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From: jeffrey E. [jeeyacation@gmail.com]
Sent: 5/19/2014 10:37:05 AM
To: Peter Thiel
Subject: That was fun , see you in 3 weeks
FP Briefing non- classified
19 May, 2014
Article 1.   The National Interest Which Road Will Egypt Take?
Kathryn Alexeeff
Article 2.   Now Lebanon What Saudi-Iran talks could mean for Lebanon and the
region
Alex Rowell
Article 3.   The Economist India's next prime minister: The Modi era begins
Article 4.   The Christian Science Monitor An India ready to dream big
Editorial
Article 5.   1-1Urriyet Will it be Cyprus' year?
Yusuf Kanli
Article 6.   The National Interest Stars Are Aligned for a Solution in Cyprus
Ozdil Nami
Article 7.   The diplomat China's Instructive Syria Policy
Adrien Morin
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Article 1.
The National Interest
Which Road Will Egypt Take?
Kathryn Alexeeff
May 19, 2014 -- With Abdul Fattah al-Sisi's official resignation from the
military and bid for the presidency, the future of Egypt looks murky at
best. While his victory is highly likely, the question remains—down which
path will he take Egypt? Al-Sisi's support for the anti-Morsi protesters
may indicate support for the democratization of Egypt and the will of the
people. On the other hand, his bid looks like a giant leap backwards for
Egypt, a return to a military dictatorship. Egypt has several potential paths
forward under an al-Sisi government, none of which are ideal.
Unfortunately, Egypt appears to be justifying analysts' worst fears and
will likely return to a Mubarak-style military autocracy under al-Sisi.
The first option is a military government that enacts economic and
political reforms that improve the lives of the citizenry, not just the
military or the elites. This will lead to a slower evolution toward
democracy. On the plus side, slower evolution under a stable government
would allow structural changes to take root, fostering effective institutions
and greater stability. The negative side is that evolution of this sort would
be neither smooth nor straightforward. It would come in fits and spurts,
punctuated by returns to oppression and violence. It would also be
extremely slow, and easy for a demagogue to reverse. Unfortunately,
given Egypt's current situation, option one is highly unlikely. Given the
high levels of repression and violence, the only reforms the government
will likely enact would involve greater centralized power in its hands.
Furthermore, there are a myriad of ways for a government to pay lip
service to democratization without actually decreasing its power. Another
option is that Egypt becomes stuck in a proverbial time loop—repeating
the revolution every year or two when the government fails to deliver on
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actual, on-the-ground improvements. This would not necessarily make
Egypt worse off, but it could further weaken the economy as revenue from
key industries, such as tourism, continues to decline. It would not improve
conditions either, as improvements, unfortunately, take longer that the
voting public generally likes. The potential upshot of this option is that,
hopefully, over time, mass action would become more and more cohesive
and leaders start to emerge from the morass. This would bring developed
political parties into Egypt's political system and potentially, leaders from
outside the military and the elite as well. This, however, will remain only a
temporary option. Revolutions, or even mass action, are difficult to
maintain over time. Moreover, if some improvements, particularly
economic improvements, do occur, the majority of the country will
acquiesce to a nondemocratic government. The best example of this is the
Chinese government, which has managed economic growth without any
accompanying political liberalization. Eventually, either a government
will improve conditions for the average Egyptian, or it will become so
repressive that mass action ceases to be a viable option. The third option is
a total crackdown on any and all political movements and the return of a
repressive and autocratic government. The impetus behind this path is the
idea that establishing stability is the first and foremost priority of the
government. If you establish stability, the rest will follow. Or, if the
government is truly cynical, it simply does not care what happens as long
as the ruler and his or her cronies are taken care of Right now, it looks as
though Egypt has chosen to go with option three, the return to repression
under military rule. The first step for any autocracy is to get a firm grip on
the political process, weeding out the opposition. This is precisely what
has been occurring. Massive repression of the Muslim Brotherhood is the
most obvious example of this process. While there are some legitimate
security concerns regarding the Muslim Brotherhood ties to ongoing
violence, banning the entire organization and labeling them all as terrorists
is like using a sledgehammer on a nail—overkill and likely to create a
mess. It does, however, have the benefit of getting the only meaningful
political party out of the current political scene and that is a key step in
political consolidation. Other examples of consolidation abound, including
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harsh treatment of dissents and a crackdown on journalists. While Egypt
is headed down the path of autocracy, this does not suggest the futility of
change or of promoting democracy in Egypt, nor, say, that the Arab
Spring was a failure. Autocracy will not be a permanent fix for the factors
that nourished the Arab Spring. It will work for a while, maybe even a
decade, but eventually, repression will not be enough, and the
demonstrations will begin again. A little liberty is a dangerous thing—
especially when it bears fruit. The Arab Spring in Egypt may not have
brought about democracy, but that does not mean it failed. Egypt now
knows the impact mass action can have on its government. They have seen
not one, but two governments fall as a direct result of protests and popular
action. Egypt may be moving back toward a military dictatorship, but now
the people have a taste of liberty. No matter how repressive the military
establishment decides to be, the genie is out of the bottle.
Kathryn Alexeeff holds a master's degree in Security Studies from
Georgetown University and has worked at the Atlantic Council's South
Asia Center.
Article 2.
Now Lebanon
What Saudi-Iran talks could mean for
Lebanon and the region
Alex Rowell
May 16, 2014 -- In a potentially momentous surprise move that could
herald an alleviation of political and sectarian conflict across the Middle
East, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal announced on
Tuesday an invitation to his Iranian counterpart to travel to Riyadh to enter
negotiations over the rival countries' "differences."
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Saudi and Iran, powerhouses of Sunni and Shiite Islam respectively,
presently support opposing sides in many of the Middle East's major
confrontations, and are often seen as having radically divergent and
competing visions for the future of the region.
Which is why, in Lebanon — a country where the two powers wield
extensive influence over their respective allies — the news of a possible
rapprochement has already sparked confidence that political deadlock on a
number of key disputes may be resolved, perhaps even defying
expectations of a presidential vacuum by ushering in a successor to
President Michel Suleiman in time for the expiry of his term on 25 May.
"I [now] believe we will have an elected president on the 25th," said MP
Ahmad Fatfat of the Saudi-supported Future Movement. "That [Prince
Faisal's] invitation was public means they already agreed on many points
under the table. That means the negotiations regarding the new president
have already been done."
Beyond the elections, Fatfat added the talks would likely also yield wider
benefits in terms of security and the economy. Earlier this week, Saudi
lifted what has been described as an "unofficial ban" on its citizens
traveling to Lebanon, fueling hopes of a boost to the country's struggling
tourism industry. Saudi analysts concurred that the overall situation in
Lebanon would likely improve in the near future.
"I think in Lebanon there is already agreement [between Saudi and Iran],"
said Jamal Khashoggi, veteran Saudi journalist and former advisor to then-
ambassador Prince Turki al-Faisal. "The agreement in Lebanon is to
contain the situation."
In neighboring Syria, however, where Iranian-backed regime forces
continue to suppress a Saudi-supported armed rebellion, Khashoggi
expects very little to materialize from Saudi-Iranian talks.
"I'm not optimistic," he told NOW. "The Saudis and Iranians are still far
apart. The Iranians must relinquish their expansionism toward the
Mediterranean, or we have to give up Syria. And I don't think we can
afford to give up Syria. And besides, even if we decide to give up Syria,
the Syrian people are not going to give up Syria."
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"So basically, the Iranians are acting like the Israelis — they want peace,
and they want to keep the land."
Other analysts, while conceding any progress would be slow, had
somewhat more positive forecasts on the Syrian front.
"[Syria] is a tough one to happen quickly, but at least if they start talking
then it's a good thing," said Andrew Hammond, policy fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Islamic Utopia:
The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia.
"Fundamentally, the chances of the Syrian tragedy being brought to an
end, or the beginning of this disaster being brought to an end, require these
two countries to come to an agreement [...] They are the keys to the
Syrian conflict, so they have to start talking, even though it will take a
long time."
Accordingly, with little chance of the two reaching agreement on Syria in
the immediate future, the talks may in fact focus on other areas of dispute,
such as Iraq, where a new coalition government is being formed following
parliamentary elections on 30 April.
"The other issue is Iraq, now that the election is over and all the horse-
trading is beginning," said Hammond. "I wonder whether that actually
may have been the main impetus for this invitation."
Perhaps the most significant changes resulting from Faisal's initiative in
the long run, however, will pertain to Saudi itself Having been "shocked,"
as Hammond put it, by the United States' decision to pursue warmer ties
with Tehran last year, and initially threatening a "major shift" in its
relations with Washington as a consequence, Riyadh may now be
grudgingly coming to terms with the new order envisaged by President
Obama.
"It does suggest there is a potential for them to reassess the situation and
try and move things forward, find some way of having a new relationship
with the Iranians, given the fact that the Americans clearly want to move
forward, and the smaller Gulf states do as well," said Hammond.
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Alex Rowell joined NOW in Beirut as a reporter and blogger in February
2012. A British citizen, he was raised in Dubai and studied economics in
London.
Article 3.
The Economist
India's next prime minister: The Modi era
begins
May 18th 2014 -- IN THE days since May 16th when Narendra Modi and
his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stormed to victory in India's general
election much commentary has wrestled with the idea of history. Most
commentators seem to agree that May 2014 marks an historic moment.
One reason is the scale of Mr Modi's landslide victory, which scooped up
282 seats for the BJP and thus an absolute majority in parliament. That is
first time since 1984 that any party has won a majority for itself It is also
the first time ever that a party other than Congress has done so.
Conversely, the defeat for Congress is far worse than anything in its long
history of dominating Indian politics: it won fewer than a sixth the seats of
its rival, getting just 44. In much of north India, the political heartland,
Congress was wiped out. Some correctly ask if its eventual recovery
(assuming that will happen one day) would require being rid of the Nehru-
Gandhi dynasty that has been at its heart for so long.
Yet the size of Mr Modi's victory, and Congress's defeat, tells only part of
the dramatic story. The immense dissatisfaction with Congress was
undeniable. Voters were unhappy with high inflation, slowing growth,
weak leadership, corruption and much more. Such voter grumpiness,
usually summed up as "anti-incumbency", is all but inevitable for a party
that had been in power for a decade. Yet more has happened here. Take,
for example, the utter defeat of the Bahujan Samaj Party of Mayawati, the
Dalit leader in Uttar Pradesh. She was not an incumbent and her party
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managed to collect some 20% of the votes cast in the state. Indeed, after
the BJP and Congress, it got the most votes nationally of any party in the
election. Yet it failed to win a single constituency. By contrast the BJP not
only collected a huge tally of votes but also turned those efficiently into
seats. With 31% of the national vote-share, they captured nearly 52% of
the seats in parliament.
That suggests an important shift in Indian politics. The BJP did
extraordinarily well because it approached the election in a far more
professional, strategic and efficient way than its rivals. The methods it
employed were modern, and the skill at which Mr Modi and his fellow
leaders conducted their campaigns rivalled the sort of performances put in
by American presidential contenders (and with similar quantities of money
to spend). Rahul Gandhi of Congress, in the end, proved to be a hopeless
amateur, poorly advised without even decent media-management skills or
the ability to present a strong campaign message. Many regional figures
proved similarly out of date in their campaigning. The BJP's roadshows
and rallies, the door-knocking by volunteers, the influence on India's press
and television channels, the ability to set the agenda of discussion, all went
to making the election a remarkably one-sided affair. The chief minister of
Bihar, Nitish Kumar, tendered his resignation on May 17th, after his party
was flattened by the BJP in the state. (Assam's chief minister, from
Congress, has also offered to quit.) That was not because of anti-
incumbency—voters in Bihar are happy with the work Mr Kumar has
been doing—but because the BJP's campaign was vastly superior.
Mr Modi in his first speeches after his victory has sounded magnanimous
and made the right noises about running the country for all, bringing
everyone along. He also mentioned, only partly accurately, that the BJP's
success transcended caste politics and religious appeals. If that were
entirely true, it would be another reason to call this election result historic.
In fact the BJP did make some use of caste and religion, as when Mr Modi
played up his "other backward classes" background while campaigning in
Uttar Pradesh, or when he criticized Bangladeshi (read: Muslim)
infiltrators in Assam and West Bengal. It is troubling, too, that the new
parliament will have the fewest Muslim members of any since 1952, while
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the ruling BJP has not a single Muslim MP among its cohort of 282;
Muslims are reckoned to comprise at least 14% of the Indian population.
But largely Mr Modi told the truth: the BJP's manifesto and Mr Modi's
speeches emphasised economic and development matters. The victory he
achieved is more the result of his talk of strong government and
improvements to the material lives of voters than anything else. That is
encouraging. It suggests that he will now seek to govern in a way that
encourages economic growth, job creation and better infrastructure, along
with further reductions in poverty and inflation. Mr Modi has been
dropping strong hints that he hopes to remain in power not only for the
current five-year term, but to win re-election and reshape India's economy
and political landscape. In other words, he is considering his long-term
prospects by keeping in mind the rise of a powerful new constituency that
will only gather more influence as the years pass: the young, urban,
educated and impatient set of voters who aspire for material gains to their
lives. We argued before that such voters, for whom there is only "one
God, that is GDP", will increasingly decide the outcome of Indian
elections. Mr Modi and the BJP look set to corner their support.
What comes next? On May 20th the BJP will meet, apparently to elect Mr
Modi formally as their leader. That, apparently, is a precursor to the
formation of a government which is going to include the immediate allies
of the party that make up the National Democratic Alliance. It could, too,
be made from of a wider coalition, since the BJP—if it is to push through
legislative changes quickly—will need additional help from other parties
that control powerful states, and to win more support in the upper house of
parliament.
Unease persists about the role of the Hindu-nationalist right, whose
footsoldiers undoubtedly helped a great deal in getting BJP candidates
elected. With Mr Modi having been an activist member in the right-wing
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) since he was a boy, some on the
right have expectations that he will pursue an agenda of Hindutva (for
example getting a temple erected in Ayodhya, or changing the
constitutional status of Muslim-majority Kashmir). Others look for
evidence that nationalism of a protectionist variety will have a strong
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influence on Mr Modi's policies. For example over the weekend BJP
spokesmen have been saying that the party still intends to reverse an
existing policy that would allow foreign investors to open supermarkets in
larger cities, and even then only under limited circumstances.
Mr Modi would be wiser to downplay the influence of both sorts of
nationalists. To sustain confidence that he can get the economy growing
faster will require pulling off some difficult feats, not least attracting more
foreign capital into a host of industries which could include insurance,
banking, defence and many parts of infrastructure. He needs to send a
clear message, as he picks ministers and begins to offer policy, that India
aspires to become strong on the back of economic growth, more
international trade, deeper global engagement—and not by promoting
nationalist tendencies at home. He has a decent record of reaching out to
other countries, notably Japan, in his time as chief minister of Gujarat.
Since his victory on May 16th he has fielded calls from Barack Obama,
David Cameron and a host of other global well-wishers eager to engage
India internationally. Mr Obama for example made clear that India's
prime minister would be welcome to visit the United States. The
Americans in particular want a decisive break from an earlier period, when
interaction with Mr Modi concerned his record in handling communal
violence in his state in 2002. Mr Modi in other words, by winning so
emphatically on May 16th, appears both to have made history and escaped
it. That is no mean feat at all.
Article 4.
The Christian Science Monitor
An India ready to dream big
Editorial
May 18, 2014 --Years before Narendra Modi won this month's election
that now allows him to become India's next leader, the former tea-stall
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worker asked this question on behalf of the world's second most-populous
nation:
"It is often said that India does not dream big and that is the root cause of
all our problems. Why can't we dream like China, Europe or America?"
Note how Mr. Modi compares India to other continental powers. This
reveals just how much today's 1.25 billion Indians, who are digitally
hitched to the global flow of ideas, have adopted new views of their
capacity for progress — not only for India but for themselves.
During his campaign, Modi tapped into this rising aspiration for India to
emulate the best in other countries. One in eight voters went to the polls
for the first time, a sign of the fact that two-thirds of the population is
under 35. He and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promised economic
growth, clean governance, and decisive leadership, all of which Modi
delivered as chief minister of Gujarat state — although sometimes too
harshly or divisively.
His record and his campaign promises really reflect an India ready to join
the global community. Voter turnout was a record 66 percent. And the
electoral results cut across the old divides of caste, rural vs urban, old vs.
young, poor vs. middle-class. On those measures alone, India has
surpassed China, which is not even allowed to have elections, and the
political disunity in Europe and America.
The BJP's election sweep was achieved in part out of public frustration
with the long-ruling Congress party. Its corrupt, paternalistic, and dynastic
style no longer fits an India of smart phones and social mobility. More
than two-thirds of Indians are dissatisfied with their country's direction,
according to a Pew poll. In throwing off the past, voters have allowed the
BJP to rule with a clear majority in the lower house of parliament. Such a
feat was achieved only once before, in 1984, after the assassination of
Indira Gandhi boosted the Congress party in an election.
As prime minister, Modi must not forget he is riding an awakening of
Indian expectations as much as leading them. His checkered past as a
Hindu nationalist, and in sometimes treating India's Muslims as less than
citizens, cannot color his leadership in a constitutional democracy.
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Religion, including Hinduism and Islam, can help Indians define their
individual identity. But in a country of such size and diversity, one that is
home to a third of the world's poor, only secular rule can ensure the unity
needed to fulfill people's collective hopes.
"India has won," Modi tweeted after his victory. This apparent humility
may serve him well in preventing an overreach of his powers. India does
not need big-man style rule now that a historic election has shown Indians
are ready to dream big.
Article 5.
Hiirriyet
Will it be Cyprus' year?
Yusuf Kanli
19 May 2014 -- The highlight of the one-day trip to North Cyprus by
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu might best be his bold declaration that
time has come to end the 50-year-old Cyprus problem. Can there be
relevance between the age and the time for the resolution of a problem?
Obviously not, but a minister expressing conviction that time has come to
end a problem carries incredible importance and naturally boosts
expectations to that end.
Is it really the high time, best opportunity, right moment, last chance or
whatever for a Cyprus deal? All through the past many decades, somehow
many prominent and otherwise effective personalities, including not only
Davutoglu and people of his caliber, but many premiers, presidents and at
least every American leader since George Bush Sr. have declared many of
the past years as the "Cyprus year" but that Cyprus year never came...
Will it come this time? Sure... the Cyprus problem could easily be
resolved if the two sides on the island ever develop sufficient political
will; prepare their respective societies to be receptive to a painful
compromise and international actors stop paying lip service to the idea of
a resolution, but instead genuinely support a resolution.
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Do the two sides on Cyprus have political will? Does Turkey want a
settlement? Is Greece prepared for a deal that might trigger a larger deal
with Turkey over the Aegean and Thrace issues? Of these questions only
one element is affirmative; Turkish Cypriots want a settlement. In 2004,
they not only demonstrated simultaneous referenda, but repeated polls
have shown since then that the pro-settlement resolve of Turkish Cypriots
is over 65 percent. Greek Cypriots? Polls show a decreasing 41 percent are
receptive to the idea of resolution, less than 30 want federation. Officially,
both Greece and Turkey support a compromise deal on Cyprus. How
sincere are they? Last time, in 2004, despite all of the pledges made
before, Greece eventually could not support a plan for resolution. Will it
support a compromise deal this time? Let us hope it will. Turkey will
support any deal supported by Turkish Cypriots, provided it somehow
maintains a presence on the island. Why should it not, after all, if Britain,
a country far away, has two sovereign bases just because it was the
previous colonial power? Was it not Turkey that leased the island to
Greece?
International actors all keep on vowing to support a deal on Cyprus. Why
would the British want a settlement knowing that despite the recent
agreement it signed in haste with the Greek Cypriots, British bases on
Cyprus will be the next and joint target for all Cypriots if ever they resolve
their bilateral quagmire? Russians would not want a resolution either.
Why should they? To upset their peculiar position as the major energy
supplier of Europe, (particularly) to Germany? Or to render life even more
difficult to the Russian population and collaborators engaged in bleaching
business?
Why would Americans support a compromise deal if they benefit more
from the British bases on the divided Cyprus? The upcoming visit of
American Vice President Joe Biden this week and the anticipated visit to
the island within weeks by Secretary of State John Kerry of course
demonstrate an interest in the Cyprus problem. A visit by a U.S. vice
president — the first in 52 years — of course will be meaningful.
Plans to ease European energy dependency on Russia might play a role for
an accelerated demand for a Cyprus deal push. Don't the Americans know
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better than anyone else a Cyprus peace requires engagement in goodwill
and determination by both sides and of course at least Turkey, if not
Turkey and Greece together? Why would Greek Cypriots want a
resolution as long as they enjoy alone the "sole legitimate government" of
Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot part of the island is considered only as
"areas not under the government's control?"
Yes, Davutoglu may wish to see accelerated peace talks and a
commitment from Nikos Anastasiades to work for a deal "as soon as
possible." In view of the latest European Court of Human Rights and these
plain realities, can that be possible anytime soon?
Article 6.
The National Interest
Stars Are Aligned for a Solution in Cyprus
Ozdil Nami
May 19, 2014 -- The Cyprus problem is at a critical juncture as there
exists a unique opportunity for its solution. If this opportunity is utilized, a
united Cyprus will be the keystone of a wider area of cooperation and
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. A glance at the issues
that are affected by or directly resulted from the prolongation of the
problem clearly highlights the need for an early settlement in
Cyprus.
The 50th Year on the UN Agenda
The Cyprus problem has been on the agenda of the United Nations for
half-a-century. For decades, it has consumed considerable diplomatic and
political effort, domestic and international alike, but to no avail. As such,
it has gained a reputation as an intractable and inexorable problem that
eluded an ultimate settlement. The island of Cyprus, nearly half the size of
the state of Connecticut, has subsequently become synonymous with
conflict, despite its nostalgic narrative as a haven of peaceful coexistence.
Since the drawing of the Green Line in 1963, Nicosia, the Janus-faced
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capital of both North and South Cyprus, remains today as the last divided
city in Europe and the only divided capital in the world. However, the
Cyprus problem has to change face and move on from this conundrum
characterized by a relentlessly enduring state of conflict to an inspirational
success story of peace. Time is ripe for such a change, especially in view
of current dynamics that are molding together both on the island and in the
region.
Missed Opportunities
April 24, 2014 marked the 10th anniversary of the referenda held on the
UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan (the Annan Plan) on both sides of the
island. This was the first time in the history of Cyprus negotiations that a
comprehensive settlement document, comprising 9,000 pages, was put to
separate simultaneous referenda. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan
with an overwhelming majority (65 percent), despite the great sacrifices it
entailed for them. They did not only vote in favour of a solution, but also
for moving beyond the traumatic past and building a common future
within the EU through a new partnership with Greek Cypriots.
Unfortunately, the Plan failed due to the resounding 'no' vote (76 percent)
of the Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot aspiration for a
solution has prevailed even in the face of deep frustration ensuing the
Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and the continued isolation
imposed on Turkish Cypriots in all aspects of life. The fact that they have
been left out in the cold, while the Greek Cypriot side has unilaterally
become a member of the EU, did not change the Turkish Cypriots' resolve
for settlement. Yet, it further complicated the prospects of reconciliation
on the island.
Thriving Opportunities from Within
Against this background, the Turkish Cypriot side has intensified its
endeavors to overcome this crisis of confidence and engaged sincerely
with the Greek Cypriot side for the preparation of the ground for a new
dialogue. Subsequently, the two sides were able to initiate a series of
agreements in early 2008, which paved the way for the resumption of full-
fledged negotiations after a four-year stalemate. Since then, intermittent
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negotiations have been underway, with significant progress attained on the
majority of the chapters of the Cyprus problem as a result of the intensive
efforts put forward by the two sides in reaching convergences.
Furthermore, with the recent agreement on the Joint Declaration of
February 11, 2014, an important milestone in the negotiations has been
reached, which clearly provides for the broad outline of a solution and the
main principles upon which the new partnership will be established.
Hence, the announcement of the Joint Declaration triggered a very
positive atmosphere that was further fostered by the support of a wide
spectrum of actors on both sides as well as the extensive espousal received
by the international community.
The Far-Reaching Consequences of the Problem
In light of this promising political climate on the island, combined with
the existence of some external factors that are currently at play, there is an
historic opportunity that should not be missed in bringing the long-
overdue Cyprus problem to a closure. The recent developments in our
region strongly signal a pressing need in this direction. It is beyond doubt
that the Cyprus problem holds back the potential of cooperation in a
broader context. Since its conception, the relations between Turkey and
Greece have been negatively affected by it. A full-scale rapprochement
between the two countries has been held hostage to the chronic status quo
on the island. In the course of time, this has been exploited as an excuse to
oppose Turkey's bid for EU membership through the blocking of some
chapters in her accession talks. EU-NATO strategic cooperation has also
been hampered in a similar fashion due to the non-existence of diplomatic
relations between South Cyprus and Turkey. As a NATO member, Turkey
has proven to be an indispensable strategic partner of the Transatlantic
cooperation since the inception of the Cold War. Although a NATO
Council decision in late 2002 enabled the participation of the non-EU
members of NATO in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),
the Greek Cypriot side has been blocking Turkey's involvement both in
the ESDP and her prospective membership in the European Defense
Agency (EDA). As a result, no meaningful dialogue can practically be
established between the EU and NATO, creating a situation whereby the
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Cyprus problem is literally obstructing the deepening of the EU-NATO
strategic relations. The current crisis in Ukraine clearly highlighted, once
again, the need for closer cooperation between the two institutions.
External Dynamics Necessitating a Settlement
The crisis in Ukraine also brings forward the necessity of alternative
energy supplies en route to Europe. Recently, the island of Cyprus has
driven considerable attention as a result of the newly found energy
reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Common sense dictates that
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, together with neighboring countries,
adopt a win-win approach and share the benefits of the natural resources
of the region on an equitable basis. Such cooperation and the resulting
interdependency could only bring much needed stability and prosperity to
the region and help restore the ties between Turkey and Israel.
The Promise of a Solution
Cyprus lies at a strategic crossroads between the East and the West.
However, as all these developments indicate, the island's full potential can
only be utilized with the solution of the Cyprus problem. A solution will
not only provide for peace on the island, but will also prompt a wave of
cooperation in its wider region. Therefore, all relevant actors, including
the two sides on the island, should act in a spirit of good-will and
compromise in bringing an end to this half-century-old problem. The
Turkish Cypriot side is ready to do its utmost in this regard, with a view to
realizing the island's destiny to become a hub for peace and stability rather
than a source of conflict and tension.
Ozdil Nami is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.
Article 7.
The diplomat
China's Instructive Syria Policy
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Adrien Morin
May 18, 2014 -- The crisis in Syria erupted early in 2011 as part of the
Arab Spring and worsened as the year went on. A first draft resolution to
intervene in Syria was proposed by France, Germany, Portugal and the
U.K., on October 4. This proposal was vetoed by Russia and China,
marking the start of a long diplomatic impasse with Moscow and Beijing
on one side and the Western powers on the other. China and Russia would
later veto two more draft UN resolutions. Three years after the clashes in
Syria began, and with the civil war now being supplanted in media
headlines, it is worth reviewing Chinese policy. Has Beijing purposefully
been more assertive toward Western powers, and the U.S. in particular?
Western Concerns
Chinese foreign policy worries the West on a number of fronts. One
concern is the formation of a "united front" of China and Russia, to
oppose Western goals. Certainly, China and Russia have together vetoed
draft resolutions supported by the three other permanent members of the
Security Council. The world has meanwhile witnessed China's impressive
rise in recent decades as well as Russia's attempts to return to Great Power
status. Perhaps an anti-Western alliance of those two actors could indeed
challenge the U.S. and its allies. In the meantime, the West finds itself
frustrated by Chinese foreign policy pragmatism, or as the critics would
have it, the absence of values. This is de facto incompatible with Western
moral ideals, which invoke human rights or other ethical arguments.
Chinese realpolitik is seen as amoral, if not immoral. Chinese policy is
also not up for domestic debate — a lack of transparency and little civic
engagement make sure of that. Those who fear that Chinese foreign
policy is driven by the intent of challenging (and eventually supplanting)
the West would view Beijing's support for the Syrian regime as
ideological. This concern rises as China becomes more popular in the
Middle East. Mostafa Kamel, a member of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry,
"expressed admiration for China's position and proposition on the Syrian
issue and said that Egypt is willing to strengthen communications and
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coordination with China on the issue." Could the influence of Western
powers in the region be weakened, for the benefit of China? All these
concerns come back to one issue: China's new role within the
international community. As a new — and still growing — power, some
observers fear that China may soon have the ability to challenge and
threaten the Western liberal model that has dominated international
organizations since the end of the Cold War.
The Reality
These concerns are misplaced. First, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
has a high level of suspicion toward Western proposals at the international
level and within the executive organs of the United Nations in particular.
China seems to view the UN as a potential tool to oppose what it considers
Western interventionist policies around the world, and it is clear that the
Chinese government was greatly disappointed when the United States and
its allies acted on their own to impose, by force, a regime change in Iraq in
2003. The frustration was even greater during the Libyan crisis that ended
with the overthrow and execution of former leader Muammar Gaddafi.
Indeed, from Beijing's perspective, resolution 1973 of the United Nations
seeking to impose a no-fly zone in Libya did not give any foreign power
the right to intervene militarily on Libyan territory and against the Libyan
regime. Beijing learned a lesson. The second element may be more
important: Beijing's stance on the Syrian crisis is consistent with China's
long-term foreign policy and its fundamental principles. The basis of
Chinese foreign policy is articulated in the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, enunciated by Zhou Enlai in 1954: 1) mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-
interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit;
and 5) peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and
economic and cultural exchanges with other countries.
Since the opening of the country under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese
foreign policy can be more generally characterized as pragmatic.
Pragmatism and the five principles are the key to understanding China's
response to the Syrian crisis and indeed its general approach to foreign
relations. This model excludes moral or ethical arguments from the
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practice of foreign policy, and as such is antithetical to Western ideals,
which raises questions, misunderstandings, and fears among the Western
powers as China emerges a major world power. The notion of peaceful
development is also important, and is central to Xi Jinping's
administration. This concept means that China seeks peaceful relations
with other members of the international community to establish fruitful
economic relations that will serve Chinese development goals. To achieve
this goal, China needs a stable environment. The concept of peaceful
development means, according to Xi Jinping, that "China will never seek
hegemony or expansion."
Although Western powers may not approve of the "Chinese Model," it
does explain Chinese policy on the Syrian crisis.
It is also worth noting the influence of China's domestic situation on
Chinese policy in Syria. Beijing cannot legitimize any insurrection abroad,
as it has to deal domestically with separatist issues (such as in Tibet,
Xinjiang, or Inner Mongolia.). To show that domestic considerations can
logically obliterate considerations of human rights, George Abu Ahmad,
taking domestic policies of Iran, Russia or China as an example, explains
that "the exceptional decision to attack the population is, therefore, not
only a sovereign right of the twentieth-century state, but the paramount
right that guarantees a state's integrity." This perspective helps us to
understand the way in which China may have internalized the causes of
the Syrian crisis in the context of its own domestic separatist issues and
thus cannot provide any legitimacy to an insurrection abroad.
A final point to make is China's inability and unwillingness to take on a
"superpower" role within the international community. China has no
experience being a political leader on the international stage, and as a
result has mostly abstained in the Security Council on any draft resolution
that did not directly affect its own domestic situation. Nor does it like to
take any strong stances that could lead to diplomatic clashes with a major
power, especially the U.S. It seems improbable, given the record of
Chinese positions in the UN, that China would have opposed the Western
resolutions on Syria without the support of Russia.
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The South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu, and the ADIZ
Some may argue that China is clearly adopting a more assertive policy in
East Asia — using the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
dispute, or the Air Defense Identification Zone as examples. However,
there is a difference, and this has to do with the "sphere of influence" of
China and, more specifically, with the sovereignty and integrity of
Chinese national territory (as Beijing defines it). For the CCP, the Syrian
crisis is a "pure" foreign policy issue, as the Chinese government has no
territorial claim in Syria or in the Middle East in general. On the other
hand, Beijing has always considered the South China Sea and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as part of its sphere of influence and by
vigorously defending its claims on those territorial disputes, the CCP
purports to do nothing but protect its territorial integrity. It's arguable that
this concern with territory has been the very first priority of China
throughout its history. The debate over the East China Sea ADIZ, which
China established in November, can also be related to the territorial
integrity of the Middle Kingdom. However, Western criticisms should be
balanced against the knowledge that the ADIZ is an American invention
(1950), which South Korea (1951) and Japan (1969) adopted long before
China did. At any rate, the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,
and the ADIZ issues are domestic issues for the CCP, rather than "pure"
foreign policy matters.
This article doesn't seek to take a normative position. Rather, the point is
that in the Syrian crisis China has followed a consistent foreign policy, in
line with its principles and traditions. The outcome of this policy may not
satisfy many Western actors, but that is not enough to accuse China of
following a more assertive foreign policy toward Western powers and the
U.S. in particular. Of course, the new status of China in the international
community allows it to make its voice heard, instead of the silence that
may have prevailed before its economic arrival. But the considerations of
the CCP as it formulates its foreign policy have remained the same since
the creation of the PRC. In the future, China is likely to be more capable
of achieving its goals in its "domestic" Northeast Asian claims, but there
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is no evidence showing that the CCP is purposefully becoming more
assertive in its foreign policy towards the West.
Napoleon said two-hundred years ago that, when China wakes "she will
shake the world." It may not be time to start shaking yet.
Adrien Morin is a postgraduate student of International Affairs at Peking
University.
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