how america lost its secrets
ton, D.C., to Austria so that its specialists could debrief him on the
secrets he held in his head, it would have an even greater interest in
exfiltrating Snowden from Hong Kong to get, aside from his documents,
whatever secrets he held in his head. If Russian intelligence
were willing to opportunistically accept the delivery of U.S. secrets
from an unknown espionage source that it neither recruited nor
controlled, such as Hanssen, it would obviously have little hesitancy
in acquiring the secrets that Snowden had stolen of his own volition,
even if Snowden had acted for idealistic reasons.
If Russian intelligence focused its search pattern on disgruntled
American intelligence workers, such as Ames, it is plausible that it
spotted Snowden through his Internet rants against U.S. surveillance.
Even if it had missed Snowden in Hawaii, a disgruntled former
civilian employee at the NSA would have received its full attention
after he contacted Russian officials in Hong Kong. While the tactics
of the SVR might have changed since Cherkashin retired, its objectives
remained the same. And the NSA remained its principal target.
Nor is there any reason to doubt that it still measures success in its
ability to obtain, by whatever means, the secret sources and methods
of its adversaries. Snowden was in a position, with both the documents
he had taken and the knowledge he had in his head, to deliver
the KGB such a coup.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 264
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 26
The Handler
As for [Snowden’s] communication with the outside world, yes, I
am his main contact.
— anatoly kucherena, Moscow, 2013
On november 1, I still had not been able to make contact with
Anatoly Kucherena, and my flight back to New York was in five
days. My fixer, Zamir, had been trying to arrange an appointment
for three weeks, but he had only received one callback from Kucherena’s
assistant, Valentina Kvirvova. She wanted to know how I knew
Oliver Stone. Zamir told her of my part in Stone’s movie. That was
the last he had heard from her. Meanwhile, a Moscow- based journalist
told me that she had waited eighteen months to hear back from
Kucherena before giving up. I also learned from a Russian researcher
that Kucherena had not given a single interview since his television
interview with Sophie Shevardnadze on September 23, 2013. And
no Russian journalist, or any Moscow- based foreign journalist, had
ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point, Zamir was
becoming increasingly doubtful about my getting access to either
Kucherena or Snowden.
I turned to another contact in Moscow. When I had been investigating
the 2006 polonium poisoning of the former KGB officer
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 265
9/30/16 8:13 AM
266 | how america lost its secrets
Alexander Litvinenko, I had interviewed Andrei Lugovoy. A former
KGB officer assigned to protecting the Kremlin’s top members in the
1990s, Lugovoy later opened his own security company. In 2005, he
became a business associate of Litvinenko’s in gathering information
and made regular trips to London to meet with him. Because
he had tea with Litvinenko at the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel
in London on November 1, 2006, the day Litvinenko was poisoned,
he became the main suspect in the British investigation. He could
not be extradited, however. After reconstructing the chronology of
the crime, I established that Litvinenko had been contaminated with
polonium at a Japanese restaurant some four hours before his tea
with Lugovoy. I therefore wrote that the crime scene might not have
been at the Pine Bar, a finding that he said he greatly appreciated.
Lugovoy was elected to the Duma in 2007 and also hosted a
twenty- four- part television series on espionage for which Putin personally
decorated him. He was also now reputed to be in the inner
circle of power in Moscow. So I called him.
We arranged to meet in the bar of the Hotel National. A short
but well- built man with a bullet- style haircut, Lugovoy showed
up promptly at 1:00 p.m. After discussing some of the subsequent
developments in the still- lingering polonium investigation, I asked
him if he knew Kucherena.
“I don’t know him, but I know someone who does,” he answered.
“Why are you interested in seeing Kucherena?”
I told him that I wanted to speak to him about Snowden but I had
been unable to arrange a meeting.
“That’s no problem,” he said, raising his cell phone (which never
left his hand). He hit a number on the speed dial and spoke rapidly
in Russian (which I do not understand). He cupped his hand over the
phone and asked how long I would be in Moscow. After I told him
that I was leaving that Friday, he spoke again in Russian to the person
on the other end. “You will have an appointment on Thursday,”
he said.
Later that afternoon, Valentina, Kucherena’s assistant, called to
say that Kucherena would be happy to see me at his office at 6:00 p.m.
on Thursday. I didn’t ask Lugovoy whom he had called. Whomever
Lugovoy called obviously had the power to arrange the meeting.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 266
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Handler | 267
When I arrived at Kucherena’s office, I was with my translator
Zamir. (Kucherena did not speak English.) I arrived ten minutes
early, and a receptionist showed me into a well- lit square room
with an elegant table in the center. There was a sumptuous basket
of exotic fruits on the table and large portraits of racehorses on the
walls. Another door opened, and a tall, graceful woman came into the
room and introduced herself as Valentina. She was wearing a wellfitting
black dress, a striking jade necklace, and high heels. When
she asked whether we would like anything to drink, it seemed more
like the prelude to an elegant dinner party than an interview about
Snowden.
Valentina spoke very good English. She apologized for the delay
in responding to my requests, explaining that she received “thousands
of requests” for interviews and did not have time to answer
them. When I asked how many were answered, she shrugged and
said, “Not many.”
At that moment, Kucherena entered with a jaunty step, a cherubic
face, and untamed white hair. He was wearing gray slacks, a partially
buttoned cashmere polo sweater, and a fully engaging smile.
As I had learned from his entry in Wikipedia, he was born in a
small village in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia in 1960
and had obtained his law degree from the All- Union Correspondence
Law Institute in 1991. He opened his own law firm in Moscow
in 1995. Kucherena’s well- known friendship with Putin had
evidently not hurt his law practice. His clients had included such
well- connected defendants as Viktor Yanukovych, the president of
Ukraine overthrown in 2014; Grigory Leps, a Russian singer blacklisted
by the United States for allegedly acting as a money courier
for a Eurasian criminal organization; Valentine Kovalev, a former
Russian minister of justice charged with corruption; and Suleyman
Kerimov, a civil servant from Dagestan who had amassed an estimated
fortune of $7.1 billion. Kerimov had recently been charged
for manipulating the price of potash in Belarus. Most of these clients
were reputed to be part of Putin’s inner circle.
To break the ice, I asked Kucherena about Oliver Stone. I knew
he had a small role in Stone’s forthcoming movie, in which he plays
Snowden’s lawyer in Moscow.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 267
9/30/16 8:13 AM
268 | how america lost its secrets
“I was impressed by how few takes he needed to shoot my scene,”
he answered.
“How did you come to be Snowden’s lawyer?” I asked.
“Snowden picked me from a roster of fifteen lawyers with which
he had been provided.”
Because Snowden did not speak or read Russian, I asked Kucherena
about how Snowden had come to pick him from the roster. Could
he have known about his connections?
“I suppose it was because of my record in defending human
rights,” Kucherena replied with a broad smile.
Kucherena went to Sheremetyevo International Airport to meet
his new client on the morning of Friday, July 12, 2013. At that point,
he said that Snowden had been held virtually incommunicado for
twenty days. Other than Russian officials, the only person he had
been allowed to see during this period was Assange’s aide, Sarah
Harrison.
“Where in the airport did you meet him?” I asked. “Was it in a
VIP lounge?”
“It was in the transit zone,” he replied coyly. “That is all I can say.”
They spoke through a translator. By this time, Harrison had sent
twenty- one countries petitions for asylum that were signed by
Snowden. Whatever their purpose, Kucherena did not consider them
helpful.
“I told him that if he wanted to get sanctuary in Russia, he would
have to immediately withdraw all the petitions in which he had
asked other countries for asylum.” Kucherena said that otherwise he
could not represent him. Snowden agreed to that condition.
Shortly before 5:00 p.m., Kucherena accompanied Snowden, who
was wearing an open- neck blue shirt and a badly creased jacket, to
area G9 in the transit zone, where they emerged from a door marked
“Authorized Personnel Only.” A number of officials in dark suits,
who Kucherena assumed were from the “special services” to protect
Snowden, were already in the room. Snowden and Harrison seated
themselves at a table. A Russian translator was also seated at the
table. At this point, thirteen invitees were ushered into the room
to witness Snowden’s first public appearance in Russia. It was rare
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 268
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Handler | 269
if not unprecedented for an American intelligence worker to seek
asylum in Russia.
These invitees included some of Putin’s close associates, progovernment
activists, and representatives of both Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch. “It was totally bizarre,” said
Tanya Lokshina, the deputy director of Human Rights Watch, who
attended. “Although it was billed as a press conference,” she recalled,
“there was no press or photographers allowed in the room.” Nor was
anyone allowed to photograph or record the event.
Snowden read from a prepared statement accusing the U.S. government
of violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
saying he was a victim of political persecution, and concluding, “I
will be submitting my request to Russia today [for asylum], and
hope it will be accepted favorably.” After answering a few questions
posed by the audience, he left the room with Kucherena and Harrison
by the same door they had entered.
In discussing this meeting, Kucherena told me that Snowden had
not intended to seek asylum in Russia when he arrived on June 23.
Because he also said he had not met Snowden prior to the day of the
conference, I asked how he knew Snowden’s intentions.
“When I accepted the case, I received Snowden’s dossier,” he
answered. “I was able to see all his interviews.”
Presumably, Snowden’s dossier included his interviews with the
FSB, the SVR, and other Russian security services. If so, it would
explain how Kucherena could be so certain that Snowden had
brought “material” with him to Russia that he had not provided to
journalists in Hong Kong. Before meeting with Kucherena, I had
met with Sophie Shevardnadze, who told me that Kucherena had
personally approved the translation of their interview into English.
So I asked Kucherena about the interview. It will be recalled that in
response to a question about whether Snowden had secret material
with him in Russia, Kucherena had said “certainly.” Was this
exchange accurate?
“It was accurate,” he answered.
Snowden, as we know, had said in Hong Kong that he had only
given journalists some of the state secrets he had stolen and that he
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 269
9/30/16 8:13 AM
270 | how america lost its secrets
deemed others too sensitive for journalists. So I wanted to find out
from Kucherena which documents Snowden had taken to Russia. I
went about it in a roundabout way. When Shevardnadze asked him
about the secret material Snowden might reveal in Russia, Kucherena
pointedly called her attention to Snowden’s CIA service, suggesting
that he might possess CIA files. I also knew that in Kucherena’s
roman à clef, he had Joshua Frost, the thinly veiled Snowden- based
character, steal a vast number of CIA documents that could do great
damage to U.S. intelligence. By retaining them, Frost made himself
a prime target of the CIA.
So I asked, “Is Joshua Frost fact or fiction?”
“I can’t tell you that,” he said. “If I said he was Snowden, it would
violate the attorney- client privilege.”
“I understand,” I said. “But did Snowden do what Frost did in
your book?”
“That is for you to decide,” he answered with a sly smile. “It’s my
first novel.”
When I asked if he could arrange for me to see Snowden, he
said that first I would have to submit my questions to Ben Wizner,
Snowden’s American lawyer at the ACLU. He made it clear to me
that the exposure of Snowden to journalists, or at least the vetting of
journalists, had been outsourced to Wizner. Kucherena was handling
Snowden’s liaisons with the Russian authorities while Wizner was
handling the Snowden narrative, including selecting the media outlets.
Presumably, Wizner had handpicked Snowden’s past interviewers
in Moscow, including Barton Gellmna, James Bamford, Brian
Williams, John Oliver, Alan Rusbridger, and Katrina vanden Heuvel.
“After that, the final decision is up to Snowden,” he said. That
seemed to conclude the interview, but as I got up to leave, he added,
“His legal defense is fairly expensive.”
Snowden had said in a BBC interview in 2015, as previously mentioned,
that he had brought enough cash to Hong Kong and Russia
to cover all of his expenses. So I asked Kucherena if Snowden had
brought his own funds.
“He was penniless when he arrived,” he replied. I found that
answer plausible because the FBI reportedly had not found a large
cash withdrawal from his account before his departure and it seemed
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 270
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Handler | 271
to me too risky for him to carry a large sum of undeclared cash
through three airports. Because large sums of cash must be declared,
the detection of the money could compromise his plan to deliver his
NSA documents. Snowden might have told the BBC he had brought
cash to allay suspicions about who was financing his stay in Moscow.
I was intrigued by this remark. Snowden, as far as I knew, didn’t
need a legal defense, because he was not charged with a crime in
Russia and the United States had no extradition treaty with Russia.
While Kucherena unfortunately did not arrange an interview with
Snowden, he did something I considered more important. He confirmed
the accuracy of his September 2013 assertion that Snowden
had brought secret material to Russia, material he had not given to
journalists in Hong Kong. After what I had learned from Cherkashin
about the lengths that Russian intelligence would go to obtain U.S.
communications intelligence secrets, I viewed Snowden’s access to
this material to be a crucially important part of the mystery.
That day, I immediately sent my questions to Ben Wizner, and I
offered to fly back to Moscow if Snowden would grant me an interview.
In March 2016, Wizner answered that Snowden had “respectfully
declined.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 271
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 272
9/30/16 8:13 AM
part five
CONCLUSIONS:
WALKING THE CAT BACK
In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able
to reason backward.
— sherlock holmes, A Study in Scarlet
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 273
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 274
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 27
Snowden’s Choices
It is the choices we make that show who we truly are.
— j. k. rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone
Russian authorities had the opportunity to thoroughly
debrief Snowden as to his motive for stealing state secrets,
whereas U.S. authorities did not. It cannot be assumed that he had
a single consistent motive in 2013. Snowden has shown, if nothing
else, that he was adaptable to changing circumstances. He might have
begun taking documents for one reason and found other reasons as
he proceeded in his quest. Many of the reported circumstances of his
activities, including his probes, contacts, theft, and escape, are disputed
by his supporters. Many of his other activities are shrouded
by the secrecy of the NSA. We do know, though, that Snowden made
four extraordinary choices during the nine- month period in 2013. If,
as is said, actions speak louder than words, Snowden’s four choices
illuminate the underlying concerns guiding his acts. In the case of a
classified intelligence breach, as in the post- action analysis of a masterful
chess game, the sequence of moves a player makes provides an
important clue to his strategy. Let us review what we have already
learned about these decisions.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 275
9/30/16 8:13 AM
276 | how america lost its secrets
The First Decision
The initial move that Snowden made in preparation for the Level 3
breach was switching jobs on March 15. Snowden chose to leave his
job as a system administrator at Dell to take one at Booz Allen as an
analyst in training. His motive could not have been money, because
it was a lower- paying position. At the time he made this choice, he
had already set up an encrypted channel with Laura Poitras for the
purpose of sending her secret material. But he did not have to change
jobs to send her important secrets. So what was his purpose in making
this fateful choice?
The job change was not necessary to expose NSA domestic activities.
If he had only wanted to be a whistle- blower, there were ample
documents about the NSA’s activities already available to him on
the NSANet. He also had access at Dell to the administrative file
that contained the FISA court orders issued every three months to
Verizon. In addition, as the NSA’s damage assessment established,
before switching jobs, Snowden had already taken most of the documents
pertaining to the NSA’s domestic operations that he could
have supplied to Poitras and Greenwald for whistle- blowing purposes.
Indeed, while still at Dell, he had told Poitras he had a copy
of Presidential Policy Directive 20, a document in which President
Obama authorized the NSA to tap into fiber cables crossing the
United States. Snowden described it to her as “a kind of martial law
for cyber operations, created by the White House.” True, he took a
more recently issued FISA order and PRISM presentation in April
after switching jobs, but he could just as easily have taken the January
2013 version of the FISA order from the administrative file of
Dell. It would have had the same explosive effect in the media.
Nor did he switch jobs to lessen the risk of getting caught. Actually,
the change put him in far greater jeopardy. At Dell, he was relatively
safe from apprehension because he could take documents,
such as the Presidential Policy Directive 20, from access points at
the NSA shared by many of his peers, making it difficult to trace the
theft. Indeed, if he just wanted to expose the NSA’s domestic operations,
he could have done the entire operation at Dell. He could even
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 276
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Snowden’s Choices | 277
have sent Poitras documents anonymously over his own Tor software
and server. And he could have remained in his self- described
“paradise” in Hawaii with his girlfriend.
When he chose to move to Booz Allen, the risk of exposure
greatly increased because of its auditing system. Any documents he
took without authorization could be traced back to him (though not
in real time). As he later told Greenwald and Poitras, he knew that
stealing documents at the Booz Allen job meant that he would either
go to prison or escape from America. He didn’t want to face prison
time, so the job change required an escape plan. As part of that plan,
soon after he started work at the Booz Allen– managed facility, he
submitted a request for a medical leave of absence.
We can safely assume that the reason he made this risky switch
in employment was that he wanted something beyond the whistleblowing
documents. He wanted documents that were not available
at the Dell job. One such document he took was the top secret
Congressional Budget Justification book for fiscal year 2013. This
“black budget,” as it is called in Congress, contained the entire intelligence
community’s priorities for, among other things, monitoring
the activities of potential adversaries and terrorist organizations.
It specified the money requested not only by the NSA but by the
CIA, the DIA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and other intelligence
services. Snowden could not have objected to the budget’s
being somehow secret or illegitimate, because it was duly approved
by both houses of Congress and the president. If it was not for purposes
of whistle- blowing, presumably he had another purpose for
taking such a document. It certainly held value to other actors. “For
our enemies, having it [the black budget] is like having the playbook
of the opposing NFL team,” said the former CIA deputy director
Morell in 2015. “I guarantee you that the SVR, the Russian foreign
intelligence service, would have paid millions of dollars for such a
document.” If unlike Ames, Hanssen, and Pelton, Snowden was not
after acquiring money, he must have seen another value in taking it.
The documents he stole at Booz Allen certainly increased his
value to adversary nations, because they included lists revealing the
NSA’s sources in Russia, China, and other foreign countries.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 277
9/30/16 8:13 AM
278 | how america lost its secrets
Snowden wanted more than just NSA secrets. He used his new
position and widened access at Booz Allen to go after secret documents
from the intelligence services of Britain, Australia, New
Zealand, and Israel. He revealed this operation only after receiving
sanctuary in Russia. He told an interviewer that by moving to his
new Booz Allen job as an infrastructure analyst, he gained the ability
to pry secrets out of the allies of the NSA. “I had a special level
of clearance, called ‘Priv Ac,’ ” he said. This “priv ac” status did not
allow him to bypass the password protection at sealed- off compartments
at the NSA, but it did allow him to request files from foreign
services cooperating with U.S. intelligence.
By way of example, he described one file from the British GCHQ
cipher service that he copied, stole, and provided to other parties. It
exposed a legally authorized British operation to collect electronic
data on terrorist matters in Pakistan by tapping into Cisco routers
used by telecom companies in Asia. This GCHQ operation, as
Snowden knew, violated neither British nor American law. He told a
BBC interviewer in regard to that file, “What’s scariest is not what
the government is doing that’s unlawful, but what they’re doing
that is completely lawful.” So his criteria for taking such documents
were not their illegality. In his five weeks at this Booz Allen job, he
also used this same newly acquired “priv ac” at the NSA to steal files
from the Israeli, Canadian, and Australian intelligence services.
Jumping from one outside contracting firm to another for the
purpose of penetrating other Western intelligence services is not
the conventional mission of a whistle- blower. In the parlance of CIA
counterintelligence, the actions of an employee of an intelligence
service who changes his jobs solely to steal the more valuable secrets
of this service is called an “expanding penetration.” It is not possible
to believe that Snowden did not know the immense damage that
the highly sensitive documents he was taking from the NSA and its
allies could cause.
His choice to switch jobs did not come out of the blue. It was not
based on serendipitously discovering the documents after he began
working at Booz Allen. As he told Lana Lam, he knew in advance
that by switching to the job at Booz Allen, he would gain the opportunity
to take the lists of NSA sources. He knew that the NSA’s
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 278
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Snowden’s Choices | 279
secretive National Threat Operations Center’s chief business was, as
its name suggests, countering direct threats from China, Russia, and
other adversary states and that to deal with these threats, the NSA
had used sophisticated methods to hack into the computers of adversaries.
The NSA was even able to remotely gain entry to adversary
computers that were not hooked into a network. “It’s no secret that
we hack China very aggressively,” Snowden later said from Moscow.
He had a planned target: getting the lists of the enemy computers
that the NSA had hacked into.
He also knew he was undertaking a dangerous enterprise. He even
mentioned the possibility that he would be “in an orange jumpsuit,
super- max prison in isolation or Guantánamo,” perhaps even
assassinated.
He knowingly chose this course presumably because he believed
the value of the secrets he would obtain by switching jobs outweighed
the risk of imprisonment. Or worse. Part of his calculus
might have been the belief that the NSA lists, GCHQ documents,
and other material in his possession could give him great leverage, if
he chose to exert it, in his future dealings with intelligence services
(including the NSA). His choice to widen his access was made, if not
to get rich, to empower himself.
The Second Decision
The second choice of consequence that Snowden made was to make
Hong Kong his first stop. He had many other options. He could have
remained in America, as almost all previous whistle- blowers had
chosen to do. If he did that, he would have to make his case in court
(and, in that case, the Level 3 documents he took might have been
retrieved before they fell into unauthorized hands). He could have
also chosen to make an escape to a country that did not have an active
extradition treaty with the United States. He could have, for example,
taken a direct flight to Brazil, which has no extradition treaty
with the United States. Brazil also had the advantage of being the
home country of Glenn Greenwald, whose cooperation he sought.
Snowden could have gone to many other countries without extradi-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 279
9/30/16 8:13 AM
280 | how america lost its secrets
tion treaties with the United States. Yet, instead, he flew to Hong
Kong, which had an extradition agreement that had been enforced
throughout the past decade with Hong Kong courts ordering the
arrest of almost every fugitive charged by U.S. authorities. He could
expect that when the United States filed a criminal complaint, Hong
Kong authorities would seize him and the alleged stolen property of
the U.S. government in his possession. Even if he were released on
bail and successfully defeated extradition in a Hong Kong court, the
Hong Kong authorities would almost certainly retain all the NSA
and GCHQ files he had gone to such lengths to steal.
His reason, as he told Greenwald, was that China could provide
him with physical protection from any countermeasures by U.S.
intelligence agencies such as “American agents . . . breaking down
the door” of the hotel room and seizing him. China also had sway
over Hong Kong’s security activities.
Hong Kong was therefore merely a protected stopover en route to
his next destination. If he had gone directly to Moscow and provided
the same journalists with the same documents at a press conference
in Moscow, his status as a whistle- blower might have been viewed
with less sympathy in the media. Even The Guardian, for example,
might have been reluctant to publish a Moscow- based story revealing
British and American communications intelligence secrets.
The Third Decision
The third choice Snowden made, and the choice that most effectively
defined him to the public, was to reveal himself as the man behind
the leak in a video in Hong Kong. He not only identified himself as
the person who stole the government documents published by The
Guardian and The Washington Post but also incriminated himself
further on camera by allowing Poitras to film him actually disclosing
the NSA’s secret operations to Greenwald. By disclosing classified
data to Greenwald, an unauthorized person, he intentionally burned
his bridges.
What makes this choice intriguing is that there was no evident
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 280
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Snowden’s Choices | 281
need for him to expose himself in this way. If he merely wanted to
be a whistle- blower, he could have, as Bradley Manning did, anonymously
sent the documents to journalists as “Citizen Four.” In fact,
in late May 2013, that was exactly what he did. He anonymously
sent Gellman the PRISM scoop, which the Post published on June 6.
He also sent Greenwald and Poitras documents while he was still
the anonymous Citizen Four. Neither Gellman nor Greenwald had
suggested the need for a face- to- face meeting with Snowden. Even
after he had revealed his true identity to Poitras and Greenwald on
June 3, the Guardian editor Ewen MacAskill offered him the option
of remaining an unnamed source for the stories. He said, as he later
told Vanity Fair, “You should remain anonymous; the stories are
just as good without you.” However, anonymity was not part of
Snowden’s long game.
The reason he gave Greenwald in Hong Kong for going public in
this way was to avoid having any suspicion fall on his co- workers at
the NSA. Yet in the initial stories published by Greenwald, Poitras,
and Gellman, Snowden had not allowed the reporters to identify him
by either name or position. If he did not act to deflect suspicion from
his co- workers for the initial investigation, why do it a week later?
In the intervening week, the FBI had already launched its criminal
investigation. In any case, he did not need to be the subject of a documentary
film to take sole responsibility for stealing state secrets. He
could have simply allowed Greenwald to identify him by name as
the source in the stories.
One thing that Snowden could not accomplish by anonymously
transferring the documents to journalists was a starring role in the
drama. If he had appeared digitally masked in Poitras’s video with
an altered voice, he would not achieve fame. To do that, he needed to
allow Poitras to film him committing the crime of turning over NSA
documents to Greenwald. This video was also part of his advance
planning. Indeed, one reason he chose Poitras was that she was a
prizewinning documentary filmmaker. Snowden, while he was still
working at the NSA in March 2013, made it clear how he intended
to use Poitras’s filmmaking skills. He told her, “My personal desire is
that you paint the target directly on my back.” Making himself the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 281
9/30/16 8:13 AM
282 | how america lost its secrets
on- camera star of a twenty- hour- long reality show, edited first into
a video and then a full- length documentary, transformed him in the
public’s mind into a hero.
It would be a mistake to assume that the central role he gave
himself was simply an exercise in narcissism. After the video was
released, he was no longer a near nonentity servicing a computer
system at a backwater NSA base in Hawaii. He had emerged from
the shadowy world of electronic intelligence to become one of the
most famous whistle- blowers in modern history. It was a mantle
that would allow him to also become a leading advocate of privacy
and encryption rights, as well as the leading opponent of NSA spying.
While this remarkable transformation might not have been his
entire motive, it was certainly the result of the choice he made to go
public.
The Fourth Decision
The final choice he made was to board a nonstop flight to Moscow
on June 23. Once the U.S. criminal complaint was unsealed on June
21, he needed to leave Hong Kong; his continued presence would
have been a complication for the Chinese president, Xi, scheduled
soon to meet President Obama. His only route out of Hong Kong
went through two adversaries of the United States: China and Russia.
China, as far as is known, did not offer him sanctuary. According
to one U.S. diplomat cited by The New York Times, China might have
already obtained copies of Snowden’s NSA files and did not want the
problem of having Snowden defect to Beijing. In any case, if it had
not already acquired the files, it could assume it would receive that
intelligence data from its Russian ally in the intelligence war. Whatever
its reason, China did not use its considerable power in Hong
Kong to block Snowden’s exit.
Nor did Snowden obtain a visa to any country in Latin America or
elsewhere during his monthlong stay in Hong Kong. As in the oftcited
Sherlock Holmes clue of the dog that did not bark, Snowden’s
lack of any visas in his passport strongly suggests that he had not
made plans to go anyplace but where he actually went: Moscow. His
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 282
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Snowden’s Choices | 283
actions here, including his contacts with Russian officials in Hong
Kong, speak louder than his words.
Just as he believed the Chinese intelligence service could protect
him in Hong Kong from a physical attack by agents of the United
States, he could assume that the FSB could protect him from them
in Moscow. He was not entirely naive about its capabilities. During
his service in the CIA, he had taken a monthlong training course at
the CIA’s “farm” at Fort Peary, in which counterintelligence officers
taught about the capabilities of the Russian security services. He
couldn’t have believed that Russia would allow a defector from the
NSA who claimed to have had access to the NSA’s sources in Russia
and China to leave Moscow before its security services obtained that
information.
It is not uncommon for a defector to change sides in order to find
a better life for himself in another country. Some defectors flee to
escape a repressive government or to find one in which they believe
they are more closely attuned to its values. Russia, however, is ordinarily
not the country of choice for someone such as Snowden seeking
greater civil liberties and personal freedom. So why did Snowden
choose Russia for his new life?
The four choices just discussed that Snowden made, taken together,
show that Snowden was determined to succeed where others
before him had failed. He not only wanted to take full credit for
stealing files from the NSA but also wanted to escape any American
retribution for his act. His decision suggests to me a highly intelligent,
carefully calculating man who was hell- bent on finding a new
life for himself in a foreign country. A common thread that runs
through these four choices is a willingness to do whatever was necessary
to achieve this new life, including disregarding his oath to
protect secrets and instead transporting them on thumb drives to
a foreign country. To protect himself, he was also willing to rely on
the influence of adversary intelligence services in Hong Kong and
put himself in the hands of Russian authorities in Moscow. He was
also willing to use some of his classified documents as a medium of
exchange, if not bait, with journalists to get the public attention he
sought.
These choices paid off for Snowden, the new hero of millions. In
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 283
9/30/16 8:13 AM
284 | how america lost its secrets
Moscow, he could enjoy a safe life, free from the threats of a CIA
rendition team dropping from the sky or extradition proceedings. He
was now under the protection of Putin’s Russia. The press had a field
day with the domestic surveillance documents that he gave them. As
far as Snowden was concerned, as he told Gellman on December 21,
2013, in Moscow, “The mission’s already accomplished.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 284
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 28
The Espionage Source
The government’s investigation failed. [It] didn’t know what was
taken.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2014
In moscow, I had learned that Russian intelligence services use
the broad, umbrella term “espionage source” to describe moles,
volunteers, and anyone else who delivers another state’s secrets
to it. It applies not only to documents but to the secret knowledge
that such a source is able to recall and includes both controlled and
uncontrolled bearers of secrets. It is also a job description that fit
Edward Snowden in June 2013.
Unless one is willing to believe that the Putin regime acted out of
purely altruistic motives in exfiltrating this American intelligence
worker to Moscow, the only plausible explanation for its actions
in Hong Kong was that it recognized Snowden’s potential as an
espionage source. Snowden’s open disillusionment with the NSA
presented the very situation that the Russian intelligence services
specialized in exploiting. He had also revealed to reporters in Hong
Kong that he had deliberately gained access to the NSA’s sources
and methods and that he had taken highly classified documents to
Hong Kong. He further disclosed that before leaving the NSA, he
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 285
9/30/16 8:13 AM
286 | how america lost its secrets
had gained access to the lists of computers that the NSA had penetrated
in foreign countries. He even went so far as to describe to
these journalists the secrets that he had taken as a “single point of
failure” for the NSA. And aside from the documents he had copied,
he claimed that the secret knowledge in his head, if he disclosed it,
would wreak havoc on U.S. intelligence. “If I were providing information
that I know, that’s in my head, to some foreign government,
the US intelligence community would . . . see sources go dark that
were previously productive,” he told the editor of The Guardian in
Moscow.
In short, he advertised possessing priceless data that the Russian
intelligence services had been seeking, with little success, for
the past six decades. These electronic files could provide it with the
keys to unlock the NSA’s entire kingdom of electronic spying. Could
any world- class intelligence service ignore such a prize? To miss the
opportunity to get its hands on such a potential espionage source
would be nothing short of gross negligence.
In fact, this golden opportunity was not missed in Hong Kong.
Even if the Russian intelligence service had not previously had
him in its sights— which, as discussed earlier, appears to me to be
extremely unlikely— he made contact with Russian officials in Hong
Kong, and Putin personally approved allowing Snowden to come to
Russia.
This decision made it possible for Snowden, without an entry
visa to Russia, or, for that matter, any other country, to check in
and board an Aeroflot flight to Moscow. We also know that a special
operation was mounted to take Snowden off the plane once it landed
in Moscow. Such an operation could not have been executed without
advance planning. Nor would he be removed from the plane without
a plan for his stay in Russia. Once Putin approved it, there is little
reason to doubt that the plans to get Snowden to Moscow, and whatever
cover stories were deemed necessary to obscure them, had been
carried out professionally by Russia’s special services.
When an intelligence service makes such elaborate preparations
for extracting a foreign intelligence worker, it presumably also
expects to debrief him or her on arrival. Pelton, for example, who
had access to far less valuable information than had Snowden, was
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 286
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Espionage Source | 287
held incommunicado in Vienna for two weeks during his debriefing.
It would be inconceivable for an intelligence service to bring
a potential espionage source such as Snowden to Russia and allow
him to catch the next plane to Latin America. The false report provided
to the press that Snowden was flying there was likely nothing
more than a smoke screen to confuse foreign observers while he was
receiving his initial debriefing and evaluation.
When it comes to the esoteric enterprise of reconstructing the
work of U.S. communications intelligence, military as well as civilian
experts in cryptology, computer sciences, and communications are
necessary. Unlike in the case of Pelton, Snowden, according to Anatoly
Kucherena, had secret material in his possession. Even if Russian
intelligence had already acquired copies of the electronic files
prior to Snowden’s arrival in Moscow, Snowden’s interpretation of
them would be part of the debriefing because intelligence data needs
to be put in context.
“This debriefing could not be done overnight,” according to a former
high- ranking officer in the GRU, the Russian military intelligence
service. “There is no way that Snowden would not be fully
debriefed,” he said. He also said GRU specialists in signals intelligence
would be called in.
Putin’s approval of the Snowden operation was not without consequences.
Not only did Obama make good on his threat to cancel
the pre- Olympics summit with Putin, but also, as it turned out,
the Snowden exfiltration proved a turning point in the “reset” of
U.S.- Russian relations. Having to accept the onus of declining relations
with the Obama administration, Putin, it seems safe to assume,
attempted to get the bonus of the NSA’s communications intelligence
from Snowden. The GRU, the SVR, and other Russian intelligence
services would not stop questioning Snowden, even if it took
years, until they had squeezed out of him whatever state secrets he
had. Because Snowden was rewarded with sanctuary, a residence, and
bodyguards, there is no reason to doubt that he refused to accommodate
his hosts. While he might continue to see himself as a whistleblower
on a supranational scale, as far as Russian intelligence was
concerned, he was an espionage source.
For an intelligence service, the game is not over when it obtains
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 287
9/30/16 8:13 AM
288 | how america lost its secrets
state secrets. It still needs to fog over the extent of its coup, as said
earlier, to prolong the value of the espionage. Hence it is likely that
the story that Snowden had thoroughly destroyed all the stolen
data in the month prior to departing for Russia, as well as the story
that he had turned down all requests to be questioned by the FSB
and other Russian intelligence officials, was part of the legend constructed
for him. The repetitions of these uncorroborated claims in
his press interviews might also have enhanced his public image for
the ACLU effort to get clemency for him. Even so, in view of the
importance of such communications intelligence to Russia, it would
be the height of naïveté for U.S. or British intelligence to accept such
claims as anything more than camouflage.
As for Snowden’s motive, I see no reason to doubt his explanation
that he stole NSA documents to expose its surveillance because
he believed that it was an illicit intrusion into the privacy of individuals.
Such disaffection is not a unique situation in the intelligence
business. Many of Russia’s worldwide espionage sources before
Snowden were also dissatisfied employees who had access to classified
secrets. Like some of them, Snowden used his privileged access
to reveal what he considered the improper activities of the organization
for which he worked. In that sense, I fully accept that he began
as a whistle- blower, not as a spy. It was also as a whistle- blower that
he contacted Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald, and Barton Gellman,
who published the scoops he provided in Der Spiegel, The Guardian,
and The Washington Post.
Snowden’s penetration went beyond whistle- blowing, however.
In the vast number of files he copied were documents that contained
the NSA’s most sensitive sources and methods that had little if anything
to do with domestic surveillance or whistle- blowing.
Snowden could not have acted entirely alone. It will be recalled
that the deepest part of his penetration was during the five weeks
he worked at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii as
a contract employee of Booz Allen Hamilton. It was there that he
copied Level 3 files, including the so- called road map to the gaps
in American intelligence. During this period, Snowden had neither
the passwords nor the system administrator’s privileges that would
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 288
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The Espionage Source | 289
allow him to copy, transfer, and steal the electronic files. He therefore
must have obtained that assistance from someone who had the
passwords and privileges. Other workers there might have shared
his sensibilities and antipathy toward NSA surveillance. It therefore
seems entirely plausible that he found a co- worker willing to
cooperate or, vice versa, a co- worker found him. Snowden might
not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives or affiliations,
but without some co- worker’s providing him with entry to
the sealed- off computers, he could not have carried out the penetration.
To our knowledge, whoever helped him evidently did not want
to expose himself to prosecution or defect from the NSA. That was
Snowden’s role. By accepting the sole blame in the video that Poitras
made about him in Hong Kong, Snowden shielded anyone else from
suspicion, which was, as he told Poitras, his purpose. Whoever helped
him may still be working at the NSA.
To be sure, there remains that other glaring gap in the chain of
events that led Snowden to Moscow: his whereabouts and activities
during his first eleven days in Hong Kong. Mike Rogers, the
chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, even suggested,
without any evidence, that Snowden might have been taken
to mainland China during this period. What drove his speculation
was the admission of U.S. intelligence that despite its vast global
resources for searching credit card charges, banking transactions,
hotel registrations, e- mails, police records, and even CCTV cameras,
neither it nor its allies were able to find a trace of Snowden during
that time. It was, in a phrase made famous by the former secretary
of defense Donald Rumsfeld, “a known unknown.” Just as likely he
could have been staying in a well- prepared safe house anywhere in
Hong Kong or even at the home of an unknown associate. All that is
really known is that soon after he emerged from this venue, moved
to the Mira hotel, and gave his celebrated interview to journalists, he
was safely settled in Russia.
Snowden’s actions appear squarely at odds with his assertions of
serving his country’s interests. Even accepting that he began with a
sincere desire to be a world- class whistle- blower, his mission evolved,
deliberately or not, into one that led him to disclose key communica-
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 289
9/30/16 8:13 AM
290 | how america lost its secrets
tions intelligence secrets to a foreign power with an agenda that is
hardly aligned with his country’s interests. A defector is defined in
the Cambridge English Dictionary as “a person who leaves his or her
own country or group to join an opposing one.” Snowden’s actions
fit that description. In the end, it is Snowden’s actions, not his words,
that matter.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 290
9/30/16 8:13 AM
c h a p t e r 29
The “War on Terror” After Snowden
Because of a number of unauthorized disclosures and a lot of
hand- wringing over the government’s role in the effort to try to
uncover these terrorists, there have been some policy and legal
and other actions that make our ability collectively, internationally,
to find these terrorists much more challenging.
— cia director john brennan,
in response to the Paris terrorist attack, November 2015
On the evening of November 13, 2015, nine jihadist terrorists
acting on behalf of ISIS brought normal life in Paris to a
screeching halt. Three suicide bombers blew themselves up at the
stadium at Saint- Denis while President Hollande was inside attending
a match between France and Germany. Other terrorists that
night killed 130 people at cafés, restaurants, and a theater. Three
hundred and eighty- eight others were wounded in the carnage.
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a twenty- eight- year- old Belgian citizen of
Moroccan origins who served ISIS as a logistics officer in Syria in
2014, planned the attack over many months with the help of others
in Syria. To organize it, they smuggled three suicide bombers into
Europe through Greece, raised financing, set up a base in the Molenbeek
section of Brussels, imported deactivated assault weapons from
Slovenia that were restored by a technician, bought ammunition,
acquired suicide vests, obtained “burner” cell phones, rented cars,
and, two months before the attack, rented three additional apartments
under fake identities to conceal the operation. Finally, in
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 291
9/30/16 8:13 AM
292 | how america lost its secrets
November, they made online bookings for quarters in Paris for the
nine attackers. Even though Abaaoud was well- known to Western
intelligence services, none of the communications surrounding the
preparations for the attack came to the attention of the NSA or its
allied services in Europe. A critical find for the investigators enabled
them to unravel the chain that eventually led them to the perpetrators,
but it had nothing to do with electronic surveillance. A cell
phone belonging to one of them was found by the security forces,
following a broad search they conducted, which included trash cans
situated in the vicinity of the concert halls. So this breakthrough in
the investigation had nothing to do with systematic data analysis
conducted prior to the attack.
Indeed, in the sequence of the Paris events, as in other terror
events, the challenge is not just bringing culprits to justice. It is preventing
the terrorists from carrying out their attack to begin with.
Police cannot constantly protect “soft targets” such as restaurants,
cafés, theaters, and street gatherings. The only practical means by
which a government can prevent such attacks is to learn in advance
their planning and preparations. One means of acquiring this information
is by listening in on the channels through which members
of loosely knit terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, communicate.
This form of intelligence gathering obviously works best so long
as the terrorists remain unaware that the communication channels
they are using are being monitored. Once they find out that their
messages and conversations are being intercepted, they will likely
find a safer means to communicate important information. For that
reason, communications intelligence organizations keep the sources
and methods they employ for monitoring these channels in a tightly
sealed envelope of secrecy.
Yet, in June 2013, the NSA found that envelope had been breached
by Snowden, who knowingly compromised three programs that it
used to keep track of terrorist organizations around the world. The
first system he divulged, and the one that received the most public
attention, was what the NSA called the “215” program because it
had been authorized by Section 215 of the Patriot Act of 2001. This
program compiled the billing records of every phone call made in
America. The data included the number called and the duration of
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 292
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The “War on Terror” After Snowden | 293
the call but not the name of the caller. This anonymous data was
archived into a huge database. The idea was that when any foreigner
on the FBI’s watch list of terrorists called any number in the United
States, the FBI could trace that person’s entire chain of telephone
contacts to try to determine if he or she was connected to a known
terrorist cell. There was, however, a major flaw in this program: it
did not cover e- mail and other Internet messaging, which by 2013
had largely replaced telephone calls. In addition, terrorist organizations,
after the tracking down of Osama bin Laden in 2011, had
become fully aware of the vulnerability of telephoning overseas. So
although the NSA could cite a handful of early successes that “215”
yielded, Snowden’s exposure of it did only limited damage.
Snowden did vastly more damage by revealing the PRISM program,
also called “702” because it was authorized in 2008 by Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Its effectiveness
proceeded from the misplaced confidence that terrorist organizations
in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan had in the encryption and
other safeguards used by giant Internet companies, such as Apple,
Google, Twitter, and WhatsApp. They evidently had not known
that in 2007 the NSA found a way to intercept this data before it
was encrypted. The Internet, despite metaphors such as “the cloud”
and “cyberspace,” initially travels through fiber cables, almost all of
which run through the United States and its Five Eyes allies. So by
2013 the NSA was able to access 91 percent of the Internet before
it was encrypted. This so- called upstream data included Google
searches, tweets on Twitter, social media postings, Skype conversations,
messages on Xbox Live, instant messages sent over WhatsApp,
and e- mails sent via the Internet. The NSA could also read concealed
messages in photographs and online game moves. According to a
declassified 2015 inspector general’s analysis, the actual interceptions
in this program in 2013 were mainly limited to the communications
of preselected foreign terrorists.
Until the Snowden breach was revealed on June 6, 2013, this program
gave U.S. intelligence a valuable tool for gathering unexpected
intelligence. Snowden must have been aware of how highly the NSA
valued this program because, according to the documents he released,
PRISM was “the number one source of raw intelligence used for
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 293
9/30/16 8:13 AM
294 | how america lost its secrets
NSA analytic reports.” From the continued use of these intercepted
channels by suspected terrorists on the NSA’s watch lists, it could
be reasonably assumed that these users were unaware of the NSA’s
capacity to intercept their messages on the unencrypted Internet.
Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM
program produced actionable intelligence until the time when
Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during
the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveillance
powers, among other things, “uncovered illicit financing networks,
detected suspect travel, discovered ties to aviation schools,
linked transportation employees to associates of terrorists, drew
connections to the illicit purchases of arms, tied U.S. persons to Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, and discovered a suspect terrorist on the
no-fly list who was already in the United States.” More specifically,
just between 2007 and 2013, according to the testimony of NSA and
FBI officials, it resulted in the preempting of at least forty-five terrorist
attacks. Almost all of the thwarted attacks occurred outside
the jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore did not result in
U.S. prosecutions. One of the plots that targeted Americans was a
planned attack using high explosives on the subways in Grand Central
station and the Times Square station at rush hour in New York
City in 2009. It was averted after British intelligence supplied the
NSA with the e- mail address of the terrorist suspect Najibullah Zazi
in Aurora, Colorado. The PRISM surveillance program then traced it
to an IP address on the watch list associated with Rashid Rauf, an al-
Qaeda bomb maker in Pakistan. Zazi, evidently unaware that e- mails
sent via Yahoo! could be intercepted before they were encrypted
by Yahoo!, continued sending e- mails to Rauf as he prepared to
assemble the bombs in early September 2009. As a result, the NSA
search of its database yielded e- mails from Zazi discussing the proportions
of explosives to be used. These e- mails recovered through
the PRISM program, according to an analysis done for the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 2014, provided the “critical lead” that led to
the arrest of Zazi and his confederates before they could detonate
bombs in the subways of New York City. The members of the House
and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence had no doubt that the
702 program played a key role in aborting this plot they had been
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 294
9/30/16 11:09 AM
The “War on Terror” After Snowden | 295
secretly briefed on in 2009. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of the Senate
Select Committee, pointed out with privileged knowledge that it
saved “subway cars stuffed to the gunwales with people”; Representative
Mike Rogers also spoke with privileged knowledge when he
said on June 9, 2013, referring to the 702 program, “I can tell you in
the Zazi case in New York, it’s exactly the program that was used.”
The third NSA program of interest to terrorists that Snowden
revealed was called XKeyscore. Using Internet data from PRISM, the
NSA had created the equivalent of digital fingerprints for suspected
foreign terrorists on watch lists. The “fingerprint” for each suspect
was based on his or her search pattern on the Internet. These algorithms
made it difficult for suspects to hide on the Internet by using
aliases. Once a suspect was “fingerprinted,” any attempt to evade
surveillance by using a different computer and another user name
would be detected by the XKeyscore algorithms. The “fingerprints”
only worked so long as XKeyscore remained secret from those on
the watch list. After Snowden exposed it, suspects could evade surveillance
by changing their search patterns when they changed their
aliases.
Further enabling furtive Internet users to evade the surveillance
of the government, Snowden offered specific tips about the secret
sources and methods used by both the NSA and the British GCHQ.
He revealed in a public interview, for example, that the GCHQ
had deployed the first “full- take” Internet interceptor that “snarfs
everything, in a rolling buffer to allow retroactive investigation
without missing a single bit.” When asked how to circumvent it,
he replied, “You should never route through or peer with the UK
under any circumstances. Their fibers are radioactive, and even the
Queen’s selfies to the pool boy get logged.” Aside from this warning
about using Internet providers whose wiring passes through Britain,
he also warned Internet users about trusting the encryption of any
U.S.- based Internet company because of their secret relationships
with the NSA. He added that the NSA considered “telecom collaborators
to be the jewels in their crown of omniscience.” He also gave a
warning about the attention the NSA was paying to “jihadi forums.”
He said that to avoid being automatically “targeted” by the NSA,
one needed to avoid them.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 295
9/30/16 8:13 AM
296 | how america lost its secrets
These precise tips for evading U.S. and British surveillance were
not accidentally leaked. Snowden supplied them in written answers
to interrogatives sent to him by Poitras and Appelbaum in May
2013 while he was still on the NSA payroll. He also carefully orchestrated
the exposure of the PRISM surveillance programs, precisely
specifying, as Greenwald writes in his book No Place to Hide, who
was to release the “scoops” in which newspapers. He gave Gellman a
seventy- two- hour ultimatum for exposing PRISM, as we know. He
further provided Poitras with well- organized files for publications
revealing, among other things, that the NSA had paid RSA, a leading
computer security provider, to build flawed encryption protocols,
which allowed the NSA to read encrypted messages on computers
and online video games. In short, he used these journalists to accomplish
his purpose. In light of the way he micromanaged the leaks, it is
difficult to conclude that he did not deliberately plan to compromise
and render useless these U.S. and British operations.
Whatever he intended, he clearly succeeded in blowing the cover
off NSA’s operations authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act for monitoring terrorists’ activities. After all, terrorist
groups are no different from other criminal enterprises in their need
to keep their communications secret from the authorities pursuing
them. If they find out that the police are tapping their phone lines or
intercepting other channels of communication, they can be expected
to either stop using them or use them to divert attention away from
their real plans.
In addition, Snowden suggested an alternative means to those who
wanted to evade government surveillance. He recommended that
they use end- to- end encryption, which results in messages being
encrypted before they are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald,
for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone
to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately
compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in
Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised
the NSA’s interception of concealed messages by potential terrorists
on the Internet. We cannot know whether or not any of the jihadists
involved in subsequent terrorist attacks (such as those in Paris or
San Bernardino, California, in 2015) would have used the Internet
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 296
9/30/16 8:13 AM
The “War on Terror” After Snowden | 297
or phone lines more freely if Snowden had not divulged the NSA’s
surveillance of them, but there can be little doubt that his breach
of the secrecy envelope had serious consequences for U.S., French,
and British intelligence. For example, François Molins, the former
head prosecutor of Paris, pointed out that after the Paris attacks the
French investigation had run into an obstacle: end- to- end encryption.
“We can’t penetrate into certain conversations,” he said about
“Telegram,” the end- to- end encryption program that Snowden had
repeatedly recommended, and as a result “we’re dealing with this
gigantic black hole, a dark zone where there are just so many dangerous
things going on.”
The effects of Snowden’s intervention were soon realized by the
CIA, according to Michael Morell, who had closely followed intelligence
about terrorist groups in the Middle East ever since he had
acted as the CIA’s briefer for the president on the day of the 9/11
attack. “Terrorist organizations around the world were already starting
to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,”
Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, communications
sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more
disturbing, suspects on the CIA’s watch list began switching to an
“encryption platform.” Instead of continuing to rely on the Internet
to protect their messages, they increased their use of end- to- end
encryption, which defeated the effectiveness of PRISM’s capturing
Internet traffic before it was encrypted by Internet companies.
Indeed, after the Snowden breach, ISIS even provided a tutorial on
its websites about using end- to- end encryption. So Morell and others
at the CIA helplessly watched as this previous source of unexpected
intelligence went dark.
What further heightened Morell’s concern about this sudden loss
of NSA intelligence from these sources was the discovery by the
CIA in January 2014 of two documents, one 26 pages and the other
19 pages, on a captured ISIS computer in Syria. These documents
discussed the advantages of using bubonic plague germs and other
biological weapons against Western civilian populations. They even
provided a religious justification for using biological warfare against
civilian targets in the West. In addition, evidence uncovered from
the safe house used by the ISIS terrorists involved in the Paris attack
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 297
9/30/16 8:13 AM
298 | how america lost its secrets
suggested they had been interested in acquiring radioactive isotopes.
Without the advance warning that the NSA’s surveillance of the preencrypted
Internet had provided in the past, could the CIA now contend
with such unconventional threats?
The NSA also saw its sources disappearing from its surveillance.
Before the Snowden breach, the FBI, the CIA, and the DIA, which
were the NSA’s partners in the PRISM program, had compiled a
watch list of highly active foreign terrorist targets for the NSA’s
PRISM program. These “targets” included logistics officers, bomb
builders, weapons specialists, and suicide bomber recruiters. Until
June 6, 2013, many of these targets had frequently used Internet
services, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Xbox Live, to send what they
believed would be hidden messages. After the PRISM story broke
in The Washington Post on June 6, the NSA “saw one after another
target go dark,” according to a senior NSA executive involved in
that surveillance. The NSA has watched about one thousand of
these targets take “steps to remove themselves from our visibility.”
According to the NSA’s deputy director, Richard Ledgett, in 2016,
the vanishings included a group planning attacks in Europe and the
United States.
Admiral Rogers, the new NSA director, was asked about the damage
done by Snowden. He was blunt and direct. Asked in February
2015 whether or not the disclosures by Snowden had reduced the
NSA’s ability to pursue terrorists, he answered, “Have I lost capability
that we had prior to the revelations? Yes.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 298
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epilogue
The Snowden Effect
Governments can reduce our dignity to something like that of
tagged animals.
— edward snowden, Moscow, 2016
The enormous effect that Snowden has had on America can
be divided into three categories: the good, the bad, and the ugly.
The good proceeds from the national conversation on the issue of
surveillance in 2013 that his disclosures ignited. There is no denying
that Snowden’s dramatic disclosures, despite the damage they did to
U.S. intelligence, accomplished a salutary service in alerting both the
public and the government to the potential danger of a surveillance
leviathan. The steady expansion of the NSA’s collection of telephone
billing records under the cloak of secrecy, for example, revealed a
bureaucratic mission creep that badly needed to be brought under
closer oversight by Congress. Snowden’s breach provided another
benefit. It pointed to the security dangers proceeding from the NSA’s
headlong rush to outsource its computer servicing to private contractors.
Opening this back door, as Snowden amply demonstrated,
greatly increased the risk that America’s secrets would fall into the
hands of its enemies. An intelligence service has little if any value if
it cannot keep secret its sources from its adversaries.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 299
9/30/16 8:13 AM
300 | how america lost its secrets
The conversation that Snowden began is necessary for another
reason. The relentless growth of data- collection technology had
come to endanger personal privacy. Smart phones in our pockets,
GPS recorders in our cars, fitness bands on our wrists, CCTV monitors
in stores, and network- connected devices in our homes leave a
digital trail of every move we make. The government can subpoena
as part of an investigation, as we know, our personal data, including
our Internet searches, social media postings, electronic communications,
and credit card records. In addition, the government has its
own tools of surveillance. Snowden, by disclosing that the government
was vacuuming in phone billing records and Internet activities,
hit a sore spot in the public’s consciousness. How far did the
surveillance state extend? Did an Orwellian government intercept
private conversations of American citizens? Should Apple, Google,
and other Internet giants use a doomsday system of encryption to
prevent court- ordered searches for data? Were there adequate safeguards
against government snooping?
In popular culture, surveillance is often associated with the sinister
measures taken by a totalitarian government to suppress individual
dissidence. On television we see government agents in black
vans operating arrays of tape recorders, following people on the
street, and breaking into homes to steal files and tap telephone lines.
In the 2006 Academy Award– winning film The Lives of Others, for
example, East Germany’s Stasi police use listening devices to gather
information to blackmail intellectuals to assist in the eradication of
dissent. East Germany was not the only place in the Cold War era
using surveillance to suppress dissent. Even in the United States
in the 1950s and 1960s, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI bugged the phones
of civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr., to root out
suspected subversive elements. Most Americans viewed this as a
reprehensible use of government surveillance, and the very mention
of the word, even before Snowden’s disclosure, evoked disquiet
among the public. But what Snowden exposed was not any sort of
rogue operation but programs authorized by the president and Congress
and approved by fifteen federal judges. If one accepts that the
nation’s security remains a legitimate function of government, the
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 300
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epilogue | 301
issue is not surveillance itself; it is the proper way such surveillance
is conducted.
The NSA surveillance of telephone records that Snowden exposed
was different in its intent from the surveillance of the Cold War. Its
target was a selected list of 300 to 400 foreign jihadists living abroad.
Many of these individuals residing in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan had
been identified by the FBI and the CIA as active bomb makers, assassins,
and weapon specialists. This was not domestic surveillance, but
when any of these suspects telephoned a phone number in the United
States, the NSA checked the billing records of the domestic phone
number that had been called to determine all the calls emanating
from it. The purpose of this search was to assemble for the FBI a list
of contacts that a foreign suspect might have in the United States. To
expedite this task, it obtained from telephone companies the billing
records, without any names attached, of all their users and stored
them in a single archive under its control. While this surveillance
targeted foreign terrorists, not domestic dissent, the bulk collection
of phone records had the potential for more nefarious use, a danger
that Snowden brought to the public’s attention. As a result, Congress
modified the Patriot Act so that billing records would remain
on the computers of the phone companies for a limited time rather
than on those of the NSA. The NSA could still search them after
obtaining an order from the FISA court, though it could not archive
the data for future use, so little harm to individual privacy could be
done. Snowden deserves a large share of the credit not only for this
change but for making the public aware of domestic surveillance.
The bad part of the equation is that Snowden deeply damaged an
intelligence system that American presidents have relied on for over
six decades. The heart of that system was the sources and methods
used to intercept other nations’ communications. Until Snowden, the
NSA’s wall of secrecy kept these nations from knowing about them
or, in some cases, even realizing that they were vulnerable to interception.
For example, as previously discussed, the NSA had developed
the remarkable ability to tap into an adversary nation’s computers,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 301
9/30/16 8:13 AM
302 | how america lost its secrets
even though they had been isolated from any network. This innovation
had provided President Obama and his national security team
an edge of which our adversaries were unaware from 2008 to 2013.
However, Snowden deliberately nullified this advantage in 2013 by
revealing this technology (which was published in The New York
Times and other newspapers). The vast number of documents that
he compromised contained many other secret sources and methods.
The full extent of the damage Snowden did may never be fully
known, even though the Department of Defense spent the better
part of a year, and tens of thousands of investigative man- hours,
trying to sort out just the compromised sources and methods pertaining
to military and cyber- defense operations. In addition to the
direct and significant cost to taxpayers represented by this investigation,
one measure of how serious the loss has been was revealed by
Michael McConnell, the vice- chairman of the company for which
Snowden had worked at the time of the breach. McConnell stated
publicly, “Snowden has compromised more capability than any spy
in U.S. history.” McConnell had no obvious reason to exaggerate the
loss because his company, Booz Allen Hamilton, was partly responsible
for the damage. It hired Snowden, as will be recalled, even after
its vetters had detected an untruthful statement in his application.
McConnell said, “This will have impact on our ability to do our
mission for the next twenty to thirty years.” By any measure, two
decades of lost intelligence is a steep price to pay.
To be sure, the practical value of peacetime intelligence about
the activities of adversary states is not always evident. What is far
clearer to the public is the value of intelligence that can thwart terrorist
attacks against subways, theaters, and other civilian targets.
We have seen that Snowden also deprived the NSA of much of the
effectiveness of its PRISM program by revealing it, through the articles
published at his specific behest in The Guardian and The Washington
Post that explained how it worked. This single revelation
compromised a system, duly authorized by Congress and the president,
that had been the government’s single most effective tool for
learning in advance about attacks in America and Europe by jihadist
terrorists.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 302
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epilogue | 303
The ugly part of the equation is the rampant growth of the public’s
distrust of the institutions of government in America. According
to recent polls, 4 out of 5 Americans distrust the government.
Snowden did not create this new age of distrust, but his disclosures
greatly contributed to it, as well as to the worldwide distrust of the
U.S. government. This post- Snowden distrust is especially powerful
in the section of the international media that assisted Snowden in
his release of NSA documents. In defending Snowden, it questions
the truthfulness of any government official or member of Congress
who discloses information contradicting Snowden’s claims or showing
that there was some benefit to the multibillion- dollar intelligence
system that he compromised. Even Senator Dianne Feinstein,
who herself fought the secrecy of the CIA for years, was not exempt
from such distrust when she asserted in June 2013 that the program
that Snowden had compromised had helped avert a bloody carnage
on the New York subways in September 2009, as mentioned earlier.
That she was the ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, and briefed on the program at the time of the attack,
did not prevent a distrustful press from attempting to impeach her
credibility and that of the fourteen other members of the Senate
Select Committee and the twenty members of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence who had affirmed her assertion.
In this culture of distrust, any claim that any of the secrets that
Snowden disclosed could have caused any harm is preemptively dismissed
as government propaganda. Snowden’s word also is taken
over that of government officials because, as The Nation explained,
Snowden speaks “truth to power.” Such a formulation of distrust
allows those who accept it to dismiss all assertions of government
officials representing power who contradict Snowden’s version of
reality. Such is Snowden’s glorified aura that even when his revelations
expose purported U.S. government actions in foreign lands,
including the alleged tapping of friendly government officials’ conversations,
such as Angela Merkel’s, these are implicitly conflated
with the NSA’s domestic surveillance program, around which a
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 303
9/30/16 8:13 AM
304 | how america lost its secrets
popular movement has emerged questioning its purpose and methods.
As a result, a legitimate debate on what should constitute our
domestic liberties— and potential limits to those when facing significant
security concerns— has largely obfuscated in this mind- set
the reality of Snowden’s weakening, durably and structurally, the
critical ability of the United States and its allies to address their
mounting external security challenges. In this culture of distrust,
whatever contradicts the innocent whistle- blower narrative can be
preemptively dismissed because Snowden, even though he remains
ensconced in Moscow at an unknown location, remains the ultimate
truth teller.
I do not accept either this formulation of Snowden or his version
of the events in which he was the hero. Opening a Pandora’s box of
government secrets is a dangerous undertaking. Whether Snowden’s
theft of state secrets proceeded from an idealistic attempt to right a
wrong, a narcissistic drive to obtain personal recognition, an intent to
weaken the foundations of the surveillance infrastructure in which
he worked, or a combination of such factors, by the time he arrived
in Moscow, it had evolved, deliberately or not, but necessarily, into
a mission of disclosing key national secrets to a foreign power. In
the end, such conjectures about Snowden’s motives matter less than
that he was helped, consciously or not, by others with interests that
differed from those of the United States. The effects on America of
such a massive breach of confidence might not easily be reversible.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 304
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful to the many individuals who put their knowledge
and expertise at my disposal during the course of writing this
book. Unfortunately, I cannot give due credit to some of those people
to whom I owe the greatest debt in understanding the intelligence
issues, because they spoke to me on condition that I keep secret their
identities.
I greatly benefited from the insights, erudition, and criticisms provided
by those who read draft chapters at various stages of my investigation.
I am particularly indebted in this regard to Tobias Brown,
Rachelle Bergstein, Richard Bernstein, Sidney Blumenthal, David
Braunschvig, Ash Carter, Susana Duncan, Joe Finder, Ben Gerson,
Andrew Hacker, William Haseltine, Eli Jacobs, Bruce Kovner, Robert
Loomis, Gary Lucas, John Micklethwait, Frederick Mocatta, Andrew
Rosenberg, Curt Sawyer, Sean Wilentz, and Ezra Zilkha.
I am especially grateful to Harold Edgar, the Julius Silver Professor
in Law, Science, and Technology at Columbia Law School; and
to Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law
School, for sharing with me their legal perspective on the espionage
statutes and other legal issues.
I thank Edward Lucas of The Economist for recommending
Catherine A. FitzPatrick, a writer and translator at The Interpreter
magazine as someone who “posseses a unique knowledge of the labyrinthine
world of Russian disinformation.” She proved a godsend
for this book. With her deep understanding of the workings of the
Internet, she helped me retrieve information from the dark side of
the Internet that I would otherwise would not have found.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 305
9/30/16 11:09 AM
306 | Acknowledgments
Because I do not believe an investigative book should be written
without the author visiting the crime scene and other pertinent venues,
I undertook research in Hawaii, Japan, Hong Kong, and Moscow.
Where possible, I flew the same flights that Snowden did. I am grateful
to Ena and Ines Talakic for their assistance on these research trips.
As talented documentarians in their own right, they filmed a number
of my interviews on these trips, and generously provided photographs
for this book. I thank Alexander Bitter in Hawaii, Joyce Xu
in Hong Kong, Ko Shoiya in Japan, and Zamir Gotta, Natalie Filkina,
and Svetlana Chervonnaya in Russia for their help in arranging my
interviews in those places. I also owe special thanks to Nick Grube,
an editor at Civil Beat in Honolulu, for accompanying me to the
NSA base where Snowden was working in 2013.
I am indebted to Nancy Novick for her skill, patience and enterprise
in helping me find the selection of photographs for this book.
I am grateful to Zachary Gresham for his meticulous fact- checking
and proofreading, and to Ingrid Sterner for her immensely helpful
copyediting skills. Because I perform all my own research, I alone am
responsible for any errors that appear in this book.
Mort Janklow, who has represented me for three decades, did a
superb job in arranging for Alfred A. Knopf to publish this book.
I am thankful to Julia Ringo and the team at Knopf for their help
in preparing this book. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Jonathan
Segal for meticulously editing this book. The manuscript gained
immeasurably from both his keen eye and his wise judgment.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 306
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes
prologue Snowden’s Trail: Hong Kong, 2014
3 “No Such Agency”: The best description of the birth of the NSA can be found in
Bamford, Puzzle Palace, 1–4.
4 the NSA learned: General Keith Alexander, interview with author.
4 twelve-minute video: This video can be seen at http://www.theguardian.com
/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-interview
-video. All of the dozens of videos Snowden made after this initial one can be
viewed in chronological order at https://nsa.gov1.info/dni/snowden.html.
5 I had written several books: My book Inquest examined the failure of the FBI,
the Secret Service, and the CIA to establish the context of the John F. Kennedy
assassination. This interest continued in other books of mine, including Deception,
in which I investigated the vulnerability of intelligence services involved in
espionage during the Cold War, and Agency of Fear (New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1977), in which I explored intelligence failures of domestic intelligence in
the war on drugs.
5 extradite Trent Martin: The FBI press statement on this case was released
on March 27, 2013, less than two months before Snowden bought his ticket
for Hong Kong: https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/australian
-research-analyst-extradited-on-insider-trading-charges.
6 “It’s very mysterious”: Hayden, interview with author.
6 My first surprise: I interviewed six members of the Mira staff, all of whom asked
me not to identify them. Te-Ping Chen, a journalist for the Asian edition of
The Wall Street Journal, received similar replies when she interviewed Mira
hotel employees the day Snowden left the Mira. Chen and Brown, “Snowden’s
Options for Refuge Narrow.”
6 to send Greenwald: Greenwald’s description of his encounters with Snowden
is taken mainly from chapter 1, “Contact,” and chapter 2, “Ten Days in Hong
Kong,” in Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 7–32.
7 Snowden also contacted: Gellman, “Code Name ‘Verax.’ ”
7 He proposed we meet: Bradsher, interview with author. Bradsher wrote a number
of excellent articles about Snowden and Ho. See Bradsher, “Hasty Exit Started
with Pizza Inside a Hong Kong Hideout.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 307
9/30/16 8:13 AM
308 | Notes to pages 8–23
8 appointment with Robert Tibbo: Tibbo, interviews with author.
11–12 “angel descending”: Snowden, interview with Brian Williams, NBC, May 28,
2014.
chapter 1 Tinker
15 “It’s like the boiling frog”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
15 Lon Snowden, like his father: The best reporting on Snowden’s childhood was
done by Suzanne Andrews. See Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
16 Brad Gunson, who knew Snowden: Carol D. Leonnig, Jenna Johnson, and Marc
Fisher, “Who Is Edward Snowden?,” Washington Post, June 15, 2013.
16 Snowden stayed home: Kinsey, interview with author.
16 Posting under the alias: Mullin, “NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars
Technica.”
16 He even went to anime conventions: Christopher Johnson, “Chatting About
Japan with Snowden,” Japan Times, June 18, 2013.
17 “body fat percentage”: Leonnig, Johnson, and Fisher, “Who Is Edward Snowden?”
17 “I’ve always dreamed”: Mullin, “NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars
Technica.”
17 Admiral Barrett: Coast Guard Biography, http://www.uscg.mil/history/people
/Flags/BarrettEBio.pdf. Also, for his FBI career, see http://www1.umn.edu
/humanrts/OathBetrayed/FBI%2047.pdf.
18 Army records show: Author interviews. The U.S. Army spokesman George
Wright stated Snowden was enrolled in the program between May 7, 2004,
and September 28, 2004. The spokesman Colonel David Patterson said, “He
attempted to qualify to become a Special Forces soldier but did not complete the
requisite training and was administratively discharged from the army.”
18 taking a job as a security guard: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
19 “So sexxxy it hurts”: The information about Snowden’s modeling career comes
from his posts on Ars Technica. See Mullin, “NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on
Ars Technica.”
19 Jonathan Mills, Lindsay’s father: Daniel Bates, “Snowden Totally Abandoned His
Girlfriend When He Fled amid NSA Revelations, Her Dad Says,” Daily Mail,
Jan. 17, 2014. The information about Lindsay Mills comes from her Twitter and
Instagram postings.
19 The CIA’s minimum requirements in 2006: https://www.cia.gov/careers
/application-process.
chapter 2 Secret Agent
22 “It seems to me spies”: Snowden, interview with Williams.
23 team of information technologists: Former CIA officer who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 308
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 23–25 | 309
23 The only person: “Edward Snowden’s Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive
Interview,” Last Word, MSNBC, June 12, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=
beQUMdolBWE.
25 “was trying to break into”: Schmitt, “C.I.A. Warning on Snowden in ’09 Said to
Slip Through the Cracks.”
26 explained the discrepancy: Former CIA officer who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
26 “It was not a stellar”: Drumheller, interviews with author.
26 “e-mail spat”: Snowden was interviewed via the Internet by Risen, “Snowden
Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia.”
26 “totally incapable”: Snowden, interview with Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
27 “through the system”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
chapter 3 Contractor
28 “Much of what I saw”: Greenwald, Poitras, and MacAskill, “Edward Snowden.”
30 This “free pass”: Tyler Drumheller, interview with author.
30 “So the guy with whom the CIA”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 284.
30 His initial job for Dell: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
31 Lindsay Mills: The information about Lindsay comes from her postings on Instagram
and her blog L’s Journey, https://twitter.com/lsjourneys. The information
about her and Snowden’s travel to Mount Fuji and other places in Japan
comes from the Little Red Ninja blog written by Jennie Chamberlin: https://www
.facebook.com/Little-Red-Ninja-214045021941347/timeline/.
32 working on a backup system: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
32 most of the classified data: Source who requested anonymity, interview with
author.
32 spotted a major flaw: Snowden, interview with Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
32 “I actually recommended”: Ibid.
33 Snowden made a ten-day trip: Harris, “What Was Edward Snowden Doing in
India?” Also, Shilpa Phadnis, “Edward Snowden Sharpened His Hacking Skills
in Delhi,” Times of India, Dec. 4, 2013.
33 “It is a dead-end job”: Former Booz Allen official who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
33 shaded by a sakura: The description of Snowden’s life in Maryland comes entirely
from Lindsay Mills’s Internet postings. See L’s Journey.
34 The guest speaker was: Michael Hayden, interview with the author.
34 “They [the NSA] are intent”: Greenwald, Poitras, and MacAskill, “Edward
Snowden.”
34 “none of whom took any action”: Andrea Peterson, “Snowden: I Raised NSA
Concerns Internally over 10 Times Before Going Rogue,” Washington Post,
March 7, 2014. The NSA’s response came from the NSA spokesperson Vanee
Vines in an author interview.
35 U.S. Investigations Services: Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S. Gives New Contract to
Firm That Vetted NSA Leaker Edward Snowden,” Wall Street Journal, July 2,
2014.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 309
9/30/16 8:13 AM
310 | Notes to pages 38–48
chapter 4 Thief
38 In Hawaii in 2012: Former Dell executive who requested anonymity because of
company policy restricting Dell employees from discussing the Snowden case,
interview with author.
38 “You’re in a vaulted space”: Transcript of interview with Snowden in Moscow.
Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
39 “Law is a lot like medicine”: David Weigel, “Edward Snowden and Ron Paul
Kick Off Libertarian Student Conference,” Bloomberg News, Feb. 13, 2015.
For Ron Paul’s position on “secret government,” see http://www.presstv.ir
/Detail/2015/06/02/413952/US-Ron-Paul-CIA-NSA-secret-government.
39 “The [American] government”: Arundhati Roy, “Edward Snowden Meets
Arundhati Roy and John Cusack,” Guardian, Nov. 28, 2015.
40 “fear and a false image”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
40 Snowden was fully aware: Snowden in Moscow, e-mail interview with James
Risen. Risen, “Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia.”
41 Physical Phatness: Lindsay Mills’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com
/lindsay.mills.90/about.
42 the first known document: Ledgett revealed this in an interview with Vanity Fair.
Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
42 “He stole the [NSA] test”: Snowden’s obtaining the NSA examination is
described by Michael McConnell. See King, “Ex-NSA Chief Details Snowden’s
Hiring at Agency, Booz Allen.” The extended video of the interview is at www
.wsj.com.
42 “It was totally unrealistic”: NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
43 subsequently joking to a reporter: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
chapter 5 Crossing the Rubicon
44 “What I came to feel”: Snowden quoted in Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
44 “was moving copies of that data”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
45 he later pointed out: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
45 Ledgett subsequently reported: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
45 This theft was made: Michael Hayden, interview with author.
46 “I crossed that line”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
46 “We’re subverting our security”: Transcript of Snowden interview on PBS. James
Bamford and Tim De Chant, “Edward Snowden on Cyber Warfare,” Nova, Jan. 8,
2015, www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/military/snowden-transcript.
46 bragged to James Risen: Risen, “Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to
Russia.”
47 this counterculture is “tormented”: Shils, Torment of Secrecy.
47 “[The elites] know everything”: Roy, “Edward Snowden Meets Arundhati Roy
and John Cusack.”
47 “What do you think”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations,
Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
48 violate U.S. espionage laws: Michael Hayden, interview with author.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 310
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 49–59 | 311
chapter 6 Hacktivist
49 the group Anonymous: Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy, 1–8.
50 “My own forays”: Sue Halpern, “In the Depths of the Net,” New York Review of
Books, Oct. 8, 2015.
51 Silk Road, which acted: Holman W. Jenkins Jr., “The Anti-hero of Silk Road,”
Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2015. Also, Justice Department official who requested
anonymity, interview with author.
51 “Tor’s importance”: Hastings, “Julian Assange.” Also see Julian Assange, introduction
to Underground, by Suelette Dreyfus and Julian Assange (Edinburgh:
Canongate, 2012).
51 Tor was a creation: Fitzpatrick, Privacy for Me and Not for Thee, pt. 6.
52 “the state is all-powerful”: Fitzpatrick, introduction to ibid.
53 “Meet the Most Dangerous Man”: Appelbaum, interview with Rolling
Stone, “Meet the Most Dangerous Man in Cyberspace: The American Behind
WikiLeaks,” Rolling Stone, Dec. 2, 2010.
53 In Berlin, Appelbaum: Packer, “Holder of Secrets.”
54 she identified herself: Runa A. Sandvik, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites
/runasandvik/.
54 According to an anonymous: Andy Greenberg, “An NSA Coworker Remembers
the Real Edward Snowden,” Forbes, Dec. 16, 2013.
54 “Without Tor,” he later wrote: Twitter, https://twitter.com/snowden/status
/682257506018672640.
54 “Tor Stinks”: Sean Michael Kerner, “Snowden Leaks Show NSA Targets Tor,”
E Week, Oct. 4, 2013.
55 He would later tell Sandvik: Runa A. Sandvik, “What Edward Snowden Said at
the Nordic Media Festival,” Forbes, May 10, 2015.
55 According to Sandvik’s account: Sandvik did not reveal her encounter with
Snowden in any of her blogs until eleven months after Snowden went public in
June 2013. It was only after Greenwald disclosed in his book No Place to Hide
that Snowden used the alias Cincinnatus that Internet investigators discovered
he had hosted with Sandvik the CryptoParty. Sandvik then wrote her account of
it. See Sandvik, “That One Time I Threw a CryptoParty with Edward Snowden.”
Also, Kevin Poulsen, “Snowden’s First Move Against the NSA Was a Party in
Hawaii,” Wired, May 21, 2014.
56 owner of BoxJelly: Fujihira, interview with author.
57 “The idea was to spread”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 288.
58 “Snowden was not an NSA”: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
chapter 7 String Puller
59 “It wasn’t that they put”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA
Revelations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
59 He used the same alias: All of Snowden’s post-party activities in 2012 and 2013
come from the Twitter account of “Oahu Crypto Party.”
59 The journalist to whom: The description of Snowden’s attempts to contact
Green wald in December 2012 and January 2013 can be found in Greenwald, No
Place to Hide, 7–10.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 311
9/30/16 8:13 AM
312 | Notes to pages 59–70
59 Greenwald had not always: Mark Memmott, “He Broke the NSA Leaks Story,
but Just Who Is Glenn Greenwald?,” NPR, June 11, 2013. For his part ownership
of the HJ website, see Dareh Gregorian, “Glenn Greenwald, Journalist Who
Broke Edward Snowden Story, Was Once Lawyer Sued over Porn Business,”
Daily News, June 26, 2013. Also, Jessica Testa, “How Glenn Greenwald Became
Glenn Greenwald,” BuzzFeed, June 26, 2013.
60 by “ordering illegal eavesdropping”: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 2. On Ron
Paul, see ibid., 24.
60 Freedom of the Press Foundation: Michael Calderone, “Freedom of the Press
Foundation Launches to Support WikiLeaks,” Huffington Post, Dec. 16, 2012.
60 “The first serious info war”: David Sarno, “ ‘Hacktivists’ Fight for Their Cause
Online,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 11, 2010.
61 “The US operates a sprawling”: Glenn Greenwald, “FBI’s Abuse of the Surveillance
State Is the Real Scandal Needing Investigation,” Guardian, Nov. 13, 2012.
62 Poitras had been diligently filming: Adan Salazar, “Mini Documentary Reveals
Full Extent of ‘Stellarwind’ Domestic Spy Program,” Infowars, Aug. 28, 2012.
62 Poitras had other impressive credentials: “Laura Poitras: Secret No Longer,” New
School News, Aug. 14, 2013.
63 “I didn’t. You chose yourself”: Snowden’s e-mails to Poitras were extracted from
her film Citizenfour and published in Wired. See Greenberg, “These Are the
Emails Snowden Sent to First Introduce His Epic NSA Leaks.”
63 he wrote to Micah Lee: Lee’s involvement with Snowden, although known to the
journalists Greenwald and Poitras since April 2013, was not revealed to the public
for some eighteen months. Lee, “Ed Snowden Taught Me to Smuggle Secrets
Past Incredible Danger.”
63 “I was at that point filming”: Poitras, interview with Amy Goodman, Democracy
Now, Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2015/1/15/oscars
_2015_laura_poitras_film_on.
64 “At this stage”: Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to First Introduce
His Epic NSA Leaks.”
65 surveillance of her communications: Glenn Greenwald, “U.S. Filmmaker Repeatedly
Detained at Border,” Salon, April 8, 2012.
65 “Kafkaesque government harassment”: Ben Child, “Citizenfour Director Laura
Poitras Sues US over ‘Kafkaesque Harassment,’ ” Guardian, July 14, 2015.
65 “more paranoid”: Snowden, interview with vanden Heuvel and Cohen,
“Snowden Speaks.”
66 “Is C4 a trap?”: Andy Greenberg, “Snowden’s Chronicler Reveals Her Own Life
Under Surveillance,” Wired, Feb. 4, 2016.
66 Stellarwind: Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to First Introduce
His Epic NSA Leaks.”
67 “No one, not even”: Ibid.
68 under enormous stress: Greenberg, “Snowden’s Chronicler Reveals Her Own
Life Under Surveillance.”
69 he had Poitras write: “The Frontline Interviews,” “Barton Gellman,” PBS, March 7,
2014, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics
/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-barton-gellman/.
69 Poitras had requested help: Karen Greenberg, interview with the author.
70 Council on American-Islamic Relations: CAIR-NY Blog, “Glenn Greenwald
Speaks at CAIR-NY Annual Banquet,” May 16, 2013.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 312
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 71–80 | 313
71 When they finally settled: The descriptions of the initial two meetings between
Greenwald and Poitras in April 2013 are provided in Greenwald’s 2014 book, No
Place to Hide, pp. 10-15.
chapter 8 Raider of the Inner Sanctum
73 “They think there’s a smoking gun”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
74 system for stratifying its data: Michael McConnell, interview with King, “Ex-
NSA Chief Details Snowden’s Hiring at Agency, Booz Allen.”
74 Snowden applied to Booz Allen: Booz Allen officer who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
5 “Snowden was an IT guy”: John R. Schindler, “Snowden Is a Fraud,” XX Committee,
June 12, 2015.
75 “get access to lists”: Lana Lam, “Post Reporter Lana Lam Tells of Her Journey
into the Secret World of Edward Snowden,” South China Morning Post, June 23,
2013.
75 “He targeted my company”: King, “Ex-NSA Chief Details Snowden’s Hiring at
Agency, Booz Allen.”
75 he would not have password access: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
75 engaged in a minor subterfuge: Hosenball, “NSA Contractor Hired Snowden
Despite Concerns About Resume Discrepancies.”
76 “playing with fire”: Spencer Ackerman and Ewen MacAskill, “Snowden Calls
for Whistleblower After Claims by New Pentagon Source,” Guardian, May 22,
2016.
76 establish a paper trail: Director of National Intelligence, IC on the Record (blog
on Tumblr), May 27, 2014, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/87218708448
/edward-j-snowden-email-inquiry-to-the-nsa-office. Snowden response, in
“Edward Snowden Responds to Release of E-mail by U.S. Officials,” Washington
Post, May 29, 2014.
77 He returned on April 13: Lindsay Mills’s blog.
77 a brief medical leave: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
77 needed to get passwords: Stephen Braun, “NSA to Congress: Snowden Copied
Co-worker’s Password,” Military Times, Feb. 13, 2014.
78 software applications called spiders: David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Snowden
Used Low-Cost Tool to Best N.S.A.,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 2014.
78 Finally, Snowden had to: Former intelligence officer who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
78 These later acquisitions: The document can be seen in the National Security
Archives, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-059.pdf.
chapter 9 Escape Artist
80 “I’m not self-destructive”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
80 “I took everything”: Edward Snowden and Peter Taylor, “Are You a Traitor?,”
transcript, Panorama, BBC, Oct. 15, 2015 (aired on BBC Oct. 10, 2015).
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 313
9/30/16 8:13 AM
314 | Notes to pages 80–96
80 At this point: Former DIA officer who requested anonymity, interview with
author.
80 He had visited Hong Kong: Lindsay Mills’s blog.
80 According to Albert Ho: Bradsher, “Hasty Exit Started with Pizza Inside a Hong
Kong Hideout.” Also, Keith Bradsher, interview with author.
81 for the next ten days: Former DIA officer who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
81 “his first priority”: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 43.
81 “That whole period”: Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
81 He e-mailed Gellman: Gellman, “Code Name ‘Verax.’ ”
81 Gellman could not make: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 51–52.
82 more pressure on Gellman: Gellman, “Code Name ‘Verax.’ ”
82 “I’ve been working on”: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 11.
83 Continuing his string pulling : Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent
to First Introduce His Epic NSA Leaks.”
83 asked Appelbaum to help: Appelbaum, “Edward Snowden Interview.”
84 Greenwald was awaiting: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 16–18.
85 Gibson authorized Greenwald’s trip: The description of The Guardian’s reaction
to Greenwald’s offer of a scoop was reported by Luke Harding, a Guardian
reporter commissioned to write The Snowden Files, a book that Oliver
Stone bought the film rights for from The Guardian for $700,000. See Harding,
Snowden Files, 100–115.
86 Snowden arranged for Micah Lee: Lee, “Ed Snowden Taught Me to Smuggle
Secrets Past Incredible Danger.”
chapter 10 Whistle-blower
88 “They elected me”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations,
Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
88 “I feel alone”: Lindsay Mills’s blog.
89 “so we don’t have a clue”: Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to
First Introduce His Epic NSA Leaks.”
89 “On timing, regarding meeting”: The description of the meetings with Snowden
in Hong Kong, June 3–June 9, is taken from Poitras’s documentary Citizenfour.
The film can be found at https://thoughtmaybe.com/citizenfour/.
90 “The initial impression”: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 30.
90 “Minutes after meeting”: Packer, “Holder of Secrets.”
90 One possible reason: Snowden, interview with Williams; Bamford, “Edward
Snowden”; Jane Mayer, “Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story ‘Absurd’ in Exclusive
Interview,” New Yorker, Jan. 21, 2014.
92 the Guardian policy required: Harding, Snowden Files, 114–16.
94 The next morning he: Packer, “Holder of Secrets.”
94 Tibbo and Man planned: Patrick Koehler, “The Hong Kong Layover in Snowden’s
Getaway,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 2016.
94 “I am in a safe house”: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 8.
95 The journalist chosen: Lam, “Post Reporter Lana Lam Tells of Her Journey into
the Secret World of Edward Snowden.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 314
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 98–109 | 315
96 “I was being tailed”: Corbett, “How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker Hidden
in a Moscow Airport.”
chapter 11 Enter Assange
98 “Thanks to Russia”: Julian Assange, “How ‘The Guardian’ Milked Edward
Snowden’s Story,” Newsweek, April 20, 2015.
98 Julian Assange had made: David Leigh and Luke Harding, “Julian Assange: The
Teen Hacker Who Became Insurgent in Information War,” Guardian, Jan. 30,
2011.
99 Sarah Harrison: Sarah Ellison, “The Man Who Came to Dinner,” Vanity Fair,
Oct. 2013.
99 Snowden telephoned Assange: Assange interview, in Giles Whittell, “Julian
Assange Unmasked,” Sunday Times (London), Aug. 29, 2015.
99 “Snowden told me they had abused Manning”: Michael Sontheimer, “Spiegel
Interview with Julian Assange,” Spiegel Online International, July 19, 2015.
100 Assange called Harrison: Corbett, “How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker
Hidden in a Moscow Airport.”
101 “We were working very hard”: Ibid.
101 U.S. government informed: Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, “China Said to Have
Made Call to Let Leaker Depart,” New York Times, June 23, 2013.
102 Tibbo wanted Snowden to remain: Tibbo, interview with author.
103 “The purpose of my mission”: Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
chapter 12 Fugitive
104 “If I end up in chains”: Snowden video on the Guardian site, June 17, 2013, www
.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jul/17/edward-snowden-video-interview.
104 insert an encrypted key: Gellman, “Code Name ‘Verax.’ ”
104 “I can’t help him evade”: Gellman quoted in Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews,
“Snowden Saga.”
105 asked Fidel Narváez: Juan Forero, “Ecuador’s Strange Journey from Embracing
Snowden to Turning Him Away,” Washington Post, July 2, 2013.
106 “My only comment”: Lam, “Post Reporter Lana Lam Tells of Her Journey into
the Secret World of Edward Snowden.”
106 his passage through: Perlez and Bradsher, “China Said to Have Made Call to Let
Leaker Depart.”
107 Snowden first met Harrison: Corbett, “How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker
Hidden in a Moscow Airport.”
107 Assange continued creating: Assange interview, in Whittell, “Julian Assange
Unmasked.”
108 “Anyone in a three-mile radius”: Corbett, “How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA
Leaker Hidden in a Moscow Airport.”
108 $20,000 fee: Station KGUN9, “Documents: Snowden Paid 20K for UA Skype
Talk,” ABC 15 Arizona, April 1, 2016, //www.abc15.com/news/region-central
-southern-az/tucson/documents-snowden-paid-20k-for-ua-skype-talk.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 315
9/30/16 8:13 AM
316 | Notes to pages 113–121
109 first live interview in Moscow: Snowden met with James Bamford, the author
of the 1982 book The Puzzle Palace, in Moscow in June 2014. Bamford, “Edward
Snowden.”
chapter 13 The Great Divide
113 “That moral decision”: Edward Snowden, statement, http://wikileaks/statement
-from-Edward-Snowden.
114 “Sitting on his unmade bed”: Packer, “Holder of Secrets.”
114 This powerful narrative: See Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 248–54; Snowden,
interview with Williams.
114 “There was no question”: Emily Bell, “Snowden Interview: Why the Media Isn’t
Doing Its Job,” Columbia Journalism Review, May 10, 2016.
115 When two NSA analysts: “Claim US Spy Caught with Secrets,” Los Angeles
Mirror, Aug. 2, 1960, 1. Also see Rick Anderson, “Before Edward Snowden,”
Salon, July 1, 2013.
115 “man up”: Interview with John Kerry, CBS This Morning, May 28, 2014.
115 By the Lawfare Institute’s count: https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden
-revelations.
116 British cyber service GCHQ: RT television report, “NSA, GCHQ Targeted
Kaspersky, Other Cyber Security Companies,” June 22, 2015, http://www.rt.com
/usa/268891-nsa-gchq-software-kaspersky/.
116 six government employees: Matt Apuzzo, “C.I.A. Officer Is Found Guilty in Leak
Tied to Times Reporter,” New York Times, Jan. 26, 2015. The notable exception
to the policy of seeking imprisonment of intelligence workers found guilty of
passing classified information to journalists is the extraordinary case of the ex-
CIA director General David Petraeus. Petraeus had given classified information
from his personal notebooks to his mistress and biographer, Paula Broadwell.
Although none of this information appeared in her 2012 biography, All In: The
Education of Davis Petraeus, he had violated his oath to protect this information.
Yet in a 2014 deal with the Justice Department, Petraeus was allowed to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge and sentenced to two years’ probation and
a $100,000 fine. See Eli Lake, “Petraeus, Justice, and Washington’s Culture of
Leaks,” Bloomberg View, March 4, 2015.
117 he posted about it: Snowden wrote in chat rooms on the Ars Technica site
between May 2001 and May 2012. His posts are quoted by Mullin, “NSA Leaker
Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars Technica.”
117 “an act of civil disobedience”: Mayer, “Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story
‘Absurd’ in Exclusive Interview.”
117 Ben Wizner, a lawyer: Wizner called his representation of Snowden the “work of
a lifetime.” Hill, “How ACLU Lawyer Ben Wizner Became Snowden’s Lawyer.”
118 “We’ve crossed lines”: Snowden quoted by Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
119 “Snowden a whistleblower”: Cheryl Arvidson, “Distrust of Government Apparent
in Snowden Case,” Leader’s Edge, Oct. 2013.
119 “they can trust”: “Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government,”
Pew Research Center, Nov. 23, 2015.
119 “Thanks to one man’s”: Rebecca Shabad, “Former Rep. Ron Paul Launches Petition
for Snowden Clemency,” Hill, Feb. 13, 2014.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 316
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 121–129 | 317
119 his son Senator Rand Paul: See Katie Glueck, “Rand Paul Backs Snowden, Bashes
Clapper,” Politico, Jan. 5, 2014.
119 “We actually buy cell phones”: Snowden quoted in “New The Guardian Interview
with Edward Snowden,” Guardian, July 17, 2014, https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview
-transcript.
121 Dominique Strauss-Kahn: Edward Jay Epstein, “What Really Happened to
Strauss-Kahn,” New York Review of Books, Dec. 22, 2011. Vance made his statement
on the Charlie Rose show, Feb. 19, 2016.
121 Apple made headlines: Mike Isaac, “Apple Still Holds the Keys to Its Cloud Service,
but Reluctantly,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 2016.
121 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Newt Gingrich, “A Government Snoop
That Puts the NSA to Shame,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2015.
122 the FISA court: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc
.html.
123 “His approach was”: Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “For NSA Chief, Terrorist
Threat Drives Passion to ‘Collect It All,’ ” Washington Post, July 14, 2013.
123 Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals: Charlie Savage and Jonathan Weisman,
“N.S.A. Collection of Bulk Data Is Ruled Illegal,” New York Times, May 5, 2015.
This court decision was stayed three months later on August 27, 2015, by a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals on procedural grounds. By this
time, however, the legal issue was rendered moot by Congress. See http://law
.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/2015/.
124 knowledge of the service providers: Timothy B. Lee, “Here’s Everything We
Know About PRISM to Date,” Washington Post, June 12, 2013.
125 “Edward Snowden is not the ‘whistleblower’ ”: Nicole Mulvaney, “NSA Director
Adm. Michael Rogers Discusses Freedom, Privacy, and Security Issues at Princeton
University,” NJ.com, March 14, 2015.
126 “Snowden stole from the United States”: Mark Hosenball, “U.S. Spy Agency
Targets Changed Behavior After Snowden,” Reuters, May 12, 2014.
126 “The vast majority”: “Snowden Leak Could Cost Military Billions: Pentagon,”
NBC News, March 6, 2014.
126 “over 900,000” military files: The document was obtained via a Freedom of
Information request by Vice. See Leopold, “Inside Washington’s Quest to Bring
Down Edward Snowden.”
126 “has caused grave damage”: Hearings Before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Jan. 27, 2014. See http://www.dia.mil/News/SpeechesandTestimonies
/ArticleView/tabid/11449/Article/567078/dia-director-flynn-unauthorized
-disclosures-have-caused-grave-damage-to-our-nat.aspx.
126 The CIA’s assessment: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 298.
127 “the greatest damage”: Transcript of interview with General Keith Alexander,
Australian Financial Review, May 8, 2014, http://www.afr.com/technology/web
/security/interview-transcriptformer-head-of-the-nsa-and-commander-of-the
-us-cyber-command-general-keith-alexander-20140507-itzhw#ixzz3m6TkuRa1.
127 “I don’t look at this”: Jeremy Herb and Justin Sink, “Sen. Feinstein Calls Snowden’s
NSA Leaks an ‘Act of Treason,’ ” Hill, June 6, 2013.
128 duck-rabbit cartoon: Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, 202–4.
128 “I haven’t shot anybody”: Mark McClish, “The Last Words of Lee Harvey
Oswald,” Statement Analysis, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.statementanalysis.com
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 317
9/30/16 8:13 AM
318 | Notes to pages 130–141
/lee-harvey-oswald/. Like Snowden, Oswald was a high school dropout from
a broken family who joined an elite unit of the U.S. military but failed to get
an honorable discharge, became hostile to policies of the U.S. government, and
defected to Russia. See Edward Jay Epstein, Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey
Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64–104.
129 Clapper answered that: The transcript was published by The Washington Post,
Jan. 29, 2014. For Clapper’s earlier closed-door testimony, see Steven Aftergood,
“The Clapper ‘Lie’ and the Senate Intelligence Committee,” FAS, Jan. 6, 2014.
130 On his application to Booz Allen: Hosenball, “NSA Contractor Hired Snowden
Despite Concerns About Resume Discrepancies.”
130 in contacting Laura Poitras: Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to
First Introduce His Epic NSA Leaks.”
130 “read” in the news reports: Snowden Q&A, Moscow, July 12, 2013, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=yNQSVurlAak.
131 “Consul General–Hong Kong”: James Gordon Meek et al., “NSA Leaker Edward
Snowden Seeks Asylum in Ecuador,” ABC News, June 23, 2013.
131 “had an enormous interest”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 284.
131 the Enigma machines: Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma, 286–94.
chapter 14 The Crime Scene Investigation
133 “Any private contractor”: Snowden, interview with Williams.
133 Fifteen miles northwest: U.S. Navy Information Operations Command, “History
of NIOC Hawaii,” http://www.public.navy.mil/fcc-c10f/niochi/Pages/AboutUs
.aspx.
134 General Alexander: Alexander, interview with author.
134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283–88.
136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,”
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC
Document 63-8 Filed 04/26/13, https://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/shaffer/042613
-leather.pdf.
137 By late July: Former intelligence executive familiar with the initial investigation
who requested anonymity, interview with author.
137 According to Ledgett: Tabassum Zakaria and Warren Strobel, “After ‘Cataclysmic’
Snowden Affair, NSA Faces Winds of Change,” Reuters, Dec. 13, 2013.
138 “Something is not right”: Transcript of interview with Alexander, Australian
Financial Review, May 8, 2014.
138 This discovery came: “Glenn Greenwald’s Partner Detained at Heathrow Airport
for Nine Hours,” Guardian, Aug. 18, 2013.
139 downloading documents: Ledgett was interviewed in this timeline by Bryan Burrough.
See Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
139 the chronology: NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author.
140 “millions of records”: Snowden interview, German NDR TV, Jan. 26, 2014,
http://www.tagesschau.de/snowden-interview-englisch100.pdf.
140 The FBI could assume: Former Justice Department official with knowledge of the
Snowden case who requested anonymity, interview with author.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 318
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 141–159 | 319
141 “I’m in exile”: Former member of the national security staff who cited State
Department records, interview with author. Also, Jen Psaki, the State Department
spokeswoman, told AP, “As is routine and consistent with US regulations, persons
with felony arrest warrants are subject to having their passport revoked.”
That arrest warrant was issued on June 14, 2013. The State Department Operations
Center alert said “Snowden’s U.S. passport was revoked on June 22, 2013,”
after the Justice Department unsealed the charges that had been filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 14, 2013. “The Consul
General in Hong Kong confirmed Hong Kong authorities were notified that Mr.
Snowden’s passport was revoked on June 22,” according to the State Department’s
senior watch officer.
142 had met nearly every day: Miller, “U.S. Officials Scrambled to Nab Snowden.”
142 Putin admitted: Interview, Channel One, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president
/news/19143.
143 “Vladimir Putin had personally approved”: Jennifer Martinez, “Report: Snowden’s
US Passport Revoked,” Hill, June 23, 2013.
chapter 15 Did Snowden Act Alone?
146 “When you look at the totality”: Hayden, interview with author. Also, “Hayden
Interview,” Meet the Press, NBC-TV, Dec. 15, 2013.
146 whistle-blower Bradley Birkenfeld: David Kocieniewski, “Whistle-Blower
Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S.,” New York Times, Sept. 11, 2012.
147 whistle-blower Daniel Ellsberg: Martin Arnold, “Pentagon Papers Charges Are
Dismissed,” New York Times, May 11, 1973.
147 FBI office in Media: Mark Mazzetti, “Burglars Who Took On F.B.I. Abandon
Shadows,” New York Times, Jan. 7, 2014.
147 “treasure trove”: Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 206.
150 “It is inconceivable to me”: Former Booz Allen executive who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
152 we know that Snowden: Sandvik, “That One Time I Threw a CryptoParty with
Edward Snowden.”
152 The FBI, which was: Senate Intelligence Committee staff member who requested
anonymity, interview with author.
153 “Snowden may have carried out”: Drumheller, interview with author.
153 As Snowden acknowledges: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
154 “absence of evidence”: Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), 49.
154 “The greatest trick”: Cherkashin, interview with author. The quotation from The
Usual Suspects was adopted by the movie from Charles Baudelaire’s observation
“La plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu’il n’existe pas.”
chapter 16 The Question of When
156 “The NSA was actually”: Bamford and De Chant, “Edward Snowden on Cyber
Warfare.”
156 The career of the KGB mole: Bagley, Spy Wars, 46.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 319
9/30/16 8:13 AM
320 | Notes to pages 159–171
157 A counterespionage review: Member of the PFIAB who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
157 “in that they both used”: Kevin Gosztola, “NSA Inspector General Speaks on
Snowden for First Time,” Shadow Proof, Feb. 25, 2014.
157 KGB major Anatoliy Golitsyn: Bagley, Spy Wars, 6–11.
158 Wang Lijun: Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, “Frenzied Hours for U.S. on
Fate of a China Insider,” New York Times, April 17, 2012.
159 “I think Snowden is”: Vincent Kessler, “Snowden Being Manipulated by Russian
Intelligence: Ex-NSA Chief,” Reuters, May 7, 2014.
160 A former CIA officer: Tyler Drumheller, interview with author.
161 “It is not statistically improbable”: Former NSA officer who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
162 “when and how he”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 296.
163 “looking to capitalize on”: Transcript of interview with Alexander, Australian
Financial Review, May 8, 2014.
164 “He can compromise thousands”: Carol J. Williams, “NSA Leaker Edward
Snowden Seeks Return to U.S. on His Terms,” Los Angeles Times, July 22,
2015.
165 “I am still working”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations,
Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
165 “every facet of Snowden’s communications”: Reitman, “Snowden and
Green wald.”
165 “his hosts”: Richard Byrne Reilly, “Former KGB General: Snowden Is Cooperating
with Russian Intelligence,” VentureBeat, May 22, 2014.
165 “I would lose all respect”: Richard Byrne Reilly, “Former NSA Director: ‘I
Would Lose All Respect for Russia if They Haven’t Fully Exploited Snowden,”
VentureBeat, May 23, 2014.
166 He was put in contact: Kucherena, interview with Der Spiegel, “Snowden’s Lawyer:
‘Russia Will Not Hand Him Over,’ ” Spiegel Online International, June 24,
2013.
166 “Officially, he is my client”: “Snowden in the Kitchen,” Interpreter, Nov. 18,
2013.
167 an interview as “great”: Bamford and De Chant, “Edward Snowden on Cyber
Warfare.”
167 Putin’s telethon: Elias Groll, “Snowden Called in to Putin’s Telethon. Does That
Really Make Him a Kremlin Pawn?,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2014.
chapter 17 The Keys to the Kingdom Are Missing
168 “There’s a zero percent chance”: Risen, “Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files
to Russia.”
168 “the instruction manual”: Glenn Greenwald, “ ‘Guardian’ Journalist: Snowden
Docs Contain NSA ‘Blueprint,’ ” USA Today, June 15, 2013.
168 a heart attack: Citizenfour.
168 “keys to the kingdom”: Walter Pincus, “Snowden Still Holding ‘Keys to the
Kingdom,’ ” Washington Post, Dec. 18, 2013. Also, Ledgett interview, 60 Minutes,
CBS, Dec. 15, 2013.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 320
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 171–184 | 321
169 “touched” documents: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
169 more than half the documents: Staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee
who requested anonymity, interview with author.
170 Snowden also disputed: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
170 via a Vice magazine: Leopold, “Inside Washington’s Quest to Bring Down Edward
Snowden.”
171 previously cited road map: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.”
171 The compartment logs showed: Former NSA official who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
171 “No intelligence service”: Glenn Greenwald, “Email Exchange Between Edward
Snowden and Former GOP Senator Gordon Humphrey,” Guardian, July 16, 2013.
171 An answer soon came: Sophie Shevardnadze, “ ‘Snowden Believes He Did
Everything Right’: Lawyer Anatoly Kucherena,” SophieCo, RT television, Sept. 23,
2013, //www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/snowden-russia-lawyer-kucherena-214/.
172 “all the reports”: Kucherena, interview with author.
173 Russian cyber service: Former member of the staff of the national security
adviser who requested anonymity, interview with author.
174 State Department explicitly told: Ibid.
175 “I had spent ten years”: Hill, “How ACLU Attorney Ben Wizner Became
Snowden’s Lawyer.”
176 In the case of Stone’s movie: Irina Alexsander, “Edward Snowden’s Long, Strange
Journey to Hollywood,” New York Times Magazine, Sept. 4, 2016.
176 “I went the first six months”: Bell, “Edward Snowden Interview.”
176 “There’s nothing on it”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA
Revelations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
176–177 former CIA officer Ray McGovern: Mark Hosenball, “Laptops Snowden
Took to Hong Kong, Russia Were a ‘Diversion,’ ” Reuters, Oct. 11, 2013.
177 “break my fingers”: Snowden, interview with Williams. See also Burrough, Ellison,
and Andrews, “Snowden Saga,” and Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
178 “said they believed that”: Perlez and Bradsher, “China Said to Have Made Call to
Let Leaker Depart.”
178 “Both the Chinese and the Russians”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 284.
179 “What I can say”: Snowden interview, ARD-TV, Jan. 26, 2014, https://docs
.google.com/file/d/0B95Id3j0M0lrdDA5WIZd11Ubjg/preview.
179 She urgently texted Snowden: Citizenfour.
180 Poitras’s co-interrogator: Appelbaum, “Edward Snowden Interview.”
180 there was no document: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
180 He reported that no: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
181 another person in the NSA: Ibid.
181 Greenwald suggested to the New York Times: Jo Becker, Steven Erlanger and Eric
Schmitt, “How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveal’s the West’s
Secrets, “ New York Times, Sept. 1, 2016.
181 Greenwald and Poitras: “Snowden Leak: Israeli Commandos Killed Syrian General
at Dinner Party,” Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2015.
182 Specifically, it disclosed: Cora Currier and Henrik Moltke, “Spies in the Sky,”
Intercept, Jan. 28, 2016.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 321
9/30/16 11:09 AM
322 | Notes to pages 185–199
182 Putin had publicly enjoined him: Interview, Channel One, http://en.kremlin
.ru/events/president/news/19143. Also, former Russian intelligence officer who
requested anonymity, interview with author.
183 “If Snowden didn’t give”: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
183 German federal prosecutor: Theodore Schleifer, “Germany Drops Probe into U.S.
Spying on Merkel,” CNN Politics, June 13, 2015.
184 “Russian planners might have”: Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan
Gorman, “U.S. Scurries to Shore Up Spying on Russia,” Wall Street Journal,
March 24, 2014.
184 Britain also discovered: Tom Harper, Richard Kerbaj, and Tim Shipman, “British
Spies Betrayed to Russians and Chinese,” Sunday Times (London), June 14, 2015.
184 “losing some of its capabilities”: Chris Strohm and Gopal Ratnam, “NSA Leader
Seeks Openness on Secret Surveillance Orders,” Bloomberg News, June 13, 2013.
Also, staff member of National Security Council who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
chapter 18 The Unheeded Warning
185 “The NSA—the world’s”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 287.
185 Alexander Poteyev: Sergei L. Loiko, “Former Russian Spymaster Convicted of
Treason,” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2011.
186 “live under cover in the West”: Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of
an Unwanted Witness (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), xxii.
186 The CIA learned of this: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
187 “the business of intelligence”: Angleton, interview with author.
187 preparing these “Americans”: FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Russian
Spy Case,” Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/october
/russian_103111/russian_103111.
188 NSA at Fort Meade: Gertz, “Counterspies Hunt Russian Mole Inside National
Security Agency.” Also, Bill Gertz, interview with author.
188 “They [were] looking for one”: John R. Schindler, “The Painful Truth About
Snowden,” XX Committee, http://20committee.com/2015/07/19/the-painful
-truth-about-snowden/.
188 “insider threats by trusted insiders”: Gellman and Miller, “ ‘Black Budget’ Summary
Details U.S. Spy Network’s Successes, Failures, and Objectives.”
189 The preemptive arrests: Gregory L. White, “Russia Convicts Former Spy Official
for Exposing Agents in U.S. Ring,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2011.
189 turned up no evidence: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
190 “broke the record”: Tennent H. Bagley, Spymaster (New York: Skyhorse, 2015), 3.
190 Russia had dispatched: Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 450–51. Also, Walter Pincus,
“CIA Passed Bogus News to Presidents,” Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1995.
190 “There are no rivers”: Baker, “Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for
Hackers.”
191 “The best defense”: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 322
9/30/16 8:13 AM
chapter 19 The Rise of the NSA
Notes to pages 199–214 | 323
195 “There are many things”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA
Revelations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
196 By 1914, the U.S. Army: National Security Agency, Pearl Harbor Review: The
Black Chamber, NSA, 2009, https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage
/center_cryptologic_history/pearl_harbor_review/black_chamber.shtml.
196 “Its far-seeking eyes”: Kahn, Codebreakers, 358.
198 The NSA also organized: Woodward, Veil, 471–75.
198 In 1980, President Ronald Reagan: David R. Shedd, “How Obama Unilaterally
Chilled Surveillance,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 2015.
198 “We are approaching”: Turner, Secrecy and Democracy, 92.
198 “vastness”: Woodward, Veil, 202.
199 James Bond provision: Ian Cobain, “How Secret Renditions Shed Light on MI6’s
Licence to Kill and Torture,” Guardian, Feb. 13, 2012.
199 The NSA had assiduously: Kevin Poulsen, “New Snowden Leak Reports
‘Groundbreaking’ NSA Crypto-cracking,” Wired, Aug. 29, 2013.
200 “Yes, my continental European friends”: Woolsey, “Why We Spy on Our Allies.”
200 “very foundation of U.S. intelligence”: John McLaughlin, “We Need NSA to Do
What It Does—It Makes Us Safer,” Press of Atlantic City, Jan. 8, 2014.
201 It made leading hacktivists: Charlie Savage et al., “Hunting for Hackers, N.S.A.
Secretly Expands Internet Spying at U.S. Border,” New York Times, June 4,
2015.
202 “one of the most regulated”: De, “Former NSA Lawyer on ‘Harm’ of Edward
Snowden’s Revelations.”
203 the attack on Sony: Rob Lever, “Some Experts Still Aren’t Convinced That North
Korea Hacked Sony,” Business Insider, Dec. 30, 2014.
204 “The Chinese are viewed”: Alexander quoted in Kelley Vlahos, “America’s
Already-Failed Cyber War,” American Conservative, July 23, 2015.
204 “We are bolstering our support”: “Black Budget: Congressional Budget Justification
Excerpt,” Washington Post, Aug. 30, 2013.
205 These compartments were: Former NSA officer who requested anonymity, interview
with author.
205 “The queen on our chessboard”: Former NSA officer who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
205 to confront flagging morale: Hayden, interview with author.
205–206 “the nation has lost”: Mulvaney, “NSA Director Adm. Michael Rogers Discusses
Freedom, Privacy, and Security Issues at Princeton University.”
206 Although repairing the damage: King, “Ex-NSA Chief Details Snowden’s Hiring
at Agency, Booz Allen.”
chapter 20 The NSA’s Back Door
207 “You have private for-profit”: Bamford and De Chant, “Edward Snowden on
Cyber Warfare.”
208 According to a report: “Out of Control,” NSA, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-009.pdf.
211 “All of us just fell”: Baker, “Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for Hackers.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 323
9/30/16 8:13 AM
324 | Notes to pages 214–231
212 “it stays secret”: De, “Former NSA Lawyer on ‘Harm’ of Edward Snowden’s
Revelations.”
212 North Korea in 1968: John Prados and Jack Cheevers, “USS Pueblo: LBJ Considered
Nuclear Weapons,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
No. 453, Jan. 23, 2014.
212 Booz Allen Hamilton: Booz Allen Hamilton issued a history of its evolution in
2004. “Helping Clients Envision the Future,” PDF file, 2004, https://www.booz
allen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/90th-History-Book-Complete
.pdf.
213 The private company named: Julie Creswell, “The Private Equity Firm That
Grew Too Fast,” New York Times, April 24, 2015.
214 USIS had prematurely closed: Tom Hamburger and Debbi Wilgoren, “Justice
Department Says USIS Submitted 665,000 Incomplete Background Checks,”
Washington Post, Jan. 23, 2014.
214 USIS was also open to: Ellen Nakashima, “DHS Contractor Suffers Major Computer
Breach, Officials Say,” Washington Post, Aug. 6, 2014.
214 successful 2011 attack: Andy Greenberg, “Anonymous Hackers Breach Booz
Allen Hamilton,” Forbes, July 11, 2011.
215 a computer system called e-QIP: Joe Davidson, “Federal Background Check System
Shut Down Because of ‘Vulnerability,’ ” Washington Post, June 29, 2015.
215 this memorandum noted: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
chapter 21 The Russians Are Coming
217 “The collapse of the Soviet Union”: Nick Allen, “Soviet Break-Up Was Geopolitical
Disaster, Says Putin,” Telegraph, April 26, 2005.
217 Russian units had managed: Entous, Barnes, and Gorman, “U.S. Scurries to
Shore Up Spying on Russia.”
218 Russian acronym SORM: Steven Aftergood, “The Red Web: Russia and the
Internet,” FAS, Oct. 5, 2015.
219 William Martin and Bernon Mitchell: David P. Mowry, “Betrayers of the Trust,”
Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series (NSA), Feb. 28, 2003.
220 Victor Norris Hamilton: “American Defector Is Found in Russian Prison,” New
York Times, June 4, 1992.
220 He was found dead: Edward Jay Epstein, “The Spy Wars,” New York Times,
Sept. 28, 1980.
222 Harold Nicholson: Elizabeth Farnsworth, “Update on the Case of CIA Agent
Harold Nicholson,” PBS (transcript), Nov. 19, 1996. See also “Affidavit in Support
of Complaint, Arrest Warrant, and Search Warrants: United States v. Harold
J. Nicholson,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm
/ciaspy/affidavt.htm.
223 When it comes to recruiting moles: Angleton, interviews with author.
224 well experienced with false flags: Epstein, Deception, 22–28.
224 the “Trust” deception: Ibid. Also, Raymond Rocca (the CIA’s former research
chief for the counterintelligence staff), interview with author.
227 “a learning experience”: “Out of Control.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 324
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 232–252 | 325
228 127-page Standard Form 86: David Larter and Andrew Tilghman, “Military
Clearance OPM Data Breach ‘Absolute Calamity,’ ” Navy Times, June 18,
2015.
229 Under Putin: Nicole Perlroth, “Online Security Experts Link More Breaches to
Russian Government,” New York Times, Oct. 28, 2014.
229 “It is next to impossible”: Schneier quoted in Jenkins, “Anti-hero of Silk Road.”
230 The Silk Road founder: Jenkins, “Anti-hero of Silk Road.” Also, former Justice
Department official who requested anonymity, interview with author.
230 “better cyber security”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 291.
chapter 22 The Chinese Puzzle
231 “The first [false assumption]”: Snowden video in Hong Kong.
231 “China its first credible”: 2014 Annual Report to Congress by the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, quoted in David Tweed, “China
Takes Nuclear Weapons Undersea Away from Prying Eyes,” Bloomberg Business,
Dec. 8, 2014.
232 “results of decades”: Select Committee, U.S. Congress, Report, 1999, http://
www.house.gov/coxreport/chapfs/over.html.
233 a vast enterprise in China: Nir Kshetri, The Rapidly Transforming Chinese High-
Technology Industry and Market (London: Chandos, 2008), 92.
233 By 2007, Paul Strassmann: “China Has .75M ‘Zombie Computers’ in U.S.,” UPI,
Sept. 17, 2007.
234 cyber attack had harvested: David E. Sanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Hackers
May Have Obtained Names,” New York Times, June 11, 2015.
234 “Those records are”: Baker, “Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for Hackers.”
235 any attempt to “monopolize”: Patrick Goodenough, “Chinese President in Veiled
Warning to the US: Don’t Try to ‘Monopolize Regional Affairs,’ ” CNS News,
May 22, 2014.
236 Chinese intelligence maintains: Former U.S. intelligence officer stationed in
Hong Kong who requested anonymity, interview with author.
236 “hostile territory”: Drumheller, interview with author.
chapter 23 A Single Point of Failure
238 “the single point of failure”: Gellman, “Code Name ‘Verax.’ ”
239 “Snowden thinks he is smart”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 285.
239 “The purpose of my [Hong Kong]”: Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
240 “This guy”: Ibid.
240–241 “It was a nervous period”: Ibid.
242 “I’m not going to”: Dave Boyer, “Obama on Snowden: ‘I’m Not Going to Be
Scrambling Jets to Get a 29-Year-Old Hacker,’ ” Washington Times, June 27,
2013.
243 “huge strategic setback”: Harper, Kerbaj, and Shipman, “British Spies Betrayed
to Russians and Chinese.”
243 Adding insult to injury: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden Speaks.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 325
9/30/16 8:13 AM
326 | Notes to pages 252–280
chapter 24 Off to Moscow
247 “They talk about Russia”: Bamford and De Chant, “Edward Snowden on Cyber
Warfare.”
247 Before flying to Moscow: Stone, interview with author.
248 $1 million: Mike Fleming Jr., “Oliver Stone Buys Edward Snowden Russian
Lawyer’s ‘Novel’ About Asylum-Seeking Whistleblower,” Deadline, June 10,
2014.
249 “I have been trying”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
249 “There is only one door”: Gotta, e-mail exchange with author.
250 “A special operation”: Gridasov, Yavlyansky, and Gorkovskaya, “Secret Services
in Moscow with WikiLeaks Conducted Operation Snowden.”
251 “If they [the U.S. government]”: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden Speaks.”
251 Over a hundred reporters: Irina Galushka, interview with author.
251 A statement posted: “Statement from Edward Snowden in Moscow,” https://
WikiLeaks.org/Statement-from-Edward-Snowden-in.html.
252 Sarah Harrison, Snowden’s companion: Corbett, “How a Snowdenista Kept the
NSA Leaker Hidden in a Moscow Airport.”
252 So either the rule: The maximum stay is listed on the hotel’s website, http://
www.v-exp.ru/en/price/.
253 “It was a total vanishing act”: Piskunov, interview with author.
Chapter 25 Through the Looking Glass
254 “There’s definitely a deep state”: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden Speaks.”
255 according to Cherkashin: Cherkashin, interview with author.
258 Pelton had left the NSA: George E. Curry, “Ex-intelligence Expert Guilty of
Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1986.
chapter 26 The Handler
261 “As for [Snowden’s] communication”: Kucherena interview, Shevardnadze,
“Snowden Believes He Did Everything Right.”
261 learned from a Russian researcher: Vassili Sonkine, interview with author.
261 When I had been investigating: Edward Jay Epstein, The Annals of Unsolved
Crime (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2013), 209–40.
262 “I don’t know him”: Lugovoy, interview with author.
264 It was rare: The vast majority of the fifteen American defectors to the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, including Joel Barr, Morris and Lona Cohen, Victor Hamilton,
Edward Lee Howard, George Koval, Bernon Mitchell, William Martin, Isaiah
Oggins, Alfred Sarant, Robert E. Webster, and Flora Wovschin, were involved
in espionage. The remaining three, Harold M. Koch, a Catholic priest protesting
the Vietnam War; Arnold Lockshin, a Communist Party organizer; and Lee
Harvey Oswald, a U.S. marine, defected for idealistic principles. All were given
asylum, and two, Webster and Oswald, redefected to the United States.
265 “It was totally bizarre”: Lokshina, interview with author. Also, “Meeting Edward
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 326
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Notes to pages 281–293 | 327
Snowden,” Dispatches, July 13, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/12
/dispatches-meeting-edward-snowden.
265 “I will be submitting”: “Statement by Edward Snowden,” July 12, 2013, https://
WikiLeaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html.
265 “When I accepted the case”: Kucherena, interview with author.
265 Kucherena had personally approved: Shevardnadze, interview with author.
chapter 27 Snowden’s Choices
272 Presidential Policy Directive 20: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 75.
272 to trace the theft: Michael Hayden, interview with author.
273 “For our enemies”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 294.
274 “I had a special level”: Snowden and Taylor, “Are You a Traitor?”
277 “You should remain anonymous”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden
Saga.”
279 He was also willing: Snowden and Taylor, “Are You a Traitor?”
280 “The mission’s already accomplished”: Gellman, “Edward Snowden, After
Months of NSA Revelations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished.”
chapter 28 The Espionage Source
281 “The government’s investigation failed”: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.”
282 “If I were providing information”: Transcript of interview with Snowden in
Moscow, Rusbridger and MacAskill, “I, Spy.”
282 Pelton, for example: Victor Cherkashin, interview with author.
283 “This debriefing could not”: Intelligence source who requested anonymity,
interview with author.
285 Mike Rogers, the chairman: “Congressman Says Snowden Planned Escape to
China,” UPI, June 16, 2013.
285 “a known unknown”: Donald Rumsfeld, press conference at NATO headquarters,
Brussels, Belgium, June 6, 2002.
chapter 29 The “War on Terror” After Snowden
287 “Because of a number”: Amy Davidson, “Don’t Blame Edward Snowden for the
Paris Attacks,” New Yorker, Nov. 19, 2015.
287 On the evening of: David Gauthier-Villars, “Paris Attacks Show Cracks in
France’s Counterterrorism Effort,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 23, 2015.
289 According to a declassified: Charlie Savage, “NSA Discloses Inspector General
Report,” New York Times, Feb. 16, 2016.
289 “the number one source”: “NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program,”
Washington Post, June 6, 2013.
290 according to the testimony: Ellen Nakashima, “Officials: Surveillance Programs
Foiled More Than 50 Terrorist Plots,” Washington Post, June 18, 2013. Details of
four of the plots were then released by the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 327
9/30/16 8:13 AM
328 | Notes to pages 293–299
http://intelligence.house.gov/1-four-declassified-examples-more-50-attacks
-20-countries-thwarted-nsa-collection-under-fisa-section.
290 Grand Central station: Mark Hosenball, “U.S. NSA Internet Spying Foiled Plot
to Attack New York Subways: Sources,” Reuters, June 7, 2013.
290 provided the “critical lead”: Marshall Erwin, “Connecting the Dots,” U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 13, 2014,.
290 “I can tell you”: Rogers quoted in Ed Pilkington and Nicholas Watt, “NSA Surveillance
Played Little Role in Foiling Terror Plots, Experts Say,” Guardian, June
12, 2013.
290 The third NSA program: Glenn Greenwald, “XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects
‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet,’ ” Guardian, July 31, 2013.
291 Further enabling furtive Internet: Appelbaum, “Edward Snowden Interview.”
291 These precise tips: Joseph Menn, “Exclusive: Secret Contract Tied NSA and
Security Industry Pioneer,” Reuters, Dec. 20, 2013.
291 as Greenwald writes: Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 2.
292 “We can’t penetrate”: Rebecca Savransky, “Head Prosecutor of Paris Attacks
Encryption Program,” Hill, March 13, 2016.
293 “Terrorist organizations”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 294.
293 What further heightened Morell’s concern: Ibid., 315.
293 In addition, evidence: Milan Schreuer and Alissa J. Rubin, “Video Found in Belgium
May Point to a Bigger Plot,” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2016.
294 “saw one after another”: Mary Louise Kelly, “NSA: Fallout from Snowden Leaks
Isn’t Over, but Info Is Getting Old,” NPR, March 16, 2016.
294 “Have I lost capability”: Bill Gertz, “NSA Director: Snowden’s Leaks Helped
Terrorists Avoid Tracking,” Washington Free Beacon, Feb. 24, 2015.
epilogue The Snowden Effect
295 “Governments can reduce our dignity”: Edward Snowden, “Governments Can
Reduce Our Dignity to That of Tagged Animals,” Guardian, May 3, 2016.
298 published in The New York Times: David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “N.S.A.
Devises Radio Pathway into Computers,” New York Times, Jan. 14, 2014.
298 “Snowden has compromised more”: McConnell interview, King, “Ex-NSA Chief
Details Snowden’s Hiring at Agency, Booz Allen.”
299 a distrustful press: Pilkington and Watt, “NSA Surveillance Played Little Role
in Foiling Terror Plots, Experts Say.” The first “expert” was Michael Dowling, a
Denver-based attorney who acted as Zazi’s defense counsel. He said he had no
access to the undisclosed basis of the government position because Zazi pleaded
guilty in 2011. The second expert was David Davis, a British MP, who was in the
shadow government of the Conservative Party. He resigned from the shadow
government in June 2008, more than a year before the Zazi arrest. In any case,
because the PRISM program was a closely held secret, he would not have had,
and does not claim to have had, access to it.
299 Snowden speaks “truth to power”: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden
Speaks.”
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 328
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Selected Bibliography
selected books
Andrew, Christopher. The Sword and the Shield. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 2008.
Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
Coleman, Gabriella. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous.
New York: Verso, 2015.
Epstein, Edward Jay. Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
———. Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth. New York:
Viking Press, 1966.
Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. Privacy for Me and Not for Thee: The Movement for Invincible
Personal Encryption, Radical State Transparency, and the Snowden Hack. New York:
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, 2014.
Greenberg, Karen J. Rogue Justice: The Making of the Security State. New York: Crown,
2016.
Greenwald, Glenn. How Would a Patriot Act? Defending American Values from a President
Run Amok. San Francisco: Working Assets, 2006.
———. No Place to Hide. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014.
Harding, Luke. The Snowden Files. New York: Vintage, 2014.
Hayden, Michael V. Playing to the Edge. New York: Penguin, 2016.
Jastrow, Joseph. Fact and Fable in Psychology. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1900.
Kahn, David. The Codebreakers. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967.
Lucas, Edward. The Snowden Operation. Seattle: Amazon Digital Services, 2015.
Morell, Michael J. The Great War of Our Time. New York: Twelve, 2015.
Sebag- Montefiore, Hugh. Enigma: The Battle for the Code. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 2001.
Shils, Edward. The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American
Security Policies. Chicago: Free Press, 1956.
Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1985.
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 329
9/30/16 8:13 AM
330 | Selected Bibliography
Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981– 1987. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2005.
selected articles
Appelbaum, Jacob. “Edward Snowden Interview: The NSA and Its Willing Helpers.”
Spiegel Online, July 8, 2013.
Baker, Gerard. “Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for Hackers.” Wall Street Journal,
June 22, 2015.
Bamford, James. “Edward Snowden: The Untold Story.” Wired, Aug. 2014.
Bradsher, Keith. “Hasty Exit Started with Pizza Inside a Hong Kong Hideout.” New York
Times, June 24, 2013.
Burrough, Bryan, Sarah Ellison, and Suzanna Andrews. “The Snowden Saga.” Vanity
Fair, May 2014.
Chen, Te- Ping, and Ken Brown. “Snowden’s Options for Refuge Narrow.” Wall Street
Journal, June 10, 2013.
Corbett, Sara. “How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker Hidden in a Moscow Airport.”
Vogue, Feb. 19, 2015.
De, Rajesh. “Former NSA Lawyer on ‘Harm’ of Edward Snowden’s Revelations.”
Bloomberg, July 27, 2015.
Gellman, Barton. “Code Name ‘Verax’: Snowden, in Exchanges with Post Reporter,
Made Clear He Knew Risks.” Washington Post, June 9, 2013.
— — — . “Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says His Mission’s
Accomplished.” Washington Post, Dec. 23, 2013.
Gellman, Barton, and Greg Miller. “ ‘Black Budget’ Summary Details U.S. Spy Network’s
Successes, Failures, and Objectives.” Washington Post, Aug. 25, 2013.
Gertz, Bill. “Counterspies Hunt Russian Mole Inside National Security Agency.” Washington
Times, Dec. 1, 2010.
Greenberg, Andy. “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to First Introduce His Epic NSA
Leaks.” Wired, Oct. 13, 2014.
Greenwald, Glenn, Laura Poitras, and Ewen MacAskill. “Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower
Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations.” Guardian, June 9, 2013.
Gridasov, Andrei, Igor Yavlyansky, and Mary Gorkovskaya. “Secret Services in Moscow
with WikiLeaks Conducted Operation Snowden.” Izvestia, June 23, 2013.
Harris, Shane. “What Was Edward Snowden Doing in India?” Foreign Policy, Jan. 13,
2014.
Hastings, Michael. “Julian Assange: The Rolling Stone Interview.” Rolling Stone, Jan.
18, 2012.
Hill, Kashmir. “How ACLU Attorney Ben Wizner Became Snowden’s Lawyer.” Forbes,
March 10, 2014.
Hosenball, Mark. “NSA Contractor Hired Snowden Despite Concerns About Resume
Discrepancies.” Reuters, June 20, 2013.
King, Rachael. “Ex- NSA Chief Details Snowden’s Hiring at Agency, Booz Allen.” Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 4, 2014.
Lam, Lana. “Whistle- Blower Edward Snowden Talks to the South China Morning Post,”
South China Morning Post, June 23, 2013.
Lee, Micah. “Ed Snowden Taught Me to Smuggle Secrets Past Incredible Danger.” Intercept,
Oct. 28, 2014.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 330
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Selected Bibliography | 331
Leopold, Jason. “Inside Washington’s Quest to Bring Down Edward Snowden.” Vice,
June 4, 2015.
Miller, Greg. “U.S. Officials Scrambled to Nab Snowden.” Washington Post, June 14,
2014.
Mullin, Joe. “NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars Technica.” Ars Technica, June 13,
2013.
Packer, George. “The Holder of Secrets.” New Yorker, Oct. 20, 2014.
Reitman, Janet. “Snowden and Greenwald.” Rolling Stone, Dec. 4, 2013.
Risen, James. “Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia.” New York Times, Oct.
17, 2013.
Rusbridger, Alan, and Ewen MacAskill. “I, Spy: Edward Snowden in Exile.” Guardian,
July 18, 2014.
Sandvik, Runa A. “That One Time I Threw a CryptoParty with Edward Snowden.”
Forbes, May 27, 2014.
Schmitt, Eric. “C.I.A. Warning on Snowden in ’09 Said to Slip Through the Cracks.”
New York Times, Oct. 10, 2013.
vanden Heuvel, Katrina, and Stephen F. Cohen. “Snowden Speaks: A Sneak Peek at an
Exclusive Interview.” Nation, Oct. 10, 2014.
Woolsey, R. James. “Why We Spy on Our Allies.” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2000.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 331
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 332
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index
<TK> 16pages
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 333
9/30/16 8:13 AM
334 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 334
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 335
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 335
9/30/16 8:13 AM
336 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 336
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 337
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 337
9/30/16 8:13 AM
338 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 338
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 339
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 339
9/30/16 8:13 AM
340 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 340
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 341
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 341
9/30/16 8:13 AM
342 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 342
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 343
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 343
9/30/16 8:13 AM
344 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 344
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 345
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 345
9/30/16 8:13 AM
346 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 346
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 347
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 347
9/30/16 8:13 AM
348 | Index
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 348
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Index | 349
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 349
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 350
9/30/16 8:13 AM
illustration credits
Edward Snowden on video shown in Hong Kong: AP Photo/Kin Cheung
NSA base on Oahu: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Barton Gellman: AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite
Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras in Hong Kong: AP Photo/John Minchillo
Mira hotel: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Room 1014 at the Mira: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Keith Alexander: AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite
Vladimir Putin: AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev
Julian Assange: Anthony Devlin/PA Wire
Russian airline Aeroflot: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Michael Hayden: Rex Features via AP Images
U.S. base at Yokota: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Snowden’s home in Hawaii: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Lindsay Mills: Luis Silos
NSA headquarters: AP Photo/Patrick Semansky, File
Jacob Appelbaum: Axel Heimken via AP Images
Runa Sandvik: AP Photo/John Locher
CryptoParty: Courtesy Ena and Ines Talakic
Anatoly Kucherena: AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko
Snowden’s first appearance in Russia: Human Rights Watch, Tanya Lokshina
Anna Chapman: AP Photo/Sergei Karpukhin, Pool, File
Poitras, Greenwald, and Mills: Kevin Winter/Getty Images
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 351
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 352
9/30/16 8:13 AM
a note about the author
Edward Jay Epstein graduated from Cornell University and
received a Ph.D. from Harvard. His undergraduate thesis on the
search for political truth became a best- selling book, Inquest: The
Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth. His doctoral
dissertation on television news was excerpted in The New Yorker
and published as News from Nowhere. After teaching political science
at MIT and UCLA, he became a full- time author. He won the
prestigious Financial Times/Booz Allen & Hamilton Global Business
Book Award for both best biography and best business book
for Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer. He has written
investigative pieces for The New Yorker, Vanity Fair, The Atlantic,
and The New York Review of Books. He lives in New York City.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 353
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 354
9/30/16 8:13 AM
a note on the type
The text of this book was set in a typeface called Aldus, designed by
the celebrated typographer Hermann Zapf in 1952– 53. Based on
the classical proportion of the popular Palatino type family, Aldus
was originally adapted for Linotype composition as a slightly
lighter version that would read better in smaller sizes.
Hermann Zapf was born in Nuremberg, Germany, in 1918. He
has created many other well known typefaces including Comenius,
Hunt Roman, Marconi, Melior, Michelangelo, Optima, Saphir, Sistina,
Zapf Book and Zapf Chancery.
Composed by North Market Street Graphics, Lancaster, Pennsylvania
Printed and bound by Berryville Graphics, Berryville, Virginia
Designed by Maggie Hinders
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 355
9/30/16 8:13 AM
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 356
9/30/16 8:13 AM